For over a century, prior to and years after the American Revolutionary War, the Kentucky rifle was the premier weapon of the world. It’s grove-bore accuracy and effective distance literally far outshot smooth-bore muskets. It proved the perfect weapon of the huntsmen who could kill game at up to three hundred yards; incredible when compared to the musketeer who considered himself lucky if he hit his target at eighty yards. This rifle had been introduced into the colonies about 1700 by the immigration from Switzerland and the adjoining German states; but in the hands of American gunsmiths it evolved into a firearm of accuracy, and in the hands of experts some remarkable results were obtained.
The American rifle was developed to fulfill the critical needs of frontier life – namely survival; those whose livelihood demanded that the rifleman returned from the hunt with food for the table. So why, when the military had such a superior weapon at their disposal, did they continue to depend on the more ineffective musket? Throughout the American Revolution and long beyond, the regimental weapon of choice remained the musket, limiting companies of riflemen to mainly probing enemy forces or in support roles. The answer had to do with the rifle’s apparent weaknesses when applied to military tactics of the day.
European armies fought over a terrain whose wilderness had been tamed for countless centuries. Open pastures blanketed the continent in which armies met on a field of battle, not tangled forests. With the introduction of firearms, men were massed in ranks. Each side marched across the field within effective range of their firelocks, often from fifty to eighty yards of their enemy. The order was given and they volleyed or fired as one by ranks. Depending on the situation, one or several volleys would be released before the order was given to either retreat, advance, or charge with the bayonet – a deadly sixteen to seventeen-inch blade attached to the muzzle or end of the musket. Because the smooth bore musket ball tumbled in flight, it rarely hit a direct target when aimed. Military leaders had relied on the mass shooting of the volley to send a wall of lead towards their opponent, hoping that some of the shot would find a mark.
Therefore, there was no need to develop a trooper’s aim, just point in the direction of their enemy and fire. In the excitement of battle, soldiers would often fire high so sergeants and officers instructed their men to fire low. Training focused on quickening the speed of reloading. If one side could fire faster than the other, more damage would be done, weakening their opponent. An officer would hope for three volleys per minute, while four was the exception obtained by crack outfits. When attacking a defensive position, the assaulting force would march as close as they could before firing, often within forty yards. After the enemy volleyed, the commanding officer would either continue volleying or order an immediate charge with the bayonet. They could cover the ground before their enemy had time to reload and thereby overwhelm the defenses.
These tactics, though proven effective for the musket, were basically ineffective for the rifle. There were two main reasons: extended time to reload a rifle and rifles lacked bayonets. By the time a crack outfit of musketeers were able to fire four times, a rifleman would only get off one shot. Even though the accuracy of the rifle meant that they could halt and fire effective volleys from a greater distance – which at times did prove to be an advantage, for the most part this did not occur. By the time the riflemen reloaded – even when firing from a much greater range, the opposing side could close up the distance rapidly and release several devastating volleys or charge with the bayonet and overwhelm the riflemen. Such a charge proved to be a distinct disadvantage to the rifleman as they could not counter a bayonet charge – rifle not having bayonets.
Tactics therefore limited the riflemen to the weapon’s strengths – which required fewer numbers of riflemen than musketeers. The rifle became the firearm to be used undercover where ever trees, walls, or ditches hid the riflemen while he took time to reload – developing guerrilla type tactics. Companies of riflemen would often probe enemy lines and offer ‘hit and run’ tactics’, weakening the enemy, pull back, and hit them again, while allowing their main attacking force to advance. The rifle would continue to harass their opponent from a distance while the main force of musketeers attacked – similar to the longbowmen of medieval Europe. Also, riflemen were effective in sniping the enemy from afar, especially officers. Though accepted European protocol frowned upon targeting officers, the American forces during the Revolution had no such limitation, in fact officers were more often targeted. During the Battle of Saratoga, British General Simon Fraser was pointed out by American officers and fell to a rifleman’s bullet.
In Europe, traditional tactics proved successful time and time again, but had their limitations in America. Vast fields for armies to gather and meet in battle for the most part did not exist in a land of virgin timber and sparse settlements. When hostilities erupted between British forces and American colonists, the established military might of England faced a populace peppered with frontiersmen skilled in the use of the rifle. British General William Howe experienced just how devastating this gathering of farmers and frontiersmen could be against massed British steel. During the Battle of Bunker Hill, June 17, 1775, the British assaulted the main redoubt while their best troops pressed the attack along the American flank in hopes to gain the rear and cave in the American line. The flanking troops marched in traditional fashion and fired a volley before charging with the bayonet. However, they faced Colonel John Stark’s New Hampshire frontiersmen – mostly riflemen who spent a lifetime hitting a target the size of a squirrel at three hundred yards. Stark lined his men up in three ranks. Each man took time to aim and sent his deadly shot right on target. By the time the third rank fired, the first had reloaded and the result was catastrophic for the attacking British. The beach and nearby fields were littered with so many dead and dying redcoats that one could not walk without treading on bodies.
Over time, England dealt with the American’s tendency for rapid ‘hit and run’ tactics by developing their own light infantry battalions and shock troop battalions of grenadiers. These regiments, chosen from among the finest companies of established regiments, moved swiftly and attacked with such proficiency, that they proved highly effective against the accuracy of the long rifle. British companies of rifle became more common as was the use of riflemen in skirmishing operations. Also, the long tradition of German riflemen came into use when additional rifle companies of Jaeger Hessian (recruited from German huntsmen) were incorporated in German and British ranks.
The rifle took its name from the German riffeln, meaning to groove. Grooves were cut into the barrel’s bore which gave the shot a drill-like spinning motion, allowing it to travel a flatter trajectory than the musket ball that tumbled. This allowed the shot to attain the target more accurately and quickly. This principal was not new; the arrow and crossbow bolt were designed to spin by feathers, and the javelin thrower gave his weapon a rotary twist with his hand. Unlike muskets, in which the ball and powder was prepared ahead of time by the use of ‘cartridges’, the rifle’s ball was wrapped in a patch of greased linen or leather and the powder poured down the muzzle. This was one of the reasons the rifle took longer to reload. The patch made the ball fit the tube snugly and at the same time, acted as a lubricant, so that the ball could easily be rammed home. Because it fitted tightly, the rifle bullet had much greater gas pressure behind it than the loose-fitting musket ball. This pressure, together with the small caliber of the bullet, resulted in higher velocity and greater distance.
The Kentucky rifle is considered a distinctly American achievement; however, it cannot be claimed totally independent of the European rifle. European specimens dating back to around 1600 can still be found in museums. Though the American gunsmiths became great craftsman, they learned their craft from European master gunsmiths who had served years of apprenticeship. In spite of its name, which was acquired when Kentucky was a vast wilderness, the Kentucky rifle was made mainly in Pennsylvania by gunsmiths of German and Swiss descent.
By the 1730’s, Lancaster was early developed as a rifle-making center. The Pennsylvania-German gunsmiths were among the most versatile colonial artisans, and their best rifles were works of art. They made rifle barrels of soft iron around an iron core, welding a few inches at a time and withdrawing the rod as the work progressed; they wrought locks with springs of well-tempered steel which represented the highest mechanical and technical accomplishment of the time, and proof-tested the springs severely, for life depended on their quality. Superbly balanced gunstocks were cut of maple, upon which were carved designs in relief that sometimes equaled the fine carvings found on Philadelphia Chippendale furniture of the period. Often the stock was polished with a finish that resembled tortoise shell and enriched it with inlays of brass and silver. The inlays usually had talismanic significance. The crescent moon was the symbol of the Virgin. The heart, which sometimes had the lower tip twisted slightly to one side, was an ancient Christian symbol of the fifth wound of Christ. And the bird symbolized the human soul.
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SOURCES
Grancsay, Stephen V. The Craft of the Early American Gunsmith. The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin, New Series, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Oct., 1947), pp. 54-61 Published by: The Metropolitan Museum of Art.
Loucks, Augustus. York Rifle Company, 1775-1908. 1908: Digitalized from Princeton University, Princeton, NY.
Westwood, David. Weapons & Warfare, An Illustrated History of Their Impact – Rifles. 2005: ABC-CLIO Inc., Santa Barbara, CA.
Wright, John W. Some Notes on the Continental Army, Part. 1. William and Mary College, Quarterly Historical Magazine. Vol. 11, No., 2, (Oct. 1931), pp 81 – 105.
Featured Article Cover Artwork, Care of U.S. Army Center of Military History