General Artemas Ward – America’s First Commander-in-Chief in the War for Independence

“Who?”… is the most common response when mentioning Artemas Ward. With the popularity of sixties iconic TV shows, another’s reply might be, “Don’t you mean Artemas Gordon?”…referencing Ross Martin’s sidekick role on the Wild Wild West TV series that ran four seasons starting in 1965. Of course there might be the more smug response, “Oh, you must mean Charles Farrar Browne, America’s first stand-up comic better known under his nom de plume Artemus Ward”. Maybe… but that guy spelt his name with a ‘u’, not an ‘a’.

But as for the rest of us historical buffs, we know Artemas Ward (Nov. 26, 1727 – Oct. 28, 1800) as the first commander-in-chief of the American Army. Lackluster, ulta-conservative, slow to act, some at the time might say slow to think, he was one who enjoyed eating – a lot. A consummate Puritan politician who put God before country and anything else he could think of, he never did anything rash. He had his critics, often the words doltish, crass, vacuous, and just plain deadpan became common complaints. Many contemporaries blame the loss of Bunker Hill on Ward’s cautious nature not to rush reinforcements and ammunition to Prescott and Putnam when they implored him to do so. (Including George Washington – one reason why the two couldn’t stand each other). But, as things ended up, when war erupted, General Artemas Ward was the right man at just the right time with the necessary skills to keep the American army and the rebellion intact… waiting for the real pros to take over who, as it turned out, pretty much blundered along in the beginning as paunchy Aretemas did.

Many early patriotic leaders, like General Ward and Dr. Joseph Warren, who was killed at Bunker Hill, were soon forgotten after the opening shots of war. Intentional or not, they were unceremoniously slipped between the dusty pages of history, overshadowed by the more flamboyant figures such as Washington, Daniel Morgan, or the boisterous Boston ‘rabble rousers’ like the Adam’s family. But it is important to be reminded of these early, soon forgotten, passionate patriots; those who fanned the embers that flared to rebellion. Each had unique skills that carried a nation towards independence. There were skillful propagandists who roused the masses, erudite lawyers and statesmen who organized a government, veteran military leaders of the recent French and Indian War, merchants who could find both supplies and money to cloth and arm an army, and the land’s husbandry – cannon fodder to stand before British steel, clutching the family’s ancient firelock, most not even knowing how to fire the damn thing let alone hit anything.

As to where Ward’s abilities lay…?  He fought in the French and Indian War, but fell sick and from his bed, watched his regiment march off to battle. He was voted to command his county’s militia, but though popular, never led his men with hawkish fervor – he was not one to call back “follow me boys”. Where then in the cauldron of rebellion did he flourish? It was in government; standing before local assemblies, proclaiming virtues to the patriotic cause while spending innumerable hours mumbling through boring committees as the nuts and bolts of insurrection were hatched out. This is where he made his mark, where his organizational skills shined. It was the meticulous attention to details that helped guide his fellow patriots, but when tasked with leading them into battle, it was his overly cautious nature that also shined. And as some of his colleagues would captiously point out, far too brightly for victory.

By the summer of 1775, Ward pulled together a gaggle of well-intentioned, bumbling farmers into what would become the Continental Army. Nearly eight months earlier, on October 27, 1774, the newly formed Boston Committee of Safety chose General Artemas Ward, a militia officer during the French and Indian War, along with battle hardened but elderly veterans Jedediah Preble and Seth Pomeroy, to lead the newly formed militias in the advent of war. When hostilities did come, General Ward was picked as supreme commander, probably because, at age 47, he was the youngest of the three militia generals. He inherited a haphazard collection of poorly armed, even more poorly trained, undisciplined colonials whose passion for rebellion far overshadowed their military abilities. Except these dogged settlers were damn good fighters when their backs were up against the wall. Something the British learned at Lexington/Concord, and Bunker Hill, where General William Howe helplessly watched his legions mowed down like a giant scythe cutting through the ranks.

Ward may not have been the most exciting and inspiring leader. A stiff-board religious fanatic, as a judge he levied heavy fines if one even muttered a curse word. But with all things considered, especially when hostilities erupted, he offered a cool head to step back and take a deep breath. General Ward never concocted a brilliant plan to drive the British into the sea. Yet perhaps more importantly, he didn’t do anything that could have destroyed his army of amateurs. Early biographer Charles Martyn wrote of Ward as “a life lived in the strength of an unquestioning faith in the Puritan religion, of an intelligence of high order directed chiefly to the practical interests of mankind, of a character distinguished by industry, and patience, and forgetfulness of self, by tenacity of conviction and complete integrity.” We can forgive Charles for some of his lofty descriptions, the times he lived and having been commissioned to write a book about Ward by Artemas’ great-grandson. But he wasn’t far from the truth. Ole’ Artemas did bore everyone in the room to tears while driving hot-blooded patriots to no end with his obstinate and cautious nature. But he cared, deeply, and threw himself fully into the job. After Bunker Hill, though bruised, the British army was nearly equal in number to the rebels surrounding them and remained among the most disciplined and proven fighting force on earth. As such, the overweight, somewhat laid-back Ward would do all he could to keep the status quo, content to watch his enemy from across the river and wait for his replacement.

Historians will agree that General Ward fulfilled his duty. He maintained an army. Militiamen, fathers, sons, even grandfathers remained vigilant outside of Boston; one fighting force to keep the British bottled up in the city. When General George Washington took over on July 3, 1775, he pulled no punches when he described his new command as “a mixed multitude of people under very little discipline, order, or government.”  They were dirty, rowdy, and obstinate, choosing when and how they would answer to an officer. As to Ward, he was dismissed as “a fat old church warden,” who had not the military skills to whip an army into shape.  But no matter how shabby the army appeared, or how justified the new commander was to complain, Ward was able to hand over an army.  A force he led through two ferocious battles, one inflicting the highest number of British casualties for the entire war, while keeping the English ‘hounds at bay’, neatly tucked up in Boston. He relinquished an army to be reckoned with; that of determined men who proved they could fight, and were ready to become soldiers.

After his death in 1800, Ward would fade into obscurity. Historians remembered him mostly as the inept commander portrayed by Washington or not at all. Even the central Massachusetts town named in his honor eventually changed its name to “Auburn.”  Only after his great-grandson, Artemas Ward, commissioned an historian nearly a hundred and twenty years after Ward’s death, did anyone write a biography. As to statues, it took his great-great-great granddaughter to commission a statue in Washington DC, which now sits at the center of a busy traffic circle with no pedestrian traffic… no one to read the inscription that states he was our nation’s first commander of the army.  As to further studies, his great-grandson also donated Ward’s Shrewsbury home as a museum and $5,000,000 to Harvard University on the condition that the university worked to restore the general’s reputation. That was a hundred years ago and only recently have graduate students begun to use the home and its collections as a scholarly resource to do just that… some might argue it took a while.

“A man universally esteemed, beloved and confided in by his army and their country.”

John Adams

Early Life

From birth to death, unless necessary, Artemas rarely strayed from his home of Shrewsbury, Massachusetts.  He would become the town’s and county of Worcester’s leading politician and militia commander. Though the learned councilman proved he wasn’t a military firebrand, he was organized, intelligent, and honest, from which he garnished the respect of his community. Artemas Ward was born on November 26, 1727 “unto Nahum Ward (1684-1754) and Martha Howe (1687-1755), his wife.” He was the sixth of seven children:  Nathum (1713-?), Benjamin (1716-1717), Persis (Ward) Eager (1718-1768), Ithamar (1721-1800), Martha Patricia (Ward) Mize (1724-1797), Elisha Ward (1733-?), and half-brother Damaris (Hutchins)Hapgood (1705-1793). Damaris was a son from Martha’s first marriage to Benjamin Hutchins. He died in 1704 at age 25 – at the time his wife Martha was pregnant with their first child. Martha married Artemas’ father Nahum Ward on Jul 16, 1714 in Boston.

Lieutenant and later Colonel Natham Ward, of his local militia, had been a successful West Indies sea captain in his early twenties. He settled down in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, becoming one of its founders and selectmen in 1717.  He was a land developer, farmer, lawyer, and justice of the peace, holding court in his house. Artemas’ first home, a square frame structure with a big stone chimney and home-hewn oaken timbers, was sold to Henry Baldwin after Ward’s father died. It was soon turned it into a popular hangout for future patriots: Baldwin Tavern.

Schooling

Artemas attended common school in Shrewsbury and was home tutored by Rev. Job Cushing. He helped his father fill out writs and legal papers in which he apprenticed towards a judicial career; one in which he was well suited. Because Artemas was good with writing and numbers, he was admitted to Harvard College in 1744 at age sixteen. At that time the total enrollment was about one hundred students. Artemas studied mainly under Thomas Marsh and John Winthrop. Artemas, as a student, was religiously pure, following a straight and narrow course all through college. It was a preview of his character that he maintained all his life. Artemas never took chances and behaved appropriately, evidenced in his name never having appeared on the disciplined list like so many of his colleagues. When President Edward Holyoke initiated a campaign against swearing and cursing, Artemas stepped up to be the second signature in support. He graduated on July 6, 1748.

After Harvard & Marriage

After he left Harvard, he accepted employment to teach school in Groton, Massachusetts.  He boarded with Groton’s minister, Reverend Caleb Trowbridge. He was soon attracted to the minister’s oldest daughter, Sarah Trowbridge (1724 – 1788), twenty-five and three years his senior.  The two courted and became engaged before Artemas resigned his position in early 1750 and returned to Shrewsbury. He and Sarah were married on July 31, 1750 at the Trowbridge home in Groton. He lived in the Yellow House, west of the meeting-house – thirty-four acres of farm land fronting 500 feet of the Post Road. Ward soon opened a small general store at the site that used to house a shoemaker’s shop.  He sold a wide assortment of items from dry-goods to rum.  The house was purchased by Artemas’ father who deeded it to his son on February 15, 1753. Artemas and Sarah would have eight children: Ithamar (1752-1828), Nahum (1754-1778), Sarah (1756-1838), Thomas Walter (1758-1835), Martha (1760-1781), Artemas (1762-1847), Maria (1764-1833), and Henry Dana (1768-1817).

Early Community Leader and Military Experience

Within a year of moving back to Shrewsbury, Artemas became the town’s Tax assessor on March 4, 1751. A few months later, on June 22nd, like his father, he was appointed Justice of the Peace and set up court in his home. In 1752, the town clerk’s duties were added to his growing list of community service as was Selectman. These were positions he would hold throughout his life, right through the American Revolution and almost up until his death. The selectman’s position alone was held for twenty terms. Throughout his business and personal affairs, Ward’s strict adherence to Puritan values became his guiding light.  On May 16, 1757, he was selected to the General Court. Again, he maintained this position, like selectman, for many years. The Provincial legislature met in Boston, requiring regular trips of some forty miles distant, which Ward traveled by horse, even in winter.  Like his father who was a colonel in the local militia, on January 28, 1755, Artemas Ward was commissioned a Major of the 3^rd Regiment of Militia in the counties of Middlesex and Worcester. He was also a captain of the 1^st company in the town of Shrewsbury. England and France were once again stirring up hostilities and he soon became involved in the French and Indian War.

French and Indian War

After the fall of Fort William Henry to the French on August 9, 1757 and the massacre of over two hundred of the garrison by Native Americans, it was feared that General Louis-Joseph Montcalm would continue south to Fort Edward. From there, the French general would unleash his Native American allies to invade Massachusetts. Thousands of militiamen grasped their firelocks and marched west and north toward Fort Edward on the Hudson River to meet the enemy. Among them were Major Ward and his companies. However, Montcalm, as he did the year before in 1756 after capturing Fort Oswego, he was satisfied in the destruction of Fort William Henry and swung north to Montreal. The militias returned home and Artemas soon took up his legislative duties, including representing his region in the Provincial assembly in Boston.

In January, 1758, Ward assisted Colonel William Williams in forming a new regiment in which Artemas was commissioned a major. This was in support of a planned expedition led by British Supreme Commander General James Abercrombie against the French forces at Fort Ticonderoga (Fort Carillon) and Crown Point. During this time, Artemas was so involved in legislative and military affairs, that his store in his home suffered. He eventually gave up on the business, allowing it to die off.  On May 6^th, Williams’ regiment had its marching orders.  The militia met up with the main British army numbering 15,000 men total – the largest army assembled in America to that point. Among its officers were several who were to be closely associated with Ward in later years: Charles Lee, four years his junior, captain of a company of His Majesty’s Grenadiers of the 44th Regiment; and Brigadier-General Timothy Ruggles, Lieutenant-Colonel John Whitcomb, Major Israel Putnam, and Captain John Stark of the provincial forces.

Campaign sickens Ward

By June 28^th, Williams regiment made the southern shore of Lake George and were preparing to move up the lake by water toward Fort Ticonderoga. On July 3^rd, Ward was promoted to Lt. Colonel. Soon after, he had what was termed “an attack of the stones.” He laid prone in his tent from painful bladder stones while his regiment set off to attack the fort. The main bayonet attack against the French works was conducted by British regulars while supported by the provincial troops. Williams men remained in the forest to the right of center and fired upon the enemy from there. The ill-conceived plan proved a dismal failure. The French under General Montcalm held while British losses in killed and wounded amounted to nearly two thousand. After Abercrombie’s July 8^th attack, the army spent the next several months camped on the southern shore of Lake George.  The harsh environment of wilderness campaigning was devastating to the thirty-one-year-old Ward with heavy-set features.  He never fully recovered and would suffer reoccurring bouts of poor health for the rest of his life. Only after General Montcalm abandoned Fort Ticonderoga and retreated back to Canada, were Ward’s men, on October 24^th, marched home to Worcester and Middlesex.

Leading up to the American Revolution

Ward’s military reputation did not suffer by his illness. On his return to Shrewsbury, he was appointed colonel of his county’s militia regiment, and in 1762, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas. For the next decade, he shouldered a great deal of committee work, for both the crown and later, for the patriotic Committee of Correspondence, including Safety and Supply. Often, he was burdened with crafting responses to various government actions, such as the provincial counter to Governor Bernard’s Stamp Act requirements and later Governor Hutchinson’s take on trade and revenue acts.  Ward continued to distinguish himself with his dogged opposition to royal authority, siding with Samuel Adams, Joseph Warren, James Otis, and other leaders of the Sons of Liberty. He drew the wrath of crown officials and the admiration of patriots.

When taking the floor in debates, Ward was second only to James Otis in speaking against the Revenue acts of Parliament. His discourse was so vehement that on June 30, 1766, Royal Governor Francis Bernard revoked Ward’s military commission as colonel of his regiment. In 1768, Ward won, yet again, election to the Council over Lt. Gov. Hutchinson, however Governor Bernard vetoed the results for Worcester and banned Ward from the assembly.  Ward remained active throughout the turmoil of provincial assemblies that were dissolved by the Royal Governor. He often chaired many of the various committees and assemblies that sprang up in their place.  After the Boston Massacre in 1770, and the relative peace of 1772, Ward was a vigorous member of the Council serving on many committees in various capacities. When the Sons of Liberty erupted in protest against the newly enacted revenue on tea, resulting in the December 16, 1763 Tea Party, Ward and his colleagues were once more in the thick of what was becoming open rebellion. With the closing of the Port of Boston in May, 1774, impending hostilities seemed only a matter of time.

March To War

By October 27, 1774, Massachusetts was preparing for war. A depot was established in Concord to house arms and powder. The Powder Alarm on Sept. 1, 1774 proved that militia’s were ready to heed the call to arms at a moment’s notice. Thousands would converge on Cambridge to beat back a supposed British attack. On September 5^th, the first Continental Congress met in Philadelphia. On Sept. 9^th, the Suffolk Resolves, drawn up by Joseph Warren, became a blueprint for war against oppression and was eagerly adapted by the Continental Congress. After Massachusetts Governor General Thomas Gage abolished the provincial assembly, county committees became common. A Provincial Congress was announced for October 11th in Concord in which a rapid response of young men to arms was adapted labeled ‘minute men.’ Committees of Safety and Supply were created from members of the Massachusetts Committee of Correspondence on October 26^th. It was the job of the Committees of Safety and Supply to provide the leadership, organization, and materials necessary for war. They were also given the power to call out the militia for “the safety and defense of the colony” whenever they felt the need to do so.

Appointed Commander-in-Chief of Massachusetts Forces

On Oct. 27^th, forty-seven-year-old Artemas was selected as one of three commissioned generals of the Massachusetts militias. The other two, Jedediah Preble (67) and Seth Pomeroy (68) had been fierce fighters in the French and Indian War, Pomeroy rising to general of militia – however their age was of concern which overshadowed their advancement after war was declared. The Provincial Congress met again on Nov. 23 in Cambridge and appointed two more generals; John Thomas and William Heath – both men would become major generals in 1776, Thomas in March and Heath in August. After more British troops arrived in Boston, both from England and transferred north from New York City, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress ordered each town to increase training of their militias. By February, 1775, with the spark of war imminent, it became necessary that regimental units could no longer report only to their own officers.  On Feb. 1, 1775, the Provincial Congress met in Cambridge. On the 6^th, it was decided there needed to be a central command that would coordinate a unified response to an attack. A commander-in-chief of all Massachusetts militias would be selected among the five previously appointed generals. Ward got the job a little over two months before Lexington and the ‘shot heard round the world.’

The Provincial Committee met on March 23, 1775 in Cambridge and continued meeting until April 15^th. It was a grueling session as they prepared not just Massachusetts for the advent of war, but the cooperation of other New England colonies. A sixth general officer was appointed; another war veteran, John Whitcomb aged sixty-one. Ward was worn out and returned to Shrewsbury. Meanwhile, there was concern that storing the arms and powder in one location was too risky. On April 18^th, cartloads began to distribute the munitions between the nine local towns. That night, British troops would embark in boats to cross the Charles River and begin their march towards Concord. At dawn, they would confront Lexington’s Militia, about sixty men strong, drawn up in the village green. They were ordered to disperse, and just as Captain Parker ordered his men to do so, a shot was fired and the British regulars fired a volley and attacked with bayonet. War had come to Massachusetts, but by then, the alarm had been spread that the ‘British were out’ and thousands of armed colonists were already advancing towards Concord.

War and General Ward Assumes Command of the Army

Artemas had been ill in bed from his recurring gall-stones when the express rider galloped through Shrewsbury with news of the clash at Lexington. The next morning, April 20^th, at daybreak, he mounted his horse and set out toward Boston, forty miles distant. On Ward’s arrival at Cambridge, he took command of the besieging forces and called the first council of war of the American Revolution.  The commander who took his place at the head of the council table was a man of medium height; clean shaven, of prominent features; too stout for his forty-seven years (some stated too fat to mount his horse, which proved an exaggeration) and at that moment, showing the effects of his recent illness. Three general officers were present – Ward, William Heath, who had been active during the previous day’s battle, and John Whitcomb. Also, six colonels, including William Prescott of Pepperell, who would command at Bunker Hill, and six lieutenant-colonels. Samuel Osgood acted as aide-de-camp to General Ward.

A God- fearing man, Ward strongly believed in and lived up to the religion he professed; quiet, thoughtful, and rather over-stern in demeanor; somewhat slow in speech and with a biblical turn to his conversation, he was inflexible in his ideas.

First Days of Calamity

Not a combative warrior, Ward was overly cautious and painfully slow in decisions, but did prove his organizational skills and ability to look at the whole picture to craft a careful plan forward. That first day, and the next few following, were full of feverish activity and grave anxiety. Guards were posted and earthworks hastily thrown up to bar the roads leading north, west, and south from Boston, and to protect the central position at Cambridge. Messages were sent widespread for gunpowder and weaponry. Generals Thomas and Heath were posted along the road in Roxbury that led to Boston Neck. Several days after these defenses were strengthened as it was believed that if General Gage was to attack, forcing a passage out of Boston, he would do so there. However, there was a larger concern.

Farmers and merchants from all over New England had dropped all they were doing and answered the call to alarm. They had no change of clothing, no food, no money to purchase what they needed.  Once the British were driven back into Boston, they were not equipped to hang around for a long and drawn-out siege. Ward and the Committee of Safety drew up a quick quota system for representing town militias to sign up volunteers to remain. This fell on its face as even before the order could be drafted, men melted away – eager to return home. Ward wrote to the Provincial Congress on April 23^rd, imploring them to act as he was without authority to enlist the men around him, or to pay them, or to hold them in any way. The Provincial Congress responded by declaring it would raise an army of 13,600 and hoped to do so by year’s end.

Struggles to Maintain an Army

This did not solve the most immediate problem for Ward and those trying too field an army. The men present were there to protect their families, not abandon them. While they remained day after day in restless camps, farms and businesses were neglected. Even the young single males felt the tug for home as parents needed their presence to help maintain the farm or the shop.  However, many passionate patriots supported containing the British. Many were hopeful for a negotiated peace. They still saw this as Parliament’s war with few demanding full independence from their mother country.  To help keep them together and enough bodies to preserve the siege, leaders stressed upon the officers to keep the men busy. “The Army Is employed thus,” wrote Jonathan Meriam in the Cambridge lines, “a large number is upon guard night and day; another party Is upon fatigue, or labour, & ye rest perform Duty on the Common from 10 o’clock to 12 o’clock & from 4 o’clock to Sunset.”

Ward was very busy in trying to obtain the necessities of war through extensive letters to local and county leaders. There proved to be a shortage of everything except food. The towns supply ample meat and produce from the countryside as well as raiding the islands in the harbor.  The forming army was most vulnerable the last week of April and first two of May as either men either openly quit to go home, or others who decided to take up the Provincial Congress offer and enlist, needed to go home to set their affairs before returning.

There was a hint of Ward’s desire to project a more aggressive stance. On May 9^th, he and his council of war sought additional men by calling in militiamen from surrounding towns to support the lines at Roxbury. With the added manpower, he’d hoped to seize Dorchester Heights to the south of Boston. This May 9^th Proclamation to take Dorchester did not happen. General Thomas believed that the seizure of the peninsula was too hazardous for his division. Things quieted down in that quarter of the siege as it became apparent that British General Gage had no intention of attacking Roxbury. By May 12^th, Ward’s attention was turned north and to the Charlestown peninsula.

First Consideration of Entrenchments on Bunker Hill

A joint committee appointed by the council of war and the Committee of Safety was proposed “for the purpose of reconnoitering the highlands in Cambridge and Charlestown.”  On May 12th, they advised the raising of breastworks near Prospect Hill on both the north and south sides of the road from Cambridge to Charlestown. So too, they recommended redoubts on Winter Hill and Bunker Hill, the latter being the highest point of the Charlestown Peninsula. The report concluded with the statement that “when these are finished, we apprehend that the country will be safe from all sallies of the enemy in that quarter.” The committee’s recommendations for breastworks near Prospect Hill on the road to Charlestown was enacted upon, however the redoubts on Winter Hill and Bunker Hill were put off.

Bunker Hill’s First Proposal

Colonel William Prescott and General Israel Putnam, along with other veterans, were under the strong opinion that a redoubt should be constructed on Bunker Hill. They believed this would draw out the British upon which they could be attacked on favorable ground. If not draw them out, it would add strength to the ever-tightening siege to force the British to give up the city. Ward and Joseph Warren, President of the Provincial Congress, disagreed. Ward, ever cautious and not willing to take a massive risk, strongly believed that the army was not ready. They did not have enough cannon nor powder for what could bring on a general engagement. It would also take additional soldiers to man any exposed post on Bunker Hill, drawing away from other sectors that jeopardized the entire line. Ward was defiant, he would not budge. After further discourse, it was agreed that Putnam and Prescott would be allowed to construct a redoubt on Bunker Hill, as well as moving to obtain Dorchester Heights, only when the army was deemed ready. Meanwhile Ward focused on equipping a fleet of bateaux and whaleboats to act as fire boats against British ships anchored in the Charles River and the Harbor.

May 20^th , Ward’s commission as supreme commander of the Grand American Army

The Provincial Congress made it official on May 20, 1775, giving full command of the army around Boston to Ward. Within a week, other colonies in New England, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, unofficially did likewise, putting their regiments under Ward’s leadership. Even though Ward was given command of the army, there was no firm documentation nor established formal government that forced the men to obey his officers. Discipline was at an all time low. Men followed orders only if they so desired. If an officer was thought to be too harsh or incompetent, he was ignored. Many of the men still wore the same clothes they had on when they first responded to the Battle of Lexington and Concord. Hygiene was deplorable with many ‘tombs’ or ditches for relieving oneself improperly maintained; the stench becoming unbearable. Sickness began to take its toll. Ward was open to criticism that he did little to rectify this at the time. To his defense, some advocated that he was too busy obtaining desperate supplies while trying to hold a make-shift army of amateurs together. As to issuing orders for better hygiene and to act more ‘soldierly, for those who had no inherent sense of discipline or military duty, it just fell on deaf ears.

Second Continental Congress Adopts Massachusetts Army

The Second Continental Congress was at an impasse as to who should command the growing army outside Boston. Factions declared that it was a New England army and should be commanded by a New Englander. Middle and southern colonies stated that a pretext for their support of a Continental Army depended on it being commanded by a southerner.  On June 9^th, Congress began to accept the New England army as their own. The delegates in Philadelphia asked New York’s Provincial Congress to send 5,000 barrels of flour to the ‘Continental army’ in Massachusetts. A day later, they urged the New England colonies to supply the army with all the gunpowder they could manage; in both cases they promised to reimburse the cost.

On June 12^th, General Ward’s action would have a huge impact on the upcoming Battle of Bunker Hill. He moved Colonel Reed’s New Hampshire Regiment closer to Charlestown Neck. Behind Reed, at nearby Medford, he stationed Colonel John Stark’s New Hampshire Regiments. These were the two largest regiments in the army and among the most disciplined and properly armed. During the coming battle, Stark would soon prove himself as a fearless commander and tactician whose use of three lines, instead of the traditional two to volley, would decimate the attacking British. At this time news leaked to the Americans that newly arrived British General William Howe proposed a plan whereby the siege could be broken.

British Plan to Break Out

On May 25^th, English General Gage had received the greater part of the reinforcements for which he had been waiting. Well equipped, well disciplined, well officered, and headed by three additional famous generals, they felt that their turn had come. The time was ripe to raise the siege. Gage is given credit for the planned attack, however newly arrived General William Howe worked out the details. On June 12^th they finalized orders to take Dorchester Neck south of Boston including Dorchester Heights. Once that was done, troops would march west and attack the colonial forces stationed in Roxbury. A simultaneous attack would be launched across the harbor north of Boston, occupying Charlestown Peninsula. Once secured, that assaulting force would march over Charlestown Neck and attack Cambridge, only three miles distant. The plan was to meet up with the Dorchester force pushing up from the south, totally routing the rebel siege. The British attack was set for June 18^th.

Colonel Prescott ordered to Bunker Hill

On June 15^th, the Committee of Safety learned of the British plan. In response, President of the Provincial Congress, Joseph Warren, sent instructions to General Ward to immediately fortify Bunker Hill and the heights of Charlestown.  Ward put Prescott in command that included about 200 men of Putnam’s regiment under Captain Thomas Knowlton, James Frye and Ebenezer Bridge’s Massachusetts regiments along with Samuel Gridley’s artillery company hauling two cannon; approximately 1,200 men in all. So too, General Israel Putnam accompanied them with wagons of entrenching tools. At six o’clock on the evening of June 16, 1775, Prescott paraded his men in Cambridge before setting out. They made the three mile or so journey in about three hours, arriving the hills near Charlestown at around 9PM. A dispute as to where to construct the redoubt and entrenchments soon broke out between the two principal commanders; Prescott, Putnam, including Gridley (engineer). While their men settled down with nervous anticipation, the leaders’ discussion lasted until near midnight before reaching an agreement. The redoubt and entrenchments would be closer to Boston on Breed’s, not Bunker Hill.  Putnam was still adamant about constructing a defensive position on Bunker Hill, north and further back from the actual battle. His obstinacy carried on right up to and throughout the battle. This raised a problem – not one person was in overall command.

Ward Criticized

Ward would later draw criticism for lack of involvement in the battle. Rather than taking command himself, he ordered Colonel William Prescott to lead the initial units sent to construct the redoubt. In fairness, Ward was justified in his concern that the leaked British plan to break out of the siege was framed around two attacks against the American line; one to the north at Charlestown where he sent Prescott to construct a redoubt, and the other south, over Boston Neck against General Thomas’ men at Roxbury. Even with the redoubt and defenses on Bunker Hill, the British might still launch an assault over Boston Neck against Roxbury. If they were successful, and the lines at Roxbury collapsed, Cambridge would be next and the newly erected defenses at Bunker Hill would be mute if the American army was routed.  Ward could argue that to maintain control of both the siege lines and Charlestown Peninsula, he needed to remain at his headquarters in Cambridge.

Did Ward Ride Out to Bunker Hill on June 16^th?

Ward was also criticized for not having examined Charlestown peninsula prior to ordering Prescott to construct a redoubt on Bunker Hill. Historian Charles Martyn, the first to write a comprehensive biography of Artemas Ward, commissioned by Ward’s, great grandson, wrote that on June 16^th, the day before the battle, at around noon, Ward rode out to examine Bunker Hill before returning that afternoon to Cambridge. His is the only account that places Ward on the peninsula before the battle. Martyn cites a narration printed in the Essex Institute of Historical Collections by Thompson Maxwell; in 1775 he was a 2^nd Lt. in Colonel Reed’s 3^rd New Hampshire Regiment.  Maxwell dictated this narration to General James Miller in 1818 when he was nearly eighty. He places Ward on Bunker hill; however, an earlier narration dictated to a relative, Mr. Gleason, does not. In his later narration to Miller he stated, “I was ordered to Charlestown Neck. About 12 same day, [June 16, 1775] a number of our officers passed us & went onto B. Hill [Bunker]— Genl. Ward with the rest, — returned & went to Cambridge. In the Evening Col. Prescott passed with his Brigade.” Maxwell continued that he and his brother, Captain Hugh Maxwell, along with Hugh’s company, joined Prescott’s force that night. This is historically accurate, confirmed in primary accounts and Swett’s early 1826 text on the battle.

In the earlier narration to Mr. Gleason, Maxwell stated: “June 16. Col. Reed’s regiment stationed at Charlestown Neck. Putnam. Heath, Prescott, etc., on Bunker Hill. In the evening walk on the hill with Capt. Reed. My brother. Col. Hugh Maxwell, engineer, and about 1000 men at work. I drive stakes. June 17, engaged in’action, and retreat to Winter Hill, Gen. Sullivan of New Hampshire, commanding.” Maxwell had been known to exaggeration, particularly with the Boston Tea Party. At first his wording appears obvious that he was an observer. In his later narrative, he was an active participant. Also, in his later narrative upon which Martyn quotes, Maxwell states he heard Putnam call out that ‘the dogs would not come out.’ That is wording that Prescott reported after that battle that Putnam spoke to him.  Ward may have ridden out to examine Bunker Hill before riding back and ordering Prescott to Bunker Hill.  But based solely on Maxwell’s account is not conclusive.

No Single Commander of Bunker Hill Defenses

Ward appointed Prescott to command the redoubt and defend it. He never specified who would be in overall command on Charlestown. As it turned out, there would be four commanders that eventful day, all making decisions based on the situation to their front; Colonel Prescott in the redoubt, Captain Knowlton and Colonel Stark along the entrenchments and fence leading down to the water, and General Putnam, who constantly drew men and supplies from the front back to Bunker Hill where he still planned to throw up a defensive line. This arrangement hampered coordination and manpower, including ammunition, at critical aspects of the battle. Under the situation, it is a wonder the colonists did so much damage to the attacking British before being forced to retreat.

Ward Refuses to Send Reinforcements

After Prescott constructed the redoubt, he was to be relieved the following evening by a force of equal strength — Colonels Nixon, Little, and Mansfield regiments, and 200 Connecticut troops. Early the next morning, June 17^th, Cambridge learned, as did all of Boston, that the redoubt was discovered by the British; the HMS Lively opened fire. Putnam rode in shortly after with news that the redoubt was not erected on Bunker Hill, but Breeds, closer to Boston. At first Putnam agreed with Ward that they should not send the proposed reinforcements until they know for sure what the British were up to. The enemy could still launch an attack on siege lines. Ward had but 4,000 men present at Cambridge and Roxbury. Putnam rode off, but returned within the hour. This time he requested that the reinforcements be sent immediately. Ward refused to budge.  He eventually agreed to order 200 men of Colonel Stark’s regiment to the redoubt. (Stark had the largest regiment in the army numbering 600 men).

At 10 o’clock, Major John Brooks arrived at headquarters. He left Charlestown on foot at 9 AM. Colonel Prescott believed that the British were readying to attack and requested ammunition and reinforcements to be sent at once. Ward refused. The Committee of Safety, which was in session at Ward’s headquarters, also urged that the additional troops be sent. Prominent member Richard Devens demanded that Ward immediately release the requested reinforcements. Ward remained obstinate and refused to change the disposition of his forces or to weaken his center by even so much as a corporal’s guard until the English plans were fully shown. And with a valid concern for low powder supplies, he also refused to dispatch the additional ammunition.  Major Brooks would remain at Cambridge until the last reinforcements were ordered to Bunker Hill. By then the battle would be over.

Ward Orders Reinforcements

Cambridge could hear the warships, gunboats, and the batteries on Boston’s Cobble Hill’s continual bombardment of the redoubt, including Charlestown neck. So too Ward continued to vacillate over the decision to reinforce Prescott at the risk of drawing down his troops on siege lines, particularly General Thomas’ regiments at Roxbury. On top of that, the ‘sulky’ commander was suffering through yet another attack of gall stones. However, by 11 AM, Ward reluctantly relinquishes his stubborn stance on any additional troops to Prescott and orders the rest of Reed’s and Starks’s New Hampshire regiments to Charlestown. Yet he still holds off on dispatching the three Massachusetts regiments under Nixon, Little, and Mansfield, plus the additional 200 Connecticut troops, around a thousand men in all. Unknown to Ward, General Gage had no intention of following through on the original plan designed to lift the siege by a largescale attack against Roxbury. Gage, under the command of General William Howe, was assembling a powerful force to overwhelm the ‘rabble’ on Breeds and Bunker Hills and drive them off the peninsula.

Between twelve noon and one o’clock, news arrived Cambridge that the British have landed a large force on Charlestown Peninsula. This is confirmed by primary sources: Captain Chester of Spencer’s regiment fixed the time of alarm at about one o’clock, Jesse Smith of Nixon’s regiment was similar to Chester’s, Lt. Colonel Storrs of Putnam’s regiment gives the time at noon, and Caleb Haskell, a fifer in Little’s regiment states that ‘the army’ [reinforcements] set out soon after the alarm. With news that convinced the British had shown their hand and Charlestown would be the primary attack, he ordered the alarm sounded. The Massachusetts regiments, including part of Gridley’s regiment of artillery and the remaining companies of Bridge’s regiment set out for Bunker Hill. So too another company of Putnam’s Connecticut regiment as well as a contingency from Colonel Spencer’s regiment.

General William Howe completed his debarkation at Moulton’s Point on the southern portion of Charlestown Peninsula without interruption. His troops consisted of the 5th, 38th, 43d, and 52d battalions of infantry, ten companies of grenadiers, ten of light infantry, and six cannon including howitzers. He eyes Prescott’s command, including the breastworks down the eastern slope towards the water. He saw that the rebel position was stronger than he had thought and decided to hold off the assault. So too, he discovered that the cannon shot was the wrong size for his artillery. He sent back word for more men and proper sized cannon balls. While waiting, he ordered his men to break for lunch. By 2 PM, nearly two hours after he had originally arrived, Howe’s reinforcements were packed in barges and heading towards Charlestown Peninsula.

This decision to hold off the attack allowed the New Hampshire and Massachusetts troops, with additional Connecticut detachments, to arrive the battlefield in time for the general attack.  Back in Cambridge, Ward learned that additional British troops ware being sent over to Charlestown. This confirmed that there was little danger that General Gage would attack Roxbury or Ward’s center. To his credit, Ward ordered several Massachusetts regiments onto Charlestown. They included those commanded by Colonels Paul Dudley Sargent, Jonathan Ward, John Patterson, and Thomas Gardner. So too sixty-ne year old Seth Pomeroy, veteran commander during the French and Indian War and one of the original three generals commissioned by the Committee of Safety, borrowed a horse and rode to battle.

Of the regiments sent to Prescott’s aid, many never made it to the front lines along Breed’s Hill. Some companies failed to cross Charlestown’s Peninsula due to severe bombardment by British gun boats.  Colonel Mansfield did not march his men across the neck. Neither did Colonel Scammans, who commanded a large regiment from Maine, who dallied on Cobble Hill before crossing to Bunker Hill where he immediately ordered his men to turn about and retreat. [Scammans would later be court-martialed]. Others got as far as the summit of Bunker Hill where General Putnam was busy trying to dig another defensive position and went no further.  By the time the battle started, there were more men with Putnam, safely cowering behind Bunker Hill, than up front, confronting the attacking British. To Stark, Reed, Nixon, Sargent, Paterson’s credit, including other regimental commanders, they continued on past Bunker Hill and descended to Breed where they either took up positions in the redoubt or along the entrenchments and wooden fence stretching down to the water. Stark’s regiment would construct a stone wall right up to the water’s edge and defend the beach, where they decimated Howe’s light infantry in a failed flanking attack.

Battle of Bunker Hill and Withdrawal

Howe’s additional troops arrived; three more companies of grenadiers and light infantry including the 47^th battalion of marines who landed under the eastern end of Breed’s Hill at Madlin’s shipyard. By around 3 PM Howe ordered his men forward. Twice the British would be beaten back by a hail of accurate shot, cutting down entire lines of assaulting troops. By the third and final attack, Howe ordered his men to discard their heavy haversacks. He would no longer try and flank the fort by attacking the entrenchments down to the water. The main assault would concentrate on the redoubt with feints along the rest of the line. His men raced up the hill at the point of the bayonet and into less fire. By then, the rebel powder and shot was nearly gone. Americans pulled back as redcoats surged over the redoubt’s six-foot embankment.

Colonels Stark, Reed, and Knowlton, seeing the redoubt overrun, ordered their men to pull back. Most of the American casualties occurred in the redoubt as the defenders tried to make their escape out the back and up Bunker Hill to where Putnam was stationed with a large contingency of men. It was at this moment that newly commissioned General Joseph Warren, President of Massachusetts’s Provincial Congress, was shot in the head and died instantly. He had ridden to the redoubt just before the battle began, acting as a common soldier by refusing Prescott’s offer for him to take command. Prescott would be among the last to leave the redoubt, fending off several attacks by British Regulars with his sword.

Casualties and Immediate Aftermath

The British had suffered 1,054 casualties, 226 dead and 828 wounded, over the weeks and months, many of these would die of their wounds. A disproportionate number of casualties would be officers, nearly a hundred; they were basically irreplaceable.  The casualty count would prove to be the highest suffered by British in any single encounter during the entire war. Of the Americans, there were approximately four hundred and fifty in which one hundred and forty were killed. Thirty were captured, most of them with grievous wounds; twenty died while held prisoner. Besides the loss of entrenching tools, most of the rebels came off with their muskets, however five of the six cannon brought onto the field were lost.

It was a British victory. They cleared Charlestown Peninsula and maintained a garrison on Bunker Hill until the new supreme commander, William Howe, abandoned Boston on March 17th, nine months to the day after Bunker Hill.  British General Clinton, with a nod to Pyrrhus of Epirus, wrote in his diary that “a few more such victories would have shortly put an end to British dominion in America.” One aspect of the battle that became apparent, had reinforcements not arrived when they did, just prior to Howe’s assault, there is little doubt that the British would have gotten behind the redoubt, forcing Prescott to give up his command, no matter how strong the garrison proved. With the addition of Stark, Reed, and other commands that filtered down from Bunker Hill, the colonials were able to beat back Howe’s attempt to flank the fort. The British would not follow through with an attack after taking the Peninsula. Besides a few minor skirmishes and frequent artillery duels across Boston Neck, they would remain bottled up throughout the winter while London decided the next step.

Ward Chosen Second in Command of the new Continental Army

 After the battle, there were some criticisms of Ward grumbled among some of the officers and in camp. It mainly had to do with lack of support for Charlestown prior to British assault. It would dampen but not hinder the support of fellow New Englanders who pressed that Ward be given a high command in the new Continental Army. John Adams was Ward’s biggest fan in Congress – mainly because he had pushed for a New Englander to be given supreme command. When it was given over to Washington, a southerner, Adam pushed aside Charles Lee’s bid for second in command to see that Congress handed it to Ward. On June 15^th, two days before Bunker Hill, it was official; Washington was commander-in-chief with Ward his second, Lee third, followed by Schuyler and Putnam. Cambridge was notified of this on June 24^th, Washington and Lee were in route and would arrive in little over a week.

On July 2^nd, Ward entertained the two new commanders at headquarters and the next day, the troops assembled for Washington’s review. He later publicly commented that he found an army in disarray. Dirty, independent, defiant, discipline scattered among regiments depending on individual commanders, and noncommittal – many coming and going as they pleased. Ward would take personal offence which affected the two men’s relationship for the rest of their lives. Though Washington’s criticism was harsh towards Ward and his staff, he was handed over an army when it could have easily vanished prior to the Continental Congress declaring its existence.  Two and a half months earlier, five days after the Battle of Lexington and Concord, April 24^th, General Ward wrote to the Provincial Congress. He informed them that unless they furnished him with enlisting orders immediately, he should be left entirely alone. They did so, and the Continental Congress ended up with an army.

Ward Remains with the Army

Washington divided the new army into divisions, each with two brigades with a major general commanding and two new brigadiers under him. Lee would be given the left siege line from Cambridge north and east to Charlestown. Ward was given the right and the all-important duty of guarding Boston Neck and Dorchester, which was considered the greater risk of British attack. When Henry Knox brought up the cannon from Ticonderoga the following spring, Ward was given command of the artillery and men positioned on Dorchester Heights. With cannon that could level every building in Boston breathing down their necks, it would prove the end of British occupation. On March 17, 1776, Howe pulled anchor and most of the ships sailed for Halifax, Nova Scotia to wait on London’s next move. Due to fears of small pox, only soldiers who had been infected prior to or inoculated entered the city right after the British left. Ward was given command of the first American troops to enter the city and by March 20^th, Boston was deemed safe. Two days later, Ward offers his resignation.

Peer Criticism of Ward’s Actions During the Battle of Bunker Hill

One of the early critics of Ward was expressed by Colonel Paul Dudley Sargent of New Hampshire. He expressed his opinion that had Ward “marched the whole of his troops then in Cambridge to Charlestown not one of the enemy would have escaped, but instead of that he only walked Hasting’s front yard the whole day.” [Hastings House was Ward’s Headquarters at Cambridge]. Several officers were incensed against Ward because he “never so much as gave one written order that day.”  Though many orders that day must have been expressed verbally, it is interesting that only one written order was recorded in Ward’s Order Book for June 17; that to General Thomas for ordnance to be sent to Cambridge.  Henry Dearborn was a captain in Colonel Stark’s 1^st New Hampshire Regiment at Bunker Hill. He complained about Ward’s actions that day stating “nothing like discipline had entered our army at that time. General Ward, then commander in chief, remained at his quarters in Cambridge, and apparently took no interest or part in the transactions of the day.” James Warren of Plymouth became president pro tempore of the Provincial Congress after Dr. Warren’s death at Bunker Hill. He proved to be an enemy of Ward in several letters to various dignitaries, this one to John Adams on June 20, 1775: “Had our brave men, posted on Ground injudiciously at first taken, had a Lee or a Washington instead of a General destitute of all military Ability and Spirit to command them, it is my Opinion the day would have terminated with as much Glory to America as the 19th of April.”

Historians add their criticism of Ward

Several early historians accused Ward of hesitancy and indecision during the Battle of Bunker Hill. Samuel Swett, champion of Putnam, penned in 1826 that “Prescott repaired to Cambridge, furious as a lion driven from his lair, foaming with indignation at the want of support when victory was in his grasp…” Richard Frothingham, wrote in 1875 that “General Ward was not sufficiently supplied with staff-officers to bear his orders; and some were neglected, and others were given incorrectly.” David Pulsifer wrote in 1872 that “General Ward was without staff officers to bear his commands, excepting one aid and a secretary… Loss and neglect of orders were the inevitable consequence” He also added that “It was not till the battle was near over, that General Ward ordered down his own regiment, Putnam’s, and Sargent’s, But before they could arrive the battle had ended.” George Bancroft, famed 19^th century English historian, was brutal in his criticism of Ward citing James Warren among others. Even poets got into the act. Richard Emmons 1839 lengthy poem on the Battle of Bunker Hill included the stanzas: “Ward cautious in reply – My thoughts suggest — Twill be too bold to venture on the crest. – Of yonder summit. Their batteries, their fleet – Would presently our rude designs defeat. – More prudent would it be to here maintain – Our posts, and strengthen our defensive chain.

Ward Resigns but Remains with the Army

Ward’s health had deteriorated since the start of 1776 due to the daily rigors of command. Once the British were driven out of Massachusetts, Ward decided his work was done and wished to return home to Shrewsbury. Washington received Ward’s resignation on the 22^nd of March. A copy was also sent to Congress in Philadelphia who accepted it the following month. By all accounts, Washington was apparently glad that Ward decided not to stay, but hoped he remain for a spell longer.  The commander-in-chief was preoccupied with reports that Howe’s departure was only temporary and that New York City should expect an invasion by the summer. He needed to shift the army south, but also had to keep a post in Boston. Washington wrote to Ward, asking him to stay temporarily. Ward agreed and was officially given the command of the Eastern Army on March 29^th with the understanding that he would keep the position until a proper replacement was assigned. Washington left for New York on April 3^rd leaving behind five lean regiments – two in Boston, one at Charlestown, one at Dorchester, and one at Beverly to guard prize ships and their cargos.

Ward continue to suffer from his recurring bladder stones. He sluggishly kept busy by reconditioning all the coastal forts; ‘fort hill’ in Boston, Charlestown Point, Castle Point, Noodles Island, and Castle Island, many with a number of heavy cannon mounted to defend against a sea attack. At the end of April, Washington had reports that the work on the region’s defenses were ‘exceedingly slow’ and notified Ward of the matter. By early May, Washington wrote that he heard that defenses at Bunker Hill and Dorchester Heights were inadequate. Throughout, Ward continued to write to Congress requesting his registration be finalized and his replacement sent. He was cognizant of his ability to continue writing “I cannot be content to continue in office when I am conscious, I am not able to do the duties.”  Congress accepted his resignation on April 23^rd, and Ward, on May 4^th, shot a letter to Washington saying: “The sooner I am relieved the more agreeable it will be to me, as my health has declined much this Spring.”

The summer of 1776 saw an invasion of New York to the south and an American disaster in Canada. Ward had to send off two regiments leaving only three to defend the Boston region. Militiamen were called up to fill in the gaps. Washington suffered a dearth of experienced officers and even though Ward’s sickness confined him to his bed, there was no replacement available. Ward’s health improved slightly over the winter months, but by January 28, 1777, Ward was reminding Congress of the need for his replacement. Ward also rejoined the local legislature with his selection to the state’s General Council, though due to health concerns, he attended few meetings. Finally, with the promotion of brigadiers, Major General William Heath was assigned to the Eastern Army and Ward was relieved on March 20, 1777.

Massachusetts Council and Delegate to the Continental Congress

Back in Shrewsbury, Ward devoted full time to the state Council. Over the next three years, he missed few meetings and served as president on more than one occasion. Between July and August, 1779, the Americans launched an expedition against the British at Penobscot, Maine, which was part of Massachusetts. It was a dismal failure with the loss of the entire American fleet but for one vessel. Ward was chosen to head an investigation of the disaster and on Oct. 7^th, determined that Commodore Richard Saltonstall ‘was the principal reason for the failure’ of the expedition. So too Paul Revere, a commissioned Lt. Colonel of artillery, was found ‘censurable for insubordination.’ On November 18, 1779, the General Court elected Ward to represent Massachusetts as a delegate to the 1780 Continental Congress; joining Samuel Adams, John Hancock, and Elbridge Gerry.  Ward left for Philadelphia on May 16, 1780.  June 14^th was his first day in Congress at Independence Hall. He would labor in Congress for a full year, departing for home on June 18, 1781. On June 22^nd, while on his way home, Ward was elected to another term in Congress, however because of ill health, he declined.

National Civil Servant. Ward served continuously with the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1779 through 1785, being elected speaker in 1785. He was not affiliated with the Massachusetts delegation to the 1787 Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia. In 1788, he was chosen as one of the nine councilors who advised the state’s governor. In December of that year, he ran for the United States House of Representatives and lost. So too December brought grief with disappointment. His wife, Sarah, aged 64, after years of marriage, died on December 16, 1788.

Ward spent the greater part of 1789 and 1790 in semiretirement on his Shrewsbury farm. By the fall of 1790, he was again a candidate to represent the Worcester district in the Second United States Congress and House of Representatives. This time he was successful, eventually serving two terms. He set out for Philadelphia in October, 1791, having missed the opening session that met on March 4th, 1791, at Independence Hall. (The First U. S. Congress had met in New York City at Federal Hall). He traveled by stagecoach rather than horseback as he had done eleven years earlier when attending the 1780 Continental Congress. Ward would align himself with the Federalists, supporting George Washington, John Adams, and Alexander Hamilton. Though Ward supported Washington politically, after 1775, he and the Virginian were never close. In fact, Ward did all he could to avoid Washington, claiming publicly that he never liked the man.

Retires from Public Life

The Third Congress dissolved on March 3, 1795, and General Ward welcomed Its end as the self-appointed termination of his political career. He wrote to his son Henry Dana: “…and this day finisheth my public political life. I shall now return to the private walks of life, and spend the few remaining days of my Pilgrimage … in solitude…” Though retired from consideration for national and state appointments, he continued to preside as chief justice of the Worcester County Court of Common Pleas for another three years. By the summer of 1797 General Ward had begun to feel that his strength was unequal to his judicial duties. On June 12, writing to his daughter Maria: “…I shall soon leave that Court [Court of Common Pleas] and confine myself at home. I am old & infirm, it is time for me to quit the theatre of action, and while I remain here live a domestic life.” He sat in court for the last time during the session of December, 1797, and soon after terminated his long career as a judge. He spent the remaining two years of his life in quiet retirement in his home, presently known as the Artemas Ward House.

Last years and Death

In 1798, his health continued to decline, now including advanced stages of painful gout. On July 18, in a letter to his daughter Maria he writes: “I have been much unwell. For four months I have not been one hundred rods from my house… I am an old man upwards of seventy years of age… We are told in scripture that threescore and ten years is the age of man; beyond that is grief and pain.” On March 6, 1799, again to Maria he wrote: “My health is no better than when you saw me last, I have not been one hundred rods from my own house for more than twelve months. I have just recovered from a verry ill turn.” In November, 1799, he suffered a paralytic stroke and was unable to dress or undress himself. On March 20,1800, he suffered another stroke. By Tuesday, October 28^th, he lay dying. His son Thomas wrote Maria that “he is past speaking or taking anything unless it be a little water to wet his mouth.” He died a little before seven PM that day in his home, October 28, 1800. He was buried on the afternoon of the following Friday, October 31st, in Shrewsbury’s Mountain View Cemetery. He was interned next to Sarah, his wife of thirty-eight years, who predeceased him on December 16, 1788.

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RESOURCE

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Ellis, George Edward. Sketches of Bunker Hill Battle and Monument. 1843: C. P. Emmons, Charlestown, MA.

Emmons, Richard. The Battle of Bunker Hill, Or the Temple of Liberty, An Historic Poem in Four Cantos. 1839: Sackett & Sargent Printers, New York, NY.

Fleming, Thomas J. Now We are Enemies, The Story of Bunker Hill. 1960: St. Martin Press, New York, NY.

Frothingham, Richard.  The Battle of Bunker Hill.  1875: Little Brown & Company, Boston, MA.

Mass Moments – A project of Massachusetts Humanities.  “October 28, 1800.

Martyn, Charles.  The Life of Artemas Ward The First Commander-in-Chief of the American Revolution.  1921: Published by Artemas Ward – great-grandson, New York, NY.

Maxwell, Thompson.  Historical Collections of the Historical Institute Vol. VII June 1865   No. 3.  “The Narrative of Major Thompson Maxwell Compiled from MSS Written from his Dictation in 1818 to General James Miller and Lt. Allanson.” 1865: Swasny’s Job Office, Salem, Massachusetts.  May 20 Found on American Archives.

Maxwell, Thompson. Narrative of the Military Life of Major Thompson Maxwell.  Reprinted from N. England Historical and Genealogical Register for Oct., 1833 by Mr. Gleason, 1891: David Clapp and Sons Printer, Boston, MA. Found on American Archives.

Phillips, Kevin.  1775, A Good Year for Revolution.  2012: Penguin Group, New York, NY.

Pulfiser, David. An Account of the Battle of Bunker Hill. 1872: A Williams & Co., Boston, MA.

Revolutionary War Commander Artemas Ward Dies https://www.massmoments.org/moment-details/revolutionary-war-commander-artemas-ward-dies.html

Swett, S.  The History of Bunker Hill with a Plan 1826: Munroe and Francis, Boston, MA.