General Sullivan’s Expedition Against the Iroquois and the Battle of Newtown

Skoi Yase Heoweh gnogek

Once a Home, Now a Memory: Iroquoian

In the spring of 1779, Major General John Sullivan was selected to lead an expedition against the Iroquois Nation that was launched later that summer. Most of the Native American Confederation (known as the Longhouse Confederation) had aligned with the British. The campaign was budgeted by Congress and ordered by General Washington in response to the outcry by western settlers angered by the Iroquois (named Haudenosaunee) and Loyalists attacks on Cherry Valley,  Wyoming, and German Flatts; all within the course of one year. Sullivan was given free rein to attack Native American settlements, burn and destroy all homes and food supplies, capture prisoners to be held as hostage, and drive the Iroquois from their lands.

In this, Sullivan would achieve more success than he had on any battlefield. Researchers have access to over two dozen detailed journals of the expedition; a wealth of resources that collaborate the expedition’s timing and actions. There have been frequent claims that Sullivan’s actions can be regarded as genocide against the Native American tribes. The 1948 U.N. Conference on Genocide following World War II found motive, intent, and outcome as factors in defining genocide. With the intended total destruction of the Iroquois villages and their food supplies, killing an estimated 500 Seneca, Ononadaga, and Cayuga tribes people, and the Nations having been driven from their cultural lands into the wilderness at the start of the coldest winter on record, where hundreds starved to death; one can argue successfully that this expedition fully met the parameters of genocide.

Most Native American Tribes Allied with the British

Prior to the American Revolution, the British were concerned by violence between white settlers and Native peoples on the frontiers and attempted to keep the two groups separated. The Proclamation of 1763 reserved the lands west of the Appalachian Mountains for Native Americans, which the colonists vehemently resented. One provision in the Declaration of Independence, July 1776, charged that King George III and Parliament had “endeavored to prevent the population of these states.” Another had claimed collusion with Native American violent raids, stating that England had “endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages.”

At the start of the American Revolution, most Native American communities tried to avoid involvement in what they saw as a dispute between a King and his subjects. As the war progressed, many Native Americans were forced to chose sides, more often siding with the British. England had an advantage in convincing Native Americans to fight on the side of the Crown. British policies before the war had tried to limit the encroachment of white settlers onto Native lands, while American colonists were eager to expand westward. The British also maintained a network of forts and trading outposts on the frontiers, like Fort Niagara and Fort Detroit. From these bases, British officers could encourage groups of Native American warriors to launch devastating raids on communities that supported the American cause. Oftentimes these warriors were accompanied by American Loyalists who had been forced to flee those communities. 

In the south, most of the Cherokee and Creek tribes favored the British. Along the Ohio Valley from Pennsylvania to Illinois and south to Tennessee, the Shawnee and Delaware chose England. In the north, along the Pennsylvania frontier into western New York, four of the Iroquois (Haudenosaunee) Confederation (Mohawk, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca), allied with the British while two, Oneida and Tuscarora, favored the rebellious colonials. And in the far north, supporting the British, were Great Lakes Tribes of the Chippewa, Ottawas, and Potowatomi; known as the Three Fires. Of all the tribes, among the most active who aggressively aligned with loyalists against colonial settlements, were the Iroquois. They participated in three devastating attacks that gained national attention; Cherry Valley (Nov. 11, 1778), Wyoming (July 3, 1778), and German Flatts (Sept. 17, 1778). As such, they gained the most vindictive attention of the new American Congress.

Congress and Washington Plan Retribution Against the Iroquois

In June, 1778, after intense lobbying by New York’s Governor George Clinton and others, the Second Congress voted to allocate $932,743 towards an aggressive campaign against the Iroquois Nation; around 85% of their total budget for the year and in today’s terms, worth an estimated 30 million dollars. On February 27, 1779, they made it official by passing a resolution directing General George Washington to take action. By the spring of 1779, preparations were finally underway for an expedition to eradicate Native Americans from New York and Pennsylvania and points west.

As rank required, Washington at first offered the command of the expedition to General Horatio Gates. Basking in the attention and celebrity status as the hero of Saratoga, he had no desire to wade into the wilderness chasing Native Americans and declined, stating reasons of health. General John Sullivan of New Hampshire with then selected to lead with Brigadier General James Clinton, brother to New York Governor George Clinton, serving as his second in command. Sullivan campaigned with Washington and had commanded brigades and later divisions during all the major battles since 1776. He had been captured at the Battle of Long Island and soon after exchanged to present a peace offer to Congress.  Clinton had been promoted to brigadier general after the failed Canadian invasion and was with the army of the north in their victory at Saratoga in 1777. He had remained with the army of the north.

Washington’s orders to General Sullivan regarding the Iroquois were direct in a letter to the general dated May 31, 1779. Sullivan had already arrived at Easton, Pennsylvania on May 19^th to take command of the main body of the expedition that was to invade the Iroquois nation. Washington wrote, “The expedition you are appointed to command is to be directed against the hostile tribes of the six nations of Indians, with their associates and adherents. The immediate objects are the total destruction and devastation of their settlements and the capture of as many prisoners of every age and sex as possible.”  He added, “…to lay waste all the settlements around with instructions to do it in the most effectual manner, that the country may not be merely overrun but destroyed.” He made note on laying waste to all food supplies for the present and future, “…It will be essential to ruin their crops now in the ground and prevent their planting more.

Washington gave directions as far as peace talks writing, “you will not by any means listen to ⟨any⟩ overture of peace before the total ruin of their settlements is effected.” He added, “Our future security will be in their inability to injure us the distance to which they are driven and in the terror with which the severity of the chastisement they receive.” He also added his pessimism towards any chance of peace; “Peace…would be fallacious and temporary—New presents and an addition of force from the enemy would engage them to break it the first fair opportunity…”

The Expedition’s Plans to Eradicate the Iroquois Nation

The Expedition was to be a three-prong attack that would destroy the Iroquois Nation’s Villages and drive them further west. It would focus on the Onondaga and Seneca Tribes, mainly in the Finger Lakes region in western New York and the Pennsylvania border area. Two main forces totally nearly 4,000 men were to advance from the east. Sullivan would personally lead three brigades of around 2,400 men northwest from Easton, Pennsylvania, along the Delaware River and New Jersey border. Another smaller force of one brigade of 1,600 troops under Brigadier General James Clinton was to advance west from upstate New York along the Mohawk River, and then southwest to the Susquehanna River where they would form up with Sullivan’s force before attacking the main villages of the Iroquois.

General Sullivan’s troops would be forced to construct their own roads through uncut wilderness as they marched from Easton; 65 miles to Wyoming, Pennsylvania (present day Wilkes-Barre) on the Susquehanna River. From there, they would progress up the Susquehanna another 80 miles to Tioga, Pennsylvania; a Native American village near the New York border at the junction of the Susquehanna and Chemung Rivers, present day Athens, PA. Sullivan was to wait for the northern force under Clinton and if time, construct a fortification at Tioga.

Clinton’s men were to assemble at Schenectady, New York from where they would travel 40 miles up the Mohawk River Valley to Canajoharie. They would turn southwest and cross overland 24 miles through uncut wilderness, hauling their boats, to Lake Otsego, the source of the Susquehanna River. This would be a staging point as Clinton was to dispatch parties to attack and raid the nearby Onondaga villages in the region. When ready, he was to float and march his army 140 miles down through the Susquehanna River Valley to join up with Sullivan at Tioga, destroying villages along the way.   

Once the two main forces were linked at Tioga, they were to advance north and west into the Finger Lakes region and the heart of the Six Nations’ land, torching all settlements within their reach. Washington’s orders included establishing blockhouses along the route. Having destroyed the villages and crops and defeated any Native American and loyalist resistance, Sullivan was to turn his attention to Fort Niagara.

A third and independent force of around 600 men under Colonel Daniel Brodhead, commanding the Western Army, would depart from Fort Pitt and advance north up the Allegany River. It was to act as a diversionary force and if possible, link up with Sullivan’s main force as the Major General prepared to attack Fort Niagara. At first Washington cancelled this separate expedition due to supply concerns and stability of the region. But as the summer progressed, Brodhead’s regional militia’s attacks against the local Native American forces was extremely successful. So too, reports came in that warriors had left their villages north along the Allegheny River undefended, having rushed to combat Sullivan’s forces approaching from the east. This prompted Washington to reorder Brodhead’s force to advance from Fort Pitt some 250 miles north into the Finger Lake Region from the west, destroying Mingo and Seneca villages as they progressed.

Troops Designated for the Expedition

General Sullivan was to be given 4,469 Continental soldiers for the expedition; four brigades under Brigadier William Maxwell, Brigadier Edward Hand, Brigadier Enoch Poor, and Brigadier James Clinton. The 600 men under Brodhead, mainly militia with one regiment of regulars, was independent and not included in this figure. However, by the time the expedition began to march, Sullivan’s numbers would be reduced to just under 4,000; this was due to disease, desertions, and expired enlistments.

The three brigades under direct command of General John Sullivan advanced from Easton, Pennsylvania:

• 1^st Brigade commanded by Brigadier General William Maxwell
  • 1^st New Jersey; Colonel Matthias Ogden
  • 2^nd New Jersey; Colonel Israel Shreve
  • 4^th New Jersey; Dlias Dayton
  • Spencer’s  New Jersey Regiment; Colonel Oliver Spencer.
• 2^nd Brigade commanded by Brigadier General Enoch Poor
  • 1^st New Hampshire; Colonel Joseph Cilley
  • 2^nd New Hampshire; Lt-Colonel George Reid
  • 3^rd New Hampshire; Lt.-Colonel Henry Dearborn
  • 2^nd New York; Colonel Philip Van Cortlandt
• 3^rd Brigade commanded by Brigadier General Edward Hand
  • 4^th Pennsylvania; Lt-Colonel William Butler – was with Clinton’s Brigade until Tioga
  • 11^th Pennsylvania; Lt-Colonel Adam Hubley
  • German Battalion; Major Daniel Burchardt
  • Artillery Regiment; Colonel Thomas Proctor
  • Morgan’s Riflemen; Major James Parr – Daniel Morgan (dissatisfied with Congress) had retired on June 30, 1779 and would re-enter the service in June 1780.
  • Independent Rifle Company; Captain Anthony Selin
  • Wyoming Militia; Captain John Franklin
  • Independent Wyoming Company; Captain Simon Spalding

The brigade that advanced from Schenectady, New York:

• 4^th Brigade commanded by Brigadier General James Clinton (Second to Sullivan)
  • 3^rd New York; Colonel Peter Gansevoort
  • 4^th New York; Colonel Frederic Weissenfels
  • 5^th New York; Colonel Lewis Dubois
  • 7^th Massachusetts;  Major Daniel Whiting – Most accounts give this as the 6th MA. This is incorrect. The reason: Francis Heitman 1914 roster of Continental Officers – the ‘bible’ of researching Continental rosters – incorrectly lists Whiting as commander of the 6^th. Lt. Col. Thomas Nixon commanded the 6^th in 1779. Journals kept by officers during the campaign refer to this regiments as Alden’s – which was the 7^th. Whiting took command after Alden’s death at Cherry Valley in November, 1778.  Also, a letter from Whiting to Washington – dated May 12, 1779 and written from Fort Alden, Cherry Valley prior to his joining Clinton’s brigade at Lk. Otsego in June.
  • New York artillery detachment, Lamb’s 2nd; Captain Isaac Wool.

The additional force of 600 men departing from Fort Pitt:

• Led by Colonel Daniel Brodhead; commander of the Western Army
  • 8^th Pennsylvania Regiment; Colonel Daniel Brodhead
  • Rawlings’ Maryland Rifle Corps
  • Local bands of militiamen
  • Host of Delaware Warriors allied to America

Expedition’s Slow Start

In his orders to General Sullivan dated May 31^st, Washington expressed the need for speed: “…it [is]essential that your operations should be as rapid and that the expedition should be performed in as little time as will be consistent with its success and efficacy…”  The Commander-in-Chief had hoped that by the time Sullivan received his letter, the general would have already marched to Wyoming. In this Washington was sorely disappointed. It would take Sullivan over two months to cover just 65 miles of the 200 mile journey to the Finger Lakes Region, as well as prepare for the next leg, before resuming the march.

Washington had been concerned that any delay in the army’s movement would allow Native Americans and their British and Loyalist allies time to mount a resistance. It turned out there was no need for concern. Word of the planned invasion of Native American lands had been known by British intelligence from the very beginning. Fortunately for the Continentals, the man in the best position to send reinforcements to counter the expedition, Sir Frederick Haldimand, British Governor-General of Quebec, refused to credit the reports and did nothing. With England focusing on taking the war to the southern colonies, he was strapped for money and supplies. So too, he was more concerned with defenses along the St. Lawrence, including rumors of another American invasion into Canada. This left Colonel John Butler’s Loyalist Rangers and his Native American allies sorely outnumbered before the encroaching expedition.

Lt. Thomas Blake, 1^st New Hampshire and General Enoch Poor’s brigade, wrote in his journal that Sullivan had arrived at Easton, Pennsylvania on the Delaware River along the New Jersey border on May 19^th.  Sullivan, true to form, wrote and complained to Washington about lack of supplies from commissaries in Pennsylvania. While stockpiling supplies, the general also knew that he had to cut a 65-mile military road wide enough to accommodate his baggage, wagons, and artillery; though thick woods over mountainous terrain and across almost impassable swamps, including approximately 24 miles of the Great Swamp, also called Tackhanack, prior to arriving at Wyoming.

Lt. Blake’s 1^st New Hampshire Regiment, commanded by Colonel Cilley, had begun a military road north to Wyoming on May 28^th. Three days later, on the day Washington wrote to Sullivan hurrying him along, Cilley was joined by two more regiments each from New Hampshire and New Jersey. Blake would record that 200 men from three regiments worked on cutting a road through the wilderness throughout early June. On June 11^th, Blake wrote that he and his men arrived at the Bullock farm in Wyoming.  So too, Lt. William Barton of Maxwell’s New Jersey Brigade recorded that his men arrived at the Bullock farm on June 12^th; as did surgeon Jabez Camfield of Spencer’s 5^th New Jersey.

Lt. Colonel Henry Dearborn, commanding the 3^rd New Hampshire, recorded that General Sullivan didn’t leave Easton until June 17^th.  On June 23^rd Sullivan complained in a letter to Washington, “…more than one-third of my soldiers have not a shirt to their backs…”  But Washington was used to his dogmatic and bleating senior officer, having berated Sullivan previously in a letter to the New Hampshire lawyer that “No other officer of rank in the whole army has so often conceived himself neglected, slighted and ill-treated as you have done, and none I am sure has had less cause than yourself to entertain such ideas.” Lt. Barton and Lt. Blake both recorded that Sullivan arrived at Wyoming along with 5 regiments on June 23^rd and that by the 24^th, all of Sullivan troops were in the Wyoming area. Though Sullivan was still nearly 80 miles from his rendezvous at Tioga, he would wait another 37 days before once more getting underway.

Washington’s May 31^st letter was also concerned of the expedition becoming overburdened with supplies that could slow an army’s movements writing, “your troops may move as light and as little encumbered as possible even from their first outset…”  However, some officers thought Sullivan’s month long delay at Wyoming to hoard as many supplies as possible was justified. Surgeon Campfield wrote that the army was delayed at Wyoming until the 31^st of July so to fix what he thought was supply problems. He wrote “the long stay of the army at Wyoming was owing to the infamous conduct of the Commissaries and Quartermasters, employed in furnishing the necessary provisions and stores. And finally, when the army did march, it was so scantily supplied that the success of the expedition is by that means, rendered exceedingly precarious.”

However, once camped at Wyoming, no urging or goading from Washington, Continental Congress President John Jay, or the Board of War could induce Sullivan to expedite his provisioning. An overcautious man by nature, by the time the fastidious lawyer finally decamped from Wyoming, he was actually so overprovisioned that, according to one officer, his men were “mired down with flour and baggage.” Sullivan’s ponderous expedition now included 134 boatloads of supplies, 1,200 overburdened packhorses, and some 700 head of cattle.

Sullivan Floats and Marches to Tioga to Await Clinton’s Force

On July 31^st, nearly two months behind the original schedule, while his boats packed with supplies poled their way up the Susquehanna River, Sullivan’s six-mile-long caravan started lumbering up the Susquehanna Valley. Meanwhile, its commander grumbled to anyone who’d listen about the poor support he’d been afforded by Congress. On August 11^th, the army’s vanguard, General Poor’s brigade of New Hampshire regiments, reached Tioga, present day Athens, Pennsylvania.

Much of Tioga had been burned the previous year on Sept. 26, 1778, by Colonel Thomas Hartley’s Retaliatory Expedition in response to Loyalist Colonel Butler’s attack on the upper Susquehanna River region and Wyoming. Sullivan’s men found the remaining ashes of the infamous Queen Esthers [Montour] log cabin, where exaggerated reports claimed she had personally killed nine prisoners, driving a tomahawk into their brains then drying and dressing the scalps to hang from her hut. Other accounts state that the Frenchwoman, taken captive as a child and raised among the Iroquois, was often kind to captured Europeans. Stories of her atrocities and others committed by the Iroquois, only grew with each telling, was instrumental to push Congress to fund Sullivan’s Expedition to destroy the lands of the Iroquois Nation and kill and capture as many as possible.

According to Lt. Samuel Shute of the New Jersey 2^nd, upon arriving, Sullivan sent Capt. Cumming with 6 men to scout out the nearby town of Chemung, about 12 miles distant from Tioga. He returned the next day and on the 12^th, Sullivan immediately ordered General Hand’s brigade to spearhead an attack on the nearby Indian town of Chemung (also named Shemung); reported to have a population of 200 to 300 Native Americans.

Hand’s men left at 8 PM and after an all night’s march, they arrived at Chemung at dawn, only to find it deserted. This would become the norm. From the expedition’s formation to its slow and ponderous progress, loyalists and Native Americans from Pennsylvania to Canada knew an American army was on the march. Sullivan’s every move had been observed giving Native Americans time to evacuate their towns before the Continentals arrived. Hand’s men looted and burned fifty homes at Chemung. Journals varied as they chased from 30 to 50 warriors two miles upriver before falling into an ambush. Here the expedition saw its first casualties.

According to Lt. Blake, they were fired upon before the natives ran off. Later, while burning fields of corn, they received shot from across the river with one killed and four wounded. Lt. Blake would report that the number of wounded and killed were 15 or 16 soldiers with one confirmed Native American killed. Surgeon Campfield reported in his journal that 8 or 9 soldiers had been killed and wounded.  Lt. Shute of the NJ 2^nd reported 6 killed and nine wounded. Sergeant Moses Fellows of the 3^rd NH offered more details; after a mile chase, they were fired upon by 30 Native Americans from a hill – wounding 3 officers, killing 6 privates, and wounding seven privates. While burning corn, all accounts state they were fired upon again from across the river and are consistent in that another man was killed and four or five more wounded. According to Reverend William Rogers, General Hand’s brigade chaplain, six of the dead were from Poor’s brigade of the 11^th Pennsylvania; a sergeant, drummer, and four privates. Also of the 11^th were two officers badly wounded and six privates slightly wounded.  A few accounts mention Native American casualties only briefly; however, Rev. Rogers is more precise stating that a bloody jacket was found and several Native Americans were seen being carried by their friends, estimating they had seven or eight killed or wounded.

While waiting for Clinton, Sullivan followed through on Washington’s recommendation to build blockhouses and fortifications along the way as staging posts.  He instructed his men to raise earthworks and construct a fort a few hundred yards from the junction of the two rivers. His officers named it Fort Sullivan. Four days after arriving at Tioga, on Aug 15^th, Sullivan ordered General Poor to take 1,000 men and advance up the Susquehanna to seek contact with Clinton’s Brigade.

General James Clinton Slow Progress Through New York

On June 14, 1779, Clinton’s 1,600-man brigade [accounts vary from 1,400 to 2,000] began traveling up the Mohawk River from Schenectady, NY to Canajoharie, about 40 miles distant [7^th MA was at Fort Alden, Cherry Valley – 6 miles east of Lk. Otsego and marched from there to join Clinton]. They arrived three days later and detachments of men immediately began the 24-mile trek south to the brigade’s staging area at Lake Otsego which is the source of the Susquehanna River. Over the next several weeks, men would continually be engaged in cutting and repairing a military road from Canajohare to the lake to accompany an endless number of wagons laden with supplies and bateau.

Many accounts in both text books and articles on the internet incorrectly state that upon arriving at Canajoharie, Clinton sent out an expedition against the Onondagas, burning 50 homes, killing 32 Native Americans, and taking an undisclosed number of prisoners. As stated, this is wrong. An expedition was launched against the Onondagas; however, it occurred from April 6 to the 29^th, 1779 and was led by Colonel Goose Van Schaick, not General Clinton. Van Schaick had 558 men under his command and upon completion, had plundered and destroyed several Onondaga villages without losing a single man. Primary sources give the number of killed Native Americans as around 30 and prisoners anywhere from 34 to ‘a great number.’ At the time, Van Schaick’s expedition was considered more successful than Sullivan’s later expedition.

General Clinton’s brigade consisted of four New York Infantry Regiments, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, and 5^th; however, the 2^nd Regiment had joined Sullivan’s push up from Easton to assist in constructing a military road to Wyoming and rejoined their brigade at Tioga, Pennsylvania. Also, the 4^th Pennsylvania of General Hand’s brigade accompanied Clinton’s brigade from New York, joining Hand’s brigade at Tioga. Clinton’s brigade also included detached NY cannon; Lamb’s 2^nd Company of  Artillery. Clinton was to proceed to the rendezvous point at Tioga via the Mohawk River in New York then southwest through the Susquehanna River Valley into Pennsylvania. He was to destroy all Onondaga villages he came upon and kill and capture Native Americans and Tories he encountered within his march.

Lt .Erkuries Beatty of the 4^th PA Regiment wrote that Clinton’s brigade departed Schenectady, NY “supplied with 36 Bateaus to go up the Mohawk River…Monday 14^th [June, 1779]…embarked in our boats at 2 o’Clock, proceeded up the River…”  The vanguard of Clinton’s brigade arrived at Conojoharie at sundown on the 17^th, meeting Col. Gansevoort’ Regiment who had arrived previously. By the 20^th, Beatty’s regiment was camped within four miles of Lake Otsego, 24 miles by road southwest of Conojoharie. He wrote that a great number of wagons full of supplies and bateau were being transported to the lake and that his regiment was busy with daily repairs to the road. He also mentioned the clearing of brush and the beginning construction of a dam “on the lower end of the lake (which is about 8 mile in length and 2 in breadth) we found two companies of Col. Alden’s Reg’t [7^th Mass. Reg under Lt. Col. Brooks – Alden was killed at Cherry Creek on Nov. 11, 1778] who had made a Dam across the neck that runs out of the lake so as to Rais the water for to carry the Boats down the creek”

On July 1^st, General Clinton and the 4^th NY arrived at the Lk. Otsego camp; the next day moving his headquarters to the lower portion of the lake.  Like Sullivan, Clinton appeared obsessed with preparations; with little or no concern for the operation’s speed; a fact that worried Washington. For the entire month of July, Clinton did not move from Lake Otsego. Instead, he continued to transport over 200 bateaux and stock pile provisions in a never-ending flow of wagons. Except for 265 soldiers dispatched to the Mohawk River Valley to chase after a war party and shooting a deserter, Beatty’s journal entry on July 30^th was typical of most days; “Nothing of Consequence happened to Day.”

August began with the brigade’s officers spending two days finishing  off six kegs of rum. By August 8^th, Clinton was finally ready to head towards his planned rendezvous with Sullivan at Tioga; 160 miles downstream the Susquehanna River. On the 9^th, the dam was burst and the brigade’s 220 boats, with three men navigating per boat, floated down the river. Meanwhile the main body of the regiments marched alongside. The day after Sullivan arrived at Tioga, on August 12^th, Clinton’s force plundered and burned a Tory Scottish Settlement called Albout; its inhabitants had previously fled to Canada. They passed Native American villages that had been destroyed by detached Americans in the fall of 1778 under Colonel William Butler that included Unindilla (which had a grist mill and saw mill), Conhunto, Onoquaga (which had been similar to New England villages with “ good log houses with stone chimneys and glass windows and likewise had a church…”

On Aug. 17^th, while the boats continued down the Susquehanna, the infantry probed inland, coming across Shawhianghto, a town of 10 or 12 homes, and Ingaren, 5 homes with a good deal of crops including a tannery which were all burned and destroyed. On Aug. 18^th, a detachment discovered the town of Chenango (4 miles north of present day Binghamton) of several homes had already been destroyed by the fleeing Native Americans. So too, word reached them that “Genl. Poor was 9 miles from us coming to meet us…”  The next day they destroyed a few more homes and met Poor’s men at Chocunut, a village of 50 – 60 homes. That very morning Poor’s men had destroyed the village along with another, Owego of around 20 homes. Clinton and Poor’s men continued the march toward Tioga arriving on the 22^nd, Serg. Moses Fellows of the 3^rd NH gives this date as the 21^st. Sullivan fired 13 cannon and Clinton answered with his three pieces. Beatty reported that the fortification labeled Fort Sullivan consisted of four blockhouses.

United, Sullivan’s Expedition Marches Toward the Finger Lakes Regions

On Aug. 26^th, the now united expedition resumed the march and proceeded up the Tioga. According to Lt. Beatty, they left at 11 am, “leaving all our heavy baggage and women at the garrison…” A long train of pack horses carried “27 Day provision likewise went with us 7 Pieces  of  Ordinance with three Ammunition Waggon…”  The line of march for the expedition was set in long columns, two deep, and two or three hundred yards distance from each; Hands Brigade of light infantry led the vanguard forming two columns, behind Hand’s right column (in single file) was Poor’s brigade, behind Hand’s left column marched Maxwell’s brigade, artillery and pack horses were in the center, with Clinton’s brigade bringing up the rear. Riflemen probed the region ahead of  Hand’s columns as skirmishers and 400 men marched the flanks of the army, 200 to a side, commanded by Colonels Ogden and Dubois.

They marched about 6 miles that first day before making camp. Many signs of the enemy were apparent, including several fires further ahead. The next day, Aug. 28^th, the army did not move, having to repair several heavily laden wagons that had broken down. A small detachment had been fired upon, but returned without injuries. The army resumed the march on the 29th; “went about 3 Mile when [approximately 10 AM] we found the Enemy strongly Entrenched with Logs. Dirt brush &c the firing Immediately begun in front with the Rifle Corp & the Indians made great halooing, orders was given then for the troops to form in line of battle which was done.” Lt. William Barton of Maxwell’s brigade judged the enemy’s entrenchment was about half a mile long and covered with branches and greenery in ambush fashion. Lt. Barton noted that on the right and behind the enemy was a destroyed town, figuring that they made use of the timber for their earthwork.

Battle of Newtown, August 29, 1779

At around 11 AM on August 29^th,  General Hand’s rifle skirmishers had come upon the half mile earthworks and reported back to Sullivan. It was thrown up by both Loyalists and Native Americans to counter General Sullivan’s progress. Dr. Jabez Campfield wrote that it was manned by 1,000 men, “mostly Indians… having with them three or 400 rangers and Tories…” Sullivan placed the total enemy number at 1,400 in his report, of which two to three hundred were Loyalists; both local and Rangers, under Colonel John Butler. The rest comprised Native Americans of Delaware and Six Nations’ tribes led by Thayendanegea or Joseph Brant, Mohawk military commander. Lt. Colonel Henry Dearborn, commanding the 3^rd NH, wrote that it was “very advantageous ground with a large brook in front, the river on their right, a high mountain on their left, and a large settlement in their rear called New Town.”  The expedition’s first and only heated battle between the two opposing forces would result in a complete and decisive victory for the Americans fought near present day Elmira, New York.

Sullivan’s expedition had spent over two months traversing the wilderness towards the Finger Lakes Region. Their every move had been under scrutiny by Native American war parties and Loyalist scouts. Loyalist commander Colonel John Butler, who had led successful raids against rebel settlements, arrived from Fort Detroit with his Loyalist Rangers. He joined Joseph Brant and the two advocated a strategy of guerilla type tactics; retreating in the face of the larger American force while sending out small parties to continually harass the invading rebels. When Sullivan reached Tioga, Pennsylvania, a small party of Delaware tribesmen who had villages nearby, would not agree to Butler’s strategy. They wished to stand and fight to halt Sullivan’s force before the Americans could cause any more destruction. To preserve the Native American unity, several Six Nations’ War Chiefs aligned with the Delawares; however, against their better judgement.

Butler was left with no choice but to comply.  He supervised the construction of a half-mile earthworks north of Tioga that stretched across a narrow valley between a mountain and the Susquehanna River, this to protect his flanks. Colonel Dearborn wrote that “their works were very artfully mask’d with green bushes so that the discovering them was as accidental.”  The intent was to ambush the Americans, causing such great initial damage, that the battle would end in a slugfest stalemate, leaving the Americans no choice but to retreat. Once the battle commenced, Butler was not prepared for Sullivan’s effective cannonade, timed with Colonel Poor’s New Hampshire Brigade having climbed the mountain and assaulting the Native Americans and Loyalist on their left; routing the entire force.

The battle was initiated as General Hand brought the rest of his brigade forward. According to Major John Burrowes of Spencer’s 5 New Jersey, “the skirmishing riflemen were fired upon by Indians who immediately ran back, trying to draw the Americans which proved to be an ambush before their earthworks.”  Lt . Beatty of the 4^th PA wrote that “the firing was kept up very briskly by the Rifle men & a company who was sent to reinforce them, likewise the Indians returned the fire very brisk with many shouts for about 2 hours while a disposition was made for to attack them.” During this time, Colonel Proctor of Hand’s brigade brought his cannon forward. It was decided while Hand would feint a frontal attack, General Poor’s brigade would climb the mountain on the earthwork’s left, so to flank and get into the enemy’s rear. Sullivan wrote, “General Poor was therefore detached to gain the hill…and fall into the enemy’s rear.” Sullivan hoped to time Poor’s attack with an intense cannonade that, caught between artillery bursting among them and Poor’s brigade pouring down from the rear, the enemy would be routed. He ordered Clinton’s New Yorkers to follow Poor up the hill as reserve. He also ordered Maxwell’s Brigade to remain in Poor’s rear as reserve. Dr. Campfield wrote, “At 3 PM began –  Poor’s men crossed a mile swamp then up a half mile mountain to flank the enemy’s left.”

Lt. Beatty wrote that “after they [General Poor’s brigade] had gone about half an hour, Genl. Hands brigade advanced in a line of battle with all our Artillery in the Centre within about 300 yards of the Enemy’s works but in full View of them a very heavy cannonade began…”  Sullivan had hoped that Poor, with Clinton’s support, would have gained the hill’s summit when the cannonade began; however, that was not to be the case. Sullivan wrote: “General Poor moved on to gain the hill, and General Clinton followed as directed, but both of them were for some time delayed by a morass. General Poor had already arrived at the foot of the hill, when the cannonading began in front of their works, but, upon attempting to ascend it, he found a large body of the enemy posted  there, who began to fire upon him. His troops charged with bayonets, and sometimes fired as they advanced. The enemy  retreated from tree to tree, keeping up an incessant fire, until his troops had gained the summit of the hill.”

With cannon shell bursting among them and a firefight erupting on the mountain to their left, the Native Americans and Loyalists resolve began to falter. Sullivan wrote, “Our cannonade in front, and, I doubt not, the unexpected fire from General Poor on the enemy’s left, occasioned them instantly to abandon their works, in the utmost confusion.” Lt. Beatty placed the timing from cannonade to the enemy’s collapse at a half hour writing, “throwing of Shells the enemy returned the fire very brisk for about half an hour when the Enemy retreated up the hill in a great Disorder.”  By the time Brant’s and Butler’s men had started their retreat, most accounts place Poor at the hill’s summit. Again Lt. Beatty, “…as they got near the top received a very heavy fire from Genl. Poor’s brigade; the enemy then took round Genl. Poor’s right flank by the river which Genl. Poor’s had not guarded as he had not time to, therefore they made their Escape leaving a number of their dead behind them.” Sullivan had ordered 250 men under Colonel Ogden of Maxwell’s 1^st New Jersey to cover the enemy’s right along the river to prevent their escape. However, Ogden was not in position to do so allowing Brant’s and Butler’s force to slip away.

Short Pursuit and Casualties

Once Butler’s force left their works, General Hand’s brigade pursued up the hill, linking with Poor’s brigade. Lt. William Barton of Maxwell’s brigade wrote that as Poor’s men ascended the hill, they were hampered “by a loose scattering fire; but…gave way, leaving their dead behind, amounting to eleven or twelve which were scalped immediately.”  Sullivan and Col. Dearborn reported that eleven enemy bodies had been found while Maj. Burrowes put the number at 17, one a considerable chief. All accounts agree that the number of wounded enemy was unknown as they had only left their dead behind.  Lt. Beatty wrote “the rifle men pursued them about one Mile farther and made a Negro prisoner, likewise saw some of their wounded going up the river in Canoes they fired on them but they All made their Escape.”  The ‘Negro’ taken was a freeman Tory as a white Loyalist was also made a prisoner. They informed their captors that Butler’s Rangers were led by the Old Butler [Col. John Butler] with the younger Butler [John’s son Captain Walter Butler], and McDonald [Capt. John McDonald]; that Butler had about 300 Loyalists with around 4 – 500 Native Americans under Mohawk Chief Joseph Brandt.

Of American casualties, Barton wrote that “Two or three of ours killed, and thirty-four or five wounded, Among the latter Maj. Titcomb, Capt. Cloise, and Lt. Alli.”  He added that one of the officers “of which is since Dead.”  Dr. Campfield wrote that “We had only 3 killed and 30 wounded, among were a Maj., Capt., and Sub’n, all of the Hampshire troops… [Poor’s Brigade]”  Colonel Dearborn recorded a total of 32 casualties, among which three were killed and 29 wounded, including three officers in which one later died that night, I.t.  McCawley, all from Poor’s brigade.

Lt. Barton recorded that “at half after three the firing ceased, and the army proceeded one mile and a half to a  considerable town consisting of about twenty huts,” which according to Beatty was above the enemy’s works. This was a new Native American settlement which Sullivan named New Town in his report. Afterwards, this town was identified as the action that took place nearby – calling it the Battle of Newtown.  Clinton’s men burned the village that evening which Colonel Dearborn put at about 40 buildings, including all crops within the fields.

Brutal Atrocities Practiced by Sullivan’s Troops

Colonials spoke vehemently of a practice attributed to ‘savages’ egged on by their British masters; that of scalping one’s enemy and carrying the gruesome byproduct as either a trophy or in exchange for a reward. Such ‘willful butchery’ was condemned throughout the thirteen colonies and helped launch Sullivan’s vengeful campaign to eradicate the Iroquois Nation. However, white colonials actively took part in the gruesome practice of scalping whenever they came across their Native American enemies. More so, they participated in horrifically skinning dead Native Americans, and in some cases while still alive, so to stitch together the torn flesh into leggings and other various clothing worn with pride.

Lt. William Barton of the 2^nd NY wrote that after the Battle of Newtown, Monday, Aug., 30^th, “at the request of Maj. Piatt, sent out a small party to look for some of the dead Indians…toward noon they found them and skinned two of them from their hips down for boot legs; one pair for the Major and the other for myself…”  It was not uncommon for men to argue over Native American scalps considered one’s rightful trophy. Again, Barton wrote, “…he pursued and killed one of them. The men then went to scalp him, which caused some dispute who should have it…”  Journal after journal in which Native Americans were killed, they were promptly scalped or skinned. Entries such as “Here an Indian was killed and scalped…” or “…our men pursued, we killed and scalped…” After the Battle of Newtown, Lt. Barton noted that “…leaving their dead behind were scalped immediately…”

Often colonials justified their own barbaric treatment of Native Americans by example of those “who fell prey to savage barbarity.” Nothing fueled American hatred and justified an ‘eye for an eye’ approach towards their enemy more than describing the brutal treatment of white women and children. Maj. Jeremiah Fogg of the 2^nd NH wrote soon after the Battle of Newtown that “This morning a captive woman and child at her breast came in from the woods having escaped from the savages…She was taken  at Wyoming last spring with five children, where her husband was killed, and child was scalped before her eyes…” Such stories only encouraged the vindictive spirit Sullivan’s men had for their Native American enemies to willfully executing the same barbarous violence they accused their enemy of practicing.

Unopposed, Sullivan’s Expedition Spent the First Two Weeks of September, 1779 Marching Further into Iroquois Land While Destroying Villages and Crops

Having been routed, the Native Americans and Loyalists under Brandt and Butler had been disenfranchised and would not try and halt Sullivan’s ruinous path through their lands; instead seeing to their families as they evacuated their villages prior to the American army’s arrival. Only in mid-September, did Brandt convince between 2 to 3 hundred braves and Tories to stage an attack which fell upon a detached party instead of the main rebel force resulting in the largest number of casualties Sullivan’s force suffered in one action. Colonel Dearborn’s daily Journal describes the towns they marched to and actions taken.

The day after the Battle of Newtown, on Aug. 30th, all sick and wounded plus four of the heaviest artillery pieces were boated to Tioga; this to allow the army to move more rapidly.  On the 31^st, the army came to the junction of the Alliganer and Kaiyugea Rivers and what Dearborn called a pretty town called Kannawaloholl. Throughout the expedition, Sullivan’s men found not the crude bark huts or longhouses of “Savages,” but instead orderly rows of houses built of hewn timbers and frame houses with windows. Well-cultivated vegetable fields extended out from the villages, along with extensive apple, peach, and cherry orchards. Many of these Native American villages rivaled or surpassed the towns that the soldiers had come from.

Dearborn wrote that they destroyed all the crops in the Kannawaloboll area before encamping. The following day saw a tiring march over ridges and through a thick, ‘mirey’ swamp. At 10 PM they came to the village of Katareens Town, or as Lt. Barton wrote, French Catherine, named for a French infant taken from Canada who later married a chief and resided there selling horses. The next day the town and all crops were destroyed before heading out.

On Sept. 3^rd, Sullivan’s force came to Lake Seneca (Kannadasege), 40 miles long and 2 to 5 miles wide running north and south, and camped on the south eastern portion of the lake. On the 5^th,  Dearborn wrote after traveling five miles north they came upon: “Candaia (Kandea) or Apple Town where there is a very old  orchard of 60 trees & many other fruit trees. The town consisted of 15 or 20 houses very beautifully situated near the Lake.”  Lt. Barton would write that Apple Town was a separate village some miles from Kandea which was on fire when he marched by. Several journals describe Kandia as a very old town, the oldest they’ve seen and very pleasantly situated on high ground before the lake.  By the 7^th, Sullivan had reached the northern shore of Lake Seneca.  Here the army turned northwest and west. A small town was destroyed before Sullivan’s force marched to what Dearborn described as the Seneca Castle and capitol of the Seneca Nation; Kannadasegea, (also Cunnusedago) consisting of 40 dwellings, with some accounts stating 50 or more. As the army rested, the next day two towns were destroyed by detachments,  Gaghsonghgw, 8 miles distant, and Skaigees or long falls, a 10-mile trek.

On the 9th and 10th, the army marched west slowly through what was called the 10-mile swamp. Fifty men were sent back to Tioga escorting the sick as well as 30 pack horses left who could no longer carry. Dearborn recorded that they “came to a very pretty town call’d Kannandaguah consisting of about 30 houses much better built than any I have seen before.”  Several parties were ordered to destroy both town and the large fields of corn nearby. On the 11^th, Lt Barton reported marching by a small town that an earlier force had put to the torch. The next day, the army came to Anyayea (also Onyauyah) of 10 to 11 houses.  Here the army built a small fortified outpost as a depot prior to marching to the next major village, 25 miles distant. Supplies and ammunition were left including a detachment with one cannon to garrison. The army then proceeded 11 miles further over what Dearborn described as excellent land. The next day, Sept. 13^th, they arrived at Kanegsas also spelt Quicksea or Canesaah of around 20 huts.Like so many of the villages Sullivan’s force found, it was a neat little town on a spacious intervale near a lake with acres of corn and squash growing in the fields. The army halted to destroy the town and crops while a bridge was constructed across a creek. That night, a party was detached to another town 7 miles distant to make discovers and return the next day and by morning, Sullivan learned they had been ambushed.

Lt. Boyd’s Detachment Drawn into an Ambush Suffering the Expedition’s Largest Single Number of Casualties

The army arrived at the village Canesaah on the evening of Sept. 13^th. Lt. Thomas Boyd, of Morgan’s Rifle Corps, was ordered onto an all-night march to locate and reconnoiter Chenussio, a village seven miles distant. He was expected to return by daybreak. He took 26 soldiers with him and the Oneida interpreter and warrior Han Yost (Thaosagawat), who had been wounded fighting alongside the Americans at the Battle of Oriskany (Aug. 6, 1777) and later with Washington at Valley Forge – the party totally 28 men.

Note most accounts incorrectly list Boyd in the 1^st Pennsylvania Regiment; due to Francis Heitman’s famous roster of Continental Officers that places him as a lieutenant in the regiment from Jan. 1778 until his death. The roster of Morgan Riflemen officers who participated in the Sullivan Expedition clearly lists Lt. Thomas Boyd. So too the men under his command. Boyd, an experienced officer, had been with Morgan and captured at Quebec in 1775 and later exchanged.

Journal accounts vary as to the particulars of Boyd’s detachment but a consensus is as follows: Late that evening, Boyd’s scouting party arrived at Chenussio to find it as villages all along the expedition’s route, empty and abandoned. Boyd’s weary men moved off into the woods to rest prior to returning to the army’s camp. Four Native Americans were seen entering the village. Boyd’s men attacked and killed one who was immediately scalped. Early the next morning, when halfway back to their camp, Boyd halted and sent four men ahead to report to General Sullivan that they had found the village. After a time, Boyd sent two men ahead at point and resumed his march towards camp. The two men returned and reported they saw a scattering of ‘Indians.’ Hoping to capture one or more, Boyd hurried his men forward. The fired upon five enemy, killing one before the others retreated. Boyd ignored Han Yost’s warning not to pursue as it might be a trap to lure them into ambush, Boyd ordered the men to chase after them.

Journals differed widely as soon they found themselves surrounded by anywhere from 200 to 400 Native Americans and Loyalists. It was reported by survivors and later accounts among Tories that Boyd’s men fought for some time, but were eventually overwhelmed. Seven riflemen who had been flanking the party were able to escape the ambush, finding their way back to camp to warn the Americans who immediately sent out a large detachment commanded by General Hand. As to the remaining 19 Americans, none would escape with their lives. When Hand’s men came to the scene of battle, only four rebel bodies were found, shot and scalped. Any Native American dead and wounded had been carried off. Lt. Barton reported that also that morning of the 14^th, Colonel Ogden’s detachment constructing a bridge over a creek had been fired upon with one man injured, later having died of his wounds.

After Hand’s detachment returned the army set off, marching upon the village Casawayalatetah which was promptly destroyed along with nearby crops. At 4 PM they arrived at the largest village yet;  Chenisee Castle (Chenussio) of a hundred buildings according to Colonel Dearborn; Sergeant Fellows placed the number at nearly 130 dwellings. Dearborn noted that the inhabitants had recently departed, leaving large quantities of food still in the process of harvesting with other signs of confusion.  Here they found the remains of Lt. Boyd and Sergeant Parker.

The two men had been horribly tortured and mutilated; Sergeant Moses Fellows of the 3^rd NH describing the gruesome details in his journal: “…Chenisee (Genesee) Castle…at this place was Lieut. Boyd and one soldier found, with their heads cut off; the Lieut’nts head lay near his body; his body appeared to have been whipped and pierced in many different places. The other head was not found. A great part of his body was skinned, leaving the ribs bare.”  Lt. Beatty confirmed the other’s head was missing and stated further that both had been stripped naked in which they had been stabbed each over 40 times and private parts mutilated.  Of Lt. Boyd’s severed head, the skin and flesh were totally pealed back from the skull with eyes gorged out. Fellows added that they were lying aside two trees which they supposedly had been tied to as there was blood on the bark and nearby grounds. Both Col. Dearborn and Sergeant Major George Grant of the 3^rd New Jersey added that the fingernails had been ripped out by the roots and they were severely beaten with what Grant described as “Prickly Ash”  Of Boyd, his tongue had been torn out. Sullivan summarized the army’s dogged determination to carry on the expedition by writing, “This was a most horrid spectacle to behold and from which we are taught the necessity of fighting those more than devils to the last moment rather than fall into their hands alive…”

Of Boyd’s detachment; Lt. Boyd, Oneida warrior Han Yost, and 26 soldiers; ten survived – the four Boyd sent to inform Sullivan and the six flankers who escaped capture. Three were horribly tortured to death – Boyd, Srg. Parker, and Han Yost. Accounts vary on the number of bodies found at the site of battle – from two to four. However, thirteen bodies were found three days later as confirmed by several journals. Serg. Maj. Thomas Grant wrote, “…arrived at Kanaghsas and encamped – 13 of Lt. Boyd Party were found today dead and scalpd near together as they were all shot it appears they bravely fought till every man was kild…Honyose Oneida Indian who was one of the Party among the dead and very much mangled…”

All were gathered and buried near where they fell in what is now Groveland, New York. Their bodies later removed in 1841 and transported to Rochester, NY in 1841 where they were reburied with honor on Patriots Hill. A plaque lists the names of Body’s party.  Of the Native Americans and Tories, some freshly dug graves were found at Chinesee (Genesee) Castle where Boyd and Parker’s bodies were discovered. Of wounded, there was no way of knowing as they were carried off by the enemy. Later accounts confirmed that among those who ambushed the party were Loyalists under Colonel John Butler and Seneca allies led by Cornplanter and Little Beard.

Sullivan Halts the Expedition’s Progress West and Turns Back

On Sept. 15^th, the army spent the entire morning destroying the large village of Chenisee (Genesee). At this point Colonel Dearborn figured that the army had destroyed a total of 15,000 bushels of corn. He explained in his journal the method of destruction was to build large fires using lumber torn from the houses upon which the corn was heaped. Other times the corn was dragged to rivers and sent downstream. Dearborn recorded that the army had reached the end of their progress west writing, “We have now got to the end of our route and are turning our face homeward.” He added they recrossed the Chenesee (Genesee) River “…& marched in high spirits…”

Sullivan wrote to Washington stating one of his reasons for going no further than the Genesee River as “After having destroyed this town, [Chinesee] beyond which I was informed there was no settlement…and the Cayuga country being as yet unpenetrated, I thought it necessary to return as soon as possible in order to effect the  destruction of the settlements in that quarter.” The original plan was to rendezvous at the Genesee River with Colonel Brodhead’s force of 600 men marching east from Fort Penn. Together, they would carry on to assault Fort Niagara, some 80 miles beyond the Genesee River. However, Sullivan’s failing health played a major factor as well as the fact that when the army left Tioga, they drew 23 days rations which was near exhausted. Even though they had forged along the way, particularly on roasted corn, Sullivan had not the rations nor supplies to sustain the army on a longer expedition. During their route home, Sullivan was intent to send out detached parties to find and destroy villages they passed during their route to the Genesee, particularly on the other far shore of the lakes they had marched along.

Colonel Daniel Broadhead’s Trek from Fort Pit up the Allegheny River Fails to Reach Sullivan

Colonel Daniel Brodhead Division of around 650 men that included the 8^th Pennsylvania Regiment, Rawling’s Maryland Rifle Corps, and regional militia and Delaware warriors aligned to the Americans left Fort Pitt on Aug. 11^th, the same day Clinton pressed southwest to join up with Sullivan at Tioga. Brodhead followed the Allegheny River into Seneca and Lenape country where he faced little resistance as he progressed; most native warriors had departed east to help confront Sullivan’s larger force. As Brodhead advanced, he, like Sullivan, found deserted villages which were quickly put to the torch, destroying 150 houses and 500 acres of corn. On September 14^th, he reached modern day Salamanca, New York, about 90 miles southwest. This was the same day that Sullivan had arrived along the Genesee; the point of rendezvous.  With his supplies running short and far behind schedule to link up with Sullivan, Brodhead turned back

Sullivan’s Homeward March

On the 16^th they reached Kanigsas  or  Chockse where most of Boyd’s party were found dead. The next day they marched to Anayaye. On the 18^th, they arrived at Kaunandaguah. On the 20^th, Sullivan began to split up his force, sending detachments to destroy settlements further out from the army’s main march. Dearborn wrote:

• 500 men [Sullivan reported 600] are detach’d under the command of Col [William] Butler who is to march round Kaiyugea (Cayuga) Lake & destroy the Kaiyugea (Cayuga) settlements at the East side of the Lake. [Sullivan’s reported to Washington that Butler had destroyed 5 principal towns and crops]
• 100 men under the Command of Col Ganseworth are order’d to go and destroy the Mohawk castle on the Mohawk  river & to proceed from thence to Albany.
• Colonel Dearborn himself, on the 21^st, took 203 men and marched to the west side of the Kaiygea (Cayuga) Lake. From there they would proceed from north to south destroying villages. Destroyed following villages: Skannayutenate (birth place of Seneca Chief Red Jacket), New Town (not the same as the battle site), Swahyawana, Coreorgonel – rejoining the main army on September 26^th.

On Sept. 26^th, the main army had returned to four miles from where the Battle of Newtown was fought on Aug. 29^th. On the 27^th, Dearborn wrote that several detachments were sent up the Allegana to destroy what houses and cornfields they might find. After destroying some small hamlets within the region, the army marched to Chemong on the 29^th and on the 30^th, arrived at Tioga. On October 4^th, the army marched for Wyoming. On the 5^th, the whole army boarded boats while detachments drove the pack horses and what cattle were left. On the 7^th, the army arrived at Wyoming. Dearborn wrote that the army departed Wyoming on the 10^th and arrived at Easton on the 15^th, having marched “150 miles thro’ a mountainous rough Wilderness with artillery and baggage…”  

AFTERMATH

Casualties and Total Destruction of Iroquois Land and Culture

Colonel Dearborn wrote in his journal that a total of 60 soldiers had been killed during the expedition. Sullivan, perhaps to cast himself in a better light, wrote to Washington on September 30^th from Tioga that 40 had died. In the same letter, Sullivan gave some stats on the devastation his army incurred on the Iroquois Nation: “The number of towns destroyed by this army amounted to 40 besides scattering houses. The quantity of corn destroyed, at a moderate computation, must amount to 160,000 bushels, with a vast quantity of vegetables of every kind. Every creek and river has been traced, and the whole country explored in search of Indian settlements, and I am well persuaded that, except one town situated near the Allegana, about 50 miles from Chinesee, there is not a single town left in the country of the Five Nations.

Sullivan’s claim that there wasn’t a single town left in the country of the Five Nations was not a bombastic claim. Just 16 separate days of recorded destruction alone included the burning down of more than 579 houses. Many of these dwellings, the white soldiers noted in their diaries, were as fine as if not better than many they resided in themselves in New England and throughout the colonies. Indeed, Sullivan’s force had wiped the indigenous natives’ land and culture from the face of the earth. It has been estimated that during a sixteen-day period in His army left a path of devastation that deserved the term ‘scorched earth.’ Despoliation of such enormous affect that the Iroquois Nation would never rebound; their people swept from their ancestral lands, leaving the survivors to throw themselves on the mercy of the British and Native Americans further to the west. 

This military campaign…was an act of genocide against my people. Our Nations are still recovering from the long term impacts from this war that resulted in the loss of lives, the separation of our Confederacy, land loss, and intergenerational traumas from this devastation.

–Michelle Shenandoah 2019

Due to the direct actions and results by Sullivan’s expedition, it can categorically be described as genocide. Thousands of Native American escaped their homes with just the ‘shirts on their backs’ before the onslaught of American troops. Most of them, women and children and the elderly, would die of starvation and exposure. The American military recorded the deaths of up to 580 Iroquois  (Haudenosauee) people. However, the actual population losses are estimated to be up to 4500 Native Americans including those killed by the military, those who starved, who died during their escape towards Fort Niagara and other British fortifications, and the starvation, sickness and more.

By September 21, 1779, there were 5,036 Native American refugees who made their way to Fort Niagara. They fled from their homes as Sullivan’s troops advanced, leaving behind all their food and necessary supplies for survival. With the advent of winter approaching, they hoped for assistance from the British. Hundreds if not thousands began to perish from lack of food and shelter. As one of the coldest winters on record began to set in, total famine at the garrison was narrowly avoided by the arrival of additional supplies and by convincing many of the tribesmen to form temporary settlements elsewhere. It was indeed, as historian Joseph R. Fischer wrote, “a whirlwind of destruction.”

Native Americans Seek Revenge

“The great, expensive expedition, glorious in its progress against the opponents of liberty, had in fact succeeded in leaving the people of New York more vulnerable, more isolated and less protected than before Sullivan’s army had marched,” according to historian Richard Berleth’s account in Bloody Mohawk. Just a year after Sullivan’s devastation, the Iroquois would have their revenge. Major Jeremiah Fogg wrote in his journal upon arriving back at Easton, “The nests are destroyed, but the birds are still on the wing.” In the spring that followed that terrible winter, hundreds of warriors under Brant, Cornplanter and Butler—fired by a terrific lust for vengeance—descended on numerous towns along the frontier, including Cherry Valley, which they hit a second time. In these raids they destroyed an estimated 1,000 homes, 1,000 barns and 600,000 bushels of grain. Such attacks continued nearly to war’s end. 

Congress had sought a final solution to thwart British influence on Native American and halt attacks on settlements. After Sullivan’s expedition, Iroquois men, women and children, whose homes had been destroyed, had begged for shelter at British forts, only to find that their allies had little room and even less compassion for them. Washington did thus succeed in making the Iroquois Nation a burden to and problem for the British. His plan for the destruction of the Iroquois homeland was a rousing success; however, he did not account for Loyalist and Native American retribution and vengeance.

Territory Opened for White Settlement

The total annihilation of the Six Nations’ homes and livelihood destroyed their ability to be independent and take care of themselves. For the remainder of the war, the tribes would be almost wholly dependent upon the British for food, clothing, and equipment. This also strained British resources, and in the end, the British would abandon their Indian allies. England made no provisions for Native Americans in their Peace treaty with America in 1783. This left the Six Nations still defiant but ill-prepared to deal with the new United States.

By eradicating the Iroquois Nation from their ancestral homes, it vanquished their power and opened up vast regions of wilderness for post-war settlement. Congress, bankrupt by war’s end and unable to pay their soldiers what was owed to them, in exchange, offered massive land grants to her veterans. Land speculators envisioned a gold mine in sales to eager settlers ready to expand onto the vast plains of western New York and Pennsylvania that also stretched into the Ohio Country south to Kentucky and west to the Great Lakes.

Bitter Twist of Irony

Popular culture continued to justify Sullivan’s eradication of an entire people, remaining strong throughout the 19^th and well into the 20^th century. Rubbing salt into the wound, recently arrived white settlers of the former Iroquois lands formed four New York counties, established between 1794 and 1804, which they dubbed Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga and Oneida. On Oct. 26, 1825, New York Governor DeWitt Clinton, son of the general who had helped devastate the Iroquois, boarded the first barge celebrating the opening of the Erie Canal—bisecting the old Iroquois territory. The passage marked the opening of the West to commerce and settlement. The barge on which the governor traveled was named Seneca Chief.

During the Centennial celebrations – the Hon. Steuben Jenkins of Wyoming gave a speech in which he described Wyoming as  “a howling wilderness, inhabited by savages and prowled over by wild beasts…” speaking of the Iroquois’ “spirit of rapacity… a  body of these restless and blood- thirsty savages…. would sally forth on a murderous foray…where, falling upon an innocent, unoffending village, with the fearful cry,  ‘We come, we come, to suck your blood’.“

The removal of the Cherokee Nation to Oklahoma Territory has been amply called the ‘Trail of Tears.’ The brutal and merciless destruction of the Iroquois Nation just as winter was setting in has been called by the offspring of Native American survivors as the ‘Winter of Tears.’

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General John Sullivan Soldier and Congressman

Soodalter, Ron. “Massacre & Retribution: The 1779-80 Sullivan Expedition July 8, 2011. Historynet.

Stephens, Karl F.  Neither the Charm Nor the Luck, Major General John Sullivan.  2009: Outskirts Press, Parker, CO.

Wait, William.  “Sullivan’s Campaign.” Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association, Vol. 6 (1906), pp. 80-86.

Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution. 1941: Historical Society of Delaware, 2011: Skyhorse Publishing, New York, NY.

Williams, Glenn T.  “The Battle of Newtown, 29 August 1779: An Aggressive Attack Carried Out With Audacity.  On Point. Vol. 12, No. 2 (FALL 2006), pp. 8-15. Published by Army Historical Foundation.

The Winter of Tears: The 1779 Sullivan/Clinton Expedition against the Iroquois Confederation. The Historical Society of Scotch Plains and Fanwood, New Jersey.

Wright, Albert Hazen.  The Sullivan Expedition of 1779 The Regimental Roster of Men. 2008: Heritage Books, Maryland.