Money and politics played a major role in the selection of major commanders to lead the colonial rebellion. An inexperienced Continental Congress rushed to form three armies; northern to cover a British invasion from Canada, the main army to confront the British Central Force, and a southern army to secure the south against an invasion from sea. In choosing their generals, any prior military experience of leadership was preferred and gained instant notice by those sitting in Philadelphia. Problem, most of these wealthy and influential merchants, lawyers, and plantation owners who put their names forward, never commanded large number of troops in the field. Nor did they have experience in preparing for and strategically placing an army on a field to do battle. It was basically a hit or miss operation when handing out major commissions. Though the northern and middle armies proved to be a hit (Major General Philip Schuyler to the north and General George Washington in Boston), the selection of leading the Southern Continental Army was a miss. And it would be a total of three misses before Congress finally allowed their Commander-in-Chief; General Washington, to choose. The phrase ‘better late than never’ comes to mind as Washington finally got it right.
Major General Robert Howe
The first major commander (or more appropriately casualty) of the Southern Continental Army to muddle things up and fail spectacularly was Major General Robert Howe of North Carolina. Energetic and with a desire for glory, the planter[1] slash politician was a member of the aristocratic ‘Rice Kings,’[2] whose vast land ownings along the southern coast brought in an enormous bounty of rice production exported throughout Europe. Though well meaning, Howe never had the means or abilities to handle an underpaid, underprovided, understaffed army while battling the egos of his fellow assemblymen; all who knew how to better manage the war than he. He became commander of the army by default on February 5, 1777 by Commander Brigadier James Moore; Moore was given the army by General Charles Lee when he was called north shortly after the Battle of Sullivan’s Island, June 28, 1776. Moore in turn gave Howe the army before he lead most of the North Carolina regiments north to join Washington at Morristown. Leading mainly South Carolina and Georgia Continentals and militia, he failed in the second and third attempts to capture East Florida (May 1777, and July 1778), mainly because he spent more time warding off local politicians who refused to recognize his command of the army than the British forces in Augusta.
In December of 1778, he was convinced by local aristocratic peers that his worn out army of militia and ragged Continental troops could stand before a British invasion force of highly trained veterans under able Highlander Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell. On a field poorly selected, he offered battle. The result was a major defeat at the First Battle of Savannah, December 29, 1778. Howe lost most of his army and escaped west to lick his wounds and gather what was left, a pattern that would become all too familiar to the Southern Army. Campbell went on to capture Georgia and only after a concerted effort by backcountry militia at the Battle of Kettle Creek under Andrew Pickens,[3] did Campbell pull back to Savannah. By then the writing was on the wall for hope of Howe maintaining his job. But it wasn’t the number of military failures that did in the overwhelmed commander, forcing Congress’ hand. Even before Campbell’s invasion, during the fall of 1778, rumors circulated that Howe had several unsavory and scandalous affairs with the ‘delicate sex.’ Seemed this was too much for all those honorable men in Philadelphia, many who secretly maintained their own collection of mistresses. In December, 1778, while Howe mulled over doing battle with the British, his successor’s carriage was heading south.
Major General Benjamin Lincoln
Without seeking Washington’s advice for Howe’s replacement, Congress chose Massachusetts farmer and politician Major General Benjamin Lincoln; a proven organizer whose ego did not stir up a hornet’s nest of objections common among his more ambitious peers. But Lincoln was a competent subordinate, not an aggressive leader of troops in the field. During the Battle of Saratoga, he had stood quietly in the background while in the fall of 1777, his commander at Saratoga, Major General Horatio Gates, clashed wills with the hotheaded but able warrior Brigadier General Benedict Arnold. Gates later awarded Lincoln by using his influence with Congress to convince Philadelphia’s couch chair quarterbacks that they had found their man to head up the south.
Lincoln was successful at first, helping to drive the British back to Savannah. But after teaming up with a strong French Fleet and infantry, his embarrassing loss at the Siege and Battle of Savannah, Sept. 16 – Oct. 9, 1779, left the British still in charge of the city and door open for British Commander-in-Chief General Henry Clinton to invade. Lincoln would have plenty of opportunities to evacuate his army from Charleston. Advice from his subordinates that the city could not be defended against a superior British force fell on deaf ears. He stood by idly while Clinton slowly and methodically advanced along the coast to encompass the American Army. By the time the vacillating American commander decided to evacuate, it was too late. On May 12, 1780, with no hope of sustaining a prolonged siege and supplies running low, Lincoln surrendered the largest American Force of the war over to the British; over 5,000 men and arms that included over 2,500 Continental troops. Among them were the entire Virginia line of trained veterans. Veteran troops were held captive and experienced militia were forced to sign pardons. It was a loss the south would never fully recover to war’s end. Once again, Congress was tasked to find a new commander for a Southern Army they had already begun to assemble from regiments earmarked to reinforce Lincoln’s beleaguered army. And once again, Congress ignored Washington’s advice, putting politics and favoritism over substance. Instead, they went for the outspoken darling of Saratoga. One, rumors had it, whose accolades for British General Burgoyne’s defeat and surrender at Saratoga on Oct. 17, 1777, rightfully belonged to General Benedict’s Arnold’s leadership on the field of battle.
Major General Horatio Gates: Third Time’s the Charm…NOT
Over Washington’s objections, Congress picked Major General Horatio Gates to head the new southern army marching towards South Carolina, temporarily under the competent command of Major General Johann De Kalb. Smooth and overconfident to arrogance, Gates had nourished many friends among Congress[4] and was soon riding south to join another Southern Continental Army that had headed south to counter British aggression. Gates had been given the best of the best Congress had to offer. Seasoned veterans who from the war’s beginning, had proven themselves time and again to stand on an open field before British steel; the 1st and 2nd Maryland Regiments and the 1st Delaware. Gates caught up with his labeled ‘Grand Army’ at Deep River, North Carolina, on July 25, 1780, about a hundred miles from the South Carolina border. Instead of resting and seeking food and supplies for the famished troops, who had already relentlessly marched hundreds of miles throughout the summer heat with limited substance, he planned to immediately to advance towards his enemy. His route took them through considered loyalist regions who did not provide for or hid food and forage, making matters worse for the starving American troops.
Throughout the march south, Gates refused to listen to the advice from De Kalb and his regimental commanders. Nor from seasoned patriot militia who had been battling their British and loyalist opponents for years. He gave up all hope of effectively scouting his enemy when he rejected the assistance of militia cavalry under former Continental Colonel Francis Marion, the famed Swampfox. He also reduced his force by readily sending off militia whose contribution in the coming battle would be sorely missed. Gates’ mindset was similar to what he had done at Saratoga. Set up a strong defense, choosing Camden, and force the British to attack, ultimately leading to their detriment as supplies wain and loss of irreplaceable troops. But while marching to Camden, he was caught with his pants down. Without local cavalry to properly scout out the enemy, he blindly ran into Major General Cornwallis’ main force, whose cavalry had alerted His Lordship that Gates was moving on Camden. Gates was forced to align his troops that night to prepare for a battle on a field he had not perused, with a malnourished and ragged army. The result was catastrophic.
At the Battle of Camden, August 16, 1780, Gates positioned his inexperienced militia on the American line of battle’s left wing; facing General Cornwallis’ elite veterans that included His Lordship’s own 33rd Regiment. With a flash of steel and bayonet charge, the militia thew away their weapons and immediately stampeded, including Gates. Eight hundred yards in the rear and seeing his left wing dissolve, he mounted his favorite steed and rode off, not stopping his personal retreat until he almost reached Virginia, some 200 miles north. This left the Continentals under General De Kalb to face the entire British force. The staunch veterans held off the British charge to their front and actually drove them back. Thinking the day was theirs, they were shocked when redcoats from their left swarmed in their rear and attacked. The American veterans continued the fight bravely until they were finally overwhelmed; De Kalb later dying of his wounds. Only by the skillful handling of Maryland and Delaware officers, did around a third of men manage to escape.
Congress Finally Listens to Washington
Gates had fled to Hillsborough, North Carolina, near the Virginia border where he gathered what remained of his army. He set about reorganizing his command and sent curriers to Philadelphia to report. He padded his defeat with complaints about lack of support, food and supplies, and having to deal with subordinate incompetence; basically avoiding responsibility. But like his predecessor General Howe, the writing was already on the wall. His disgraceful abandonment of his army and gallop 200 miles to safety could not be ignored. His reputation was in tatters. A lame dog, he carried on as commander while waiting for his expected replacement.
Congress finally threw up their hands and left the decision to Washington, where it should have laid after Howe was removed. In this case, the fourth time was the charm. Washington knew what the south needed. A leader whose proven methodical and skillful handling of large forces could maintain a clear eye on the victory line. One ready to take chances to hold his opponent at bay while keeping his army whole and in fighting condition. To wear down the enemy and force the British out of the south. Ultimately, hammering the nail in the coffin of British hopes to regain their American colonies. Washington had his man in choosing his second in command, Rhode Islander Major General Nathanael Greene. Greene replaced Gates on December 3, 1780 and soon adapted his own pit-bull in Brigadier Daniel Morgan, considered the finest field commander in the war. With Greene at the helm, 1781 would be a year of reckoning for the south with multiple clashes and major battles at Cowpens (January 17th), Race to the Dan (Jan. 19 – Feb 15), Guilford Courthouse (March 15th), Hobkirk’s Hill (April 21st) and the last major action in the south and bloodiest of the entire war – Battle of Eutaw Springs (September 8th). Like Washington had done in the north, Greene rarely chalked up battlefield victories,[5] but whose tactics wore down his enemy while driving them to the sear, paving the way to final victory.
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ENDNOTES
[1] Planter was the colonial reference to Plantation Owners, often owning multiple slaves to work their vast farms.
[2] Rice Kings predated Cotton Kings, forming the economic clout of southern exports and the first aristocratic class in the south. They padded Southern Assemblies to apply English law to the region, including overseeing western development in the backcountry. Their scorn and neglect of settlers’ needs or opinions in managing their lands led many back countrymen to despise this royal class of Americans.
[3] Pickens defeated a large force of loyalist militia at the Battle of Kettle Creek, Feb. 14, 1779, depriving British Lt. Colonel Archibald Campbell of a critical force needed to subjugate the back country. Campbell then pulled back from Augusta, Georgia to Savannah where he set up a strong defense of the city.
[4] For a time, after his victory at Saratoga, in November, 1777, Gates was appointed president of the new Board of War, supported by those in Congress who had lost confidence in Washinton’s abilities as leader. For a time Gates was in effect, though still holding his commission in the army, Washington’s civilian superior. They planned to have Washington replaced with none other, Gates. After the Conway Cabal became public, the backdoor plan to have Washington removed as commander, named for Brigadier General Thomas Conway’s secret letters to Congress disparaging Washington’s abilities to lead, it became a scandal. Washington prevailed, eventually forcing Congress to disband the Board of War.
[5] In fact, Greene would not win a major battle in the south, Cowpens was under the command of General Daniel Morgan. But his tactics of one by one, eliminating all back country outposts while wearing down his enemy, and forcing his opponent to eventually withdraw to the coast, won the day.