No man dare speak. They crept through the woods and marshland, silently lowering themselves into the water, knowing if their musket fell from their shoulder, or they hesitated even a moment, orders demanded they be speared to death. And with still a hundred yards to go before reaching the abattis of sharpened stakes that blocked their path, powder flashes suddenly lit the night. Muskets belched their flame and shot. Cannon roared and pellets of grapeshot ripped through the weeds, water, and flesh. A bloody hell tore through the American columns. Men began to fall – the Battle of Stony Point had begun.
Washington was Desperate for a Victory
By the summer of 1779, the American cause needed a shot in the arm. Congress had run out of money. Inflation was out of control. Patriots across the colonies were floundering in their support for a war that only a third of the colonists had favored in the first place. Enlistments, as always, were expiring and men were not coming forward to re-enlist nor was there new blood as replacements. The war in the south was turning dismal as loyalist troops grew more powerful and bolder in their attacks. And though future historians would praise Washington’s tactics of attrition, by the summer of 1779, the British seemed more content to play a wait and see game. Nestled in New York City was a large, well supplied, threatening army while in the south everything was going the crown’s way in a perpetual land grab. Washington sought, no was desperate, for a quick, brilliant, decisive, victory like Trenton to capture the populace’s attention and resurrect support for the patriot cause. One that could revive, like Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga, “the happiest turn in the struggle.”
And during that critical period in the summer of 1779, when the American Army needed to show colonists and the world its molded professionalism and mettle, he found what he thought was the answer in Stony Point and an elite corps of light infantrymen. To lead the assault against the stony works, Washington picked one of his most dependable officers and veteran fighter, thirty four year old “Mad Anthony” Wayne.
Stony Point was a promontory of rocky land that jutted out a half mile into the Hudson River. It is about thirty miles north of New York City, eight miles south of Forts Montgomery and Clinton, and fourteen miles south from West Point. Some had been fittingly described it as a natural sentinel guarding the gateway of the famed Highlands of the Hudson River. Kings Ferry crossed from Stony Point to Verplanck’s Point, another rocky promontory jutting out into the river slightly north on the east bank of the Hudson. At Stony Point, the river flowed past about a hundred and fifty feet below the precipice and lined its north, east, and southern extremes. The rocky fortification had two distinct defensive lines of abattis (sharpened and pointed timbers). Both southern ends of the abattis lined a beach and wetlands which was under four or more feet of water at high tide. However, though the the 2nd abattis did run south to north across the point to the water level, the first did not, ending before making contact with the northern river bank – a fault that would aide the American assault.
Stony Point was at Kings Ferry, an important crossing that connected New England to the more southern colonies. It was used extensively by Washington’s main army and the army later stationed in the Highlands. In Oct. 1777, the region fell into British hands temporarily, then to the Americans when General Clinton withdrew back to New York City. Nearly two years later, Clinton would once again send a strong force upriver. Approximately 4,500 regular and provincial troops under Major General John Vaughan advanced up the Hudson in a land and sea excursion claiming Kings Ferry on May 31, 1779. Strong detachments were assigned to construct defenses at the Ferry. Stony Point was fortified with abattis, barriers, three redoubts, and fifteen cannon, from 8 inch howitzers to twelve pound cannon mounted in batteries. Across the Hudson, at Verplanck, there was already a small redoubt labeled Fort Lafayette, manned by the Americans which was quickly occupied by Clinton’s forces. Here the 33rd regiment, General Charles Conwallis’ own, fortified the point. When the main British force withdrew south, over six hundred soldiers would be posted at each fort. In both cases the small number of Americans stationed in the region had burned stores and fled before the British.
Washington’s Army Heads North
In late May, 1779, American Major General Alexander McDougall commanded the Hudson River forces stationed at Peekskill, on the east side of the river, five miles north of Kings Ferry and Stony Point. Even before General Clinton advanced up the Hudson, Washington’s information warned him of a possible assault on West Point. He quickly drew his main army up from Middlebrook NJ and marched them north. The bulk of Americans arrived June 6th and encamped throughout the West Point and Peekskill vicinity. From his vantage at New Windsor, New York, seven miles north of West Point, Washington could await developments and plan accordingly. By then the Americans had three corps present to halt any further British advance north:
Major General William Heath commanded General Robert Howe’s Massachusetts and General Samuel Holden Parson’s Connecticut divisions in guarding the approaches on the east side of the Hudson River as far as Continental village;
Major General McDougall was at center, commanding the garrison of West Point (fourteen miles north of Stony Point) and at Constitution (across the river) with three brigades of Massachusetts and North Carolina troops.
West of Fort Montgomery, along the main roads that led north and south in the Queensboro and Doodletown region was Major General Israel Putnam’s Division of troops from Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.
Washington Plans to Take Stony Point, New York
By the tenth of July, Washington had learned enough about the fortifications at Stony Point, number of troops, position of pickets and degree of vigilance—to enable him to draw up a plan of attack in minute detail. Lighthorse Harry Lee’s Legion of 150 troopers and riflemen were assigned to patrol the region and made a complete report of the terrain and defenses. They captured enemy foragers and rounded up deserters to garnish information on the fort’s interior defenses. They also questioned farmers who were allowed to take fruit and vegetables into the fort. Also of importance, Captain Allen McLane approached the fort under a flag of truce and was allowed free reign within the compound. His quick eye determined troop strength, battery placements, and the composition of the two main defensive lines. So too, Colonel Rufus Putnam, formerly Washington’s Chief Engineer, drafted a careful survey of the grounds and surrounding hills, drawing a detailed map for the use by the assaulting force. Lastly, along with his chosen commander to lead the attack, General Wayne, Washington made a personal survey of the fort on July 6th under the escort of Capt. McLane’s riflemen.
Pennsylvanian General ‘Mad Anthony’ Wayne, who received his title not for prowess on the battlefield, but for his spit polish discipline, was an excellent choice to led a night bayonet attack through marshy wetlands. Wayne was an officer a commanding general could count on; one who did his duty to the extreme, no matter the elements nor odds. He had been with the Northern American army during the invasion of Canada. At the Battle of Three Rivers, June 8, 1776, he had led his regiment through an impregnable swamp and successful rearguard action after the failed attack. He demonstrated his tenacity of command when he held the British at bay for three hours during the Battle of Brandywine, Sept. 11, 1777, allowing the American army to withdraw before he was ordered to retreat. Also at the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778, Wayne’s men were abandoned by General Charles Lee and held out against superior British forces until reinforced by Washington. But perhaps most importantly to the planned attack on Stony Point, he had first hand experience of the rapid and highly effective use of the bayonet during a night attack, however twice on the receiving end of its brutal attack. On the night of Sept. 20 – 21, 1777, in what has been called the Battle or Massacre of Paoli, British General Charles Gray ordered his men to remove their flints in a night attack on Wayne’s unsuspecting troops who suffered many casualties. At the Battle of Germantown on October 4th, Wayne’s men soon had their revenge, driving the British troops back with their bayonets. Another brutal night time raid by “No Flint” General Gray against Colonel Baylor’s dragoons, under General Wayne’s overall command, resulted in a sudden and highly successful strike that totally overwhelmed the American camp. General Wayne was in a position to implement the same, rapid and deadly tactic against his adversary that he’d seen used against his own men.
American Force
The proposed corps for the assault was composed of picked men from all the regiments then under Washington’s immediate command. Each regiment contributed companies of 40, 50, or 60 men according to its strength. Four regiments of light infantry were each divided into eight companies. Each regiment, 340 men strong, would be split into two battalions. The total force of approximately 1,300 men would assault the fort in three separate columns from the north, center, and south. At the end of the attack, the corps would be disbanded and each company of light infantry would return to their regiment.
The four regiments and their commanders was as follows:
- 1st Regiment: Colonel Christian Febiger of the 2nd Virginia – six companies of Virginia and two of Pennsylvania troops. The 1st Battalion was led by Frenchman Lt. Colonel Fleurey and the 2nd Battalion was under Major Thomas Posey of Virginia. Febiger was a veteran of Bunker Hill and had been with General Arnold and Colonel Meigs during the assault on Quebec in 1775.
- 2nd Regiment: Colonel Richard Butler of the 9th Pennsylvania – four companies of Pennsylvania and four companies of Marylanders. The 1st Battalion consisted of four Pennsylvania companies commanded by Lt. Colonel Samuel Hay who had served with Wayne since 1776. The 2nd Battalion were Marylanders with a few men from Delaware under Major Jack Steward, a brave Baltimore ‘Maccaroni.’ Colonel Butler was considered the finest field officer from Pennsylvania.
- 3rd Regiment: Colonel Return Jonathan Meigs of the 6th Connecticut – eight companies all from Connecticut. The 1st Battalion was led by Lt. Colonel Isaac Sherman of the 2nd Conn., son of Roger Sherman, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, he had fought at Trenton and Princeton. The 2nd Battalion was commanded by Captain Henry Champion – no field commander was chosen at the time of the assault [a field commander had the rank of major or higher]. Meigs had joined Arnold in the assault on Quebec, was captured and paroled, and led the famed and highly successful raid on Sag Harbor, Long Island in 1777 in response to the British Danbury Raid.
- 4th Regiment, not fully organized at the time of the assault. It was under the command of Colonel Rufus Putnam (who would not accompany the troops during the assault) and was temporarily assigned to Major William Hull of the 8th Massachusetts – six companies from Mass and two from North Carolina. Hull also commanded the first battalion and the second was led by Colonel Hardy Murfree of North Carolina.
Noted missing in the force designated for the attack were troops from New York, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and New Jersey. These regiments had been assigned to Major General Sullivan’s Division who had been sent west to deal with the Native Americans and British Forces attacking colonial settlements.
British Forces at Stony Point
On May 30th, the main British force under the direct command of Major General John Vaughan advanced up the Hudson River from New York City. The 4,500 man force consisted of the 17th, 33rd, 42nd, 63rd, and 64th regiments plus battalions of light infantry and grenadiers units of Loyalists. They seized Kings Ferry on the 31st and construction began immediately on two forts, Verplanck Point on the east side of the ferry and a higher promontory at Stony Point on the west. The 33rd fortified Verplanck and the Stony Point defenses were built by the 64th, consisting of two lines of abattis and several open artillery emplacements with no enclosed works. Unfortunately for the defenders, the artillery emplacements were constructed in such a manner as to prevent the guns from being lowered far enough to fire effectively at close range on advancing forces. This would be a critical factor in warding off Wayne’s attackers as most of the cannon grape shot went high. When the main forces retired from the area in early June, the 17th Regiment of Foot, under its new commander Lt. Colonel Henry Johnson, garrisoned Stony Point along with the 71st Grenadier Company and detachments of provincials and royal artillery – approximately 700 men.
Plan of Attack
The general plan called for a midnight assault that divided the force into a three-prong attack. One would approach silently from the south with muskets unloaded; their only weapon being the bayonet. They would cut through the abattis and swiftly race up the ridge, swarming over the parapet before the enemy could form a counter attack. A northern assault would also attack with unloaded muskets. They would cut through the abattis and drive up the ridge with bayonets only. The center would be a false assault by two companies with loaded muskets. Once the two bayonet assaults were underway, the center distraction was to fire their muskets outside the first abattis, creating a great disturbance. It was hoped that this distraction would draw the enemy away from the inside defenses where the main attack was to launched. If all went well, the force sent forward to confront the center would be trapped between the two barriers and forced to surrender. Ever careful of deserters and spies, only the commanding regimental officers knew of the planned attack. The men would not be informed until in position just hours before the assault. Each of the four regiments were gathered and encamped either to the west south or north of Fort Montgomery so the enemy would not get word of a massed unit of light infantrymen less than a dozen miles from their position.
After consulting a deserter and Wayne’s own observation, he refined his plan of attack. Wayne decided that the main assault should be on the south side of the point along a beach, or rather sunken sand bar in which the marsh terminated. At low tide, the sand bar was usually covered with about two feet of water which could be crossed rapidly. The men would cut across this stretch of wetland, skirt the first line of abattis, and scramble onto dry land at the second abattis. A small detachment or forlorn hope would carry axes to chop through the pointed logs and branches that lined the water’s edge. These twenty men would immediately be followed by an advanced guard of 150 hand picked light infantrymen in a mad rush up the rocky slope. They would leap over the parapet and push through the fort, crying out that ‘the fort is ours’, smothering any effort by the surprised enemy to launch an attack. The main body would quickly follow, capturing batteries and putting down clumps of resistance. At the same time another smaller detachment would attack from the north, also using the bayonet. The same number of forlorn hope would chop through the abattis while 100 light infantrymen would form the vanguard and race up and into the fort so to link up with the southern attack. If all went well, the British defenders would rush a large body forward to confront the false attack in the center. After the two main assaults converged in the fort, they would turn to trap the defenders caught between the two lines of defense.
The 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiment, minus Major Hardy Murfree’s North Carolina companies, would form the right column. This largest detachment that would cross the marsh and advance on the south edge of the beach, bypassing the first enemy abattis and head directly for the second abattis. It was personally led by General Wayne. On the left and north, a smaller detachment of Colonel Richard Butler’s 2nd regiment and the North Carolina troops under Murfree, would follow an old farm lane and cross the marsh over the remains of a bridge directly in front of enemy entrenchments. Butler would then turn to attack the extreme north end of the British earthworks. He would not have to contend with the first abattis which did not extend to the river and focused on hacking through the second abattis which barred his path. Colonel Murfree, whose troops were the only ones permitted loaded muskets, would position themselves center and just outside the first line of abattis. They were not to fire until the other two units began their assault. The officers were to synchronize their watches and launch the attacks simultaneously.
Twenty-man forlorn hopes bearing heavy axes would head the south and north columns, followed by the noted advance guards of 150 men on the right or south and 100 men on the north or left. The advance guards would dispatch enemy sentries, dismantle the abattis once the forlorn hope chopped through, and lead the assault, followed by the remainder of their respective columns. Each man would have to trust entirely to his bayonet to see him through the night alive.
Lieutenant Knox of the 9th Pennsylvania was chosen to lead the forlorn hope on the right and south, and Lt. James Gibbons of the 6th Pennsylvania, would lead the one on the left or northern assault. As to the advance guards, French Lt. Col. Francois de Fleury led the right under Wayne and Major John Stewart led the left under Butler. Any soldier who skulked during the attack or who presumed to take his musket from his shoulder, or attempted to fire without orders, was to be instantly put to death by officers carrying long spears or pikes.
March to Position
The attack was set for the 15th and Washington held off gathering the attacking force as long as possible. Colonel Meigs and Colonel Hull did not arrive at General Wayne’s camp, about a half mile north of Fort Montgomery, until the 14th. The march to the staging area for the assault would cover fourteen miles. They would pass Fort Montgomery, head west for about four miles to the Queensboro district where the road led south for about 8 miles before leaving the road to the east where they were to assemble at the Springsteel’s farm, just over a mile out from the fort’s first defensive line.
Wayne roused his men early on July 15th and ordered them to shave and powder themselves. He and his officers checked weapons and were certain every man’s bayonet was properly sharpened. By noon the inspection was over, but instead of returning to barracks, the men formed in columns and marched south. They soon passed the ruins of Fort Montgomery then turned west towards Queensboro. Several hours passed under a broiling midsummer sun as they trudged along the winding and narrow mountain lanes. The path took them under Torn Mountain and around the base of rugged Bear Mountain and into the back road, which effectually screened them from observation from the river. When they turned south again, the road was ill-repaired and little traveled. Narrow and rough at best, it often became a mere pathway, leading up wild and precipitous hillsides or over deep swamps through dense and sweltering ravines. The troops finally halted at eight o’clock that evening at the farm of David Springsteel, one and a half miles west of the fort, after traversing thirteen hard miles from their original camp. While the men rested, they were informed of the planned attack and spent the next couple of hours preparing and assembling into the three separate attacking columns.
The Attack
Because the fort was thoroughly studied, the selection of troops with the required skills and experience was excellent, precautions were taken against discovery, and officers who timely kept to the plan led the men by example, the attack gained all the Americans had hoped for and more. At 11:30 PM, the corps advanced from Springsteel’s farm, allowing thirty minutes to reach the marshes at the base of the point. When Wayne’s troops gained the marsh, they found that the water covering the beach at the river’s edge was far deeper than anticipated, four feet or more. Wayne knew this would delay any chance of a quick advance, fearing the enemy would discover them and pour down a devastating fire as they waded the two hundred yards in water up to their chests. There was no delay and the men surged into the water. Soon after the advance guard entered, ‘the storm,’ as Wayne called it, broke upon the night. They were discovered by enemy pickets on the opposite bank who instantly opened up with musket and gave the general alarm. Shot began to find the mark and men fell. Cannon grape exploded and the marsh and weeds were peppered under a deadly cascade of hot metal. The column preserved and doggedly bore the deadly fire and pushed through the water. By 12:30 they reached the other side and dry land close to the second line of abatis.
The enemy continued to pour in an incessant fire of cannon balls, grape shot, and musketry. Fleury and Knox of the forlorn hope, in advance of Wayne’s column led with reckless courage. They tore into the abattis with their heavy axes, cutting through the wooden barrier that was quickly pulled down by the advance guard close on their heels. The forlorn hope threw away their axes, unslung their muskets, and rushed uphill. Both forlorn hopes would ultimately sustain over 90% casualties. The advance guard and main body followed closely, clambering over the trunks and stakes and forming on the other side. They passed the outer battery, pushed up the steep and broken slope, and rushed towards the main works at the summit.
At the first alarm, the British artillery manned the batteries and the infantry took to their stations to prepare for the defense. As soon as the British pickets opened up, the North Carolina companies under Major Murfree released a ‘galling fire’ on the center outside the first defensive line. It had the desired affect. Colonel Johnson quickly drew six companies, about half of the defenders from their stations within the fort and hurried down to the outer line under the impression that the Americans were assaulting the center. This considerably weakened the fort’s second line of defense where the main rebel attack would fall.
Colonel Butler’s regiment crossed the marsh at the northern end and rapidly made their way along the northern face of the point without meeting much opposition, He quietly brushed by the first abattis and approached the north end of the second abattis which had to be surmounted. So well had the movement been planned and timed, he was but a few minutes behind Wayne, although they had been separated for an hour. Major Steward, leading the advance guard, directed Lt. Gibbons with the forlorn hope to incline to the right toward the main works while he kept on to the upper side. Gibbon, his clothes “muddy to the neck and almost torn to rags,” attacked the abattis with zeal and forced a path into the face of devastating enemy fire. He would lose seventeen of this twenty men detachment killed or wounded.
The right or southern column reached the summit first. The vanguard struck the works near the rock and flag bastion at the western end and rushed through the sally port or over the parapet. Lt. Colonel Fleury was the first man over the top; to him fell the honor of lowering the enemy’s flag. He was followed by Knox of the forlorn hope with Sergeant Baker of Virginia, four times wounded during the action. On their heels followed the rest of the right column swarming up and over the parapet in a clash of weapons. Americans yelled the prearranged signal of victory at the top of their lungs crying “the fort’s our own,” and for the enemy to lay down their arms. Bayonets and swords were thrust where surrender was not instant. They would not allow the garrison to concentrate or rally, forcing the defenders into scattered groups. Soon ‘Mercy’ and ‘Quarter’ was heard over the turmoil. Two companies of the 17th under Captain Law offered resistance. It was short lived as some of the attackers loaded their muskets. A volley ripped into the defenders, killing the captain; the men quickly surrendered. Major Posey and his battalion pushed across the fort’s enclosure to the northerly side while Febiger seized other points. Colonel Meigs was at the head of his regiment and Colonel Hull followed, overcoming opposition at the east end. They captured the loyalist corps and several parties attempting to retreat.
As noted, six companies of the 17th, about half the garrison, had rushed forward below the outer redoubts expecting to throw back the American’s main attack. They were mortified when a sudden crash of arms and shouts of victory reverberated from behind. Colonel Johnson soon realized he’d been duped, caught between the two lines of defense. He was entirely surrounded with the rebels in possession of their main defenses in the fort. Johnson swung his force around, but was confronted by Febiger who demanded the British surrender. After being assured humane treatment, Johnson personally surrendered to Febiger.
The battle was nearly over. Some of the detached and bewildered defenders attempted to reach their central works only to meet one or the other of the American wings and were quickly overpowered. It took but thirty minutes from the time the beach was crossed to a halt of hostilities. Wayne’s larger column on the right had swept across the interior as Butler’s left column swept along the northern flank and drove parties of the enemy into the clutches of the right. At exactly one o’clock the battle was over. Stony Point was taken. Only one, Lt. Roberts of the artillery, escaped capture by swimming a mile to the anchored HMS Vulture. He informed the captain that the attack was not repulsed. The crewmen had first rejoiced, hearing the heightened battle and shouts of victory, but soon learned the fort was lost.
Fort Taken and Casualties
General Wayne was wounded in the head by a spent musket ball as he encouraged his men past the abattis towards the summit. Rather than allowing his men to remove him from further harm, he insisted that he be helped up the rocky ridge. Soon after Wayne entered the fort, the garrison surrendered. Within an hour he sat and penned a succinct but moving letter to General Washington dated July 16, 1779, 2 O’clock AM: “Dear General. The fort & garrison with Colonel Johnson are ours. Our officers & men behaved like men who are determined to be free. Yours most sincerely, Anthony Wayne.” Washington wrote the next day, “The perfect execution of orders and the superior gallantry exhibited on the occasion reflects the highest honor on the troops engaged.” Once the fort was secured, a detachment of American artillerymen under Captains Pendleton and Barr turned the garrison guns on Verplanck’s Point opposite the river to no reply. They also bombarded the HMS Vulture that was anchored off of Verplanck’s Point, driving the Vulture from her moorings and she quickly slipped down river.
Five Hundred and forty three prisoners were taken. Sixty three were killed and seventy wounded. Of the Americans, fifteen were killed and eight-three wounded, two thirds of the casualties were among the right column that was the longest under enemy fire. General Wayne had twice in the previous two years witnessed the brutality of British General Gray’s savage bayonet attacks – sparing none as his men murdered those trying to surrender. Adversely, the British captives were treated humanely and none who surrendered were put to the bayonet. A discrepancy exists over the number of British killed. Most patriotic accounts listed 63 fatalities. Historian Mark M. Boatner in his Encyclopedia of the American Revolution accepted the British report of 20 killed and many internet articles cite this number. However, Lt. Colonel Johnson wrote to Sir Henry Clinton on July 24, 1779, listing 58 missing separate from killed, wounded, and captured which may account for the additional number killed beyond the British account.
On July 17th, Washington, General Nathanael Greene, and Baron von Steuben rode down to Stony Point. “It was always fresh in Hull’s recollection how cordially the Commander-in-Chief took his comrades by the hand and with what joy his countenance glowed.” Congress would reward the key players in the assault; Wayne, Fleury, and Steward were to receive gold medals and Knox and Gibbon, those leading the two forlorn hopes, were promoted to captain. “Even the enemy applauded the achievement and especially commented on the humanity of the assailants in granting quarter in every case when military custom of the time justified the massacre of garrisons surprised at night.
Washington achieved his desired goal; he had an incredible victory to boost the country’s morale. He had no intention of holding Stony Point, as Clinton’s main army was within a two days march and could besiege it by land and water. His aides Colonels Tech Tilghman and Alexander Hamilton superintended the removal of the wounded and supplies. That morning the prisoners were rounded up and began their march to Easton, Pennsylvania. Stores were collected, cannon removed, and the fort was so dismantled that when the fortification was abandoned, very little was left to the enemy but the bare rock. Washington had also made plans to attack the fortification at Verplanck across the river once Stony Point was taken. However his plans ran astray with misunderstanding of troops involved and several hours were lost. He decided to try a siege with heavy cannon, but there was difficulty bringing the artillery forward and the assault was abandoned.
General Clinton and his main army was at Mamaroneck, NY, on the Long Island Sound about 27 miles south and east of Stony Point when word got to him of Stony Point’s demise. He immediately returned to the Hudson Valley, marching his army to the river and arriving at Haverstraw Bay, just south of Stony Point on the 19th. Clinton reoccupied the fort at once with a larger garrison and strengthened the works. His engineers recognized the defect in their previous defenses and constructed a completely enclosed work at the summit. Clinton would continue to occupy the Hudson Valley up to Stony Point, even when he joined an expedition to take Charleston, South Carolina and the war moved south. With the advent of Spain joining France in the war and with the growing fear of a possible invasion on British soil, England focused more at home defense, sending less troops and provisions to Clinton. On October 15th, he abandoned King’s Ferry and detachments of the American army were at Haverstraw Heights the next day.
Prisoners’ Fate
The British and Loyalist captives were marched off to Easton Pennsylvania. The officers continued on to Philadelphia where they awaited parole and exchange. The rank and file proceeded to Goshen, Pennsylvania under command of their non commissioned officers. An attempt at escape took place while on route resulting in eleven British wound with no record of American casualties. In Goshen, the men were put to work in a shoe factory and other such businesses that supplied war material. The officers were exchanged in December, 1780 while the men were returned by January 1781. Colonel Johnson was exchanged in August of 1780 and was court-martialed at his request for the fall of Stony Point. He was found not guilty and would later serve with General Cornwallis. In a years time he was captured again, this time at Yorktown.
Stony Point Achieved Washington’s Desires
Stony Point Achieved Washington’s Desires
Stony Point had a lasting effect. A professional British detachment of well trained veterans had held a strong, seemingly impregnable position. The fact that the Americans were capable of launching an attack at the end of a bayonet and overwhelm the fortification in just a half hour was humiliated England. Former Royal Governor William Tyron was reined in and the desultory raids against Connecticut ceased. New London was saved from a planned attack. So too was New Jersey spared as Clinton’s midsummer campaign in the north came to an early close. At Stony Point the Americans had suffered what was considered a trifling loss against the near thousand lost to the British, men General Clinton would not be able to replace. In prestige, the American soldier gained immensely. The country at large celebrated the attack and its confidence in the army became more firmly grounded. Washington had outmaneuvered his antagonist in a masterly fashion and still held the Highlands, the key to the Continent. To the country at large, Washinton’s victory had come like a refreshing tonic. Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut toasted Washington: “I congratulate you on our happy success.”
The moral effect was far reaching in the American camp. It showed that patience and discipline were bearing fruit and with such soldiers as the Continental Army, small as it was, would always be a power. No longer would the Revolution be won by the enthusiasm of “a handful of undisciplined yeomanry,” The Continental soldier came to be the equal on any in the field, English, French, Hessian – the best in Europe. In the closing years of the war, on fields like Stony Point and Yorktown, the British regular found that the trained provincial could, and would measure arms with him. If the cause was worth fighting for, men must fight, and the Americans did, as good as it got.
Read more about “Mad” Anthony Wayne and the storming of Stony Point. Check out the following previews on Amazon.
Similar articles also on Revolutionary War Journal
SOURCES
Boatner, Mark Mayo. Encyclopedia of the American Revolution. 1994 reprint: Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.
Hall, Edward Hagaman. Stony Point Battlefield: A Sketch of Its Revolutionary History, and Particularly of the Surprise of Stony Point by Brigadier General Anthony Wayne on the Night of July 15-16, 1779. 1902: American Scenic and Historic Preservation Society, New York, NY.
Heitman, Francis B. Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army During the War of the Revolution. 1914: The Rare Book Shop Publishing Company, Inc., Washington D. C.
Johnston, Henry P. The Storming of Stony Point on the Hudson Midnight July 15, 1779… 1900: James T. White & Company, New York, NY.
Lengel, Edward G. “Bayonets at Midnight, The Battle of Stony Point”. http://www.historynet.com/bayonets-at-midnight-the-battle-of-stony-point.htm
Loprieno, Don. The Enterprise in Contemplation: The Midnight Assault of Stony Point. 2004: Heritage Books, New York, NY.
Pennypacker, Samuel W. “The Capture of Stony Point.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography. Vol. 26, No. 3 (1902), pp 360-369.
Sklarsky, I. W. The Revolution’s Boldest Venture; The Story of General “Mad Anthony” Wayne’s Assault on Stony Point. 1965: Kennikat Press, Port Washington, New York.
Smith, Stephen & Camp Frederick & Barbour Lucius & White George – Attorney Generals. Record of Service of Connecticut Men I. War of the Revolution…” 1889: Hartford, Connecticut.
Tonsetic, Robert L. Special Operations in the American Revolution. 2013: Casemate Publ., Haverstown, PA.
17th Regiment in America. “Stony Point and Captivity” https://www.17thregiment.com/stoney-point-captivity/