The road to the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, March 15, 1781, was a two and a half year journey strewn by violence and death that dwarfed all other theatres of the war. From the war’s beginning, the southern colonies were marked by civil war with multiple clashes between loyalist King’s Men and patriot rebels. When the British, frustrated by a northern stalemate, invaded the coastal south with veteran regular forces, it became a slugfest drawn out over hundreds of miles of backcountry. A war of attrition and hardships, of wills and endurance. Determination to prevail drove men to commit unheard of atrocities as they sought victory, most to just survive. Guilford Courthouse culminated this bloody trek with a reckoning for one and deliverance for the other. When British might and steely resolve was forced to bow to American farmers and merchants, and accept they had done their best, when best was not good enough. When fate offered no reward but a path to ultimate defeat.
It Begins with the Southern Invasion
The Road to Guilford Courthouse started with the invasion of the south in December, 1778 by a strong force of veteran regulars under Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell. For the Americans under Major General Robert Howe, the First Battle of Savannah was the first of three major defeats of the Southern Continental Army.[1] The British moved inland, but met fierce resistance from backcountry militia. Skilled leader Colonel Andrew Pickens defeated a large loyalist force at the Battle of Kettle Creek, February 14, 1779, which halted British plans to capture Georgia. Throughout the summer months, a reinforced Southern Army led by Howe’s replacement, Maj. General Benjamin Lincoln, drove the British back to Savannah. When a failed American/French attack at the Second Battle of Savannah, October 18, 1779 could not drive the redcoats into the sea, British Commander-in-Chief Henry Clinton was bolstered to launch another invasion. Clinton, confident the south would cave into British might, landed a strong force between Savannah and Charleston on February 11, 1780 and marched north. Lincoln had vacillated on defending Charleston or saving his command by retreating inland. By the time he decided to abandon the city it was too late and he was surrounded.
The American Southern Continental Army suffered their second major defeat when Lincoln capitulated at Charleston on Mary 12, 1780; over 5,000 Americans were surrendered, the largest of the war. Mission accomplished, General Clinton departed for New York City. He left his competent second-in-command, General Lord Charles Cornwallis, to carry on the completion of reclaiming Georgia and the Carolinas. Successful at first, aided by the tactics of Cornwallis’ brutal pit-bull, Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton, one by one remnant Continental and militia forces were mopped up. British outposts sprang up across Georgia and South Carolina. A third defeat of a revitalized Southern Continental Army under hapless Major General Horatio Gates at the Battle of Camden, August 16, 1780, resulted in the near annihilation of Continental forces in the south. What was left assembled at Hillsborough, North Carolina near the Virginia border. Without an American army in the field, it seemed England total domination of the south was just a matter of time. But the task was far greater than anticipated.
Backcountry patriot militiamen remained obstinate, staging multiple and destructive raids under Andrew Pickens, Thomas Sumpter, William Lee Davidson, and former Continental officer Francis Marion, aka Swamp Fox. Ultimately, with the aid of ‘Over the Mountain Men’ from wilderness settlements to the west, the rebels defeated Cornwallis’ crucial loyalist force under Major Patrick Ferguson at the Battle of Kings Mountain, October 7th, 1780. This dissolved any hope of England seeking further assistance from ‘King’s Men,’ those who remained loyal to the crown. The result was a gaping hole in British plans to capture North Carolina. Cornwallis had no course but to cancel plans to advance further north to the spring of 1781. But after three failed commanders of the Southern Army,[2] capped by the defeat at Camden, Congress finally allowed General Washington to pick his man to take charge of the remnants of the Southern Continental Army; Major General Nathanael Greene.
Greene arrived at Charlotte, North Carolina on December 3, 1780 to assume command. The Rhode Islander, who rose from private to be Second-in-Command of the American forces, was a commander the southern army had never experienced. A leader whose methodical and skillful handling of large forces allowed him to remain in contact with his enemy while seeking opportunities to strike, but always on his terms. But Greene’s addition was only part of the winning formula that led to Guilford Courthouse. The other was the arrival of a backcountry waggoneer turned warrior; the best field commander of the war; rifleman Brigadier General Daniel Morgan. Before relinquishing command, Gates had gotten one thing right. He had campaigned hard to offer retired Virginian, Colonel Daniel Morgan, leader of Morgan’ Rifle, a brigadier commission. Morgan accepted and though stricken with painful gout, came out of retirement.
Morgan had arrived at the Southern Army’s camp at Hillsborough, North Carolina on October 2nd, two months before Greene. He was given command of a brigade of Maryland and Delaware Continentals, experienced veterans, along with proven fighter Colonel William Washington and his Light Dragoons. When militia leader Colonel Andrew Pickens, considered the finest and most respected militia leader of the war, was added to the mix, Morgan’s was a force to be reckoned with. Gates sent the burly rifleman south to Charlotte to harass the British and eventually moved the army’s headquarters there. After Greene arrived, he immediately set Morgan’s elite unit to good use.
Cowpens
Greene’s foremost concern was the welfare of his men, assuring his command had adequate food and supplies. He recognized that the Charlotte region had been picked clean from previous campaigns and could not sustain the army. There was better forage to the east, but he could not pull away from his enemy, leaving the door open into North Carolina. So too, he could not abandon the western Spartan and Ninety-Six regions that were strongly patriotic; a source of food and supplies plus many veteran militiamen within his command. Therefore, with able commanders under his belt, he split his command. He took the bulk with him to the east, while General Morgan marched west with many of the army’s veteran militia and Continentals. With Morgan were between 800 and 1,000 militia that included Colonel Pickens commanding those of South Carolina, and equally competent leader Colonel Joseph McDowell leading militia from North Carolina. Lt. Colonel Edgar Howard, whose skillful actions at Camden fought off the British and saved the largest number of Continentals to fight again, led the Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia regiments, 300 of the best of the best.
Morgan left Charlotte on December 21, 1780. Greene’s general orders to the burly ‘Old Wagoneer’ were “to give protection to that part of the country and spirit up the people, to annoy the enemy in the quarter.” Greene knew that General Cornwallis could not go after one segment of his army without jeopardizing his headquarters at Camden. Nor could he risk his multiple outposts further south including Fort Ninety-Six. If Cornwallis chose to attack, he too would have to split his force. And he did just that. His darling officer and favorite mastiff, Lt. Colonel Banestre Tarleton, along with his Legion,[3] took off after Morgan with his Loyalist Legion. The plan was for Tarleton to drive Morgan into a trap and the arms of the rest of His Lordship’s command. Along with the legion, Cornwallis gave Tarleton his battle hardened 7th Foot and 71st Scottish Highlanders, along with most of the army’s Light Infantry companies and a detachment of the 17th Dragoons, totaling between 1,200 and 1,500 men. Greene and Cornwallis had gambled, pitting the finest troops of their commands against each other. And the outcome was to shake both nations.
One of Morgan’s strengths was his willingness to listen and plan accordingly. When word reached him that Lt. Colonel Banestre Tarleton was in relentless pursuit, he asked his officers to list the 26-year-old’s strengths and weaknesses, particularly those who fought against him. Colonel Washington, who was twice defeated by Tarleton, gave valuable advice. Morgan discovered keen among Tarleton’s tactics was his proclivity to immediately attack his enemy without pausing to scrutinize his opponent or terrain. To Morgan, this was a major weakness he could capitalize to his advantage. By January 16, 1780, Morgan was done eluding Tarleton. He sought good land to position his men for battle and settled on Cowpens, about 10 miles south of the North Carolina line. Pasture and sparse woods, cattle were left to fatten before driven to market. Morgan’s unique positioning of his men for battle proved to revolutionized backcountry warfare. He solved the problem of how best to utilize militia to harm the enemy and sustain a British charge while supporting the trained Continental troops.
On January 16, 1781, Tarleton got word Morgan had halted and was preparing for battle. True to form, the brash cavalryman pushed his tired troops all night long in a forced march. As expected, on the morning of January 17th, he attacked directly as soon as he came upon Morgan’s men. But the Wagoneer was ready. The night before battle, the Americans rested and ate a good dinner of fresh beef. The old rifleman went from campfire to campfire to discuss his tactics for the fight. At dawn, his militia lined up not beside the Continental troops as before, but formed two lines in front; the first composed of rifle snipers who picked off redcoats as they approached before withdrawing to the second line of militia.
When the British charged, the militia released two devastating volleys before hastily retreating. The British, thinking the militia had panicked, rushed forward in a disorganized mob, and into the trap. Morgan had previously instructed the militia to leave the field after their two shots and reform alongside the Continentals further back. When the British rushed forward, they hit the formidable line of Continental steel. A wall of lead from battle hardened troops ripped into the scarlet ranks. So too, the reformed militia continued to pour in shot before the Continentals charged with bayonet. Meanwhile, Washington’s cavalry swooped in from the flanks and mopped the field. The result, total destruction of Tarleton’s force. Only the horse of Tarleton’s cavalry escaped, for they refused to enter the battle. For Morgan, it was an incredible victory. For Cornwallis, it was a disaster of enormous consequence.
Race to the Dan
To understand Guilford Courthouse, one must consider the state of both armies, impacted by what took place over a twenty-seven day period after Cowpens. It was a month that had a profound and weakening effect on the British command known to history as the Race to the Dan. After Cowpens, Cornwallis was furious and obsessed with catching Morgan. He had lost the crack Highlander regiment and all his light infantry who were now prisoners. Cornwallis could not replace those men and was desperate to get them back. He ignored Greene’s troops to the east and focused on catching the illusive Virginian rifleman. In effect, what began as Morgan retreating before Cornwallis’ superior force, became a 250 mile race to the Dan River, along the Virginia border.
From January 19th, two days after Cowpens, to February 15th, twenty-seven days, mostly in cold, torrential rains that turned roads into muddy quagmires, General Cornwallis pushed his army to its limit in relentless pursuit. Through most of the chase, Morgan artfully remained a day’s march ahead of his enemy. He pressed north to Gilbert Town, N. Carolina, where he sent his prisoners ahead under Colonel Washington. He then set off behind Washington, heading northeast, planning to connect with Greene’s army who were ninety-five miles distant, marching northwest to rendezvous forces. Since Cowpens, over five days of persistent downpours, Morgan marched 100 miles over roads so impregnable, each footfall was buried a foot or more deep in mud.
In this situation, without baggage, necessaries, or provisions of any sort for officer or soldier, in the most barren, inhospitable, unhealthy part of North America, opposed to the most savage, inveterate, perfidious, cruel enemy, with zeal and bayonets only, it was resolved to follow Greene’s army to the end of the world.
British Brigadier General Charles O’Hara
Prior to Tarleton’s defeat, the His Lordship’s troop strength numbered between 3,200 and 3,300; this included Major General Alexander Leslie’s reinforcement slogging up from Charleston. After Cowpens, it was suddenly slashed to 2,500, even after Leslie arrived. However, what remained was a formidable force as 2,000 were battle tested British and German regulars. On January 22nd, Cornwallis left behind all camp followers and part of his baggage, and crossed into N. Carolina, never to see South Carolina again. It rained continuously and by the 27th, Cornwallis was at Ramsour’s Mill, North Carolina, staring at impassable swollen rivers that separated him from Morgan’s command, only twenty miles distant. It is then Cornwallis made a dramatic choice few British generals would ever consider. He would do whatever it took to catch Morgan, claiming even to chase the Wagoneer to the ends of earth if needed. Therefore, on the 27th, for mobility, he ordered all wagons and baggage plus supplies (including tents and bedding) to be torched; keeping a few wagons for ammunition, medical supplies and to transport the sick or wounded. Only what his troops, including officers, could carry on their person were allowed. Cornwallis waited anxiously over the next five days before the rivers were passable and he could take off after his foe.
The same day Cornwallis burned his supplies, Morgan accepted the arrival of outstanding North Carolina militia commander General William Lee Davidson with 800 men. Morgan decided to make a stand at Sherrill’s Fords, on the Catawba River. He sent the prisoners north to Moravian Town, Virginia (present day Winston-Salem) and positioned his men. While waiting for the rivers to subside, on January 31st, General Greene arrived to take command, having ridden 100 miles ahead of his army with a small detachment. He concurred to attack Cornwallis at the Catawba with North Carolina militia, but only to stall their advance. He immediately ordered the rest of the army north, 80 miles to Salisbury, where he expected they would meet up with the rest of his army for rendezvous. At the Battle of Cowan’s Ford, February 1, 1781, at 1 AM, the North Carolina held firm at the banks, killing and wounding many redcoats who forded the swollen river. Among the four militiamen killed was the critical loss of General William Lee Davidson, shot in the heart.
Over the next few days, Cornwallis was on the heels of Morgan’s army, trudging through knee-high mud and fording swollen rivers as the heavens continued in a deluge of frigid rain. Just north of Salisbury, facing unfordable rivers with too few men to confront Cornwallis, Greene managed to scrounge enough boats to ferry his men across just as the British arrived the banks to see their illusive enemy escape. Greene then rode ahead to Guilford Courthouse expecting the arrival of his main command. With Cornwallis biting at the bit at Salisbury, seeking a ford to carry on the pursuit, Greene was faced with more problems. Beside the mass desertions of his North Carolina militia (having lost their commander), he lost Morgan. On February 4th, Morgan was leading his corps down the road bent for Guilford Courthouse, now forty-seven miles away, suffered painful “rheumatic from head to foot.” He pushed his men through horrendous conditions and arrived on the 6th, whereas wracked by sciatica and a violent case of the piles, dispatched a letter to Greene reporting he could not go on further and was heading home. Four days later, he left for Virginia by hired carriage.
Over the next five days, the cat and mouse game continued. Cornwallis pressed his men beyond endurance under inconceivable conditions, filling his wagons with the sick and exhausted. Meanwhile Greene skillfully remained just one step ahead of His Lordship, maintaining his army’s health and fighting capacity. Greene’s final act in this play of wills was one of deception brilliantly executed by Colonel Otho Holland Williams leading the Maryland and Delaware Light Infantry. While Cornwallis gave his last breath in a rush to block the ford he was convinced Greene would attempt to cross, led on by Continentals under Williams acting as a rear guard before the ford, Greene’s main army crossed safely over the Dan at another Ford. His Lordship discovered the ruse too late and raced to the other force in time to see William’s men land on the other shore where the boats were immediately destroyed. The race was over. Cornwallis lost, outgeneraled and facing another river he could not cross. Left with an army malnourished with little hope of finding food or forage in a region emptied by the retreating Americans. As Cornwallis described to Lord Rawdon, “the fatigue of our troops and the hardships which they suffered were extensive.” That was to put his predicament mildly.
Armies Jab and Jockey for Position Seeking a Knockout Blow
The Race to the Dan was done leaving one army fit and well-nourished while the other in near ruin. From February 15, 1781, when the British stood at the banks of the Dan River and watched the American Army escape into Virginia, till the morning of March 15th and the roar of musketry signaled the day of reckoning, a month of desperate measures took place for both armies. Due to sickness, casualties, and desertions, General Cornwallis’ once formidable force had been reduced to just over 2,000 malnourished shadows in tattered uniforms with no hope for reinforcements. Cornwallis withdrew his headquarters fifty miles south of the Dan to Hillsborough, North Carolina, described by Continental officer Ortho Williams as a “dirty, disagreeable hole.” His Lordship’s army remained hungry, having to resort to slaughtering draft horses for meat, for Greene, during his retreat, had left little if any food or forage to replenish his troops.
On the other hand, General Greene had passed through friendly territory. His army had been well fed and fit to carry on the fight. As the British languished, the Americans fattened on fresh food and supplies furnished by those friendly to the patriot cause. The rich Virginia countryside had not been subject to war’s ravages like the Carolinas and provided a bounty of provisions to the army. And while British hopes of loyalists flocking to their banner had evaporated, Greene’s army grew in strength with the addition of Virginia militia and fresh Continental troops from Maryland. However, all was not perfect for the dogmatic Rhode Islander.
After William Davidson’s death, by the time Greene had reached the Dan, he had lost his North Carolina militia; almost to a man quitting and going home. And Virginia militia came and went at will so Greene never knew from one day to the next how many local forces he had to complement his Continentals. Of saving grace, Andrew Pickens’ South Carolinians remained, 700 strong, who stayed in North Carolina to harass Cornwallis’ troops. But they had been campaigning for two months and were eager to go home, making it known to one and all their time was short. Yet with a continual influx of reinforcements arriving weekly, it was just a matter of time when Greene would be strong enough to fight. But he could not wait too long, for word reached north that North Carolina loyalists were responding to His Lordship’s pleas to join him.
Cornwallis had sent riders throughout the region imploring for his ‘friends’ to come to him. He started to see the fruits of his efforts and Greene immediately sought to dampen this rebirth of Tory enthusiasm. On February 19th, he sent south Colonel Light Horse Harry’s Legion along with two companies of Light Infantry from the Maryland Line. They joined Pickens on the 23rd who was already campaigning in the region near Cornwallis. Lee’s scouts informed him that Tarleton’s Legion, along with 150 regulars and 100 jaegers, 450 in all, was ordered to rendezvous between the Haw and Deep Rivers with gathering loyalist militiamen including a 400 man cavalry under Dr. Colonel John Pyle.
Lee and Pickens saw an opportunity to capture or kill the despised British dragoon and immediately began shadowing Tarleton’s force. But on the 25th, fate stepped in. Lee ran into scouts of Colonel Pyle’s loyalists who mistook Lee for Tarleton, Lee and Tarleton’s Legions both wore green jackets. Going along with the ruse, Lee decided to allow the scouts to bring him to Pyle’s men who he decided to either convince to join with the Americans or go home. Following through with the deception, Lee’s troopers rode the entire length of Pyle’s command, the loyalists, thinking they were Tarleton’s Legion, formed along the road. Just as Lee met to inform Pyle he was to surrender, violence broke out. When Lee’s men were through, 100 loyalists were hacked to death while nearly all the others were horribly wounded. Lee lost but one horse and turned his attention back to Tarleton to attack his camp. But fate once again stepped in for the dragoon was called back to camp by Cornwallis before Lee and Pickens could attack. Though Lee missed the prize, he did accomplish Greene’ directive. What became known as Pyle’s Massacre devastated Tory moral to the point there was no hope of loyalists flocking to the British banner. Cornwallis would have but his regulars when he met Greene on the field of battle.
Greene’s main army crossed the Dan on February 22nd. He had been reinforced with several hundred Virginia militia under the fierce fighter General Edward Stevens. He still expected Colonel William Campbell of King’s Mountain fame with 1,000 Virginia militia. With additional promise of men, Greene believed he finally had the numbers ready to take on Cornwallis. The same day, Cornwallis marched his army out of Hillsborough. The region had become totally barren of food and supplies and for his army’s survival, he headed southwest, between the Haw and Deep Rivers. Greene soon followed. For the next two weeks, right up to the fateful battle, the armies remained close. Brigadier General Charles O’Hara, His Lordship’s second-in-command, wrote “From that time [leaving Hillsborough] to the 15th of March the two armys were never above twenty miles asunder, they constantly avoiding a general action…These operations obliged the two armys to make numberless moves which it is impossible to detail.”
Desperate Decisions
In what would become a game of hound and hare, Greene had dispatched his reliable Otho Holland Williams and his light troops to screen Cornwallis while Lee’s Dragoons remained only a few miles from the British camp. So too, Greene’s main army stayed close to his enemy, at times within ten miles. With both forces so close and sending out scouts and aggressive patrols, the forces were bound to clash in several sharp skirmishes. Often militia, both rebel and loyalist, were caught in the middle and suffered severe casualties. On March 4th, Greene’s learned devastating news. Andrew Pickens informed him that when the Rhode Islander required his horse militia to serve as dismounted infantry, they refused in mass with many deciding to go home. The South Carolina leader warned that his entire command was at risk of leaving. So too, Virginia militia leader corpulent Colonel William Campbell, the hero of King’s Mountain leading ‘Over-the-Mountain Men,’ promise of 1,000 riflemen, showed up at camp with only 60 rifle. In one day, Greene’s expected troop strength had dwindled by a third.
On March 6th, Cornwallis decided he could no longer wait for Greene to make his move. His army had been malnourished for weeks and were now on the verge of starvation. He hoped to force Greene into a general action by turning on Otho Williams’ force that now included Lee’s and Washington’s troops and Pickens militia. At 5:30 am in thick fog, Cornwallis’ army marched north with his van led by Lt. Col. James Webster’s brigade and Tarleton’s Legion. Williams was unaware of his precarious state as that morning he planned to attack a small British force at a mill about a mile from his camp. By the time patrols notified him Cornwallis was on the move, Tarleton and Webster were only two miles from his position. Williams immediately ordered all units to make a mad dash for the ford at Reedy Fork Creek near Weitzel’s Mill, about ten miles distant; the chase was on.
Battle of Weitzel’s Mill
Like the Dan, Williams’ men were caught in a race for survival while trying to hold back a superior force. At times the Continental’s rear guard, instead of in front, were on Webster’s flank. The Continentals got to the ford just ahead of the British van and began to cross. But the British were hot on their heels and were appearing on the rise just as the Americans stepped foot in the water. Williams carried on the crossing while posting a covering party of Picken’s militia, along with riflemen under Colonel Willaim Campbell and Colonel James Preston. Lee’s and Washington’s cavalry were posted on the flanks. The covering party opened in sheets of led that sent the British reeling. Once the Continentals were across, they returned the favor and covered the retreat of militia and dragoons. Most made it with reports of some drowning. However, the Americans were not out of the woods for they were pursed by hardened veterans. Webster galloped to the front of his men and drove across the ford, his men storming behind. It took Lee’s and Washington’s superior cavalry to lay down a devastating cover allowing William’s infantry and militia to escape.
Greene could sigh relief having barely avoided the loss of his most experienced light infantry, but there was one major consequence. Picken’s militia had had enough. They believed they were ill used as cover to allow the Continentals to escape while they suffered casualties rushing the ford after them under galling British fire. To a man they went home. Greene informed Picken’s to go with them and keep his regiment whole. For after Greene delt with Cornwallis, he intended to return to South Carolina and carry on the fight against British outposts. Therefore Pickens, the most skilled militiamen in the army, who followed Greene’s orders without question, would sorely be missed at Guilford Courthouse.
Greene Receives Reinforcements and Decides the Time was Ripe for Battle
Even though Cornwallis’ army was worn out and week, they remained a formidable force of veterans, used to the hardships of long campaigns. Though larger, Greene’s number of veterans was small with recent additions of untested Continentals and militia. Therefore, Greene continued to maneuver just out of reach of Cornwallis’ main army. As the Americans marched along the north bank of the Haw River, His Lordship remained parallel along the south bank, with never more than a dozen miles separating them. On March 10th, five days before Guilford Courthouse, Greene was still not prepared to confront Cornwallis. He wrote to Governor of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson, that indeed the militia had flocked to him, but come and go in such irregular order that he knew not how many men he had, and as such, could not commit to a general action.
But in the oscillating currents of war, when one day’s despair is followed with dawn jubilation, the 11th, after penning his letter to Jefferson the previous day, two brigades of North Carolina militia, 1,000 armed men,[4] marched into camp under Brigadier General John Butler and Brigadier General Thomas Eaton. Another several hundred Virginia militia arrived under Brigadier General Robert Lawson. So too, 400 untested Maryland Continentals reported, assigned to Greene by General von Steuben, who had been sent by Washington to assist Virginia turn back the raiding invasion by turncoat British General Benedict Arnold. Buoyed by a bonanza of fresh troops, Greene finally felt confident he had the men necessary to give Cornwallis a good showing. On March 12th, Greene marched his army south for Guilford Courthouse. It was one of many locations he had previous scouted as possible terrain for battle while on his way south to take command of the Southern Army in November, 1780. The next day his men took position along the New Garden Road along the fields and in the woods.
Greene knew that Cornwallis would get word of Greene’s position and eagerly accept his offer of battle. He also knew His Lordship would travel the New Garden Road and emerge in a terrain they had taken little notice. The battlefield was a mile and a half long and ranged from ranged from a mile to a mile and a half wide. The road, flanked by a defile of dense woods, crossed a brook into a clearing a quarter mile square before running into thick woods where it climbed a slope to emerge onto a larger clearing whereas near the crest of the hill, the Courthouse and hamlet of about 100 residents sat. For Greene, whose battle plans followed Morgan’s example at Cowpens, it was perfect. Once crossing the field at the bottom of the slope and subject to a galling fire from militia, they would enter the forest. The protection of the woods gave the militia confidence they could withdrawal while still firing upon their enemy and inflicting damage. So too, the woods and thick underbrush would not allow the British to maintain their lines for a deadly bayonet charge, forcing them to break up into smaller groups. As the British piecemealed their way into the upper field, there would be no time to form into line of battle as Greene’s Continentals waited to unleash sheets of deadly lead into their ranks.
As expected, Cornwallis’s patrols informed the Earle on the 14th that the Americans were offering battle. Since leaving South Carolina two months previously and without fighting a major battle, he had lost 400 men to death, wounds, illness, and desertion, leaving him barely 2,000, worn out and tattered troops. This against around twice that number. But His Lordship was obsessed to fight and destroy Greene and nothing would deter that. Besides, hundreds of miles from British supplies in a hostile region without food or forage, he had no other choice. He was twelve miles west from Guilford Courthouse and marched his men throughout the night. At 2 am on the 15th, Tarleton’s cavalry as the army’s van ran into American horse under Lee sent forward to keep an eye on the enemy’s movement. A sharp clash occurred with the Americans retreating and Tarleton’s horse cautiously following. By 4 am, Greene ordered his men aroused for a hasty breakfast and to form for battle.
Morgan had written to Greene on February 20th while painfully making his way home. “If they [militia] fight, you will beat Cornwallis; if not, he will beat you, and perhaps cut your regulars to pieces.”[5] It was both advice and prediction that was keenly on Greene’s mind as he watched his men finish their breakfast and move out for battle. A prediction held in the balance throughout that cold March morning once musketry and cannon belched their anger. And after the bloodshed, when the last musket shot lay upon a carpet of corpses, with only the cries of the wounded piercing the silence, it proved a British victory. But it came at a price. One far too dear for scarlet troops standing in faded and tattered uniforms. British Commander General Lord Charles Cornwallis learned that success came brief, and with a bitter taste. His was a Pyrrhic victory. And in that he had lost his gamble.
IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO READ MORE, WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING BOOKS
OF SIMILAR INTEREST ON REVOLUTIONARY WAR JOURNAL
SOURCE
Buchanan, John. The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas. New York: Wiley, 1997.
Gordon, John W. South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History. 2003: University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, South Carolina.
Greene, Nathanael, Ed. Richard K. Showman. The Papers of Nathanael Greene. Rhode Island Historical Society. 1983: University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
Higginbotham, Don. Daniel Morgan Revolutionary Rifleman. 1961: University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC.
Russell, David Lee. The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies. 2000: McFarland and Company, Jefferson, NC.
Swisher, James. The Revolutionary War in the Southern Backcountry. 2007: Pelican Publishing, Gretna, LA.
Thane, Elswyth. The Fighting Quaker: Nathanael Greene. 1972: Amereon House, Mattituck, NY.
ENDNOTES
[1] The first major defeat of the Southern Army was December 29, 1778; the First Battle of Savannah, in which Maj. General Robert Howe’s command was devastated, the remnants escaping up the Savannah River. The second was the disastrous surrender of over 5,000 men and arms under Maj. General Benjamin Lincoln on May 12, 1780 after the Siege of Charleston. The third was the almost complete annihilation of the Southern Army at Camden, August 16, 1780 under the command of Maj. General Horatio Gates.
[2] The failed commanders of the Southern Continental Army in order: Major General Robert Howe of North Carolina – beginning of the war until January, 1779. Major General Benjamin Lincoln until May, 1780. Major General Horatio Gates until November, 1781.
[3] Legions were not rank and file regulars, but composed of Partisan Troops, loyalists or patriots, trained and equipped as regular troops. The Legion was composed of one or more companies of cavalry light dragoons (equipped for rapid movement) and light infantry, which could be mounted when the need arose. They were often employed as forward units in the army, or as shock troops sent to rapidly seek out the enemy in a surprise raid. Often such Legions, like Tarleton’s, were extremely violent in their tactics that were repeatedly described as massacres. The most famous Legion on the American side was commanded by Lt. Col. Henry ‘Lighthorse Harry’ Lee.
[4] Often, throughout the war, militia would show up to reinforce a Continental force with half or more requiring muskets. It is a myth that all Americans had a gun during the war. Most were farmers who relied on livestock for their meat, not hunting (except those along the western frontier). No need for protection as Native Americans were pushed far west into the Ohio territories and west of the Appalachians. Most militia prior to the war practiced once a month, often using sticks and farm tools as weapons. There was no need to spend one or two year’s earnings for a gun that would spend years rusting over the mantle piece. Why, when the war began, American Committees of Safety spent a small fortune smuggling arms from France and Amsterdam to supply their armies. The myth of every American owning a gun was the birth of 19th century romanticism and the birth of a ‘gun culture’ by sportsmen clubs after the American Civil War.
[5] Buchanan, pg. 370.