Battle of Cowan’s Ford

The Battle of Cowan’s Ford, February 1, 1781, was a delaying action to counter the British army under General Lord Charles Cornwallis from crossing the flooded Catawba River. His Lordship was in pursuit of Brigadier General Daniel Morgan’s small army after the old ‘Wagoneer’ defeated a strong detached British force under Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton at the Battle of Cowpens, South Carolina, January 17, 1781. The American resounding victory at Cowpens resulted in approximately 800 British prisoners;[1] among were General Cornwallis’ finest troops who could not be replaced. The Earle was furious to catch Morgan and free his men and took after Morgan’s retreating force on January 19^th.

Thus began the Race to the Dan River located along the North Carolina, Virginia border. It was a 250 mile, twenty-seven day ordeal in which General Nathanael Greene’s main army later joined Morgan. It became a contest of attrition as Cornwallis burned his baggage and stores to lighten the load, pushing his army to the limit of endurance to destroy the southern Continental army before they could escape over the Dan into Virginia. Weeks of cold winter rains fell unmercifully throughout the arduous trek, turning the roads into a foot deep quagmire and swelling rivers to impassable death traps. Each step drew Cornwallis from his base of supplies in South Carolina and Greene closer to his line of supplies in Virginia.

Cornwallis arrived at the Catawba River on January 28^th and could see Morgan’s army encamped on the other side. He waited three days for the flooded river to subside. By the 31^st, he could wait no longer. Though still flooded and near impossible to cross, incensed at catching his prey at all costs, General Cornwallis ordered a crossing at Cowan’s Ford, a private ford he expected lightly defended. At 1 AM on February 1^st, he ordered half his army to make a diversionary feint at Beattie’s Ford, four miles to the north, while at Cowan’s Ford in a misty predawn light, his army waded into the fierce rushing water. But North Carolina militias under experienced fighter, thirty-four year old General William Lee Davidson[2] were equally determined to contest that crossing. Not to stop a superior enemy, but hold them at bay. Long enough to allow Morgan’s men under recently arrived Greene’s command the precious time to reach Salisbury and link up with Greene’s main army.

Davidson’s men, unusual for militia, gave up their ground dearly as reported by British Sergeant Roger Lamb, “The American soldiers that night did all that brave men could do…and I believe that not one of them moved from his post till we mounted the hill, and used our bayonets…”[3] General Davidson had spent four years fighting with Washington’s army before returning home to North Carolina. Davidson’s men remained fast at the banks of the Catawba, firing at the British scrambling to cross and claw their way up the river’s bank. General Cornwallis crossed the river, but paid a dear price in casualties. While positioning his men, a volley ripped through the militia’s ranks, tumbling Davidson off his horse. He lay dead, shot through the heart. The militia panicked and fled; however, General Greene was given the precious time needed to further himself from Cornwallis as the Race to the Dan intensified.

Morgan Gets a Head Start

After the Battle at Cowpens, Morgan marched 8 miles north that day and camped the night. On the next day, the 18^th, he marched another 20 miles north, arriving that evening at Gilbert Town, North Carolina (site of several major skirmishes). The next day, he sent the British prisoners with Colonel Washington’s Dragoons to Sherrill’s Fords on the Catawba River, northeast about 60 miles. There they were to wait for Morgan to rejoin them. Morgan pressed his infantry hard over muddy roads and arrived the 23^rd at Ramsour’s Mill,[4] forty-five miles from Gilbert Town. The rivers were rising rapidly, causing the fords to be nearly impassable. Morgan marched on and arrived at the Catawba River on the 25^th. He crossed to the eastern bank just as the river was impassable and soon arrived at the Sherrill’s Ford settlement. There he established the Continental camp. Morgan had pushed his men 100 miles in five days under deplorable winter conditions. He knew they needed to dry out their clothes and rest before resuming the march. He believed it would be several days before the river lowered enough for Cornwallis to pass. So he had time. He sent Washington and the prisoners once more northeast, this time to Salisbury, 35 miles distant. He also sent a rider to Greene at Cheraw Hills, ninety-five miles southeast, notifying him of his position and situation.

Cornwallis Enters North Carolina

Morgan was nearing Gilbert Town when Cornwallis was officially informed of the disaster at Cowpens. When General Alexander Leslie’s reinforcements from Charleston arrived at Turkey Creek, South Carolina the next day, the 19^th, Cornwallis began his pursuit of Morgan. Prior to Cowpens, with the expected arrival of General Leslie, His Lordship had 3,200 regulars under his command. After Cowpens, and the loss of an entire brigade of Highlanders and all his Light Infantry Companies, the cream of his command, the number was reduced to 2,500. He quickly marched his army, but without his rapid light troops to scan routes, proceeded down the wrong road. Tarleton had ridden ahead and reported Morgan was not at Cowpens. His Lordship lost three precious days trying to find Morgan’s army. It was not until the 22^nd when the rifleman’s route to Gilbert Town and then east towards Ramsour’s Mill was sniffed out by scouts. Cornwallis quickly ordered the first of two major purges.

Before entering North Carolina on the 22^nd, Cornwallis instructed most camp followers to remain behind while so too some of the baggage was destroyed. Cornwallis then entered North Carolina that same day. Unknown to him, he nor his men would ever see South Carolina again. On the 25^th, the same day Morgan crossed the Catawba River before it became impassable, Cornwallis arrived at Ramsour’s Mill, missing Morgan by two days.[5] Over the next three days, Cornwallis instructed his second and more shocking purge. He ordered both rank and file and officers to torch all baggage and supplies that included cooking, sleeping, and tenting gear, plus everything that could not be carried on the backs of soldiers. Only a few wagons escaped the carnage, enough to carry ammunition, medical supplies, and to carry the sick and wounded. By the 28^th, with a trimmed down command, Cornwallis was ready to once more renew the pursuit.

Morgan Considers Contesting the Catawba Crossing and Greene Rides North

On the 28^th, while at Beattie’s Ford, Morgan’s scouts, who had been shadowing Cornwallis’ movements, informed the Old Wagoneer that the British were still at Ramsour’s Mills, about thirty miles west of their position. Morgan knew that North Carolina General William Lee Davidson was soon to arrive with around 500 militiamen.[6] The rains had let up some and the Catawba began to recede. With Davidson’s addition, Morgan considered he had enough men to stall Cornwallis from crossing the Catawba. He also expressed his opinion that the Southern Army could not win a battle against Cornwallis’ main army. To survive, they should relinquish North Carolina to Cornwallis and retreat into the mountains to the west where they could regroup and attack weakened British outposts stretched over the vast territory of South Carolina.

Greene was with his army at Cheraw Hills, South Carolina, about a hundred miles south. On January 27^th, he learned that Cornwallis had burned all his baggage and supplies. Knowing his enemy’s intention, Greene made his decision. The waiting was over. It was time to reunite the two armies, but not for a general action. He did not yet have the men nor supplies and ammunition. But he would not fade into the wilderness as Morgan recommended. He decided the army would march hard in a dash for his line of supply in Virginia. Knowing Cornwallis would not give up, he would draw His Lordship’s army across North Carolina away from his lifeline. It would be a march of attrition. The American army would remain close to their enemy and when properly supplied and reinforced, attack, but on Greene’s choice of terrain.

Greene sent riders south to Colonel Light Horse Harry Lee who had been campaigning with Colonel Francis Marion (swamp fox). He was to ride his legion north and join the main army. He ordered boats to be assembled on the Dan River in Virginia, just over the border from North Carolina. Temporary command of the main army was given to General Isaac Huger with orders to march the men as quickly as possible to Salisbury, North Carolina, 80 miles north. There to link up with Morgan’s retreating detachment. On the 28^th, Greene set off for Beattie’s Ford, a major crossing of the Catawba, with just a guide, aide, and three dragoons.

Greene Arrives and Takes Command

Greene took only three days to cover the 100-odd mile journey under deplorable conditions. On January 30^th, the mud-stained riders arrived whereas Greene assumed command of Morgan’s force. The next day, the 31^st, Greene called a council of war with his commanders; besides Morgan was General Davidson and Colonel William Washington (John Edgar Howard commanding Continentals was not present). According to Captain Joseph Graham, at 2 PM that day, the officers sat on a log and within twenty minutes, chose a course of action.[7] General Davidson told Graham afterwards “that though General Greene had never seen the Catawba before, he appeared to know more about it than those who were raised on it.”[8] There would be no general action. The Continentals would immediately march toward Salisbury, forty miles east and six miles west of the Yadkin River.  There to rendezvous with General Huger’s column coming up from the Great Pee Dee River.^[9] Davidson’s 500 strong militia^[10] would remain to contest Cornwallis’ crossing the Catawba. There was no expectation of stopping the British, just to delay them, giving Morgan’s Continentals more time to to reach Salisbury. Once Cornwallis was across, Davidson would execute a quick retreat to join Morgan.

Greene thought the river was so high, the militia had a few more days to prepare their defense. He ordered reinforcements from local militia units to report to General Davidson’s headquarters as soon as possible. But Davidson would neither have the extra men nor time to prepare his defenses. While Greene sat on the log with his commanders, Cornwallis had already decided come hell, or in this case high water, he would cross the Catawba by dawn the next day. His plan, taking a chapter from Tarleton’s tactics, was to surprise and attack the American army while still in camp.

American Position at the Fords

South of Sherrill’s Ford were four other fords; eight miles to the main crossing at Beattie’s Ford, and three others to private fords – four miles to Cowan’s, another four to Toole’s, and ten more miles to Tuckasegee Ford. Cornwallis’ camp was approximately four miles west between Beattie’s Ford and Cowan’s Ford.

Greene left with the rest of the army an hour after his war council. He arrived at the farm of David Carr, about 8 miles north of Sherrill’s Ford and 16 miles north of Beattie’s Ford. There he set up headquarters to direct Davidson’s retreat once Cornwallis crossed the river. Prior to that, he advised Davidson that Cornwallis would most likely press the attack at the main Beattie’s Ford. But to guard the lesser, private fords closely for British cavalry, most likely under Tarleton, will probably cross and simultaneously assault the militia from the flank and rear. With that in mind, Davidson prepared his defense.

• Lt. Colonel Thomas Farmer, of Orange County, with 200 men[11] was posted at Beattie’s Ford.
• Four miles south at Cowan’s Ford, Captain Thomas Davidson of Rowan County[12] commanded 25 infantrymen with an additional 200 infantry under Lt. Colonel William Polk, second to General Davidson and commanding Mecklenburg County militia. Approximately 60 horsemen were ordered to Cowan’s as a mobile reserve under Capt. Joseph Graham of Mecklenburg County.[13]
• Another four miles south at Toole’s Ford, Captain Jonathan Potts of Mecklenburg County had 70 men.
• Ten miles further south, at Tuckasegee Ford, Major Joseph Winston[14] of Surry County was given 200 men to stand guard.[15]

That evening, Davidson rode to Cowan’s Ford where he thought the British cavalry would most likely attempt to cross. Cowan’s Ford was 400 to 500 yards wide with banks on both sides, well wooded and steep. But it had an unusual feature that would prove a factor in the battle. Though there was one entrance on the west bank where the British would enter the water, there were two exits along the east for militia to defend. The ford went straight across the river but halfway it split. A wagon ford continued forward into the deeper part of the river. The other section of the ford turned right at a forty-five degree angle and headed downriver. This rocky horse ford was between two and four feet deep. It passed the end of a little island, and emerged from the water one-quarter mile downriver and below the wagon ford. At the wagon ford Davidson put the 25 men under Lt. Thomas Davidson. At the horse ford exit, the most obvious and expected path the British to take, Davidson assigned the bulk of his men. Infantrymen were placed on a hill half a mile above the water that overlooked this exit. His horsemen were positioned several hundred yards further to the rear on a small rise. General Davidson camped about a half mile in the rear.

British Plan to Cross

While Greene conducted his council with officers, Cornwallis was at patriot Jacob Forney’s plantation, about half a dozen miles from the river between Beattie’s and Cowan’s Fords, where he prepared general orders. He had been at the Catawba River for three days and biting at the bit to get at Morgan, was done waiting for the river to subside further; they would cross in the predawn hours of February 1^st. He later wrote: “after having procured the best information in my power I resolved to attempt the passage at a private Ford (then slightly guarded) near McCowan’s ford, on the morning of the 1st of February.”[16] 

He divided his command, sending Lt. Colonel James Webster to Beattie’s Ford to command an attack in a diversionary feint to cross. The other force that would contest Cowan’s Ford was led by Cornwallis with Brigadier General Charles O’Hara commanding the Brigade of Guards.[17]The two commands as per general orders:

Beattie’s Ford Feint

• Webster’s Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel James Webster, 234
• 33rd Regiment, Captain Frederick Cornwallis, 234
• British Legion, 160
• Infantry Battalion, Captain Lochlan McDonald, 160
• Jaegar^[18], Captain Wilhelm Friedrich von Roeder, 84
• Royal North Carolina Volunteer Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel John Hamilton, 120
• Royal Artillery, 36
  • 1st Section, Lieutenant John McLeod, 18, 6-pounders, 2
  • 2 nd Section, Lieutenant Augustus O’Hara, 18, 6-pounders, 2
• Half the Corps of Pioneers
• Baggage wagons (to follow 3 hours later)

Cowan’s Ford Main Assault

• Brigade of Guards, Brigadier General Charles O’Hara, 690
  • 1st Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Chapple Norton, 170
  • 2nd Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel James Stuart, 170
  • Guards Light Infantry Company, Captain John Goodricke, 80
  • Guards Grenadier Company, Captain William Home, 80
• Webster’s Brigade, 238 of the 23rd Regiment, Captain Thomas Peter
• Leslie’s Brigade, Major General Alexander Leslie, 565
  • 71st Regiment, 2nd Battalion, Captain Robert Hutcheson, 244
  • Regiment von Bose, Major Johann Du Buy, 321
• British Legion’s Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton
• Royal Artillery, 3rd Section, Lieutenant John Smith with two 3-pounders
• Half the Corps of Pioneers

Cornwallis ordered his men to assemble to march at 1 AM on February 1^st. Shortly after, the troops headed towards the river. Webster led the diversionary force towards Beattie’s Ford and Cornwallis led the main assault crossing towards Cowan’s Ford, which he thought to be lightly guarded. The two were coordinated to begin the assault and crossing near dawn. Cornwallis was dismayed while during the march his three pounder cannon were either lost or proved ineffective by the time he got to the crossing. Cornwallis wrote of difficulties during his march to the river that early morning:

“…the morning being very dark and rainy & part of our way through a wood where there was no road, one of the three pounders in front of the 23rd Regiment and the Cavalry, overset in a swamp, and occasioned those Corps to lose the line of march, and some of the Artillery Men belonging to the other Gun, (one of whom had the match) having stopped to assist were likewise left behind. The Head of the Column in the meanwhile, arrived at the bank of the River and day began to break. I could make no use of the Gun that was up…”[19]

Battle of Cowan’s Ford

Fifteen year old local militiaman Robert Henry had been home the past four months nursing his bayonet wounds received at the Battle of Kings Mountain, October 7, 1780. On January 30^th, Henry was in school when the school master, Robert Beattie, announced Cornwallis was only seven miles distant and that Tarleton was raging through the countryside. School was dismissed to spread the news. The next day, Henry borrowed his brother’s musket and with other armed schoolmates, headed to Cowan’s Ford, a mile and half distant. They were welcomed by the picket guard at the wagon ford, by then numbering around 30 men. Henry wrote the guards “made us welcome” and that “we must choose our stands.”  Henry figured he would man his post as long as “I could stand it, until the British would come to a place where the water was riffling over a rock; then it would be time to run away.”  Besides a few school friends, Henry noted his lame schoolmaster, Robert Beattie nearby. Henry continued that “Shortly after dark, a man across the river hooted like an owl.” One of the guards took a canoe across and brought back news that “all was silent in the British camp. The guard all lay down with their guns in their arms and were sound asleep at day-break…”[20]

Just before dawn, Cornwallis, commanding 1,200 troops stood on the river bank at Cowan’s Ford and stared across, surprised by the number of flickering campfires dotting the far wooded hillside. Cornwallis wrote: “…it was evident from the number of fires on the other side, that the opposition would be greater than I had expected. However, as I knew that the Rain that was then falling would soon render the River again impassable, and I had received information the evening before that General Greene had arrived in General Morgan’s Camp, and that his Army was marching after him with the greatest expedition, I determined not to desist from the attempt; and therefore, full of confidence in the Zeal & Gallantry of Brigadier O’hara and of the Brigade of Guards under his command, I ordered them to march on, but to prevent confusion, not to fire until they gained the opposite bank…”[21] Neither the American guarding the ford nor the fast and furious river deterred the tenacious Earl.  Sergeant Roger Lamb of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers watched as “Lord Cornwallis…dashed first into the river, mounted on a very fine, spirited horse, the brigade of guards followed…the Royal Welsh fusiliers after them.”[22]

Displaying the fruits of strict discipline, rank after rank of British silently entered the rushing water. Lamb wrote that the river became breast high with the current wrapping around them and tugged. The troops followed their general, past midstream and the horse ford, carrying on into the deeper water of the wagon ford where many began to flounder. Horses and men splashed violently, raising a ruckus that did not go unnoticed. Robert Henry, who was awakened by the commotion in the river and his friend Joel Jetton shouting, “The British!” He recognized the British guide as a local Tory. He wrote, “Dick Beal, being deceived by our fires,” had not turned downstream onto the horse ford, but had continued straight ahead on the wagon ford, or as young Robert put it, “had led them into swimming water.” Local Tory Nicholas Gosnell later confirmed that it was Dick Beal guiding the British: “His Lordship chose Dick Beal for his pilot, as he well know’d the Ford…he suffered himself to be led astray by the rebel fires…”[23] Captain Graham identified the Tory guide as Frederick Hager^[24], though receiving his information years later as hearsay.

Groggy militiamen peered through thick gray mist of early dawn and witnessed bodies and horses in the river struggling to remain on their feet and press forward through the gush of water. Henry said he saw “the British splashing and making a noise as of drowning,” as the current swept mean and horse off their feet. Militiamen began to pour fire into the flailing troops. General Leslie’s horse was dragged downriver, but recovered his footing. Sergeant Lamb wrote that General “O’Hara’s horse rolled with him down the current near forty yards,” leaving O’Hara considerably bruised. Though many tumbled head over heels, hundreds successfully fought the current and bore straight ahead. Captain Graham wrote that “[The British] infantry in front with bayonets fixed, muskets empty, carried on the left shoulder at a slope, cartridge box on the same shoulder, and each man had a stick about the size of a hoop pole eight feet long, which he kept setting on the bottom before him, to support him against the rapidity of the current, which was generally waist deep, and in some places more.”[26]

As soon as fire erupted, Capt. Joseph Graham’s cavalry, camped several hundred yards in the rear, mounted and rode briskly to the wagon ford, arriving within fifty yards of the eastern shore. They dismounted and took steady aim and fired. The first three ranks of the British thinned, and they halted. Lt. Col. Francis Hall was the first to appear on horseback, and he was heard giving orders. The enemy column soon got into motion again. Graham’s men continued to fire and wrote that one of his cavalrymen aimed at Lt. Col. Hall and knocked him off his horse into the water. Two or three men pulled him up and dragged him to the other side. Hall had been killed instantly. His men marched steadily onward, as if they had not noticed their leader was lost. Capt. Dundas assumed command and deployed the light infantry into battle line as they emerged from the river. They began covering fire for the rest of the British crossing.

Once the North Carolina militia fired upon wading British troops, sounds of rolling thunder were heard coming from the north. Brigadier Webster, either timely planned or he heard the small arms firing from Cowan’s Ford, had ordered his artillery to open fire, beginning his feint at Beattie’s Ford. Captain Graham was not present, but described the action as told to him. “Cornwallis placed his remaining force in array on the face of the hill fronting Beattie’s Ford; and as soon as the firing commenced at Cowan’s Ford, made demonstrations of attacking the post at Beattie’s. A company went into the water forty of fifty steps and fired. Four pieces of artillery fired smartly for thirty minutes, and his front lines kept firing by platoons, as in field exercises. It was only a feint, however.”[25]

Cornwallis’s horse was shot in the river and fell on reaching the opposite embankment. Cornwallis wrote to Lord Rawdon in Camden that “The Guards behaved Gallantly, & although they were fired upon during the whole time of their passing, by some Militia under General Davidson, never returned a Shot until they got out of the River & formed.”^[27] Sergeant Lamb described the push to cross the swollen river that “urged us on with greater rapidity, till we gained the opposite shore, where we were obliged to scramble up a very high hill under a heavy fire.”^[28]  Graham wrote “The enemy kept steadily on, notwithstanding our fire was well maintained. As each section reached the shore, they dropped their poles and brought their muskets and cartridge boxes to their proper places, faced to the left, and moved up the narrow strip of low ground, to make room for the succeeding section, which moved on in the same manner. By the time the front rank got twenty or thirty steps up the river, they had loaded their pieces and began to fire up the bank.”^[29]

Soon after the first British troops gained the ford, General Davidson arrived with the infantry from the horse ford, about a quarter mile downstream. He ordered Graham’s cavalry to mount up and ride up the ridge to form two hundred yards behind so to guard against British cavalry from attacking them in the rear. Graham wrote, “As we moved off, the infantry [Davidson’s] took their places, and the firing became brisk on both sides. The enemy moved steadily forward, their fire increasing, until their left reached the mouth of the branch upwards of thirty poles from the ford. The ravine was too steep to pass. The rear of their infantry and front of their cavalry was about middle of the river, when the bugle sounded on the left, on which their fire slacked and nearly ceased. (They were loading their pieces.) In about a minute it sounded again, when their whole line from the ford to the branch advanced up the bank, with their arms at a trail. The hill was in many places so steep they had to pull up by the bushes.”[30]

Fifteen year old Henry, veteran of the desperate fight at King’s Mountain, held his ground and fired into the struggling redcoats slogging towards him. He wrote he “fired and continued firing until I was that one on horseback had passed my rock in the river, and saw that it was Dick Beal [Cornwallis’ guide], moving his gun from his shoulder, I expect, to shoot me. I ran with all speed up the bank, and when at the top of it William Polk’s horse [Polk was second in command to Davidson] breasted me, and General Davidson’s horse, about twenty or thirty feet before Polk’s horse, and near to the water’s edge.”[31]  Henry wrote he heard Lt. Colonel Polk shout “Fire away boys! Help is at hand!”  Henry stopped his flight and noticed his lame schoolmaster Beatty loading his gun by a tree. “I thought I could stand it as long as he could and commenced loading. Beatty fired, and then I fired, the heads and shoulders of the British being just above the bank. They made no return fire. Silence still prevailed. I observed Beatty loading again. I ran down another load. When he fired, he cried, Its time to run, Bob.”  Henry noted that Beatty fired twice more at twenty five yards and that “…I fired twice about the same distance. I…think Beatty…killed two, and I killed one.”^[32]

Henry wrote that he “looked past my tree and saw their guns lowered and then straightened myself behind my tree. They fired and knocked some bark from my tree.”[33] The British volley that slammed into Henry’s tree devastated the American’s resistance. Henry had seen General Davidson ride closer to the river. The British fire that erupted tore into the commander and he fell from his horse, shot through the heart. Word spread quickly that the intrepid leader had fallen. Henry had not heard the news of Davidson’s death. He saw Beattie turn from his tree and stuck by a bullet in the hip, breaking his thigh bone. Beattie fell and shouted for his student to run.  Henry wrote, “I then ran at the top of my speed about one hundred yards, when a thought struck me that the British had no horsemen to follow me, and that Davidson’s army would be down at the river and battle would take place.” Henry loaded his gun and sat down behind a large tree “and fired about fifty yards at the British.” But he was alone. The militia was done. Routed. Driven back by bayonet and the loss of their commander.[34]

Cornwallis wrote: “Their behavior [British troops] justified my high opinion of them; for a constant fire from the enemy, in a ford upwards of five hundred yards wide, in many places up to their middle, with a rocky bottom and strong current made no impression on their cool and determined valor, nor checked their passage. The light Infantry landing first immediately formed, and in a few minutes killed or dispersed everything that appeared before them, the rest of the Troops forming and advancing in succession.[35] Lt. Col. William Polk quickly assumed command of the militia and gathered what men he could and led them to safety, while Capt. Graham covered their retreat with his cavalry.

Casualties

Cornwallis, as usual, did not admit his loses to be heavy. He officially reported that “On our side Lieut. Colonel Hall and three men were killed and thirty-six wounded, all of the Light Infantry, and Grenadiers of the Guards.”[36] But a Tory, Nicholas Gosnell saw several soldiers drowning and being swept away. Henry wrote that the day after the battle, “It was proposed that we would go to James Cunningham’s fish-trap, and see if there were any fish in it. When we arrived at the trap, there were fourteen dead men lodged in it, several of whom appeared to have no wound, but had drowned. We pushed them into the water, they floated off, and went each to his own home.”[37] Over the days, as the waters receded, many more bloated bodies were found along the river banks. Henry went on to write that “every person who lived at or near the river between Cowan’s Ford and Tuckeseage [sp] Ford [ten miles below river from Cowan’s Ford]: That a great number of British dead were found on Thompson’s fish-dam, and in his trap, and numbers lodged on brush, and drifted to the banks; that the river stunk with dead carcasses; that the British could not have lost less than one hundred men on that occasion.”[38]

The American casualties were among the North Carolina militia guarding the fords. It was reported they had four killed and an unknown wounded or taken prisoners. Of concern to the American Army was the loss of General William Lee Davidson; a capable officer and magnet to gather local North Carolinians to fight alongside Continental troops. Cornwallis wrote that “Their General [Davidson] and two or three other officers were among the killed, the number of wounded was uncertain, and a few were taken prisoners.”[39] Exact casualty counts were difficult if not impossible when reporting on militia. As Greene wrote to colleagues and Congress, militia came and went whenever of their choosing, leaving him at a loss as to his army’s exact number. Even historical reports listed Davidson’s force to be anywhere from 500 to 800 men.  Just prior to the battle, many local militiamen, like Robert Henry along with schoolmates and his schoolmaster Robert Beattie, had joined the fight literally hours prior to the action. Therefore, they were not on any official roster. Also, when tallying those still present for duty afterwards, many would have fled the battle and not stop until they reached their homes.

Torrence Tavern

As soon as General Webster began shelling and firing upon Beattie’s Ford, the roar of battle echoed miles through the region spreading panic. Captain Graham wrote “The report of the artillery…came down the river like repeated peals of thunder…and was heard over the country to a distance of twenty-five miles…it had a wonderful effect on the people…Hitching up their teams in great haste, and packing up their most valuable goods…abandoned their homes and drove off…In one hour after the firing, the whole country appeared in motion…”[40] British Lt. Anthony Allair’s echoed Graham, simply stating the countryside “got in motion.” Farmers, families, entire communities became refuges as they had one thought; save themselves and worldly goods. Wagons were piled high while frantically driving livestock into hysterical columns that clogged the roads. Graham lamented that “unfortunately too many of them fled into the Salisbury road,” which was already swarming with militia hoofing it before redcoats pouring up river banks and fanning into the country.

About ten miles from Beattie’s Ford on the road to Salisbury was Torrence’s Tavern (also called Tarrant’s Tavern). By early afternoon, several hundred refugees with their packed wagons, screaming children, and herds of baying livestock joined fleeing militiamen as all thronged about the tavern. In complete pandemonium, many pushed through the crowds with others resting before carrying on, partaking in rumors and buckets of whiskey. Peter Forney, local resident with the militia at Beattie’s Ford later wrote, “…upon this I fled to the widow Torrence’s [Torence Tavern]…at this place I found a considerable body of Militia, but in great confusion in consequence of the death of General Davidson…Here our troops were utterly defeated…”[41] And into the maelstrom of confusion rode 200 green clad cavalry flashing heavy sabers, led by the terror of the south; Bloody Tarleton. Upon that all hell broke loose.

The effect of Tarleton’s sudden attack was like a bomb explosion, hurling the mass of bodies and animals to escape in all directions. Always at the striking edge of Cornwallis’ columns, His Lordship’s favorite pit bull was ordered to pursue escaping militiamen.  Cornwallis wrote: “I detached Lt. Colonel Tarleton with the Cavalry and 23^rd Regiment to pursue the routed Militia…Colonel Tarleton having learned that 3 or 400 neighboring Militia were to assemble that day at Tarrant’s house…[Tarleton] Leaving his Infantry, went on with the cavalry and finding the Militia…he attacked them instantly and totally routed them, with little loss on his side; and on theirs between forty and fifty killed, wounded or prisoners.”[42]  However, Tarleton was known to report his glorified efforts to his superiors while padding his legion’s ‘heroic’ results. Charles Stedman, Cornwallis’ commissary general, reported that a “British officer who rode over the ground not long after the action, relates that he did not see ten dead bodies.”  But the affair was enough to squash any last hope of militiamen resisting Cornwallis’ pursuit. As Cornwallis wrote, “This stroke with our passage at the Ford so effectually dispirited the Militia that we met with no further opposition on our march to the Yadkin.”[43]

Aftermath

About mid-morning on the 1^st, when word of the defeat reached Greene, he was at John Oliphant’s Mill on Oliphant Creek, east of the Catawba. Though the Continentals had begun their march north from Sherrill’s Ford the day before, most had started late in the afternoon, after Greene’s council had ended. They did not advance far before camping for the evening. Greene ordered all troops to hasten towards Salisbury, knowing that Morgan’s Continental Army Light Infantry was only a few hours ahead of Cornwallis’s army. He sent riders to the commanders and repaired to the David Carr Plantation to reassemble retreating NC militia. Greene was only seven miles distant at the Carr Plantation when Tarleton attacked Torrence’s Tavern. How history would have been rewritten had the brash cavalryman got word of this and rushed to ‘bag the rabble leader;’ like that which launched his career with the capture of General Charles Lee in 1776 at a tavern in New Jersey.

Sergeant Major William Seymour, of the Delaware Continentals, wrote: “We remained on this ground till the first February, waiting the motion of the enemy, who this day crossed the river lower down than where we lay…on which ensued a smart skirmish in which General Davidson was killed, and a great many more killed and wounded, upon which the militia retreated off in great disorder. We marched for Salisbury…and continued our march all night…it having rained incessantly all night, which rendered the roads almost inaccessible.” Lt. Colonel John Eager Howard wrote, “Morgan did not leave the river until 10 or 11 o’clock on the 1^st of February after it was known that…Davidson had been defeated…We marched all night in the rain & mud, and a most fatiguing march it was. We arrived at Colonel Locks 4 miles short of Salisbury at sun rise on the 2^nd & halted to get dry and for the men who had fallen out of the ranks from fatigue…”[44]

After the successful crossing at Cowan’s Ford, Cornwallis had to wait the remainder of the day for the rest of his force to cross, particularly those at Beattie’s Ford that included their wagons. Cornwallis wrote: “Rebels having quitted Beattie’s Ford, Lieut. Colonel Webster was passing his detachment and the Baggage of the Army, this had become tedious and difficult by the continuance of the rain and the swelling of the River, but all joined us soon after dark, about six miles from Beattie’s Ford.”[45] It was morning February 2^nd by the time Cornwallis advanced his army for Salisbury, 35 miles distant, where many of Greene’s men had begun to arrive, having marched all night. The goal of both armies was Trading Ford on the Yadkin, about eight miles beyond Salisbury.

Greene joined Morgan’s army with the remains of Davidson’s militia on the 3rd. Torrential rains had not let up for two days whereas Lieutenant Thomas Anderson wrote that “every step being up to our Knees in Mud it raining On us all the Way.”[46] Besides hindering the march, the downpour had also rendered the Yadkin impassable. Greene had expected to see General Huger with the rest of his army, but only Brigadier General Edward Stevens of Virginia had arrived on the 2^nd. The rest of the army would not rendezvous with Morgan’s until the 7^th and on the road to Guilford Courthouse. With only half an army and superior British force racing towards him with his back against a raging river, Greene’s position would have been suicidal. But an organized tactician, the crafty General had several weeks previously arranged for boats to be gathered at the ford in case the river was too high for an army to cross. General Stevens later wrote to Thomas Jefferson that “The Great Quantity of Rain…raised the River in such a manner as made it difficult to Cross even in Boats.”[47] But with no choice, men gathered at the river’s edge and crowded in the small boats and all day, one by one, cut through the perilous waves to cross.

Once across, Greene ordered troops to begin the march for Guilford Courthouse, sixty miles distant. General Stevens left 150 militia behind to guard wagons, but were told to fire once or twice at the enemy before running down river where canoes were waiting to ferry them across the river. General Charles O’Hara van pushed hard through Salisbury on the road to Trading Ford. Instead of running into an army in line of battle, he came up the evening of the 3^rd to find only abandoned wagons and Steven’s detached militia. He chased the ‘routed’ militia to the river, but too later. O’Hara stood and watched the Americans scramble up the bank. Once more, the British were outgeneraled, and could only gaze across one side of a river, at the tail end of an American army that had escaped their grasp.

Davidson’s Burial

Capt. Graham wrote that the night of the battle, February 1, 1781, “Major David Wilson and two others found the General’s body in the evening and carried him off in the night…” Major David Wilson commanded the Lincoln County Militia accompanied by Richard Barry and pastor Thomas McCaule. The body was found about 1500 feet from the water’s edge. It was stripped by British soldiers seeking valuables.[48] Because the British remained in the area, Davidson was carried up river to nearby Hopewell Presbyterian Church, present day Huntersville, Mecklenburg County, on Beattie’s Ford Road. He was buried that same night by torchlight where his body remains to this day. Though some secondary sources state his wife Mary Brevard accompanied the men and attended the burial, no primary source mentions her presence.

Note

A Dam at Cowan’s Ford was built by Duke Power between September 1959 and 1963, to provide hydroelectric energy for the region. Lake Norman formed behind the damn (named for Duke Power CED Norman Cocke) that flooded the Catawba River north of Cowan Ford, submerging Sherrill’s Fords, Terance’s Tavern, and parts of the historic route Greene’s army took toward the Yadkin River.

In 1923, an eight foot monument was erected where Davidson was to have fallen, commissioned by Davidson’s great grand-son E. J. Baxter Davidson. Early 1959, when the Cowan’s Ford Dam was planned, the neglected 1923 monument had been rediscovered; covered in thick weeds and barbed thickets. It was moved south of the dam, 1500 feet up an embankment from the river. On February 1, 1971, Duke Power President William McGuire officiated the dedication of a new monument to Brigadier General William Lee Davidson. The text on the monument was written by historian Chalmers G. Davidson who indicated that “The exact spot [of Davidson’s death] is now under water near the east end of the dam.”[49]

IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO READ MORE, WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING BOOKS

OF SIMILAR INTEREST ON REVOLUTIOARY WAR JOURNAL

Race to the Dan

Road to Guilford Courthouse

British General Charles Cornwallis Was America’s Best Friend Before Becoming Her Fiercest Enemy

Southern Militia in the American Revolution

American Revolution In the South: A Brutal Civil War

In the South: Continental Congress Finally Gets it Right with General Nathanael Greene

Arguments for a Southern British Invasion

RESOURCE

Adkins, Christopher.  “William Lee Davidson, The Last General of the Catawba.” Sept. 21, 2025. LKN Law. 

Adkins, Christopher. “The Battle at Cowan’s Ford: Mecklenburg’s Last Stand in the Revolution.” November 21, 2025. LKN Law:

American Revolution North Carolina Tours. “Battle of Cowan’s Ford: The British Push Across the Catawba.” https://amrevnc.com/battle-cowans-ford/

Anderson, William Lee.  “Defense of the Catawba River by North Carolina militiamen that helped save the American Army Southern Department.”

Buchanan, John. The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas. New York: Wiley, 1997.

Gordon, John W.  South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History. 2003: University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, South Carolina.

Graham, Alexander William.  General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History. 1904: Edwards & Broughton, Raleigh, North Carolina.

Greene, Nathanael, Ed. Richard K. Showman. The Papers of Nathanael Greene. Rhode Island Historical Society. 1983: University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

Henry, Robert & Edited by David Schenck.  Narrative of the battle of Cowan’s Ford, February 1st, 1781. 1891: Manuscript furnished by Lyman C. Draper, Published by Reece & Elam, Greensboro, NC.

Russell, David Lee. The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies.  2000: McFarland and Company, Jefferson, NC.

The American Revolution in North Carolina. “Battle of Cowan’s Ford.”

Schenawolf, Harry.  “Race to the Dan.” March 24, 2026: Revolutionary War Journal.

Swisher, James.  The Revolutionary War in the Southern Backcountry. 2007: Pelican Publishing, Gretna, LA.

ENDNOTES

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[1] Sources vary widely with most leaning towards the lower number. Reports of British casualties after the battle agree that upwards of 200 men were killed with another 180 wounded. British commander Banastre Tarleton had just under 1,200 men. With around 380 casualties, this left approximately 800 prisoners.

[2] William Lee Davidson was an experienced veteran and competent leader, described as a fearless, of the Continental Army who entered the war in North Carolina early on. He was a captain of Rowan County militia in 1775, then a major of his militia regiment the following year. Later in 1776, he enlisted in the Continental Army as major of the 4^th NC Regiment assigned to the main army under General George Washington. Between 1777 – 1780, he was Lt. Colonel (second in command of the regiment) of the 5^th, 7^th, 3rd, and 1^st North Carolina Continental Regiments. He saw action at the major battles at Brandywine Creek, Germantown, and Monmouth. He was sent south where in 1780, the North Carolina State Assemble offered him a commission as General of the state’s militia. 

[3] Buchanan, pg. 347, Lamb Occurrences, pg. 344.

[4] Ramsour’s Mill was the site of a major British defeat, June 20, 1780, of 1,300 loyalist partisan forces under Lt. Colonel John Moore by backcountry militia under the command of General Griffith Rutherford and Lt. Colonel John Locke with a hundred horsemen under Major Joseph McDowell. Though outnumbered three to one, the patriot militia’s early morning attack against the loyalist proved a Tory route. A big factor was the use of grove-bored rifle, their renowned accuracy mowed down attacking loyalists before the ‘over the mountain men’ gave their ‘Injun’ war hoop and attacked in brutal man-to-man fighting. 

[5] Historians have noted that had Cornwallis not lost all his light infantry at Cowpens, he most likely would not have wasted three days stumbling in the wrong direction, and have had these elite troops figure out Morgan’s route earlier. He could have laid in a march to get to Ramsour’s Mill ahead of or at the same time Morgan arrived, catching his foe before he could send the valued prisoners ahead.

[6] The number of militiamen with Davidson has varied in timely records; anywhere from 300 to 800. On Jan. 31^st, the eve of the Battle of Cowan’s Ford, Greene wrote a discouraging letter to Samuel Huntington, President of Congress, that he had only 300 militia under Davidson to contest the several fords on the Catawba. In the early morning hours of the day of battle, Morgan, who was marching the Continentals north towards Salisbury, NC, wrote to Governor of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson, that there were near 500 with Davidson.

[7] Graham later wrote of this meeting that during the council, British arrived at the far bank of the Catawba to observe: “About the time General Greene arrived, the British vanguard, of about four or five hundred men, appeared on the opposite hill beyond the river. Shortly after their arrival, some principal officer, with a numerous staff, thought to be Lord Cornwallis, passed in front of them in different stations, halting and apparently viewing us with spy-glasses.” Graham, pg. 289.

[8] Buchanan, pg. 344. Graham, pg. 289-290.

[9] The Great Pee Dee River was the name given to one of the major rivers that drained North and South Carolina in its southeast trip to the sea. It was the Pee Dee in South Carolina; however, the same river was called the Yadkin in North Carolina. The accepted reason was that early settlers named rivers and creeks not as a one continuous drainage system, but on local influence. The South Carolina portion was named for Pedee Native American Tribe and in North Carolina, the same river upstream was named for the Yadkin (or Atkin) tribe.

[10] Accounts vary as to the exact number of General Davidson’s command, with some placing it closer to 600 militia.

[11] Some sources give the number of militiamen at Beattie’s to be 500. This may be closer to the number as those originally posted, but some sources state Davidson later ordered 250 horsemen from Beattie’s Ford to Cowan’s later in the evening of the 31^st to assist the 50 or so men posted there; this in fear Cornwallis’ cavalry forcing the cross there as Greene warned.

[12] This reader could find no direct relationship between Thomas Davidson of Rowan County and General William Lee Davidson of Mecklenburg County. Many Davidson’s settled south in the Charlotte, North Carolina region so Thomas may be a distant relative.

[13] Captain Graham wrote that “…General Davidson gave orders to the cavalry and about two hundred and fifty infantry to march down the river to Cowan’s Ford, four miles below Beattie’s, leaving nearly the same number at that place.”  Sources also state that Capt. Graham was in command of between 56 and 60 cavalrymen.

[14] Some sources state Colonel John Williams of Surry County commanded Tuckasegee Ford, but this reader could find no such person in the Surry County militia archives. Colonel Francis Locke commanded the Surry militia and was not present. Only two companies were present from Surry County whose commander this reader could not find. Sources also give Major Winston, Locke’s second, as being present and assumed to have commanded this detachment. On January 29^th, Morgan wrote to General von Steuben in Virginia that he had sent 200 of Davidson’s men to Tuckasegee to place obstacles in front of the ford’s exit, but does not give which officer commanded this detachment. Only secondary sources state Col. John Williams, yet again, this writer could find no such person on archive rosters. If any reader has further information on this, please contact this website. Thank you.

[15] Anderson, pg. 31.

[16] Ibid, pg. 13.

[17] The Brigade of Guards dates from 1659 and continues to the present. In Britain, it had three regiments: First Guards (later Grenadier Guards), Coldstream Guards, and Third Guards (or Scots Guards). In 1776, for service in North America, selected soldiers from each combined into one regiment of two battalions. It participated in battles at Long Island, White Plains, Fort Washington, Short Hills, and Germantown. In January 1781, it joined Earl Cornwallis in the South. On 1 February, it forced the Catawba River crossing. On 15 March, it participated at Guilford Courthouse. Anderson, pg. 31.

[18] Jaegers were German riflemen who performed scouting and skirmishing duties for the British army. Armed with groove bore rifles that spun bullets in a trajectory, similar in marksmanship to American frontiersmen who carried the same basic weapon manufactured by Lancaster gunsmith immigrants from Germany.

[19] Ibid, pg. 16.

[20] Buchanan, pg. 346.

[21] Anderson, pp. 16-17.

[22] Buchanan, pg. 346.

[23] Ibid., pg. 348.

[24] Militiaman Robert Henry wrote that the guide was a local Tory named Dick Beal. Henry was at the ford and recognized Beal leading the British and that it was Beal who took aim at Henry in an attempt to shoot him.  Local Tory Nicholas Gosnell later confirmed that it was Dick Beal guiding the British. However, cavalryman Captain Joseph Graham stated it was Frederick Hagar. But Graham never got a look at those fording the river. He was firing from a cavalry position over 100 yards from the water and by the time he had taken position, the British were already advancing up the bank. When Davidson arrived shortly after with infantry, the general ordered Graham to mount his men and ride several hundred yards to the rear as a reserve. Therefore, Graham never saw who was guiding the British, but got his information as hearsay from others.

[25] Anderson, pg. 15, Graham, pg. 295.

[26] Anderson, pg. 17. Graham, pg. 291.

[27] Anderson, pg. 17.

[28] Buchanan, pg. 347.

[29] Anderson, pg. 19, Graham, pg. 293.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Buchanan, pg. 347.

[32] Buchanan, pg. 347, Henry Narrative, pg. 11.

[33] Buchanan, pg. 347, Henry Narrative, pg. 11.

[34] Over the years, diversity surrounded accounts of who shot Davidson? The answer is most likely that it was fired by one of the British troops advancing up the embankment; either within sustained firing, or in volley. Militiaman Robert Henry stated that soon after he saw Davidson arrive, the general rode closer to the river to position his men. Henry and those around him took cover as a British volley ripped through their position, carving up the tree he hid behind. It was at that moment that Davidson fell from his horse, shot through the heart. The next possibility is that the Tory guide Dick Beal fired the fateful shot. Local Tory Nicholas Gosnell as recorded by Henry later said that “His Lordship chose Dick Beal for his pilot,” and though Beal led the British astray by guiding them over the Wagon Ford, “he did good another, for he killed that damn Rebel General…”

The least possible shooter is Frederick Hager. The evidence that Hager was even present during the battle is thin at best, based not on eyewitness accounts, but solely on hearsay told to Captain Joseph Graham. Also, subjective evidence that led historians to assume Hager as the shooter was based on a small caliber rifled bullet. Shortly after the battle, Graham had written that Davidson “was pierced by a ball and shot dead from his horse.”^[34] No mention of caliber of shot. But in 1827, Graham stated as tradition, that Frederick Hager shot Davidson on the circumstantial evidence that Davidson’s wound was caused by a rifle ball and Hager was the only one within the British vanguard who had a rifle. But Davidson’s body was recovered late at night with British patrols nearby and whisked to a nearby cemetery to be buried by torch light. There would be no time, nor desire under those circumstances to examine what type of bullet killed the general. Major Wilson nor the two men accompanying him reported examining the wound. It appears Captain Graham merely wrote years later what he learned through tradition; that Davidson was killed by a rifled bullet and that Hager, as Tory guide rumored to be the only enemy carrying a rifle, was the shooter. 

[35] Anderson, pg. 15

[36] Ibid., pg. 21.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Buchanan, pg. 348. Henry Narrative, pg. 12.

[39] Anderson, pg. 21.

[40] Ibid, pg. 24.

[41] From Peter Forney pension application. Anderson, pg. 27.

[42] Anderson, pg. 26.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., pg. 25.

[45] Ibid., pg. 27.

[46] Buchanan, pg. 349.

[47] Ibid.

[48] The British soldier, or soldiers, who stripped Davidson’s body had confiscated his wallet, containing a transcribed message from George Washington and orders from Nathanael Greene. The wallet was carried to England and ultimately stored in a British archive where it remained in obscurity until 1964 when rediscovered by Davidson’s biographer Chalmers G. Davidson. Anderson, pg. 24.

[49] Buchanan, pg. 349.