From January 19 – February 15, 1781, a dramatic race of courage, determination, and endurance played out over a 250 mile stretch of South and North Carolina to the Dan River, just over the border of Virginia. British General Charles Cornwallis had one mindset; to destroy the American Southern Continental Army under General Nathanael Greene. To capture his illusive opponent, His Lordship was willing to push his army to the very limit, even destroying baggage and supplies to hasten the march, as he claimed he would follow Greene to the ends of the earth. While the British slogged relentlessly in their pursuit under cold drenching winter rains that swelled rivers and turned roads into deep quagmires, so too the Americans were dogged in their determination to retreat from their adversary, avoiding a fight they had not the men to win. It was a battle of wills that prevailed and who desired it more as both sides gambled with their army’s survival; held in the balance throughout the ordeal. In the end, it proved to be an important cog in the war’s outcome. As the British learned the hard way, victory is brief and comes with a bitter taste.
Background
Major General Nathaniel Greene assumed the reins of the Southern Continental Army on December 3, 1780. He had his work cut out for him; three previous major generals had left a shambles of the command. Major General Robert Howe had lost Savannah and most of his army to British Lt. Colonel Archibald Campbell on December 29, 1778. His replacement, Major General Benjamin Lincoln, did far worse. He chased the British back to the coast, but then cornered himself at Charleston, South Carolina, whereas on May 12, 1780, Supreme British Commander General Henry Clinton captured his entire army; the largest in the war. What was left, with the addition of backcountry militia and Continental reinforcements from Delaware and Maryland, was destroyed three months later by the mulish incompetence of Major General Horatio Gates at the Battle of Camden, August 16, 1780. The army’s remains gathered along the North Carolina border with Virginia, licking its wounds while leaving South Carolina and Georgia in British hands.
By early fall of 1780, the deep south was placated, except for annoying raids by backcountry bands of militia. Cornwallis felt free to move against North Carolina. But soon after he advanced over the border and took Charlotte, disaster struck. Major Patrick Ferguson, placed in charge of Tory militia that formed Cornwallis’ western flank, was pursued by backcountry militia and over the mountain men. He holed himself atop a mountain where his command was annihilated at the Battle of King’s Mountain, October 7, 1780. This canceled Cornwallis’ plans to advance north and his army returned to Winnsboro, South Carolina.
The winter of 1780-81, British General Lord Charles Cornwallis was once more biting at the bit to invade North Carolina. General Henry Clinton’s orders remained explicit; Cornwallis was to secure South Carolina and Georgia before advancing north. But His Lordship was in a quandary. He firmly believed that he could not stop the persistent raids and attacks on his outposts without going after the root of the problem. He blamed North Carolina militias and the presence of a once more resurrected Southern Continental Army as the source for South Carolina rebel aggression. By destroying the American army, Cornwallis was convinced it would demoralize backcountry patriots and halt the flow of men, arms, and supplies south; thereby snapping the lifeblood of southern resistance. For Cornwallis, the path was clear. But once more, like King’s Mountain, a surprise defeat skewered His Lordship’s well laid plans.
Cowpens
Soon after relieving Gates of command, by mid-December 1780, Greene marched his army south. But unlike Gates, he was cognizant of the needs of an army on the move; good forage and well-rested. With Cornwallis stationed at Winnsboro, South Carolina, mid-state so to be near the main British outposts at Camden and Ninety-Six, Greene camped in the Yadkin River[1] to the east of his enemy. But due to the region’s limited forage, and to give moral and material support to partisan rebels along the western frontier of South Carolina, he split his army. He sent a large detachment west, over a third of his army, under Brigadier Daniel Morgan, approximately 800 of some of his finest troops, Maryland and Delaware Continentals that included a battalion of Virginia militia who were all former Continental soldiers.
One hundred and forty miles separated the American armies with Cornwallis in between, about forty miles from where Morgan would make camp along the Broad and Pacolet Rivers. For Cornwallis, this was an opportunity. If he destroyed Morgan’s detachment, he could then move directly against Greene’s army. A victory would leave North Carolina in British hands, allowing Cornwallis to team up with British forces in Virginia, thereby placing the whole of the south once more under Crown rule. Cornwallis decided to do likewise and split his army. However, both units would march northwest. The detached force would drive hard and force Morgan in a pincer movement to catch the rebel force between them. For this Cornwallis needed a commander who had proven to push his men and enemy ruthlessly; no other than his favorite mastiff, Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton.
But His Lordship’s plan ran amuck the moment he chose a daring but rash company field commander and not an experienced general strategist. Tarleton would prove no match Daniel Morgan, who later historians would call the finest general the American army every fielded. Morgan’s expertise in intelligence and innovative use of militia to draw his enemy in to face his most experienced troops was ingenious. And Tarleton graciously obliged. Within an hour, Tarleton lost every infantryman, among the finest Cornwallis had, including all his light infantry. This loss of a third of Cornwallis’ force, men he could not replace, should have been cause for Cornwallis to postpone any thought of invading North Carolina. But for the confident and obstinate Earle, nothing would deter him from what soon would become a passion; destroy Greene’s army if he had to chase him to the ends of earth.
The Chase Begins: January 19, 1781
Since Cowpens was decided by 8 am on the 17th, Cornwallis first learned of the disaster from mounted troopers arriving at Turkey Creek that same evening, some forty miles southeast. He waited for confirmation from Tarleton the next morning, the same day Morgan pointed his detachment north with prisoners in tow; minus British officers who had been paroled.[2] Cornwallis’ first line of order, he would go after the rugged rifleman and finish what Tarleton had failed to accomplish. His Lordship figured that Morgan would drag his feet, encumbered with over six hundred prisoners. He also assumed Morgan would remain in the Cowpens region and hold the country in the Broad River vicinity. If His Lordship moved quickly, those prisoners, the cream of Cornwallis’ infantry, would be reclaimed.
Prior to Tarleton’s defeat, the Earle’s troop strength numbered between 3,200 and 3,300; this included Major General Alexander Leslie’s reinforcement slogging up from Charleston. After Cowpens, it was suddenly slashed to 2,500. However, what remained was a formidable force as 2,000 were battle tested British and German regulars. His Lordship still had tree first-rate units: his own 33rd Foot commanded by the intrepid Lt. Colonel James Webster, 23rd Foot (Royal Welch Fusiliers), and 2nd Battalion of the 71st Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders) – the 1st Battalion of Highlanders Light Infantry had been captured at Cowpens. With Major General Alexander Leslie were three units of regulars (also first rate) and one regiment of Tory Militia: 690 Household Guardsmen (selected from the finest of the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards), 347 German troops from the Hessian von Bose Regiment, 103 Jaegers (skilled riflemen and skirmishers), and 246 militiamen from the North Carolina Volunteers (the last would be of minimal help to Cornwallis).
There was only a scattering of loyalist militia for most under arms were wiped out at Kings Mountain. So too, few King’s men offered to join British forces after the brutal lynching of captive principal loyalist leaders by backcountry rebels. Greene’s army, including Morgan’s detachment, was similar in number, hovering around 2,000 Continentals and militiamen. But Cornwallis veteran regulars outnumbered the rebel army’s Continentals by more than two to one.
General Leslie’s force arrived at Turkey Creek with no rest for the weary. Cornwallis set off north for Cowpens the next day, January 19th, to catch Morgan. He was confident Greene’s main army was still at Cheraw Hill, South Carolina, about 95 miles directly east of him. Loss of Cornwallis’ light infantry immediately played its hand. Often these fast moving, intelligence gathering infantrymen would forge ahead and establish a proper route while harassing a fleeing foe. In this case, the British army spent the first two days marching the wrong direction on the wrong road. Morgan was nowhere near the battlefield. The former leader of Virginian rifle knew His Lordship would be after the prisoners. That he couldn’t risk getting caught by a force that largely outnumbered him. And that he needed space between the two armies so he could affect a rendezvous with Greene.
By nightfall on the 18th, fully 12 hours before Cornwallis left Turkey Creek, Morgan had camped twenty miles north of Cowpens. By the next day, while Cornwallis was trudging down the wrong road, he added another 20 miles to Gilbert Town, North Carolina. There, Colonel Washington of the 3rd Dragoons had rejoined him and took control of the prisoners.[3] Washington whisked the captives farther north and east to cross the Catawba upriver and rejoin Morgan later at Sherrill’s Ford.[4] (some historical references give the phonetic spelling Sherald’s Ford), about sixty miles east of Gilbert Town. On January 20th, Morgan further made a beeline for Ramsour’s Mill, forty-five miles east. This was where, on June 20, 1780, backcountry militia and over the mountain men had soundly defeated British Partisan regulars (Tory troops trained and equipped like British redcoats). He arrived on the 23rd and carried on towards Sherrill’s Ford.
Meanwhile, Cornwallis finally got word of Morgan’s route. Tarleton and his legion had ridden ahead to Cowpens to discover Morgan was not to be found. On the 22nd, the British belatedly picked up the Old Waggoner’s trail heading north towards Gilbert Town, North Carolina. That same day, Cornwallis entered North Carolina, expecting soon to catch and destroy Morgan’s detachment. Unbeknownst to Cornwallis, once over the border, he and his army would never again see South Carolina.
Cornwallis Enters North Carolina and Destroys Baggage
In this situation, without baggage, necessaries, or provisions of any sort for officer or soldier, in the most barren, inhospitable, unhealthy part of North America, opposed to the most savage, inveterate, perfidious, cruel enemy, with zeal and bayonets only, it was resolved to follow Greene’s army to the end of the world.
British Brigadier General Charles O’Hara
Just before entering North Carolina on the 22nd, Cornwallis left behind all camp followers and part of his baggage so as to move faster.[5] His scouts soon sniffed out Morgan’s turn east and three days after, on the 25th, Cornwallis arrived at Ramsour’s Mill, two days after Morgan had passed on his way to the Catawba River. That same day, Morgan was only twenty miles east, on the eastern bank of the swollen Catawba River. Morgan had pushed his tired army around 100 miles in five days over mud soaked roads during unceasing and at times torrential rains. By the time he crossed the Catawba River, it rose so high as to be impassable. This gave the Brigadier rifleman time to rest his worn out troops at Sherrill’s Ford. He met Colonel Washington and once more sent the prisoners ahead, to Salisbury, about 35 miles further east, notifying Greene of his actions. While waiting for the North Carolina militia under the fierce fighter William Lee Davidson, Morgan continued to monitor Cornwallis’ movements, learning that on the 28th, His Lordship was still at Ramsour’s Mill.
But that same day, the 28th, Cornwallis was on the move. Prior to that he made a dramatic choice no other British general had, or will make, he burned his baggage train. Except for enough wagons for medical supplies, salt, and ammunition, and four empty wagons for the sick and wound, all went up in flames. The officers, including Cornwallis, set an example by ordering their elaborate baggage, luxuries that eighteenth century officers considered their due for campaigning in the field, be destroyed before the rank and file. Though without shelter and other implements common during the march, many considered the loss of rum rations to be the most critical. He then set off for the Catawba and Beattie’s Ford, just south of Sherrill’s Ford, one of several fords along the Catawba.
By the time Cornwallis was once more on the move, the arrival of the North Carolina militia was welcomed by Morgan. General Davidson had with him approximately eight hundred men. Morgan decided to attempt to take a stand at Sherrill’s Ford. He ordered all private fords along the river to be filled in with obstacles to make them impassable. He sent Davidson’s North Carolina militia to Beattie’s Ford to guard against Cornwallis’ crossing. All prisoners and extra supplies were sent north to Moravian Town, Virginia, present day Winston-Salem. On the 29th, Cornwallis was in sight of Beattie’s Ford; however, the river had rose rapidly stalling any thought of an immediate ford. The next day, Greene arrived at Beattie’s Ford to take charge.
Greene Arrives. Battle of Cowan’s Ford
When Greene learned of Morgan’s victory at Cowpens, he thought of following it up with an assault on the Ninety-Six outpost. But his Virginia militia’s enlistments were up and they were set on heading home. On the 27th, Greene learned that Cornwallis had burned his baggage train so not to hamper his advance north. He decided it was time to reunite the army and get in Cornwallis’ way. He foresaw the possible need to retreat to Virginia and ordered boats gathered on the Dan River, just over the border from North Carolina. General Isaac Huger was put in charge of the main army and ordered north to Salisbury, about 80 miles north. He also sent word for Lt. Col. Henry ‘Lighthorse Harry’ Lee and his 280 Lighthorse, who had been campaigning with Francis Marion, to catch up to Huger. On the 28th, Greene rode out of camp, accompanied by a guide, an aide, and three dragoons. The mud-spattered general made the 100 mile trip in three days.
The next day, January 31st, Greene held a council of war at Beattie’s Ford. The river was receding and they knew in a few days, the British would attempt a crossing. Greene had not the men to stop him. A plan was set in motion. Davidson’s militia would contest Cornwallis’ crossing, but only to delay him long enough for the Continentals to gain a head start on the march to Salisbury. They would then make a hasty retreat. Four miles south of Beattie’s Ford was another, private crossing called Cowan’s Ford, about 400 yards wide. Cornwallis might consider it to be less guarded and attempt to cross there. To counter, Davidson sent 250 infantrymen to man the banks. At 1 AM on February 1st, Cornwallis left just enough troops to act as a diversion at Beattie’s Ford, then marched his regulars south. At daybreak, through thick mist, 1,200 British and German troops silently approached the ford. The swift running river was breast high, but the hardened regulars plowed into the river with fixed bayonets.
When the redcoats were detected, militia opened up, but discipline prevailed and the regulars carried on in silence. Several were shot, but most casualties succumbed to drowning in the swollen river. British regular Sergeant Lamb recorded that their position with unloaded muskets in chest high water “urged us on with greater rapidity, till we gained the opposite shore, where we were obliged to scramble up a very high hill under a heavy fire: several of our men were killed or wounded before we reached the summit. The American soldiers that night did all that brave men could do…and I believe that not one of them moved from his post till we mounted the hill, and used our bayonets.” [6] Cornwallis reported four dead and thirty-six wounded, but from reports of the number of bodies found downriver, it was most certainly higher. The Americans had four killed and an unknown wounded. But what was most dear to the cause, was the loss of Brigadier General William Lee Davison, shot in the heart, fierce fighter who fought for four years with Washington and later returned home to lead militia bands.
Cornwallis Presses Hard and Hits Roadblock
The North Carolinians hastily followed after Greene on the mud encased Salisbury Road. At Tarrant’s Tavern, about fifteen miles distant, some of the militia paused for refreshments and rest. Tarleton’s legion was soon upon them, sabering militia and civilians. Greene was warned of Tarleton’s presence and left for Salisbury during the early morning hours of February 2nd. There he sent an express rider to Huger’s command and ordered they join him further east at Guilford Courthouse, 50 miles distant and halfway to Hillsboro near the Virginia border. He spent the day seeing that supplies were rushed forward to keep from the fast moving British. On February 3rd, he met with Morgan and his continentals. The goal was to get to the Yadkin and cross at Trading Ford before the river was impassable. The rains were torrential. Brigadier General Edward Stevens of Virginia wrote; “The Great Quantity of Rain that fell the night before raised the River in such a manner as made it difficult to Cross even in Boats.” [7] But Cornwallis was rapidly approaching. Greene had yet to unite his army and was too weak to offer battle, especially with a raging river at his back. His only choice was to do the impossible.
Trading Ford, now under High Rock Lake, was seven miles northeast of Salisbury. All day of February 3rd, boats successfully crossed carrying troops, supplies, and most of their wagons. By nightfall, second in command Brigadier General Charles O’Hara, commanding the Brigade of Guards that included Hessians, led his van up to the Ford and found a few civilian wagons and approximately 150 militia as rear guard. He reported a few shots were fired and the militia “split and squandered.” General Stevens of the Virginia militia wrote that the rear guard were ordered “to give them a fire or two and then disperse down the river and cross in canoes…”[8] Once again, without boats to cross the fast moving swollen river, all O’Hara could do is stand and watch the Americans on the other bank.
Morgan Goes Home
February 4th, though “rheumatic from head to foot,” Morgan was leading his corps down the road bent for Guilford Courthouse, now forty-seven miles away. Though a cold winter rain fell the entire time, Morgan pushed his troops hard through the mud and arrived forty-eight hours later. Wracked by sciatica and a violent case of the piles, he set the troops about to collect forage in the area. He sat down on February 6th and dispatched a letter to Greene reporting his physical condition and that “When I set everything in as good a train as I can respecting provisions, etc., I shall move slowly to some safe retreat, and try to recover.”[9] In other words, Morgan was done. On February 10th, he hired a carriage and soon after began the long painful ride home.[10]
Greene Unites His Army, Cornwallis’ Pursuit is Unrelenting
Cornwallis retired to Salisbury determined to not let an impassable river stop him. He sent out Tory spies to determine Greene’s next move. He also sent Tarleton along the Yadkin River to find another Ford. Twenty-five miles as the crow flies upstream was Shallow Ford. Tarleton sent word; it was unguarded and passable. Cornwallis set his army in motion toward the ford. But twenty-five miles of river means forty-miles of curving, mud slogged roads to traverse. In his determination to catch Greene, he had pushed his army over 150 miles from Cowpens during the worst possible conditions. But nothing would tarnish the Lordship’s commitment and early on February 5th, he set his army in motion.
Meanwhile Greene at Guilford Courthouse had troubles of his own. Not only the loss of a great leader in Morgan, but as Cornwallis progressed north, North Carolina militiamen began to desert. the army. In turn, he could not drum up new militia to take their place. On the 9th of February, he had 2,036 men, of whom 1,426 were regular infantrymen.[11] And of the remaining army, most were in very poor condition. Cornwallis still had 2,240 men in which 2,000 were regulars. With strong intelligence arriving on Cornwallis’ strength and movements, Greene knew he could not prepare for battle and must continue the retreat north.
But where to cross the Dan River? North, the Dan could be forded, but Cornwallis was reported to be heading for Shallow Ferry on the Yadkin. That would put him around thirty miles west. He could march north and cut off any rebel dash for the fords. Downstream and northeast of him were only ferries and he had no boats. But then Lt. Colonel Edward Carrington,[12] Greene’s quartermaster general and field artillery commander, stepped in. He had boats. Six in fact to add to the ferries. There were three main ferries of their position; Dix’s Ferry (just over NC border near present day Danville, VA), Irwin’s Ferry, (20 miles downstream), and Boyd’s Ferry, (four miles further downstream). Carrington said he could assemble the six large boats and with a ferry, pass the army across. They were presently between Irwin’s and Boyd’s Ferry. Greene had his plan and he began to prepare the final sprint to the Dan.
Cornwallis detoured north and crossed the Yadkin at Shallow Ford on February 9th. The next day he entered Salem (present day Winston-Salem), twenty-five miles west of Guilford Courthouse. Cornwallis’ spies returned to report that Greene had no boats. This would rule out Greene heading for the Ferries northeast of Guilford Courthouse as the water was too deep to ford. His Lordship concluded the rebels had no choice but to carry on north of his position to the shallower fords upriver. Both armies were equally south of the fords. For Cornwallis, he was well positioned to intercept and force his elusive opponent to battle.
Greene’s Plan
Greene’s plan was to push for Dix’s ferry, a twisting march of about 70 miles northeast of Guilford Courthouse. But with Cornwallis at Salem, placing him only 25 miles west, and no major river between the two armies, Greene feared the obstinate Earl could come up on him just as he reached the ferry. With no time to cross his men, he would be forced to do battle with a fast moving river at his back. He must convince Cornwallis that he was heading to the upriver fords, north, and keep His Lordship pointed that direction while the army veered northeast toward the ferries. He had no way of knowing Cornwallis was told that Greene had no boats and assumed he would go north to the fords. But Greene needed a distraction.
And in that he had the perfect men and the man to command them; the Maryland and Delaware light troops, the crème de la crème of the American army, led by Colonel Otho Holland Williams. Battle hardened, disciplined, grim faced Continentals. They had stood firm before British steel from war’s beginning. Always in the thick of the fight when needed, it was Williams’ who ordered the devastating volley and immediate bayonet charge that broke the back of Cornwallis’ best troops at Cowpens.
Seven hundred strong, the detached light troops would act as a rear guard for the army. They would stay close to Cornwallis, forcing him to be cautious as his van probed the enemy before him. Meanwhile, Greene would carry on as quickly as he could with the main army and their wagon train. When Greene split off east for the ferries, Williams would carry on the deception by pulling back directly north towards the ford, taking Cornwallis with him. At some critical moment, when Williams felt assured Greene was either near the ferry or was crossing, he would break and make a beeline for the ferries. Williams was given Lee’s legion to act as rear guard.
Sprint to the Dan
Greene’s main army departed early on February 10th, marching as quickly as possible for the ferries. Williams’ elite detachment left soon after breakfast. Informed of Cornwallis’ approach, Lee as William’s rear guard, led his screening force so to be between his army and the British. General Charles O’Hara commanded the van and soon made contact with Lee’s horse. As expected, Cornwallis, unaware of the strength of his enemy before him, tightened his columns and slowed his march. At night, Williams remained a respectable distance from the British, alert to any sudden enemy movement to get between him and the main army. It became dreadfully cold as both armies endured long nights curled up on frozen ground without tents or proper blankets; their clothes worn and shoddy. The famed lobster back uniforms of British regulars were so faded from months of campaigning under drenching rain, that for many, there was little or no difference in color from the Continental enemy who also lost most of their ‘blues.’
Both armies were up before dawn and on the road. The second day, Feb. 11th, after a hard morning’s march, Williams, thinking he had put sufficient space from his enemy, halted for breakfast. They were interrupted when a ‘country man’ rode up and said Cornwallis’s main army was only eight miles away. Soon after Lee and a patrol of Tarleton’s horse skirmished. Lee reported his bugler was butchered and his men charged and sabered to death eighteen Legion. Tarleton stated later his men attacked and he had some losses. A Legion officer was captured who informed Williams that Cornwallis had shifted his main army to right, leaving his van under O’Hara confronting Williams to slow their march. Cornwallis had been pushing his troops to get around and behind Williams. The next few days were very intense as both sides pressed forward, resulting in several skirmishes. One incident occurred when O’Hara’s van stumbled upon Lee’s men gathered around a fire for breakfast in which all hell broke out. Lee’s men galloped off, leaving the hungry regulars to a well appreciated breakfast of corn meal and bacon.
When Williams turned from north and upper fords to northeast and lower fords and ferries, Cornwallis realized Greene’s true intent. At this point, February 13th, the chase reached it’s most stage. Cornwallis’ realizing Greene had a larger head start on him than thought, was demonic in driving his men forward. Lee stated that the British were so close that “more than once were the Legion of Lee and the van of O’Hara within musket shot.” [13]In front, but with the gap closing fast, marched Greene’s main army. He had already sent the baggage and wagons ahead “with orders to cross as fast as they got to the river.” Williams’ men greeted nightfall with relief. Finally, rest, to grab a moment’s sleep and ‘ease the joints.’. But it was not to be. Riders galloped in. Cornwallis did not bivouac. He was coming on as hard as ever. The forced march continued. Lee wrote “illusory was the expectation; for the British general was so eager to fall on Greene whom he believed within his grasp, that the pursuit was not intermitted. The night was dark, the roads deep, the weather cold and the air humid. Williams, throwing his horse in front, and the infantry of the Legion in the rear, continued his retreat.” [14]
Seven that same night of the 13th, Williams believed the game would soon be up. With Cornwallis breathing down his neck and with the main army still shy of the ferries, he thought he would be forced to turn and fight, sacrificing his command for the sake maintaining the southern army. He thought wrote a brief note and sent it ahead to Greene writing that he would “risque the Troops I’ve the Honor to command and in doing that I risque everything.” But Williams was spared, if not briefly. Later that night, a rider from Lee rode in. Cornwallis had finally stopped. The rebel columns halted and fires started. Soon, most were curled asleep before the flaming columns, grateful for a few precious hours of bliss. For now, they would survive. To carry on the retreat before the face of a tenacious foe. But a daunting forty miles still remained to the crossing. Williams remained steadfast, ready, if need be, to turn and fight, risking all if fate so determined.
Crossing the Dan, February 14, 1781
Williams was given only three hours rest. For by midnight, Lee reported O’Hara’s van was advancing on rebel pickets. “The light troops resumed their march with alacrity. The roads continued deep and broken, and were rendered worse by being encrusted with frost.”[15] By mid-morning the 14th, both armies were exhausted and stopped for rest and food. An hour later, the race relentlessly resumed with both combatants driving their men to give that last ounce of energy. By early afternoon, a mud encrusted rider galloped in with a message from Greene written at 2 PM. “The greater part of our wagons are over and the troops are crossing.” This heartened William’s light troops who pushed on even harder. Lee continued to report that O’Hara’s van, preceded by Tarleton’s Legion, remained close and so too was pressing more diligently than ever; Cornwallis knew the game was near up and his only chance for victory was to drive what was before him into the river.
That evening, while the Continental light troops and Virginia riflemen hastened with all they had remaining, a rider from Greene gave Williams another note from his commander. When read, accordingly they men raised their voices in cheer loud enough for O’Hara’s van to hear. “1/2 past 5 o’clock. All are troops are over and the stage is clear…I am ready to receive you and give you a hearty welcome.”[16] Fourteen more miles remained. With Lee’s Legion as a shield, they forged ahead like none before. Each man knew their fate was in their own hands. Their only focus, to save themselves. And over the next several hours, without pause, they covered the distance in a forced march, at times a near jog. And in that Williams saw hope. Though he was ready to sacrifice his command, Greene had made it clear to him last they parted, Williams had under him the flower of the army. To lose it would be disastrous.[17]
Late that night of the 14th, Greene was reported to be on the bank of the Dan to greet Williams’ worn out troops. Lee was close behind and sent his Legion’s infantry on first writing “Between the hours of eight and nine, the cavalry reached the river just as the boats had returned from landing the Legion infantry.”[18] When Lee’s cavalry were the last to arrive, Edward Carrington, whose organization and meticulous attention to detail was faultless, was there to oversee the execution of Lee’s crossing, as he had done for the entire army. All men and supplies were ushered into the boats while their mounts swam the river. Accordingly, the last boat across carried Light Horse Harry Lee and Carrington. Greene had done it. He had achieved the near impossible, keeping his army intact with high spirits, ready to march into friendly territory where plenty of food, forage, and new supplies awaited.
O’Hara and the van arrived on the shore of the Dan just after daybreak the next day, February 15th. The shores were empty. The boats that slipped Greene’s army from Cornwallis’ grasp lay further downstream on the opposite bank, to be disassembled. Again, His Lordship would stand and gaze out over an impassable river at a prey who had beat him to the punch. But this time there would no longer be a pursuit. Cornwallis was done. All he could do is turn and see to his devastated army. Whereas the British did the near impossible, driving forty miles over the worst terrain and conditions imaginable in thirty-one hours; Williams’ command had done the impossible, doing it in twenty hours.
Aftermath
Cornwallis had no choice but to pull back from the Dan. A professional soldier true and true. He had no plans to withdraw far, still hoping to draw Greene back into North Carolina for one last major battle that would decide the issue in the south once and for all. In the meantime, as he wrote to Secretary of State for American Affairs, Lord Germain, “My force being ill-suited to enter…so powerful a province as Virginia, and North Carolina being in the utmost confusion, after giving the troops a half of one day, I proceeded by easy marches to Hillsboro [50 miles south of the British position], where I erected the King’s Standard and invited by proclamation all loyal subjects to repair to it…” [19] But Cornwallis was just putting on a good face for his superior. In fact, his position was critical.
Both armies faced a far different immediate future. Greene had achieved safety and refuge in a friendly region ripe with food, supplies, and close to reinforcements. He could fatten his men with ample sustenance and plenty of rest while awaiting recruits from local militias and additional Virginia and Maryland Continental troops marching to join him. Cornwallis, on the other hand, had limited local support while food supplies and forage were scant at best. He had burned all his supplies and was now 240 miles from Camden, South Carolina – his base to replenish the basic needs his army needed to survive. Without loyalist militia flocking to the British banner and no hope of reinforcing his army with additional regulars, he had a fatigued army, driven beyond normal endurance during his relentless pursuit of Greene. His only hope was to maintain a minimal flow of food and supplies to his sick and worn out troops in which there was some success. But as for the local Tory militia heeding the call to join him; that never occurred.
Greene needed a month before he felt ready to march south, once more to Guilford Courthouse, where, if need be, he was prepared to offer battle. Cornwallis took him up on it and on March 15, 1781, in a bloody clash in which the balance of victory teetered back and forth, Cornwallis’ fate was sealed. Though at Guilford Courthouse the British claimed victory, Greene ended the conflict and with his Continental troops in whole, marched off, nearly as strong as they were at the start. But in Cornwallis’ Pyrrhic victory, he was left with an army completely broken. With some of his finest veterans and leaders, dead and dying in the field. Men he could never replace. His Lordship’s only hope was to march south to Williamsburg, North Carolina near the South Carolina border and seek rest and supplies from the British fleet.
Greene would not waste a moment to march his army back into South Carolina. With backcountry militia support, he eventually captured all major and minor British outposts. After three battles, one, Eutaw Springs, proving to be one of the bloodiest of the war, drove British forces back to Charleston, South Carolina. He would remain outside Charleston until the city was evacuated by the British on December 14, 1782. Five months after Guilford Courthouse, Cornwallis would find himself marooned on the end of the Virginia Peninsula, at Yorktown where, without the British fleet’s support,[20] he gave up his army on October 19, 1781, basically an ending to all major hostilities of the war.
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Reference
Buchanan, John. The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas. New York: Wiley, 1997.
Dubia, John. “The Race to the Dan.” North Carolina History Project.
Gordon, John W. South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History. 2003: University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, South Carolina.
Greene, Nathanael, Ed. Richard K. Showman. The Papers of Nathanael Greene. Rhode Island Historical Society. 1983: University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
Hand, Tom. “Race to the Dan” American Corner.
Higginbotham, Don. Daniel Morgan Revolutionary Rifleman. 1961: University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC.
Lee, Richard Henry; Edited by his grandson Richard H. Lee. Memoir of the life of Richard Henry Lee : and his correspondence with the most distinguished men in America and Europe…in two volumes. 1825: H. C. Carrey and I Lea, Philadelphia, PA.
Russell, David Lee. The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies. 2000: McFarland and Company, Jefferson, NC.
Tarleton, Lt. Colonel Banastre. A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America, by Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton. 1787: Printed for Colles, Exshaw, White, etc., Dublin, Ireland.
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Endnotes
[1] The Yadkin River flows south through North Carolina and is called the Pee Dee River when it enters South Carolina.
[2] Those parolees would arrive at Cornwallis’ camp at Turkey Creek on their way to Charleston to await their later exchange. They would share with fellow officers their vehement distaste for Tarleton. American William Moultrie, who had been captured when Charleston fell, was in Charleston when these officers arrived. He reported that “they were exceedingly angry indeed at their defeat and where heard to say ‘that was the consequence of trusting such a command to a boy like Tarleton.’ “
[3] Washington and his troopers had cased Tarleton after the battle and hooked up with Morgan later.
[4] Sherrill’s Ford was named for one of the first settlers in the region, Adam Sherrill, whose family migrated from Pennsylvania, into Virginia and later, by mid-1740’s, North Carolina.
[5] Many historical accounts state that prior to entering North Carolina, Cornwallis burned all his wagons so to move swiftly. This is incorrect. The burning and destruction of baggage occurred a few days later at Ramsour’s Mill, North Carolina.
[6] Buchanan, pg. 347.
[7] Ibid, pg. 349.
[8] Ibid., pg. 350.
[9] Higginbotham, pg. 152.
[10] Morgan would remain commissioned a brigadier in the army for the war’s entirety. Lafayette arrived later that summer to help Von Stueben counter a British invasion by General William Phillips, who had been captured at Saratoga and later exchanged. Morgan was called upon to assist Lafayette for a brief period. After the war, he led the military response to the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania. Morgan remained a bruiser his whole life, but all who knew him and future generations who studied his military accomplishments agree, there were generals, but none like Daniel Morgan. The man plowed through a life he loved. Refusing to give in, when on his death bed, he told the doctor that he wished he were 25 again, stripped naked and running the hills of the Alleghany with the devil on his heels. He died on July 6, 1802 with his family around him.
[11] Buchanan, pg. 352.
[12] Lt. Col. Edward Carrington, Virginia, was an artillery commander in Washington’s Continental Army, leading artillery at Monmouth and Yorktown. He was quartermaster general in Greene’s army where he also commanded artillery; particularly at Guilford Courthouse and Hobkirk Hill.
[13] Buchanan, pg. 357.
[14] Lee Memoirs, pg. 245.
[15] Buchanan, pg. 358.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid., pg. 360.
[20] Clinton sent the British fleet to rescue Cornwallis at Yorktown; however, they were defeated by the French fleet at the Battle of the Chesapeake, September 5, 1781.