At the Battle of Waxhaws, May 29, 1780, also labeled Buford’s Massacre, Colonel Abraham Buford’s troops were defeated by Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s saber welding mounted Partisan Legion forces. A victory by Loyalist and British regulars, this action resulted in a brutal slaughter and horrendous injuries to most of the Continental soldiers; wounds that later proved fatal for many. Impacting the severity of the British attack were conflicting reports of when the Americans tried to surrender, as well as a period of time when Tarleton was not in command of his troops. A loathing hostility had encapsulated the American Revolution in the south from the very first shots fired; what many historians claim was our first Civil War. This battle became symbolic of the vitriolic hatred expressed between Loyalist and Rebellious colonials. A ‘no holds barred’ clash of arms between partisan forces continued throughout the south for the duration of the conflict.
Though Tarleton’s loyalist troops intended to use the dreadful slaughter of ‘rebels’ as an example to squash resistance to British rule, it had the opposite effect. Patriots throughout the south turned the dreadful defeat into a propaganda gem, hardening the resolve of the rebellious faction and enticing more recruits to take up arms against the King. Perhaps, more importantly, the stunning loss of American forces in the south established a pattern of resistance to the Crown’s forces. Southerners averted to guerrilla warfare that, by the end of the war, proved beyond England’s capabilities to overcome.
Background
The Americans would be less dangerous if they had a regular army.
Major General Frederick Haldimand
So was the sentiment of General Haldimand shared by many of England’s elitist military heads. However, the fact the Americans were so bad at the accepted practice of 18th century warfare, that it manifested to their ultimate advantage in the struggle we know as the American Revolution.
Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart emphasized the paradox of Spain’s defeat at the hands of Napoleon’s forces. He wrote: “The French had beaten and continued to beat, any regular Spanish force, but the thoroughness of these defeats was of greatest benefit to the defeated. For it ensured that the main effort of the Spanish was thrown into guerrilla warfare. An intangible web of guerrilla bands replaced a vulnerable military target…”
This was exactly the case in South Carolina. After the defeat of the American Southern Army and the barbarous butchery of American soldiers at Waxhaws, England sowed the seeds that blossomed into a seething abhorrence towards the Magisterial Forces. Men like Francis ‘Swamp Fox’ Marion could attack both British and Loyalists troops, then disperse and fade into the countryside. The Swamp Fox knew he could readily reform his unit with eager recruits as he combed the southern marshes for additional targets; often supply routes so necessary to sustain an army. So too, on a much larger scale, Major General Nathanael Greene would usher in similar tactics as his force kept moving in a hit and run campaign that eventually wore his enemy down in a war of attrition.
British Southern Strategy Shifts and Loss of the American Southern Army
England’s successful probe in the south began with Lt. Colonel Archibald Campbell’s capture of Savannah, Georgia on December 29, 1778. The next year led to the return of Georgia to the Crown’s fold. This and British victories in staving off patriot attempts to regain territory emboldened England’s southern strategy. By the end of 1779, Commander of British Forces in America, Major General Sir Henry Clinton, decided to launch a second attempt to capture the city of Charleston (then spelt Charlestown) South Carolina; his first invasion as a subordinate to General William Howe having failed in 1776. A force of approximately 10,000 redcoats supported by a British fleet arrived Charleston to begin a siege which lasted from March 29, 1780 to May 12, 1780.
Major General Benjamin Lincoln’s cautious and meticulous nature proved he was not up to the task as commander of the American Southern Army. After his failed attempt to take back Savannah, Georgia, and with intelligence that the British were initiating a large-scale invasion, Lincoln decided to draw all his forces together and defend Charleston. He bottled up his entire army on the Charleston peninsula; the south’s Continental Soldiers and Carolina and Georgia militia. But most importantly, this included the recently arrived reinforcements from Virginia, the Virginia Line, proven veterans and among the best Washington had to send.
As the weeks passed, General Clinton’s superior forces enclosed around the Americans. After a few feeble attempts to break the bind that was tightening around his neck, Lincoln, cognizant that his supplies were nearly done, finally surrendered the army on May 12th. Over five thousand troops along with arms and ammunition were lost, the largest in the war. What was left of the southern army were the few American units still outside the British dragnet around Charleston. These were mainly those who had escaped, been scouting or recruiting during the siege, or were reinforcements still enroute to join Lincoln when he surrendered. Colonel Abraham Buford’s detached regiments of Virginia Continental soldiers were among the last and reinforcements sent south.
Monck’s Corner and Tarleton’s Reputation as a Butcher Established
Cavalry Officer Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton had arrived with the British invasion of New York City in August, 1776. He made his first mark in history by his swift action to capture Major General Charles Lee, second in command of the American army, while the general was staying at an inn in New Jersey. His troopers were active in intelligence and most particularly, vicious attacks on detached Americans in what was termed the Forage Wars. His escapades and daring quickly gained the dashing cavalryman accolades among his superiors.
Colonel Banastre Tarleton, along with Colonel Patrick Ferguson, had landed on the South Carolina coast in February, 1780. Both officers led partisan legions of mainly loyalist of both cavalry and mounted infantry. While Clinton maintained the Siege of Charleston, he sent his Partisan Legions into the countryside to deprive the hemmed in Southern Army of supplies and reinforcements. Thus began a war of destruction and retribution and what southerners called ‘British aggression.’ Clinton learned of General Isaac Hunger’s 500 Continental troops at Monck’s Corner and dispatched Tarleton and Ferguson along with detachment of British regulars to attack. At 3 AM on April 14, 1780, the Battle of Monck’s Corner began when Tarleton’s assault surprised the Americans during their sleep. The patriots were quickly routed and most of General Hunger’s command, including the general, escaped on foot into the swamps. Chevalier Pierre Francois Vernier, of the Pulaski Horse, was captured and later killed by Tarleton’s troopers. Though Tarleton did not order Vernier’s death, his reputation as a butcher was established.
Colonel Buford’s Command Returns North
Colonel Buford’s command was part of the Virginia Line ordered to reinforce General Lincoln at Charleston. Because of delays in outfitting his command, Buford had lagged behind the main Virginian line that reached Charleston earlier, only to be surrendered to the British shortly after having arrived. The last orders Buford received from Lincoln was to take a defensive position near Lenud’s Ferry on the Santee River, outside the city. Buford no sooner arrived at his position, when within the week, Lincoln surrendered the southern army on May 12th. Buford was informed of the surrender and was ordered by General Isaac Hunger, who had escaped Monck’s Corner, to immediately return to Hillsborough, North Carolina, some 300 miles north, nearer the Virginia border. Buford turned his column around and did so immediately; his route taking him through Camden, 120 miles north of Charleston, onto Charlotte which was another 80 miles, before the last 100-mile slog to Hillsborough.
Among Buford’s command were approximately 350 Virginia Continentals; detachments of the 3rd and 7th and two companies of the 2nd Virginia Regiments, and detached artillery with two six-pounders. Most of these men were new recruits, however the officers were veterans. Buford had been joined by 40 Virginia Light Dragoons who had escaped the siege. So too North Carolina militia under Colonel Richard Caswell were making their way north; however, the militia would part ways with Buford when they reached Camden. South Carolina’s Governor John Rutledge had managed to escape Charleston during the early stages of the siege and chose to ride the same route under Buford’s escort.
British Pursuit
On May 18, 1780, Lt. General Charles Cornwallis marched out of Charleston with orders from General Clinton to subdue the backcountry and establish outposts along the way. Cornwallis’ force of 2,500 regulars reached Lenud’s Ferry where they crossed the Santee River, then marched north for Camden. It was along this route, the same taken by Buford, when Cornwallis learned that South Carolina Governor Rutledge was ten days ahead under Buford’s escort. Desirous to capture Rutledge, he knew his large detachment of foot soldiers could never catch up. He needed mobility and turned to Tarleton’s Partisan Legion of loyalist dragoons and mounted infantry. On May 27th, Tarleton’s 270 man force of 130 Legion Dragoons, 40 of the 17th British Regiment Dragoons, and 100 mounted infantry, along with a three-pound cannon, raced ahead of Cornwallis’ detachment.
Tarleton knew Buford had a week’s head start on him. He rode his troops hard, arriving at Camden late the next day. After a brief rest and learning that Buford had passed through Camden a few days previously, he set out once more at 2:00 AM on the 29th. Again, he pushed his horses to their limit to catch up to Buford. By mid-morning, Tarleton reached Rugeley’s Mill, 20 miles north of Camden. He learned that Governor Rutledge had been there the night before and had pushed north on his own for Charlotte. He was also told that Colonel Buford’s troops were now only twenty miles ahead, near present day Lancaster, South Carolina, about six miles south of the North Carolina border. Though his horses were near spent, he immediately set off after them.
Tarleton’s advance force of 150 dragoons, both Partisan Legion and 60 horsemen from the 17th, had reached Buford’s camp later that afternoon. However, Buford had been warned of Tarleton’s pursuit and had already marched his men north. They were then two miles up the road in the Waxhaws settlements. Tarleton dispatched Captain David Kinlock with a flag requesting that Buford surrender. Tarleton had exaggerated his troop numbers to convince Buford to capitulate, or at least to delay him. It is recorded that the British cavalryman received a one sentence response, “Sir, I reject your proposals, and shall defend myself to the last extremity.” With that, Buford continued his march north with his baggage train and cannon (which would not see action that day) in front while a strong rear guard covered the rear. Tarleton decided to attack the approximately 400 Continentals with the 150 men he had on hand.
Battle of Waxhaws
According to participants, Tarleton’s advance force caught up to Buford’s rear guard at 3:00 PM. Continental surgeon Robert Brownfield reported that five American dragoons were captured in a quick sharp action. He stated that the leader, Captain Pearson, was “inhumanely mangled” by saber cuts, some inflicted after he had fallen. With his rear guard attacked and Tarleton’s main force drawing up, Buford stopped the column, except for the baggage and artillery which he ordered to continue. He then formed a single battle line in an open wood to the right of the road with his colors in the center.
Tarleton established his command post on a low hill opposite the American line. Informed that the horses were too tired to bring his artillery forward, he formed his men for a three-prong attack. On his right, Tarleton assigned approximately 100 men, equally divided between dragoons and infantry. They were led by Major Cochrane with orders to dismount his infantry and gall the American left prior to the cavalry attack. Captains Corbet and Kinlock with dragoons of the 17th and Loyalist Legionnaires, around 40, were aligned in the center to charge the American colors. Tarleton took command of his left with ‘thirty chosen horse and some infantry.’ Any additional stragglers that lagged behind because of tired mounts, numbering under a hundred dragoons, including the three-pounder artillery, were ordered to form on the hill as reserve. When all were in position, Tarleton signaled the advance. At 300 yards, they charged.
When the enemy was at fifty yards, the American Continentals presented their arms; however, they were ordered to hold their fire until the charging cavalry was within ten yards. This was a fatal tactical error by Buford. It enabled Tarleton’s formations to withstand the late volley and surge forward with the charge. Meanwhile, Buford’s men were allotted only one shot before literally seconds later, the cavalry tore into them. Tarleton’s horse was shot under him during the initial volley and trapped the commander beneath the dead animal. As British and Loyalist dragoons slashed away at the Americans, many turned and ran for their lives while others begged for surrender. In the midst of the carnage, Buford realized the battle was lost and, according to American eyewitnesses, dispatched a white flag toward Tarleton, offering surrender.
At this stage, first hand accounts of what happened next differ leading to controversy over a flag of truce and the butchery that ensued. The key lies as to when Tarleton’s horse went down, trapping the commander under his animal. If it did indeed happen during the charge, as stated in Tarleton’s memoirs of the battle, then it is most likely that he never saw a surrender flag until it was too late to put an end to most of the brutal savagery that cut down the Americans in droves, many while offering surrender. Tarleton wrote: “…the one [horse] with which he [Tarleton] led his dragoons being overturned by the volley.” Perhaps, while Tarleton lay under his horse, in the heat of battle, his men may have assumed he had been killed and engaged in, as Tarleton wrote, “a vindictive asperity not easily restrained.”
If Tarleton had received the flag, and then his horse was shot, trapping him, this would also have enraged the Loyalists and British dragoons to heightened butchery as vengeance for their leader. Buford’s troops’ accounts state that a flag was sent; but they differ on who carried and even how its messenger was treated. They do agree that the flag of surrender was effectively refused and fighting continued in which many of the Americans were cut down.
Either way, Tarleton did not have command of his troops at a critical moment when his men acted without leadership or without mercy. Few escaped the downward thrust of saber that ruthlessly sliced into flesh and killed over a hundred Americans. In a matter of minutes, the battle was over in blood soaked carnage. Colonel Buford and only a few of the cavalry were able to escape.
Tarleton’s memoirs, published in 1787, describes his actions that day from which many historians base their accounts of the battle. Worth noting is that there is no mention of a flag of surrender what so ever. The memoir records, “Some officers, men and horses suffered by this fire [opening American volley]; but the battalion was totally broken, and slaughter was commenced before Lt. Colonel Tarleton could remount another horse…” This would affirm that Tarleton’s horse fell during the opening American volley, and was not in command during the worst atrocities perpetrated on Continental troops. The memoir further states, “Thus in a few minutes ended an affair which might have had a very different termination.” He then details casualties, again, with no mention of a flag of surrender.
Casualties and Aftermath
According to Tarleton’s report of the battle, the American rebel casualties were 113 men killed, 147 wounded and released on parole, with 53 taken prisoner. The 2 six pounder cannon and 26 wagons of the baggage train were also captured. The British losses were 5 killed, 12 wounded, with 11 horses killed and 19 horses wounded. Note that future president Andrew Jackson and his family had settled in the Waxhaws region of South Carolina. Andrew and his family were cognizant of the battle and some reports state that the family aided in caring for the wounded at the Waxhaws Church. Andrew’s older brother Hugh had previously joined the patriots and had died from heat exhaustion nearly a year earlier at the Battle of Stono Ferry, June 20, 1779.
After the war, patriot militia General William Moultre noted that the lopsided number of casualties between British and Americans was not unusual for similar battles in which one cavalry gained a decided advantage early in a battle. Historian Jim Piecuch argues that the battle was no more a massacre than similar events led by Patriot commanders. For this, one may look to Colonel ‘Light Horse’ Harry Lee’s victory at the Battle of Haw River, or as the British referred to as Pyle’s Massacre, February 21, 1781. Lee’s men annihilated Loyalist cavalry under the command of Colonel Dr. John Pyle. Ninety loyalists lay dead and dozens were horribly wounded. As for Lee’s men, only one horse was killed. Author David Wilson, on the other hand, holds Tarleton responsible for the slaughter, even though he did not order it. He notes that it represented a loss of discipline, when there was no commanding officer in charge at the heat of battle, something for which Tarleton was accountable.
Charles Stedman, a Cornwallis aide, afterwards wrote of British actions at Waxhaws that “the virtue of humanity was totally forgot.” Soon after the battle, propaganda took hold. ‘Tarleton’s quarter’ became synonymous with unmerciful killing, particularly after surrender. The effect on rebellious and patriot factions throughout the south proved to many that only by taking up arms against the British, were they able to save themselves and their families from the ‘Butchers of Waxhaws’
As Cornwallis advanced through the Carolinas, he met firmer resistance which dashed his hopes for loyalist recruits flocking to his banner. Even before Tory militias could reach the British, they were squashed by patriot victories such as Ramsour’s Mill (June 20, 1780) and King’s Mountain (Oct. 7, 1780); both involving only partisan militiamen. Cornwallis would notch up a considerable victory at the Battle of Camden (August 16, 1780), and a pyrrhic victory at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse (March 15, 1781), but by then, the writing was on the wall. Without loyalist support in both manpower and supplies throughout the vastness of the south, his army was doomed; which culminated in his total surrender at Yorktown, October 19, 1781.
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RESOURCE
American Battlefield Trust. “Waxhaws.”
American Revolution in South Carolina. “Battle of Waxhaws.”
Buchanan, John. The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas. 1999: Wiley Publishing, New York, NY.
Commanger, Henry Steele & Morris, Richard B. The Spirit of Seventy-Six. The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participants. 1958: Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, IN.
Scoggins, Michael C. The Day It Rained Militia: Huck’s Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May–July 1780. 2005:Charleston, SC: The History Press.
Tarleton, Lt. Colonel Banastre. A History of the Campaigns of 2780 and 1781 In the Southern Provinces of North America. 1787: Colles, Exshaw, etc… Dublin, UK.
Weigley, Russell. The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782. 1970: University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC.
Wilson, David K (2005). The Southern Strategy: Britain’s Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775–1780. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.