Battle of Whitemarsh: Washington Dodged a Bullet

The Battle of White Marsh, December 5 – 8, 1777, also known as the White Marsh Affair or Battle of Edge Hill, was a series of large, heated skirmishes that occurred over three days between the main armies of General George Washington and British General William Howe. This series of clashes between opposing forces was the last major event before Washington marched his tired and ill-supplied army to winter camp at Valley Forge; December 19, 1777. Twenty-three miles northwest of Philadelphia on the Schuylkill River, Valley Forge was ideal to keep a close eye on British forces who had withdrawn to the city while hampering the enemy’s foraging sorties into the countryside.

Preview to Battle

After Washington failed to stop the British army’s advance towards Philadelphia at the Battle of Brandywine Creek, Sept. 11, 1777, he abandoned the city and moved his army up the Schuylkill River. Soon after Howe claimed Philadelphia on Sept. 26^th. He set up his headquarters in Philadelphia, but positioned the bulk of his regulars at Germantown, just northwest of the city. By early October, Washington saw an opportunity to take the offensive. He advanced his army on the night of October 3^rd and in the early foggy morning hours of Oct. 4^th, launched a major surprise attack against the British at Germantown. At first driving back Howe’s forces, Washington’s men became confused in the fog with regiments firing upon each other. So too, the drive was stalled when the Americans tried to pry a company of British regulars from the Cliveden House. This gave Howe time to rally his men and force the Americans back.

After Germantown, the two armies cautiously remained close; Washington hoping to keep the British in check while Howe explored opportunities for a ‘winner take all’ battle. Always the cautious general, October 19^th saw Howe withdrawing his regulars into the city where he began construction of fourteen redoubts for defense. Two days earlier, the colonists’ cause for independence received a tremendous boost when British General John Burgoyne’s surrendered his army at Saratoga in northern New York on October 17, 1777. The event that moved France closer to an alliance with the thirteen colonies was celebrated in the American camp; this news did not reach Howe until November 5^th.

Washington immediately ordered several regiments from the northern department south to beef up his command around Philadelphia; most particular Daniel Morgan’s riflemen. With this in mind, on Nov. 2^nd, the America army shifted closer to Philadelphia and set up camp at Whitemarsh, about 13 miles northwest of the city. Picks and shovels became active as a strong defensive position was etched out of a series of hills facing the Wissahickon Valley and roads up from Philadelphia. When General Horatio Gates, commander of the northern department dragged his feet in releasing the ordered brigades, Washington, on October 30th, sent his erudite aide, Alexander Hamilton to pry these troops loose. Having done so, Hamilton headed south with the required men. But General Israel Putnam of the Highlands Division threw a wrench in the works when he tried to lay claim to the same soldiers. It was not until the end of November before these vital troops finally arrived.

Ever since the British claimed Philadelphia, two American forts positioned south of the city along the Delaware River blocked British shipping from resupplying the army. Fort Mercer, about 12 miles south of Philadelphia on the New Jersey shore, and Fort Mifflin, mid-river just off from Fort Mercer on Mud Island. On September 26^th, the Royal Navy began bombarding Fort Mifflin. On October 22^nd, Howe sent a large Hessian force across the Delaware to capture Fort Mercer. Labeled the Battle of Redbank, the Hessians were successfully repelled with large casualties by the first and second Rhode Island regiments. Howe was determined to take Fort Mercer before the river iced over and sent General Charles Cornwallis to New Jersey with 2,000 British troops. To counter, Washington ordered General Greene’s division of five brigades across the Delaware into New Jersey to counter General Cornwallis’ movements with orders to attack if seemed appropriate.

While General Charles Cornwallis marched south toward Fort Mercer, Fort Mifflin had spent weeks withstanding the largest bombardment of the war. It was finally abandoned on Nov. 16^th.  Colonel Christopher Greene (nephew of Major General Nathanael Greene) commanded Fort Mercer. As a determined Cornwallis neared, he saw the writing on the wall and evacuated the fort two days later, on November 18^th. With both forts in British hands and the river cleared for British shipping – General Howe could turn his attention back towards Washington’s army. He ordered Cornwallis to return to Philadelphia. With the entire British army once more in Philadelphia, Washington ordered General Greene to camp at Whitemarsh, leaving a small portion to aid New Jersey militia against foraging raids by British troops.

By early December, Howe had not received reports that General Greene had returned to the main army. With the weakened American army so near at hand to Philadelphia, Howe decided to attempt a resounding blow against the American forces before the advent of winter. He would march the cream of his army from Philadelphia on December 4^th and confront the Americans at Whitemarsh. The desire was to draw the American leader from his defenses and force him into a ‘general engagement’, 18^th century term for a major battle. But Greene was quick to respond to Washington’s orders and on December 1^st, his five brigades rejoined the army. But most importantly, the redcoat leader’s plans had been let out of the bag, and Washington had time to prepare.

Washington’s Spy Network in Philadelphia Pays Off

The Whitemarsh battle opened with a flair of cloak and dagger nearly a week before the first shots were fired. A spy had bravely slipped through British lines and reported the redbacks on the move. On November 28^th, with General Greene’s division still in New Jersey, Washington contacted his intelligence officer, the colorful dragoon Captain Allen McLane, and asked him to keep a sharp vigilance of a possible British attack writing:  “I have certain information that Lord Cornwallis returned from Jersey yesterday it is said they intent an attack upon the army with their joint force before General Greene can rejoin us. I therefore depend upon your keeping a very good look out upon their line, and gaining every intelligence from people coming out of town, that I may have the earliest notice of their movements or intentions.”

The certain information Washington received was supplied by one of his officers, Major John Clark, in charge of a spy network that was left in Philadelphia when the rebellious Americans vacated the city. Residents of the city were frequently allowed to leave under British military passes to require necessary items from the countryside. Clark’s operatives informed him that the regular soldiers had been ordered to pack for two days rations and to stand ready for further orders. Also relayed to Washington were reports of many wagons and substantial supplies being readied, indicating an army about to march. What Washington did not have was the strength of Howe’s planned attack and a date. That was soon remedied.

Within a week McLane would reply: “Sir, Every Intelligence from the city agree that the enemy is in motion and intend a Grand stroke. Last night [either side of midnight Dec. 4th] they gave out that a body cross Schuylkill and to cover the deception they kept, their wagons and artillery moving through the city all this night this moment I received a few lines from my old friend I have good reason to believe that he keeps a good look out, and gives the best intelligence. I remain on my guard Excellency…”

How the information detailing Howe’s plans for a sudden attack on Washington’s forces at Whitemarsh was the stuff of clandestine novels. McLane never named the source of his ‘old friend.’ Alexander Garden, who had been in Lightfoot Harry Lee’s Legion of light horse, was the first to give substance to the identity of Captain McLane’s friend that kept a good look out and gave the best intelligence. According to Garden, this old friend was not a he, but a she. He stated that McLane’s source was a female “who, under some frivolous pretext, had passed the British lines…”

As the story goes, Quakers Lydia Barrington Darragh and her husband William Darragh had immigrated to Philadelphia from Ireland. When the British claimed the city, General Howe set up his headquarters at former governor William Penn’s handsome house on Market Street, across the street from the Darraghs’ residence. The Darraghs had housed General Howe’s adjunct general; whereupon meetings with senior British staff often occurred within their home. On December 2^nd, Lydia was instructed to send her family to bed early. Once done, she tiptoed to the door where the British officers were meeting and placed her ear to the key hole. She listened in on General Howe and his staff discussing their plans to attack Washington’s army. The next morning, Lydia requested and received a pass to go to Frankfort, outside the city limits, to a miller to obtain flour. She passed through British lines, left her bag at the mill, and hurried northward to meet McLane. After informing McLane of Howe’s planned attack, she returned to the mill for her flour and re-entered the city unsuspected.

John Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835 and wounded veteran of the Battle of Germantown, supported McLane’s personal involvement in obtaining details of Howe’s planned attack and informing Washington.  In his 1832  history of George Washington, he mentioned the intrigue and actions of McLane’s service at what became known as the White Marsh Affair. He wrote: “The opinion that Sir William Howe mediated an attack on the American camp, was confirmed by unquestionable intelligence from Philadelphia. On the 4^th of December, Captain McLane, a vigilant officer on the lines, discovered that this design was to be immediately carried into execution, and communicated his discovery to the commander-in-chief. Though Marshall does not name from whom McLane received this vital information.

The validity of McLane’s covert connection to Lydia Darragh was based solely on Alexander Garden’s primary statement. As such, it has been tagged by historians as an unsubstantiated story. Garden did not join the service until near war’s end and after McLane had retired. Therefore, his information would be considered secondary; having relayed it after the war as hearsay. However, the story itself has two other primary sources: Ann – Lydia Darragh’s daughter, and Elias Boudinot, Washington’s Commissary of Prisoners.

• Ann, Lydia’s daughter, is the only source that gave the account of her mother listening in through the keyhole to obtain the critical information that was later given to American intelligence. Ann stated after her mother obtained the information, she set out early on the morning of the 3^rd and walked several miles before arriving at the Rising Sun Tavern, north of Philadelphia. There she ran into Thomas Craig, of the Pennsylvania militia and an acquaintance of her son Charles. She passed on the information to Charles who relayed it to Washington.
• Elias Boudinot, Commissary of Prisoners, told a different story. While at the Rising Sun Tavern, “…a little poor looking insignificant old woman came in and…walked up to me and put into my hands a dirty old needle book, with various small pockets…” Later, when Boudinot searched the needle book, as written in his journal, he found a small sheet of parchment rolled up in the form of a pipe shank. Within was the information on Howe’s planned attack. He in turn reported it to Washington.

What Elias Boudinot’s source gave us was the reported size of General Howe’s force. He wrote in his journal that “On unrolling it [roll of paper in Lydia’s needle book] I found information that General Howe was coming out the next morning [December 4^th] with 5,000 men, 13 pieces of cannon, baggage wagons, and 11 boat on wheels. On comparing this with other information, I found it true and immediately rode post to headquarters.”  Boudinot does not say what ‘this other information’ was upon which he compared. One can assume that it jelled with what McLane had reported to Washington; particularly that McLane never revealed his source. Washington merely informed Congress “that in the course of last week from a variety of intelligence I had reason to expect that General Howe was preparing to give us a general action.”

American Army

By early December, estimates of American troops ‘fit for duty’ strength in the immediate Philadelphia area numbered from eight to ten thousand. The number of men at arms in Washington’s army was in continual flux. A Continental force of three year or duration of war enlistments had yet to dominate. As the shadow of winter’s gloom lengthened, three-month wonders and ‘sunshine’ soldiers faded into the countryside. Many furloughed soldiers sought home. Sickness and desertions reduced ranks far more than battle casualties. And while some regiments were dispatched to surrounding states to support militias harassing British foraging parties, others had arrived from the north once Johnny Burgoyne’s army surrendered at Saratoga on October 17^th.

Popular thought has painted a poorly supplied, rag-tag army drained of the will to fight. Though worn down and needing some critical necessities, this was not the case. It was two months since the Battle of Germantown, October 4, 1777. The Americans had attacked their enemy and almost tasted victory. Moral was high as former farmers and merchants were now confident that they could stand up to the best England could throw at them. But they were tired. A tough fall campaign of two major battles with endless marching and counter marching took its toll. Yet worse, Congress, through hapless committees and individuals who did not do their job, had not properly supplied their troops with food and clothing, leaving the army cold and hungry. On top of that, the men spent two months since Germantown continually setting up one camp after another. To the regular soldier shivering in tents without blankets, it appeared that ole Washington could not make up his mind where to hunker down for the winter. Meanwhile, like a boxer shuffling around the ring, Washington’s army shifted up and down the Schuylkill River, remaining close to the British with occasional jabs at their opponent.

Yet Washington had no choice. He had to remain close to his enemy if he wished to not only protect the region from British raids, but to keep his enemy bottled up; similar to the Siege of Boston. However, Washington’s mindset remained firm. He would continue to harass his opponent from strong defensive position, but perhaps more importantly, he would continue to reposition his army for a possible attack to dislodge him from Philadelphia. Even as Howe was mustering his troops to march out of the city that cold 4^th of December morning, Washington had already presented plans at a war council to assault the city; which had been voted down by nearly all officers present.

British Army

Estimates place the British force facing Washington at fifteen thousand troops. After the near defeat at Germantown, General Howe decided his troops were too vulnerable to attack and withdrew his main army within Philadelphia. By early December, his men were not much better off than the Americans. They too had had a difficult campaign, spending weeks aboard ships until marching and countermarching to throw themselves at the American rebels. Like lunging to catch jackrabbits, the pesky rebels just ran off and regrouped. Instead of annihilating Washington’s army, the rank and file spent a grueling two months after Germantown, day and night, constructing fourteen redoubts to the west and north of the city. If that was not enough to discourage the troops, word of General Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga plunged moral. To add insult to injury, like their American counterparts, they too found themselves rationing food on account of the two forts blockading supplies. It was mid-November before the forts were finally captured. Ships were just beginning to offload food and supplies when hungry and worn-out troops mustered to go after Washington’s army.

Like Boston and New York City, the army had found itself once more forced into a rabbit hole. Peering out from its rim, officers and regulars cursed everyone from the damn rebels to ‘Granny’ Howe and King Georgie himself. Since taking command, General Howe continued to hope for a peace settlement. Instead, his cautious assaults against the enemy had allowed the rebel army to slip from his grasp. Howe figured this one last thrust at Washington would bring about a decisive battle and silence his critics once and for all.

Battle December 4^th – First Contact

Howe marched nearly his entire army out of Philadelphia late into the night of December 4th; 12,000 British and Hessian troops that included provincial loyalists. Two heavy columns trudged northwest into the frosty night; one under General Charles Cornwallis proceeded up the Skippack Road. The other, under General Knyphausen, marched up the Manatawny Road. Expecting a quick and vigorous attack, no train of baggage accompanied them.

Washington prepared the defenses at the Whitemarsh camp by striking the tents and sending all heavy baggage to the rear. Dragoon Allen McLane, along with one hundred horsemen, was sent forward to observe the enemy’s movement. At Three Mile Run on the Skippack Road, McLane decided to attack Cornwallis’ vanguard with cavalry rushes. This initial contact was so effective as to change the front division’s line of march. Too small to halt Howe’s progress, McLane stayed close to their front and flank, harassing the advancing British by sniping from behind trees and fences.

Battle December 5^th – First Major Skirmish

At 3 o’clock in the morning of the 5^th, the British halted on Chestnut Hill, ten miles from Philadelphia and about three miles from the rebel camp. At dawn, they had a view of Washington’s encampment to the north that stretched four miles along a ridge of hills and Whitemarsh Creek. The British encampment on Chestnut Hill faced the right line of the American defense. Washington had since November 2^nd to entrench against an assault. The entire American line, including both wings, were firmly manned behind fortifications embellished with strong abatis, sharpened spears facing outward. Several batteries covered all central approaches with a total of fifty-two heavy cannon defending the entire line. All access roads between the two armies were over a swampy wooded plain that was covered by artillery. It was obvious to Howe that any frontal attack against such a position would fail. It was also obvious that Washington was not about to advance his main army from such a strong position to attack on open ground. But he was not averse to feeling out his enemy.

That morning, the American commander sent out nearly 1,800 soldiers to comb the Wissahickon Valley between the two opposing forces. Brigadier General James Irvine with 600 Pennsylvania militia advanced a skirmish line toward Chestnut Hill. Gen James Potter’s Pennsylvania militia brigade, about 1,000 strong, along with Colonel Charles Webb’s 2^nd Connecticut  continentals, 200 men, screened Irvine’s right by marching to Barren Hill Church on the Germantown Road.  According to Lt. Colonel Isaac Sherman, who led the 2^nd Continentals, Potter told him that division commander General John Sullivan had ordered Sherman’s Continentals to join his militia. However, Sherman told Potter he was under orders to act independently in small parties as light troops and did so.

General Irvine advanced through the Wissahickon Valley and approached the northern slope of Chestnut Hill. Just before noon, Irvine assaulted an advance post of the British 2^nd Battalion of Light Infantry, supported by both British and Hessian grenadiers.  Author Christopher Ward wrote that the firing was sharp with men falling on both sides.  Author Thomas McGuire wrote that the militia advanced up Chestnut and fired one volley. At noon, the British light infantry fanned out and moved down the north slope of Chestnut Hill. According to British reports, the light infantry fell in with around three hundred rebels. They pressed forward and Irvine’s militia panicked. As Irvine tried to rally his men, he was shot in the hand, losing three fingers, and fell from his horse, injuring his neck. By then the militia had broken and were running, leaving a wounded Irvine to be captured [Irvine would spend the next four years a captive in New York City].

This action lasted around twenty minutes. Colonel John Laurens of Washington’s staff wrote, “The militia behaved as usual, and Brigadier General Irvine was wounded and taken prisoner, while he was making fruitless attempts to rally them.” There is no official American casualty return for this action. Author David Martin’s research revealed Irvine’s Pennsylvanians received 40 killed or wounded. The British reported no troops were killed with five or six wounded and that Irvine, along with 23 of his men, were captured.

Lt. Colonel Isaac Sherman, commanding the 2^nd Connecticut Continentals during Whitemarsh, described his and General Potter militia’s actions on the 5^th in a letter dated March 11, 1778; addressed to General Washington at Valley Forge. He wrote: “The Militia [Potter’s Militia] were then advancing toward the Enemy—Having Advanced within a mile of Chesnut [sic.] Hill, I was ordered by Genl Potter to march Colo. Webbs with three Militia Regiments to a certain Home, to skirmish with and harass the Enemy as they Advanced…but could not comply with the Order, the Enemy being between me and the place…having possession of Chesnut Hill. Having reconnoitred [sic]…I advanced within eighty Rods…formed the Line under the cover of the Hill that my numbers might not be discovered by the Enemy…their left cover’d by a Wood and secured by Sandy Run Creek.” Sherman decided to feel out his enemy’s exact location. “I detached a party of 60 Men, ordering them into the Wood to Skirmish with them. The detachment marched under the cover of a Hill [and] fired before they were discovered—The Enemy immediately attacked them in a large Body and obliged them to retreat. I found their numbers much larger than was apprehended The Wood being full  therefore tho’t it prudent to retreat, and ordered one…Having re [pass] Sandy Run Creek, I formed with a determination to dispute with them had they attempted to Cross—The Detachment was soon after Order’d by Genl Potter to join hm—Nothing farther material happened that Day worth noticing…”

During the brief stand in the woods and retreat, the rebel casualties amounted to around ten killed and wounded.  Of the British, they reported three privates killed and eleven wounded. Among the British wounded was Captain James Pulteney of the 57^th Regiment of Foot, cousin of Colonel Patrick Ferguson of breechloading rifle fame. While still recovering from a wound to his ankle from the Battle of Brandywine, he was shot in the thigh. After the day’s action, Major General John Armstrong of Pennsylvania Militia praised the 2^nd Connecticut’s actions when he wrote “A few of ours behaved pritty [sic] well, killed & wounded some of the enemy…”

Slides of First Major Skirmish on December 5, 1777. Photos by Ken Bohrer at American Revolution Photos

Battle December 6^th –  Armies Content to Hold Their Positions

The rest of the fifth and all day the sixth Howe held off attacking Washington’s line. His force remained on the north face of Chestnut Hill as the two sides sat on their arms and eyed each other across Wissahickon Valley’s three-mile span. Ever since Howe led the British frontal assault against Breeds Hill in the Battle of Bunker Hill, June 17, 1775, resulting in massive casualties, the British commander tended to avoid direct assaults against fortified positions. He often chose probing and flanking motions in the hopes of less carnage to his troops. Whitemarsh was no exception. As in previous encounters with Washington’s forces, Howe remained within striking range of his enemy, offering to do battle. Washington would have none of it; content to remain snug behind his fortified position. The only actions on this day were pot shots from advanced pickets and skirmishers.

With the British force facing his right, Washington spent the day beefing up that portion of his line. Major John Andre took note writing that the rebels “appeared to be drawing their forces towards their right, on which side we appeared to threaten them.” By day’s end, Howe concluded the rebels were not to be attacked on that side. By evening, Howe believed that if he could not coax Washington out from behind his hedgehog-like fortifications, he might be able to maneuver into a flanking position to draw the enemy out of their lair where he could destroy them. He decided upon a flanking movement to his enemy’s left, toward Cheltenham Township and Jenkintown that would take him back through Germantown and past the ruined Chew House; the centerpiece of the October 4^th Battle of Germantown.

Battle December 7^th – Second Major Skirmish in Two-Fold Action

Howe Attempts to Flank Washington’s Left in Two Columns.  Within an hour or so after midnight, between one and two in the morning of the 7^th, Howe marched his army from Chestnut Hill back to Germantown. Forming the army’s rear guard was General Charles Grey’s 3^rd brigade of light guard infantry; the general was noted for his savage September 20, 1777 Paoli Massacre against Colonel ‘Mad’ Anthony Wayne’s Pennsylvanians. Included with Grey’s column of light infantry was Colonel John Simcoe’s Loyalist Queen’s Rangers, formerly under famed ranger Robert Rogers, eleven full companies including mounted infantry, grenadier, and light infantry. Along with the rangers were a party of dragoons under Captain Lord Cathcart of the 17^th Dragoons and German Jaeger riflemen.

As Howe’s men proceeded down Germantown Pike, in revengeful punishment, British and German troops torched and burned many buildings along the way. Jaeger Captain Johann Ewald wrote, “The villages of Cresheim and Beggarstown, through which the march passed were set on fire by the rear guard.” He continued, “But since the regiments had already set fire to several houses, the conflagration was so great that the jagers and rangers could scarcely get through…The cries of human voices of the young and old…who had seen their belongings consumed by the flames without saving anything, put everyone in a melancholy mood.”

From Germantown, Howe turned left onto Abington Road, present day Washington Lane, and moved northeast to flank the Continental Army’s left. First to peel off this march was General Grey, who proceeded to the left of the main army; Hessian jaegers (skirmishing riflemen) advanced Grant’s body of Loyalist Provincials and British troops. Howe’s main army continued northeast on the Old York Road toward Abington. Grant carried on northwest up Church Rd to Jenkinstown with orders to proceed up Limekiln Road towards Tyson’s Tavern, as Major Andre wrote, “where he [General Grey] was to drive in a post of the enemy and draw up in view of his camp.”  Andre continued, “While they [rebels] presumed an attack impending from that quarter, Sir William Howe, with the Elite and main army, was to have made the real attack.” This maneuver, a faint attack by a detached column at or near the enemy’s center, while the main body of troops flanked the American line, in this case Washington’s far left that had been left hanging with good roads leading out from the rebel rear, had proved effective for the British at both battles of Long Island and Brandywine.

Grant continued his advance to where the road met a long ridge called Edge Hill. This steep wooded ridge ran parallel to the American camp and was a mile from the rebel left wing. There Grant halted, waiting for gunfire to his northeast that indicated Howe was in position for his attack. Lt. Wetherall of the 17^th Dragoons, attached to Grey’s column wrote, “The position of the Rebel Army at Whitemarsh being prodigiously Strong, at Night the Army march’d to the Right [British right] by Jenkins Town, and after Refreshing the Men mov’d forward to Edge Hill, a strong thick cover,”  Lord Cantelupe, William Augustus West commanding light infantry in Howe’s main column, noted, “at two oclock in the Mornng The Army moved bac to German Town and moved to the left to Jenins Town, halted there…then moved to Hedge [Edge] hill, formed line.” Meanwhile, Howe had continued northeast along the Old York Road and made it as far as Abington before turning to his left to face Washington’s camp; his left wing hugged the northeast ridge of Edge Hill which Lord Cantelupe referred to.

Washington Again Dispatches Potter’s Militia and 2^nd Continental, This Time Adding Morgan’s Riflemen and Maryland Militia.  His enemy’s movement did not go unnoticed by Washington. Col. John Laurens wrote his father Henry, president of Congress, “By their movements, (howe’s main army) they were endeavoring to turn our left. We changed our disposition in consequence, and upon hearing they were advancing in two columns [Grey’s and Howe’s].” Once more the American commander sent out Potter’s Brigade of PA Militia and Webb’s 2^nd Continentals under Lt. Colonel Sherman to reconnoiter the enemy’s position. However this time, he added Daniel Morgan’s famed riflemen and Maryland militia under Colonel Mordecai Gist; these troops would probe for the enemy further along the American left. In the coming action, Potter’s militia and Sherman’s Continentals would confront General Grey’s column, while Morgan and Gist could come up against Howe’s main army.

General Grey Runs into Pennsylvania Militia and 2^nd Continental.  After waiting several hours to hear firing from Howe’s column (none would occur) became impatient and decided to move forward on his own. Jaeger riflemen advanced on either side of the Limekiln Road. Simcoe’s Rangers proceeded along the woods to the left and the brigade of light infantry on the right. Andre wrote: “About a mile after turning into Limekiln Road, the firing from the enemy began from a woody ridge to the left,” the northwestern slope of Edge Hill.  This would be against Simcoe’s provincials and Jaegers advancing along the left of the road. The light infantry “with great activity and ardor ran around the foot of the ridge and came upon their flank in time enough to intercept a few in their flight…”

Potter’s men [Sherman’s Continentals attached to the militia] advanced to the Wissahickon Valley and turned east and to their left toward Edge Hill, probing for the enemy through Sandy Run that lay along Washington’s center. To cover his left flank, Washington detached Morgan’s Rifle Corps with 400 picked men, recently having joined the army from Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga, and the Maryland Militia under Colonel Mordecai Gist. This was a better choice in militia for Gist’s regiment had proven equal grit to Continental soldiers standing under fire; this upcoming action would be no exception. Morgan moved southeast across the valley before the American line and towards the eastern end of Edge Hill. Potter’s detachment continued to the south side of Edge Hill. There they encountered Grey’s troops. Morgan’s riflemen and Maryland militia advanced along the eastern end of Edge Hill where they eventually came up against a portion of Howe’s main army. This set the stage for the day’s brief, but fierce action.

Potter’s militia performed as they had two days earlier; after the enemy’s first fire, they panicked and ran. Elias Boudinot (Washington’s commissioner for prisoners) wrote that “the Penn militia had run away from the first fire of the enemy that was half their numbers.” The Continentals under Lt. Col. Sherman were more dogmatic, returning fire, but were soon overwhelmed by Simcoe’s provincials and Jaeger rifle, that they too joined the rout. However, when Colonel Joseph Reed rode up and took it upon himself to assume command of Potter’s men at first contact of the enemy, accounts vary as if his zeal was an aid or hinderance, creating much confusion. Colonel Reed and General John Cadwallander had supposedly been reconnoitering the enemy’s position. Reed, former aide to Washington, was an intelligence agent and had no authority over regular troops. According to Reed’s report to Pennsylvania Assembly President Thomas Wharton, he had “endeavored to draw up the troops [Potter’s command] in the woods, in order to flank that [enemy’s] wing.” When the militia broke and ran yet as the British and Hessian light troops rushed forward with bayonets and hunting swords. Reed wrote he had rallied the militia and tried to get them to advance, “but the impression could not be worn off”. The militia were too panic-stricken. He added “we got no honor.”

But Lt. Colonel Sherman told a different story. He first complained about Reed’s actions that day to Washington in a letter on December 14th.  When he received no reply, he did so again; in a letter dated March 11, 1778 at Valley Forge. He gave far more detail, writing that Reed’s assumption of command only led to confusion and his men’s inability to attack as a cohesive unit. Sherman wrote, “We gained Edge Hill, marched a small distance & then by Order fil’d off to the Left into a Wood, which was very full of under Brush, that we could see but a few Rods either way: which undoubtedly gave the Enemy a great advantage—In this Wood Genl Reed formerly Adjutant Genl to Your Excelly came to the Regiment, hurried it forward with such rapidity, altering its Disposition, ordering one Division this way, another that, puting Officers and Men into such confusion, that render’d it impracticable to keep that regularity so necessary when going into Action. The Regiment advanced 60 or seventy Rods in the Wood when the Van Guard was fired upon, they having gained our Left Flank [this would be the light infantry of the 3^rd Brigade]….There was hardly a succession of a minute from the first fire, to our being fired upon in Front and both Flanks—In this situation the Men stood till they fired some four or five, the greater part three and none less than two rounds pr Man—the Enemy having the advantage of the Ground, were at least eight times our number—advanced within 12 or 14 Yards and began to close upon the rear of the Regt before I gave Orders to retreat, or a single Man gave way. It is true the Regiment retreated in disorder, but it was not in my power to have prevented it and considering its situation…”

The panic-stricken Pennsylvania militia ran from the northwest slope of Edge Hill and across Sandy Run which flowed just in front of the American’s fortified defenses, pell-mell for the rebel line. The New Englanders of Sherman’s Continentals fell back and regrouped; however, as Sherman wrote in his letter to Washington, General Grey had organized a flanking movement and attacked. Lt. Heinrich von Feilitzsch of Jagers wrote, “The firing was very heavy but they had to retreat head over heels.”   There was severe close-quarters combat in this area with the outraged Continentals following the routed militia towards the American lines. Grey continued to advance forward into the valley between Edge Hill and Camp Hill, up until Sandy Run.

Major Andre wrote, “they were pursued to the skirts of their main encampment.” At that point, the Jaegers and Rangers pulled back and took post on Edge Hill, with the Light Infantry Guards company on the right. Andre recorded that in this action, “Between twenty and thirty of them were killed or wounded and fifteen taken prisoners.” Frelitzsch wrote on casualties: “Our losses amounted to one dead and nine wounded.”  The Jaeger company lost no one.  He continued, “The enemy left 42 dead behind and about ten prisoners.  We chased them a short distance and then halted when the lght infantry beside us engaged them, as usual, with a bayonet attack.”

Slides of Militia and Continental Troops Battle General Grey’s Column. Photos by Ken Bohrer at American Revolution Photos

Colonel Reed’s Close Call.  According to Elias Boudinot, Reed had his horse shot out from under him as he was trying to rally the panicking militia and was almost captured. He recorded that “Coll. Reed had like to have fallen the Sacrifice to their (militia) cowardice, his horse being shot under him and he escaped with great difficulty.” General John Armstrong of Pennsylvania militia wrote that Reed narrowly escaped capture explaining that Reed “had his horse shot thro’ the head, lost one of his pistols, saddle and bridel, which he was obliged to leave with the dead horse himself having a narrow escape.”  Cavalryman Captain Allen McLane has been given credit for making a dashing entrance at a critical moment to whisk Reed away to safety, though no primary source places him nor his troops with Potter’s militia during the day’s action. McLane’s cavalry rescue of General Reed is found in Cook’s 1954 text on Captain McLane and in a published 1956 article, also on McLane. The episode has been repeated many times but only sourced once; author Christopher Ward credited it to General Reed’s grandson, Attorney William Bradford Reed, who first recorded it in his 1847 biography on his grandfather. Reed’s grandson wrote: “General Reed had his horse shot from under him at the first fire and was pinned to the ground. British infantry rushed forward to bayonet him where he lay when out of the night came the thunder of hoofs, and Allen McLane swirled upon the scene with his hard-riding troopers, sabering British right and left. The attackers fled and McLane saw General Reed to safety.” Captain McLane made no mention in his journal of any such action alongside Potter’s militia nor this incident involving Reed.

Morgan’s Riflemen and Colonel Gist’s Maryland Militia’s Fierce Fire Upon Howe’s Column. Meanwhile, a few miles to Grey’s right, the main British column continued their advance up the Old York Road toward Morgan’s left. Morgan and Gist’s troops had begun their approach to the northeast of Edge Hill. They ascended the hill and were farther up toward the crest of the ridge when some moved down through the woods. There they took position in the forest and fired upon light infantry under Colonel Thomas Twistleton. British Lt. Wetherall of the 1^st light infantry battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel Robert Abercromby, and of the 17^th light company, wrote that as Howe’s main column moved toward the top of Edge Hill, “A corps of rifle men under Morgan attack’d the right flank upon which the 1^st light infantry took post in the wood”. William Augustus West, Lord Cantelupe, stationed with the light infantry wrote that “when the army came to hedge hill, the first bat: light infantry received a heavy fire of small arms from a wood where Col. Morgan and the rebels and his rifle men were posted.” Andre reported, “The light infantry of the guards were very briskly attacked about an hour after taking post by very superior numbers.”

The Continentals had gained the hill’s crest and formed a line along its ridge with Gist’s Marylanders on Morgan’s right; concealed while firing from behind trees and fallen logs. The Americans attacked with zeal and pushed Abercromby’s light infantry back to the far side of the hill. Andre noted, “The whole affair took place in a very thick wood.”  Additional British troops were sent forward to dislodge the Continentals, but the rebels held firm. Ferocious fighting ensued all along the hillside with the Americans, particularly Gist’s Marylanders which was unusual for militia, refusing to yield. Lord Cantelupe noted that “the 4^th and 23^rd regiments were briskly engaged with the enemy.” Lt. Wetherall stated that “the 33regt. attempted to gain their flank but the rebels not knowing what force was in the wod, attack’d the front companies of the battalion with great spirit…”

Lt. Wetherall of the 17^th light company continued that of the Americans, “their fire was more destructive for the time and number than had happen’d the war.” Morgan’s troops finally broke when Abercromby’s light troops, armed with bayonets, swiftly attacked riflemen trying to reload at close range. Rifle, taking more time to reload and without bayonets, had no option but to pull back as the enemy quickly rushed them. Lt. Wetherall noted, “but being received with great steadiness and charg’d with fix’d bayonets, the rebels ran off with loss.”  Morgan had not been reinforced and fearing being outflanked by growing British numbers, ordered a forced retreat back towards the American line.

Slides of Morgan’s Rifle and Gist’s Marylanders Battle a Portion of Howe’s Main Army. Photos by Ken Bohrer at American Revolution Photos

Andre noted: “Our loss was between thirty and forty men killed and wounded; that of the rebels was probably no greater.”  Lord Cantelope wrote that “they drove the rebels with the loss of 9 killed and 19 wounded. The 4^th regiment and 23^rd were engaged and lost some men.” John Laurens, aide to Washington, wrote that “The loss of Morgan’s rifle men was 27 killed and wounded. Among the latter was the brave Major Morris.”  Major Joseph Morris, drafted for Morgan’s elite riflemen from the 1^st New Jersey regiment, commanded Morgan’s light corps. He was wounded in the head and soon after died from his wound. 

Late in the day on Dec. 7th, after the American retreat, Howe moved his army even closer to the American center and left at what was called Camp Hill, looking for an opportunity to exploit any weakness in the Continental lines. By the end of the day on the 7th, Howe grew increasingly frustrated at the lack of progress and his army’s inability to draw Washington out or dislodge his defenses.

December 8 – Howe Returns to Philadelphia

John Laurens wrote his father Henry, president of Congress, “seeing us still unmoveable; he [General Howe] judged it more prudent to retire to peaceful winter quarters, than attack us in a position, the strength of which would probably have obliged him to retire with loss, and which, even if he had gained from us by the greatest exertions, must have cost him too great a sacrifice of his best troops…”  Early on the morning of December 8th, with the cream of the British force facing the rebel army across the valley, and after defeating his enemy in two major skirmishes, Howe astonished everyone when he ordered tents struck and began pulling his troops from their positions. Captain John Peebles, Grenadier of the 42^nd Royal Highlanders, wrote in his diary of that morning, “the wather (sic) foggy and very mild for the season, all quiet about the camp…Abut 2 oclock we march’d off for the left in the face of the enemy and returned to our lines at Philada…”

The main British Army moved down to Old York Road and then turned right towards Philadelphia. General Grey’s troops left their positions and marched down Church Road. Private Jeremiah Greenman of the 2^nd Rhode Island wrote in his journal, “in ye morn discharged a few volleys at each other, then the enemy retreated into Philadelphia again taking all ye cattle they could carry with them and forages.” Washington sent Morgan’s men and dragoons to harass the enemy in their retreat.  John Donnaldson of the 1^st troop of Philadelphia light horse wrote, “two of the troop at the reqest of Genrl. Washington accompanied [dragoon] Major Allen McClean…” General Grey, perhaps due to pent up frustration, allowed his men to loot and damage local mills during their retreat. During the British retreat, Robert Morton, youthful resident of Philadelphia whose Royal sentiments was changed by British outrages, recorded in his journal that 700 cattle were driven off the fields of a wealthy farmer. He wrote: “The hessians on their march committed great outrages on the inhabitants….set fire to the house on Germantown Road, called the Rising Sun, and committed many other depredations, as if the sole purpose of the expedition was to destroy and spread desolation and ruin.”

Total Casualties and Aftermath

No American official casualty return from December 5 to 8 is known to exist. What are left we can decipher from primary source journals and referenced secondary accounts. In all, the patriots under Washington suffered 150 killed and wounded, along with 54 captured. Howe’s official casualty return lists 19 killed, 60 wounded, and 33 missing. Lord Cantelupe concurred similar numbers when he wrote in his diary that “the number of killed and wounded on our side amount to one hundred and twenty, one officer killed [assuming that the number of missing was included in this tally.”

Washington’s army dodged a bullet. While the position at Whitemarsh was formidable, two long ridges with a marshy creek valley in front, his flanks were extremely vulnerable. Both flanks ended in thin air, where there were major roads that might have been used to get the British army around him. Howe’s troops had been eager to continue, and a more enterprising commander might well have outflanked the Continental position.

Three days later, on December 11^th,  the British settled into their winter quarters within Philadelphia. The British continued work on constructing what would eventually amount to fourteen defensive redoubts, basically hemming themselves within the city. Benjamin Franklin succinctly noted that General Howe did not capture Philadelphia, but that Philadelphia captured General Howe. General Washington and staff decided that Whitemarsh, only a four hour’s march from Philadelphia, was too close to remain for the winter’s duration. A week later, on December 19th, the Americans marched fifteen miles up the Schuylkill River to their new winter quarters at Valley Forge.

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RESOURCE

American Archives Founders Online. Letters of Lt. Colonel Isaac Sherman to General George Washington.

Cook, Fred.  1954 article on McLane. He repeated earlier accounts of McLane as found in the 1914 City Historical Society of Philadelphia, Vol. 13.

Edgar, Gregory T.  The Philadelphia Campaign 1777 – 1778. 1993: Heritage Books, Bowie, Maryland.

Fleming, Thomas.  Washington’s Secret War, The Hidden History of Valley Forge. 2005: HarperCollins Publishers, New York, NY.

Greenman, Jeremiah.  Diary of a Common Soldier in the American Revolution, 1775-1783: An Annotated Edition of the Military Journal of Jeremiah Greenman. January 1, 1978: Northern Illinois University Press.

Martin, David G.  Philadelphia Campaign. 1993: Da Capo Press/Hachette Books, Cambridge, MA.

McGuire, Thomas  The Philadelphia Campaign, Vols. 1 & 2.  2006:Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA.

Morton, Robert.  “The Diary of Robert Morton, Kept in Philadelphia While that City was Occupied by the British Army in 1777.” The Pennsylvania Magazine History and Biography. Vol I, 1877, No. 1.

National Park Service. “The British Campaign for Philadelphia and the Occupation of Valley Forge in 1777.” 

Peebles, John & Gruber, Ira D editor. The Diary of a Scottish Grenadier, 1776-1782.  1997: Army Records Society (Great Britain) published by Sutton, London, UK.

Reed, William Bradford.  Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed, Military Secretary of Washington at Cambridge. 1847: Lindsay and Blakiston Publisher, Philadelphia, PA.

Solutions to History.  “The Battle of Whitemarsh, One More Go Round before Winter”

Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777 – 1778. 2003: University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.