Washington’s Retreat Across New Jersey: A British Fox Chase

By Harry Schenawolf, author of the Shades of Liberty Series about African American soldiers in the American Revolution.

Once Fort Washington fell on November 16, 1776, Washington’s army was still divided into three sections. General Charles Lee, second in command, remained at North Castle, New York, Westchester County, where the main army had withdrawn nine miles north after the Battle of White Plains. He had three divisions – his own and those of Generals Sullivan and Spencer, comprising two brigades each. Though Lee was reported to have 10,000 men in his command, in reality he had 5,500 effective troops – 4,000 were missing and reported absent or on other commands and 1,200 were on the sick list. General William Heath had four brigades stationed at Peekskill, New York, a little over 20 miles northwest of North Castle and on the Hudson River, about a dozen miles south of West Point. Technically, he was supposed to have had 5,400 under him, however, like Lee, absence and sickness left him with only 3,200 effective troops. Washington had the rest of the army of 5,400 men, however, 3,500 were posted with General Nathanael Greene at Fort Lee in New Jersey. Of those troops Greene had been sending over a substantial number to gradually reinforce Fort Washington from around 1,200 troops to nearly 2,900 on the Manhattan side of the Hudson River. When Fort Washington was captured, all those men were lost and imprisoned. This basically left about 2,000 men directly under Washington who shifted his immediate command to New Jersey to join what was left of Greene’s reduced force.

Though he should still have 14,000 men left in his army to counter any offensive move by British Commanding General William Howe, those numbers were dwindling daily due to large scale desertions. Shortly after the Battle of White Plains, October 28, 1776, the army was idle at North Castle where there was plenty to eat and drink. A mild autumn, a full stomach, and a period of rest and the men were feeling more hopeful. That soon changed with the fall of temperatures and Fort Washington. The nights were frosty and November rains were frequent and chilling. The army had always been poorly provisioned. Tents were lacking, blankets scarce, and men’s clothing was too meager and too ragged to keep them even passably warm.  British Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie noted in his diary that “many of the Rebels who were killed in the late affairs, were without shoes or stockings, and several were observed to have only linen drawers on, with a rifle or hunting shirt, without any proper shirt or waistcoat. They are also in great want of blankets.” He noted that the weather previously had been mild, “but in less than a month they must suffer extremely.”[1]

The rank and file, even officers, knew all this and though a speck of hope had kept some in camp, with the complete loss of New York City, along with all the provisions stored at Fort Washington, and soon to be total loss of critical supplies stored at Fort Lee, it was too much to bare. With enlistments soon to end, many saw no reason to continue suffering for a cause that was fading rapidly. In large droves, both militia and Continental troops, soldiers quietly slipped out of camp and went home. On Nov. 9^th, even before the fall of Fort Washington, the Commander-in-Chief wrote that many of the Connecticut militia regiments had been reduced “to little more than a large company.” On the thirtieth, he said that the Pennsylvania militia of General Ewig’s brigade, though they had enlisted to January 1^st, were “deserting in great numbers.” General Washington was in a dilemma or perhaps crisis was a better term. Of those who remained with him in New Jersey, enlistments of 2,060 men, which represented more than half of his force, would be up on December 1, 1776. Of those left, including the men in New York under Lee and Heath, they would be free to go home at the end of the year. Come January 1, 1777, the entire American army would cease to exist and many believed, including most particularly the British and those who remained loyal to the crown, so too the rebellion.

Just before the fall of Fort Washington on Nov. 16^th, Washington had sent General William Alexander ‘Lord’ Stirling’s brigade across the Hudson at Peekskill to act as an advance guard. He marched past Haverstraw to the Palisades and posted a hundred men to hold a gap called the Clove, sent out scouts, and continued on to Hackensack, New Jersey. Washington had followed the next day, through the Clove, and set up headquarters at Hackensack. It was from there that he communicated with Greene over his young general’s decision to hold the fort and even reinforce it, drawing much needed troops from his division to do so. Washington didn’t get to see matters for himself until the evening of the 15^th and by then, it was too late in the day to visit the fort and troop positions to determine if the garrison should be held. When he did so the next morning, it was too late. Howe attacked at 7 AM and Washington put the fort into fate’s hands and crossed back over the Hudson to watch the disaster from Fort Lee. The surrender and consequential loss of all armaments and supplies critically upset his plans. Instead of the fort detaining the British army for months in a siege, Greene had been confident that the post could hold out through December, Howe had taken all defensive lines and the fortification in just a few hours. The British were now free to do what they pleased, including marching a large force into New Jersey. Exactly what they did four days later.

Fort Lee falls Without a Fight and the Chase Begins

When Fort Washington was lost, Washington wrote to Congress that he was determined to hold Fort Lee. A few days later he saw the looming folly in what would only be another disaster. It turned out that he suffered a partial disaster for once again, he was a day too late. Washington acted quick enough to save his men, but not the large storage of provisions – tents, clothing, cannon, ammunition, food, etc – that would be so needed in the weeks to come. At 9 PM on the 19^th on a “very rainy” night, the 1^st & 2^nd battalions of British light infantry, two battalions of British and Hessian grenadiers, two of the Guards, and two companies of Hessian Jagers (riflemen; many were former huntsmen in Germany), approximately 4,000 men, struck camp and marched to their transports. By dawn, General Charles Cornwallis led them to the New Jersey side of the Hudson, about five miles above Fort Lee. There they scaled the heights of the Palisades and headed towards the fort. Fortunate for General Greene, an officer on patrol spotted the redcoats advancing and raced back to rouse Greene out of bed. He immediately sounded the alarm. He sent word to Washington and ordered his men under arms.

What occurred next was no retreat, but a panic-stricken flight in an attempt to gain the road to the Hackensack River Bridge before the enemy. Greene was able to assemble a small gathering out of his disorganized force and left them in charge of Washington who by then had come up. He raced back to the fort and rounded up another three hundred men who basically left with just the clothes on their back and what they could grab. Even still, the British had come up so fast that of these, 105 were captured and about ten killed. When the British got to the fort, they discovered all the rebel army’s tents still in place along with precious blankets, breakfast kettles still boiling, and three drunken soldiers. Besides all the cannon along with shot and canisters, a thousand barrels of flour fell into the enemy’s hands. The only silver lining in what was yet another catastrophe for the Americans, was that the gunpower had been carted away a day or so before Cornwallis struck.

Lee was left at North Castle with three divisions to guard New England against any move Howe might make in that direction. True to form, prior to leaving for New Jersey to counter Howe if he decided to march against Philadelphia, Washington did not issue any direct orders to his over-stuffed, egotistical second in command. He told the former British officer that if Howe marched into New Jersey, that he had “no doubt of your following with all possible dispatch.” With the fall of Fort Lee and over 4,000 British troops under Howe’s mastiff, General Cornwallis, who rapidly pursued Washington’s forces, there was no doubt of Howe’s intentions. New England was not Howe’s target. He was after Philadelphia. And it was time for Lee to act on Washington’s ‘intentions’ and march his 5,000-man army to his commander’s aide. But the pompous officer was confident that he knew better than an amateur planter from Virginia playing soldier and remained put.

Washington continued to send dispatches to Lee, hinting that he pry himself loose and march to New Jersey. On the 20th of November, the day Ft. Lee was abandoned, Col. William Grayson, one of Washington’s aides-de-camp, wrote to Lee on his leader’s behalf, “His Excellency thinks it would be advisable in you to move the troops of your command on this side of the North River.” The next day Washington kept trying, “I am of opinion… that the publick interest requires your coming over to this side.” Instead of a firm order that directed Lee to join him, Washington continued his vague perchance of suggesting his subordinates follow his desires – just as he did with Greene, hinting that Fort Washington be abandoned when there was time, but never telling him to just do it. Lee, of course, knew better and remained right where he thought he should, leaving Washington on his own to face the full force of Howe’s army.

By the time Greene grabbed his hat and raced out of Fort Lee just before the British poured through the gates, Washington had “not above 3,000 men and they much broken and dispirited.” As in the past the Americans, mainly farmers who were used to hard labor digging in the earth, were often able to construct impressive barriers and earthworks practically overnight. But in this instance, there were obstacles that could not be overcome. Washington gloomily wrote that the land was “almost a dead flat,” without natural barriers.  And though the terrain didn’t offer the ridges and features to carve out strong earthworks, it didn’t really matter; the Americans had lost all their intrenching tools with the fall of Forts Washington and Lee, over 500 pieces. There was not a pick nor shovel to entrench and axes were few in which to level stretches of forests to construct redoubts and gun placements. There would be no American defense with multiple trenches and abatis to face British General Cornwallis’ rapid advance. If the rebel force under Washington’s command hoped to survive to fight another day, they would have to rely on their legs and sheer determination to keep one step ahead of the encroaching British.

On Nov. 17^th, General Stirling’s advance brigade of eight regiments, approximately 1,200 men, had arrived at New Brunswick, south of Newark, New Jersey, and on the road to Princeton and Trenton. It was the day after Fort Washington had fallen. Like most of the army, his brigade was in deplorable condition. “We arrived at Brunswick broken down and fatigued – some without shoes, some had no shirts,” wrote Lt. Enoch Anderson of Haslet’s Delaware. There, Stirling camped and waited for Washington to join him. Once Cornwallis took Fort Lee on the 20^th and immediately set off in pursuit of the Americans, Washington knew he could not hold Hackensack with his weakened army. He feared being caught in the narrow space between the Hackensack and Passaic Rivers. He left three regiments to dispute the British crossing over the Hackensack Bridge and on Nov. 21^st, marched his army to Aquackanock and crossed the Passaic, rushing on to Newark where he arrived on the 22^nd. Meanwhile, his men left at the bridge immediately destroyed it when the redcoats approached then hurried to join the main army.

The race was now on. Cornwallis was in command of the British vanguard and unlike lethargic ‘Granny Howe’, he did not have the politics of supreme command to deal with. He saw his enemy and, being one of the most competent officers in the British army, he would do all he could to rapidly draw his forces up to destroy him. While Cornwallis’ engineers sought to construct passages over destroyed bridges, Washington lingered at Newark for five days. He spent his time calling upon Congress for more men and William Livingstone, the governor of New Jersey, to supply militia. He also sent dispatches to Lee, again ‘suggesting’ the obstinate general join him. Lee continued to trust his own judgement far more than Washington’s. He believed his first objective was to protect lower New England and he could not do so by marching his men south to Jersey. He was also convinced that Howe would soon order his troops into winter quarter. Why then subject his soldiers, who already faced shortages in blankets, tents, and shoes, to a long and grueling winter march? Without an explicit order from Washington, Lee continued to ignore his commander’s ‘requests’ that he join him. As for reinforcements, the best Congress could do was to call upon the Philadelphia Associators, a loosely organized volunteer organization of militia. They had a very poor turn out and took their time assembling and marching. And New Jersey? Washington’s requests went unanswered. There would no militia. On November 28^th, the vanguard of Cornwallis’ force was hot on the heels of their quarry, entering Newark just as the rebel rear guard was marching out to join Lord Stirling at New Brunswick.

Two days later, November 30^th came and went, as well as 2,000 American forces. Washington had just written to Congress lamenting that few among the Flying Corps were left and of those, he did not believe they would remain past their enlistment which was soon to end. So too for many of the regular army’s terms which expired on Dec. 1^st, leaving him with just a handful of men. This included enlistments for the Maryland and New Jersey militia brigades under General Reazin Beall of Maryland and General Nathaniel Heard. Even though the officers implored their troops to remain and fight, almost to a man then continued marching – straight for home. Washington dismally wrote that “being applied to they refused to continue longer in service… But what is still worse,” he continued, “Altho’ most of the Pennsylvanians are enlisted till the first of January, I am informed that they are deserting in great numbers. Dispirited by a succession of defeats, wearied with marching day after day, lacking food and all necessary provisions, they were, as Reed described them, “the wretched remains of a broken army.” The British were not blind to their adversary’s plight. Officers were writing home that “Peace must soon be the consequence of our success.” General Cornwallis was already considering heading home once the rebel army no longer existed and Philadelphia was captured. General Howe was so confident that he was about to finish off a teetering opponent on the brink of ruin, that he divided his army and sent his pesky and mettlesome second in command, General Henry Clinton, north with more than 6,000 men, to winter camp in Rhode Island.

Besides the fact his army was disintegrating around him, Washington was cognizant that so too was the faith in his leadership evaporating. However, he may not have been prepared for the discovery of just how deep the threads of discontent and perfidy were woven throughout his ‘family’ of chosen aides and confidants. On November 21^st, from Hackensack, NJ, Colonel Joseph Reed, Washington’s aide-de-camp and personal secretary, his closest confidant and one with whom, in all probability, the supreme commander had spent the most time since accepting the helm of the army, wrote General Charles Lee a letter that laid laurels upon the head of the former British officer. “I do not mean to flatter or praise you at the expense of any other,” he wrote and then proceeded to do just that, “but I confess I do think it is entirely owing to you that this army, and the liberties of America… are not entirely cut off. You have decision, a quality often wanted in minds otherwise valuable”, meaning Washington. So too, like Washington, Reed was desperate for Lee to join the army, but as a savior, shoving aside the fumbling Virginian farmer. He assured Lee that his confidence in him was shared by every member of Washington’s staff and so too generally by the officers and soldiers. He fed Lee’s imperious ego and then twisted the dagger when concerning the loss of Forts Washington and Lee writing, “Oh! General, an indecisive mind is one of the greatest misfortunes that can befall an army; how often have I lamented it in their campaign… We are in a very awful and alarming situation – one that requires the utmost wisdom and firmness of mind,” meaning Lee’s.[2]

Reed would never receive Lee’s reply for on Nov. 30^th, it fell into Washington’s hand. Lee wrote back on the 24^th that he too lamented “that fatal indecision of mind which in war is a much greater disqualification than stupidity.” He reiterated that Washington wished him to march to New Jersey “in so pressing a manner as almost to amount to an order.”  He then reassures his adulating compatriot that he would soon “fly to you” writing “for to confess a truth, I really think our Chief will do better with me than without me.”[3] The letter had been sent by express and since Reed was at Burlington and not at New Brunswick when it arrived, Washington, naturally supposing it to be related to official business, opened it. He was deeply hurt by the letter that indicated his trusted adjunct general and personal secretary had been communicating with his second in command behind his back. Lee’s choice of words proved that he was repeating and responding to Reed’s own thoughts which were clearly derogatory to Washington’s military capacity. Perhaps worse, hinting that such candor raged throughout the supreme commander’s staff and general officers, including rank and file. With the British army breathing down his neck and his own forces deserting and heading home, Washington found the time to respond to both men in a civic manner. Though much pained by this disclosure, and no doubt his renowned temper privately cursed the two men to hell and back, Washington took a deep breath and acted with his usual self-control and dignity. He penned a letter to Reed the same day he mistakenly opened Lee’s correspondence. He basically explained why he opened the letter and made no mention of its content “which neither inclination or intention would have prompted me to [open it].” Washington did not enclose the letter, but kept it, its content later disclosed by Lee himself after the affair at the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1776. This became a fatal blow to Washington’s and Reed’s association. After the 1776 campaign ended, Reed returned to Philadelphia and Washington soon found another, some would say more competent and loyal aide-de-camp, to take Reed’s place, Alexander Hamilton.

On Dec. 1^st, with a large portion of his men leaving camp for home and the enemy within sight of his forces, Washington had not given up trying to pry loose his reluctant second in command and yet again implored upon Lee to march south, making no mention of the letter he had mistakenly read. He wrote, “The Enemy are advancing, and have got as far as Woodbridge and Amboy, and from information not to be doubted, mean to push to Philadelphia. The force I have with me, is infinitely inferior in Number and such as cannot give or promise the least successful Opposition… I must entreat you to hasten your march, as much as possible, or your arrival may be too late to answer any valuable purpose…”  He wrote to Congress in a postscript that “1/2 after 1 o’clock PM. The Enemy are fast advancing, some of ‘em are now in sight. All the men of the Jersey flying Camp under Genl. Herd being applied to, have refused to continue longer in service.” He again begged Governor Livingston to call out his militia writing to the governor, “…Unless my force is speedily augumented, it will be impossible for me to make any stand at this Place… the militia from the Counties of Morris and Sussex, turn out slowly and reluctantly, whether owing to the want of officers of spirit to encourage them, or your summons not being regularly sent to them, I cannot say; but, I have reason to believe, there has been a deficiency in both cases.” By 7:30 PM, Washington jotted a quick note to the President of Congress: “In a little time after I wrote you this evening, the enemy appeared in several parties on the Heights opposite Brunswick and were advancing in a large body towards the crossing place. We had a smart cannonade whilst we were parading out Men but without any or but little loss on either side[4]. It being impossible to oppose them with our present force with the least prospect of success, we shall retreat to the West side of Delaware and have advanced about Eight miles where it is hope we shall meet a reinforcement sufficient to check their progress. [Washington speaks of the Associators of Philadelphia who had marched, but would not meet up with the army for several more days].[5]

By December 2nd, Washington was in Princeton and on the 3^rd, he was writing to Congress from Trenton, informing them that he had commandeered every Durham boat (large, flat bottom boats used to transport goods) along the Delaware River and ordered all other boats both north and south of the river, for a space of seventy miles, to be either destroyed or gotten to the Pennsylvania side so the enemy could not use them to cross, commenting that just one Durham boat could, with several crossings, transport an entire regiment in short order.[6] His only aim was safety for what stores and army he had remaining. Baggage, wounded, and the sick were immediately transferred to boats that came up from Philadelphia. Meanwhile he patiently waited in Trenton for word from General Stirling who he had left at New Brunswick.

Stirling’s brigade had been the advance force into New Jersey and now had become the army’s rear guard. He had remained at New Brunswick to await Cornwallis and delay his advance by any means possible. His brigade, five Virginia regiments and one from Delaware, Haslets Delaware Blues, were among the best troops Washington had. One thousand two hundred strong, “the flower of the army,” they destroyed provisions and burned a hundred of their precious tents which they had no wagons to cart.  Lt. Anderson of Haslet’s Delawares wrote, “when we saw them reduced to ashes, it was night. We made a double quick-step and came up with the army about 8 o’clock. We encamped in the woods, with no victuals, no tents, no blankets. The night was cold and we all suffered much, especially those who had no shoes.”[7] New Brunswick lay on the Raritan River, about 26 miles northeast from Trenton. Stirling knew his meager numbers could not stop or even delay Cornwallis’ hugely superior force. Cornwallis, an energetic, swift-moving commander, had already marched his men twenty miles through a heavy rain, over the most wretched roads deep with mud, in a single day in his attempt to overtake Washington. Now, just miles from Stirling and his prey in sight, with several easy fords of the Raritan River nearby, Cornwallis was ordered to stop his perpetual pursuit. There he waited four frustrating days for General Howe to personally join him. Four critical days were lost to the British allowing Washington the extra days he would need to cross most of his army and supplies across the Delaware.

By December 4^th, Washington had received news from Lee that he was about to cross the Hudson at Peekskill in a few days, but would not be able to come to his aid for some weeks. On the 5^th, Washington heard that some of the enemy had forded the Raritan River, but that Cornwallis’ main force had held up, he assuming the heavy rains had delayed the normally persistent general. By then, Washington had been strengthened with the arrival of some of the expected Pennsylvania Associators and part of Colonel Nicholas Haussegger’s regiment of Pennsylvania and a contingency of Maryland Germans.[8] He wrote to Congress that “I shall now… face about with such Troops as are here fit for Service and March back to Princeton and there govern myself by Circumstances and the movements of General Lee. At any event, the Enemy’s progress may be retarded by this Means if they Intend to come on, and the People’s fears in some measure quieted…” In his letter to Congress, he laid the blame for the army’s withdrawal in the face of the enemy at the feet of New Jersey’s governor who failed to enforce the state’s militiamen to fall out when needed. He wrote that had they stepped forward, “we might have prevented the Enemy’s crossing the Hackensack… we might with equal probability of success, have made a stand at Brunswick on the Raritan…”[9] On the 7^th, he set out with 1,200 men, hoping that with Stirling’s force, they could make a concerted effort to halt Cornwallis’ progress at Brunswick. But when he was within a few miles of Princeton, he met Stirling in full retreat.

General Howe had arrived on Dec. 6^th and the very next day, he had freed Cornwallis to continue the pursuit. Stirling had already received word of Howe’s arrival and had vacated New Brunswick by the time the British were pushing down the road towards Princeton. Washington immediately swung his troops around and took control of the rear guard. He dispatched all his men back to Trenton with orders to load transports and without delay, cross the river. He kept Haslet’s Delaware regiment to act as a rear guard. Lt. Anderson of the Delawares reported his commander-in-chief’s personal actions with the rear guard to assure any delay he could of Cornwallis’ rapid advance: “We continued in our retreat – our Regiment in the rear and I, with thirty men in the rear of the Regiment and General Washington in my rear with pioneers[10], tearing up bridges and cutting down trees to impede the march of the enemy. I was to go no faster than General Washington and his pioneers. It was dusk before we got to Trenton. Here we stayed all night.”[11]

Cornwallis, an experienced campaigner, had marched slowly and cautiously, with flankers thrown out on both sides to scour the woodlands and to spot possible ambushes. The torn-up bridges and felled trees and other obstacles also delayed his usual rapid march. Washington’s efforts were successful as the British vanguard did not reach Trenton until two o’clock the next afternoon, December 8^th, just as the last of the Americans were shoving off for the Pennsylvania shore, Washington, like at Brooklyn, among the last to leave. American batteries on the Pennsylvania side of the river shelled Cornwallis’ light infantry and Hessian Jaegers as they showed themselves along the bank. The British reportedly lost thirteen men before withdrawing out of range. British artillery responded, but by then the Americans were safely protected in the woods. Lt. Anderson wrote, “…that night we lay amongst the leaves without tents or blankets, laying down with our feet to the fire. We had nothing to cook with, but our ramrods, which we run through a piece of meat and roasted it over the fire, and to hungry soldiers it tasted sweet.”[12] Cornwallis detailed men to range up and down the river to look for boats, but they came back empty handed. All water craft were either smoldering ashes or on Washington’s side of the Delaware River.

The next morning, Washington wrote that he posted Stirling’s Virginians and Haslet’s troops in detachments at different landing places up the river to “prevent the enemy from Stealing a March upon us from up above.”[13] Howe, knowing the ragged and wretched condition of the men left in Washington’s command and having intelligence that most, if not all, of his troops would cease to exist within three weeks’ time due to ending enlistments, decided to give up the chase. He distributed his troops at various posts in New Jersey: Pennington, New Brunswick, Trenton, and Bordentown. There, he could keep an eye on the fizzling rebellion and garnish intelligence so to renew the campaign in the spring when he would finally end the distasteful fiasco.

Meantime, Howe rushed back into the arms of Mrs. Elizabeth Lloyd Loring, his commissary general’s wife, to enjoy the fruits of wintering among New York City’s elite loyalists. His Hessian mercenaries would have to bear the brunt of manning the distant outposts along the Delaware, subjected to pesky and continual raiding by New Jersey’s militia and rebel scouts. Worn down by continual alarms and false alarms, within a few weeks’ time, Hessian commander Colonel Johann Rall would, on the evening of December 25, 1776, ignore reports of yet another large force of Americans approaching his works. He would turn in and allow his men the much-needed rest after their Christmas festivities. Before 1776 came to a close, the rebel army under Washington, that which by all accounts had ceased to exist, rose up and in one incredible victory, revitalized a rebellion that all had thought, including America’s own leaders, had been laid to rest.

If you would like to read more about 1776 and New Jersey’s role in the American Revolution, check out these free previews of great books on Amazon

Exciting New Series of African Americans who fought in the American Revolution

Also of similar interest on Revolutionary War Journal

December 1776: Washington and the Continental Army in Crisis

Washington’s Crossing and Flight Across New Jersey in 1776

The Battle of Long Island: The Stone House at Gowanus Creek

Battle of Kip’s Bay: An American Disaster that Nearly Cost Washington’s Life

Battle of Harlem Heights Sept. 16, 1776: Americans Gave the British a Good Drubbing

Battle of White Plains: Washington Draws His Foot in the Sand

Should Washington Have Defended New York City in the Summer of 1776?

The 1776 List of Battles and Skirmishes of the American Revolution in Chronological Order

SOURCE

Commager, Henry Steele & Morris, Richard B. The Spirit of Seventy-Six, The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participant. 1958, 1995 edition: Da Cap Press, New York, NY.

Ellis, Joseph J. Revolutionary Summer, The Birth of American Independence. 2013: Alfred A. Knop, New York, NY.

Fisher, David Hackett. Washington’s Crossing. 2004: Oxford University Press, New York, NY.

Fitzpatrick, John C. Editor. The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources 1745-1799, volume 6, Spet. 1776 – January, 1777. 1932: United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.

Gigantino, James J. The American Revolution in New Jersey: Where the Battlefront Meets the Home Front. 2015: Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ.

Graydon, Alexander. Memoirs of His Own Time, with Reminiscences of the Men and Events of the Revolution. 1846: Edited by John Stockton Littrell, Lindsay & Plakiston, Philadelphia, PA.

Heitman, Francis. Historical Register of the Officers of the Continental Army During the War of Revolution, April 1775 – December 1783. 1914: The Rare Book Publishing Company, New York, NY.

Johnston, Henry P. The Campaign of 1776 Around New York and Brooklyn. 1878: S. W. Green, New York, NY.

Karels Carol, Editor. The Revolutionary War in Bergen County: The Times that Tried Men’s Souls. 2007: History Press and Arcadia Publishing, Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina.

Mackenzie, Frederick & Edited by Allen French. A British Fusilier in Revolutionary Boston Being the Diary of Lieuutenant Frederick Mackenzie….Vol. I of II. 1926: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

McCullough, David. 1776. 2005: Simon & Schuster, New York, NY.

Mitnick, Barbara J. New Jersey in the American Revolution. 2007: Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ.

Reed, William Bradford. Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed: Military Secretary of Washington, at Cambridge, Adjutant-general of the Continental Army… Vol. 1. 1847: Lindsay and Blakiston, New York, NY.

Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution. 1952, 2011 edition: Skyhorse Publishing Company, New York, NY.

FOOTNOTES

[1] McKenzie I, pg. 97-98, Ward, pg. 276.

[2] Reed, pp 255-257

[3] Ibid, pp 257-258.

[4] This smart cannonade was led by none other than Captain Alexander Hamilton. It is reported that as the Americans were pulling up the planking of the Newbridge that spanned the Raritan, the young commander continued a sharp exchange with British artillery. It was reported that one redcoat had been killed. Accordingly, this action may have been the first time Hamilton came to Washington’s attention. Some historians believe it was during the rear-guard action during the evacuation of New York City on Sept. 15^, 1776, while others state that Hamilton’s incredible performance at the Battle of White Plains, Oct. 28, 1776, was the first time Washington knew of the youthful artillerist. Only problem with this theory, is that Hamilton did nothing at the Battle of White Plains, the entire episode of him shelling Hessian troops was made up by his son, quoting his father which had to do with the evacuation of New York, a month earlier than the battle.

[5] Fitzpatrick, pp 318-322.

[6] Perhaps a seed was planted for his Crossing on Christmas day which used several Durham boats to traverse the Delaware River.

[7] Ward, pg. 282.

[8] Ibid, 283.

[9] Fitzpatrick, pg. 331.

[10] Pioneers were non-combatants. They drove wagons, provided firewood, built embankments and fortifications, dug and emptied tombs (outhouses), and did the menial camp necessities. Often slaves and reportedly ‘black freemen’, who were often runaway slaves, were used in this work. The British army, under General Henry Clinton, advertised that any black slaves of patriots who made their way to British lines (similar to Virginia Governor Dunbar’s Proclamation in 1775), would be freed. Instead of arming these runaway servants, they were put to work as pioneers.

[11] Ward, pg. 284.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Fitzpatrick, pg. 334.