Battle of Three Rivers June 8, 1775

The Invasion of Canada Did Not Go Well for the Americans

From the time the Americans were defeated before the walls of Quebec City on a blizzard evening of December 31, 1775, until the last of a devastated rebel force gave up Canada in mid June, 1776, the entire episode of a new nation trying to flex its muscle over what was Canada and England’s 14^th colony in America, can only be described as a tragedy – most especially for the families of countless young Americans who’s bones were left buried in unmarked graves throughout Quebec and along Lake Champlain’s islands.

By the fall of 1775, Major General Richard Montgomery, with a small American army, invaded Canada from Lake Champlain and north along the Richelieu River, capturing Montreal. Colonel Benedict Arnold invaded Canada by a wilderness trek through Maine to the outskirts of Quebec City. Arnold’s force was devastated by the harsh journey and had to wait for General Montgomery before attacking the British fortress at Quebec City on December 31, 1775. The attack was a dismal failure with Montgomery killed and Arnold severely wounded in the leg. So too, Daniel Morgan of the famed Morgan’s riflemen was captured.

Arnold remained at Quebec City and laid siege. However, by spring, the British were reinforced and easily pushed Arnold’s small force west along the St. Lawrence River. But the Second Congress was not through. They ordered a large Continental Force north to energize the invasion. General John Sullivan, New Hampshire lawyer turned warrior, was put in overall command of these reinforcements and what was left of the original American invasion. As more troops made their way north, Sullivan decided to halt the British advance west along the St. Lawrence River. For this he chose Three Rivers or Trois Rivieres upon where his foot would be drawn.

With a resounding victory against the British garrison at Three Rivers, Sullivan hoped to gain time for the rest of his men to arrived. With these fresh numbers, the Americans would push the British back to Quebec City, where they would once more lay siege, claiming the fortress and the ultimate prize of Canada itself. But it would not be. Poorly planned and executed, due to inexperience and abysmally trained troops, as well as inadequately equipped, the attack against professional regular British troops proved a complete disaster. Most of the Americans floundered in the the region’s multiple swamps. Those who survived the attack and pestilent mire took days before finding their way back to American camps.

Here is a comprehensive list of the reinforcements sent north – most arriving Canada by June 1st:

• 2^nd Cont. Reg. – N. Hampshire – Colonel James Reed – arrived Montreal May 29
• 5^th Cont. Reg.  – N. Hampshire – Colonel John Stark – arrived Montreal May 29
• 8^th Cont. Reg. – N. Hampshire – Col. Enoch Poor – Gen. Thompson Brig. – Ticonderoga
• 15^th Cont. Reg. – Mass. – Col John Paterson – Gen. Thompson Brig.- May 14 Montreal
• 24^th Cont. Reg. – Mass. – Colonel John Greaton – Gen. Thompson Brig., Sorel May 9
• 25^th – Cont. Reg. – Mass. Col. William Bond – Gen. Thompson Brig., Chambly May 12
• 1^st Pennsylvania Battalion – Col. John Philip DeHaas – Montreal May 24
• 2^nd Penn. Battalion – Col. Arthur St. Clair – Chambly May 30.
• 4^th Penn. Battalion – Col. Anthony Wayne – Most moving up Lk. Champlain – late May
• 6^th Penn. Battalion – Col. William Irvine – Sorel June 5^th
• 1^st New Jersey Regiment – Colonel William Winds – St. Jean May 31
• 2^nd New Jersey Regiment – Colonel William Maxwell
• 3^rd NJ Regiment – Col. Elias Dayton – stationed at Tryon County NY – Ft. Stanwix
• Burrall’s Connecticut Reg (Militia) – Col. Charles Burrall – May 7^th near Deschambault
• Bedel’s N. Hampshire Reg. (Militia) – Col. Timothy Bedel – west of Montreal
• Porters Mass. Reg. (Militia) – Colonel Elisha Porter
• Carpenters and Smiths were commanded by Colonel Baldwin.

Generals Sullivan and Thompson, Question Enemy Strength. Report on Army’s Poor Condition

A portion of this article was taken from a larger, detailed account of the 1776 American retreat from Canada; the September 20, 2018 article posted on Revolutionary War Journal. You may view the entire article here: Canada Lost: The American Retreat from Quebec January – June 1776

General William Thompson[26], commanding a Brigade of four regiments, three from Mass. and one from New Hampshire, was eager to use his command to earn laurels in battle. General Benedict Arnold’s reaction, when learning of Thompson’s assignment to command a brigade of reinforcement north predicted, “the flower of the army is doomed by Thompson.”[27] William Thompson was born in Ireland in 1736 and had immigrated to Cumberland County Pennsylvania where he became a land speculator and surveyor on the Pennsylvania frontier.  In 1759, during the Fort Duquesne campaign in the French & Indian War, he had briefly commanded a company of Light Horse without distinction and saw no action. He was aggressive in nature and though having no field or combat experience, had a high regard for his abilities as a military commander and organizer. He was quick to write about the confused state of matters he found upon arriving in Canada writing General Washington from Chambly on the Richelieu on May 14^th: “I cannot help being a little surprised at the confused manner in which our Army retreated from before Quebeck, and still more to hear that it is intended to abandon the country as far as the mouth of the Sorel. The last part of my intelligence I cannot think is true, and still expect to find General Thomas with part of the Army at Richelieu. That and all the country above [Montreal] we surely can keep possession of. I shall warmly recommend fortifying Point Deschambault, and hope it will be gone into; and I think there is nothing to prevent our doing it. The confused state of this country is past description; but matters will be soon settled. I am sure that if we are supplied with powder, provisions, and entrenching tools, all will be well.”[28]

So too did General Sullivan write to Congress the day after he arrived on May 31^st to take command of the army from General Wooster[29] who held it briefly during General Thomas’ deteriorating health. “Upon my arrival, I was informed that Gen. Thomas was down with the small pox, without the least prospect of a recovery.”[30] He comments on the army’s dismal condition and questions the enemy’s strength and position. “[I] inform you that no one thing is right; everything is in utmost confusion, and almost everyone frightened at they know not what. The report is that General Carleton [British commanding general] has advanced to Three Rivers, and the ships are coming up the St. Lawrence… other persons, who have come from 80 miles below Quebec declare that there is no appearance of men or ships on this side of that city…” Sullivan adds, “I am fully convinced that the later report is true… I am surprised that an army should live in continual fear and even retreat before an enemy which no person has seen…” He writes that “the army… has dwindled into a mob, without even the form of order or regularity – the consequences of which we have experienced by the infamous retreat from Quebec…” He laments over the disorganized state of the army and offers in summary, “To give you a full account of what I have already learned would take a volume…”[31]

On June 2^nd, two days after General Sullivan arrived and the death of General Thomas, General Thompson wrote to Washington, expressing his personal praise of his abilities and discouraged by the New England troops within the ranks. He has changed his tone from his earlier letter, questioning the presence of British troops: “Having received information that Colonel McLean[32] with about 800 regulars and Canadians, had advanced as far up as the Three-Rivers, I have sent off Colonel St. Clair, with between six and 700 men to attack his camp, if it can be done with the least probability of success…” He lamented that he did not arrive in Canada two weeks earlier with his present troops as he was certain he would have defeated Carleton at Deschambault. He now has his doubts over the prospect of success writing “I now begin to entertain doubts of our ability to keep the Providence [Canada]. Our artillery is lost and the New England troops are so much infected with or afraid of the small pox as almost to prevent their doing duty.” He added that he has ordered all the sick and heavy baggage sent south in case a quick retreat is needed.[33]

As early as May 10^th, the Congressional Commissioners in Montreal, indulging in military tactics, had their doubts on the army’s ability to halt the British advance, writing Congress, “Our Army are now on their way to the mouth of the Sorel where they propose to make a stand. Colonel Greaton’s battalion is arrived there, and we expect the residue of the brigade under the command of General Thompson is arrived before that at St. Johns. From the present appearance of things, it is very probable we shall be under the necessity of abandoning Canada…We can certainly keep possession of St. Johns until the enemy can bring up against that post a superior force.” Due to lack of supplies, they discouraged additional troops sent north, “A further reinforcement will only increase our distress. An immediate supply of provisions from over the lakes is absolutely necessary for the preservation of the troops already in this Province, as we shall be obliged to evacuate all of this country…No provisions can be drawn from Canada…”[34]

Americans Plan to Attack at Three Rivers (Trois Rivieres)

The newly arrived generals knew that without provisions, the fresh troops could not endure a long defensive engagement. A quick strike was needed to halt the British advance and give more time for supplies to be sent up from Ticonderoga. Encouraged by the information confirming a smaller detachment of British soldiers at Three Rivers than American troops available at Sorel, Thompson was keen to attack and General Sullivan concurred. As noted, Thompson had sent Colonel St. Clair’s regiment down the St. Lawrence to keep an eye on the enemy, reaffirming in his mind an inferior enemy had garrisoned the town. This is an extract found in Force archives of a letter written from the camp at Sorel dated June 10^th, after the battle: “Before the arrival of Colonels Wayne and Irvine’s Regiments [4^th and 6^th Penn. Battalions], Colonel St. Clair, with a detachment of seven hundred men, was sent down the river St. Lawrence about nine leagues, to watch the motion of the enemy, and to act occasionally. General Sullivan’s arrival here was at a critical time.“

“Canada was lost, without some notable exertion; the credit of our arms gone; and no number of American troops to sustain our posts. It was said that the taking of Trois Riviers, with such troops as were in it, would be of service. A detachment, under General Thompson, was sent down the river, the corps under Colonel St. Clair was to join them, and if the General thought it expedient, he was ordered by General Sullivan to attack the enemy at Trois Rivieres.”[35] Thompson was convinced he faced no more than 800 men who were isolated and vulnerable. He was eager for a battlefield victory and had every intention of attacking, as of June 6^th, when ordered to engage the enemy if he ‘thought it was expedient.’ Though rarely executed by experienced troops, Thompson decided to divide his raw troops into five columns and launch a coordinated night attack; a move that proved a prerequisite to disaster.

American Forces at Three Rivers

The basic plan of attack was for five columns of troops to land four miles upstream of the town of Three Rivers. Under the cover of darkness and using a Canadian guide, they were to march to the garrison and launch a dawn attack on the unsuspecting British. The 2^nd New Jersey comprised the first column of 390 men commanded by Colonel Maxwell. Colonel Irvine of the 6^th Pennsylvania made up the second column. The third column of 700 men was led by Colonel St. Clair commanding the 2^nd Pennsylvania. The fourth column was led by Colonel Anthony Wayne. He had a detachment of riflemen and some muskets, numbering between 150 and 200, as the rest of his regiment was still making their way up Lake Champlain. Lt. Colonel Thomas Hartley commanded the fifth column of reserves. All total, approximately 2,000 Americans were designated to make the attack. All five columns had to maneuver a difficult night’s march and coordinate a dawn attack. With its intricacies over what proved to be horrid swampy terrain and unless all factors were in the American’s favor, such an operation could easily be doomed to failure. It all fell upon the shoulders of first the pilot who would steer the Americans across the lake to within four miles of Three Rivers and the Canadian guide who would lead them to the garrison.

General Thompson Orders the Attack on June 8th and a Perfidious Canadian Guide

The only orders that survived the failed American attack were issued by General Thompson to Colonel St. Clair. He expressed the need to finish the attack by daybreak and secure a retreat, bringing off the artillery, ammunition, arms and public stores [and if] “found impracticable they will be destroyed… I need not point out to you the necessity of your business being executed with vigor, and that the most proper time for it is before day…”[36] General Thompson would personally lead the charge, ultimately joining Colonel Irvine and St. Clair’s columns as they emerged from the swamp and formed to attack. The guide was a Point du Loc farmer named Antoine Gauthier who proved to be either a loyalist, incompetent, or both. Instead of landing four miles from their objective, they pulled onto shore nine miles from the garrison. Gauthier then led them on an all night, meandering path through thick swamps and a quagmire that separated the columns, including individual regiments. By daylight, only partial units of totally exhausted troops formed to confront an organized and well rested enemy. Afterwards, the American officers claimed that Gauthier intentionally led them astray. To this day, Canadians celebrate Gauthier as a local hero, dedicating a stone memorial to his memory.

Village of Three Rivers and British Garrison

The town of Three Rivers, about halfway between Quebec and Montreal, was located northwest from a prominent river junction: where the St. Maurice River flowed into the St. Lawrence from the north, and the Riviere Becancour joined the St. Lawrence from the south. Originally a fur trading town, at that time its function was to support river traffic. Francis Grant, an English gentleman traveling in Canada in 1767 noted: “Three Rivers is a small town on the North West bank of the River St. Lawrence, containing in all about 100 houses, most of which are small and mean…”[37] By early June, the vanguard of the British advance was under the command of Lt. Colonel Simon Fraser of the 24^th Foot, temporarily promoted to Brigadier. A member of a long line of Highlander warriors, Colonel Fraser had extensive battlefield experience during the Seven Years War, including a span with the Dutch Scottish Brigades and latter attached to Prussian forces under Frederick the Great. He had also tutored under Prussian and American rifle ‘huntsmen’ forming light infantry and rifle brigades in America, in answer to British General Braddock’s eye opening defeat at the start of the French and Indian War. He was considered one of if not the best wilderness officer stationed in America. Decisive and quick to action, he had proven that when engaged with the enemy, he did not hesitate and attacked with aggressive zeal.

A typical British regiment consisted of ten companies broken down to one company of light infantry, one of grenadier, and eight of infantry or foot soldiers. Each company had 70 to 80 rank and file. Therefore, instead of basically one regiment, as General Thompson expected to find at Three Rivers, Fraser had four full regiments: his own of the 24^th, 29^th, 47^th, and 62^nd; all at near strength numbering over 3,000 men. Many secondary accounts state that the British began landing troops when the American column was spotted from the river. There are primary sources that confirm that the 29^th was disembarking at the start of the battle. However, acting Brigadier Fraser had already landed a good deal of his forces and was amply prepared to counter any rebel attack against his lines.

Inexperience and Poor Planning Played a Major Role at the Battle of Three Rivers

The plan of attack was based on faulty information as well as a night maneuver by inexperienced troops which was very risky and ultimately ill conceived. General Sullivan and General Thompson, both recently arrived, were convinced the confusion and retreat of the army was unfounded and that they were there to ‘put things right’. Both wanted an early and decisive victory over the advancing British. Precautions that should have been taken during planning, and even during the operation, were not taken, tainted by both men’s desire to prove their battle field abilities (which prior to arriving in Canada were either nil or very limited). As the action unfolded, military decisions made by officers when confronted with obstacles, such as mistakes in positioning troops, terrain, strength of the enemy, reaction to enemy fire, leaving the bateaux insignificantly guarded, etc., were poorly made at best as they were also questionably executed. A few quick decisions, namely by Colonel Anthony Wayne, and the reserve commander, Colonel Hartley, enabled an effective rear guard action which saved a large portion of the retreating Americans. It was also reported that the British commander, General Guy Carlton arrived after the battle and reportedly allowed a sizable contingency of Americans to escape over the Machieche River (present day Saint-Maurice River), rather than be encumbered with providing provisions and housing for additional American prisoners. Those rebels who made it back to Sorel, among the best the Americans had, were devastated, many falling ill while physically pushed to the extreme during the next few weeks’ hasty and forced retreat back to Ticonderoga, New York.

Primary Sources Detail Observations of Events as they Unfolded

There are several primary sources that document what occurred the night of June 7^th and the next day, June 8^th , including the American retreat over the next several days. The battle itself was short lived, with the Americans fleeing back into the swamp when they realized they confronted a far superior force. The real disaster did not occur in massive battle casualties, however over 400 were either killed, wounded, captured, or never heard from again during the flight back towards Sorel. The decisive blow to the army in Canada was that a 2,000 rebel force, among the newest arrived reinforcements and the ‘flower of the army’, was smashed and devastated both physically and mentally after literally days of starvation and wading through horrific swamps.

The Following Six Accounts will be Examined

• Colonel William Irvine leading the 6^th Pennsylvania
• Captain Charles Lacey’s observations who was not part of the attack, but was in a position to witness some of the action.
• Colonel Anthony Wayne’s detailed description in a letter to Benjamin Franklin.
• Colonel Hartley who led the reserve.
• Lt. John Eny of the 29^th gives a British version of the action.
• Colonel St.Clair’s account as described in his papers, edited by his biographer William Henry Smith.

Colonel William Irvine from his Journal

“Colonel Irvine’s Regiment and three companies of Wayne embarked in bateaus at Sorel under the command of General Thompson and proceeded to Nicollet…joined by Colonel St. Clair who had 700 men under his command… Cross the river to Point de Lac; the pilot [not Gauthier] deceived us, for his orders were to steer within four miles of Trois Riviere. [Irvine is the only account that expresses deceit by the pilot]. Point de Lac is 9 miles [from Three Rivers]. Notwithstanding, this disappointment, we marched with all possible expedition for Trois Riverie, but here our misfortunes began, our guide led us quite out of the way into a swamp, which sufficient to engulf a thousand men. Before we got disentangled from this dreadful place, daylight appeared, so that instead of attacking the town of Trois Riviere before day, we found ourselves three or four miles from it. Here we were at a loss of what to do; had no intelligence of the strength of the garrison; to attack was hazardous, and to retreat without knowing the enemy’s strength we could not think of, therefore marched on…” [This decision in itself was not logical, nor did it follow basic military protocol as historians have been quick to point out. All historical accounts that have examined the battle agree that at this point, the Americans should have called off the attack.]

The river was on the American right when they were discovered by British ships. Irvine continued, “They fired incessantly, while we marched about three quarters of a mile; here we inclined to a wood on our left, in order to avoid the firing from the shipping, but avoiding one evil, we fell into a greater, for we now entered into a swamp, which I suppose to be four miles over.” Irvine sums it up when he wrote, “Nature, perhaps never found a better place calculated for the destruction of an army. It became impossible to preserve any order of march, nay, it became at last so difficult, and the men so fatigued, that their only aim was how to get extricated; many of the men lost their shoes, and some their boots…about 7 o’clock [AM], some officers reached one extreme of the swamp…they saw clear ground and horses at little over a quarter of a mile.” [This clearing was not on dry surface, but proved to still be part of the swamp, covered in mire].

Col. St. Clair, Lt. Col Allen, and Colonel Irvine “strove to draw the men up in some order,” which Irvine wrote was difficult as they had not cleared the swamp. Thompson came up and ordered as many as could be collected to move forward to the cleared ground and form. However, the men were “worn down with fatigue…thirsty and feint.” They were ordered to join Colonel Maxwell’s regiment who encompassed the first column and was suppose to be in front of them, yet had not been seen since they entered the swamp. [Colonel Wayne’s account explains that Maxwell’s column was actually on their left, however the enemy had opened an intense fire from that direction placing Maxwell’s regiment at the front. From which they broke and retreated]. While moving forward, they heard a brisk firing and General Thompson ran forward. He sent back word for Irvine’s riflemen, “but they being chiefly in the rear, could not get up…” By the time Irvine joined Thompson, Maxwell’s division “was entirely broken, and retreating in such disorder, that there was no possibility of rallying them.”

At this stage, General Thompson tried to rally what troops he had nearby. He ordered Irvine to retreat fifty paces into the woods to make a stand. It was to no avail. The men broke and ran leaving a small party of Thompson, Irvine, Lt. Bird and half a dozen or so infantrymen. They were attacked by Canadians and spent the whole day “through swamps and thickets alternately… we waded and wandered here till near daylight [the next day], our strength and spirits being now nearly exhausted…” They paused and sent out a soldier who returned saying they were completely surrounded. British soldiers and Canadians were seen firing on stragglers. Thompson decided it would be “better to deliver ourselves up to British officers, than to run the risk of being murdered in the woods by Canadians… we went up to a house where we saw a guard and surrendered ourselves.[38]

Pennsylvania Captain Charles Lacey’s Account

Captain Charles Lacey was not in the attack, but was on the southern side of the St. Lawrence River and observed the embarkation of the force, and its fate writing on June 8^th

“Last night General Sullivan received a letter from General Thompson advising him, that he proposed to attack the enemy at the Three Rivers by surprise with his whole body this morning. The army was to cross over in Bateaux, land above the Three Rivers, and attack the enemy at daylight…Early in the morning we head firing down the river, which we supposed to be the attack on the enemy… It was however broke and at intervals, not like a general charge. We waited all this day in suspense without a word of intelligence from the army. On the morning of the 9^th , we again heard the report of cannon, the singly and soon discontinued. About 10 o’clock AM the Bateaux of the army came in sight. In great anxiety we all hastened to the edge of the river…but were sadly mortified to find our army had been defeated. That the bateaux which transported over the army, being cut off by the enemy from the troops who lost their way came up by detachment to the enemies batteries, were driven back. Finding the enemy in possession of the place where the bateaux were left, took to the woods and swamps.” He added that Major Woods, who was left in command of the bateaux, saw two frigates underway and ordered the bateaux to push further up river until he deemed safe to wait for the army. “The ships of war Major Wood discovered… had entered Lake St. Peters [where the St. Lawrence widens], nearly abreast of the bateaux. Finding himself in this precarious situation he ordered those in the bateaus to provide directly them to the mouth of the Sorel… thus abandoning the army to make the best of their way, through horrid swamps, up the north side of the river.” [British Lt. Enys of the 29^th Foot concurred that the bateaux had pushed off before they could be captured]

“On the 10^th, by order of General Sullivan, crossed the River St. Lawrence to the north side with a scout of ten riflemen and Lt. Read, to proceed down the St. Lawrence until we met the retreating army. Proceeded through most horrid swamps, were almost devoured by muskeetoes of a monstrous size and innumerable numbers, came into a very indifferent and swampy road, not meeting with a single habitation, which we followed until after dark, when we lucky fell in with the leading detachment under Captain Smith of the 6^th Penn Regiment, of Colonel Irvine’s regiment, with whom we returned leaving two of our men to direct those in the rear [of] the rout to the mouth of the Sorel. The troops being so scattered, they did not arrive until the later part or evening of the next day.”[39]

Colonel Anthony Wayne’s Account

Colonel Anthony Wayne lead the 4^th Pennsylvania Battalion and wrote a detailed description to Benjamin Franklin as soon as he returned to camp:

“On the 7^th it was agreed in a council on war to attack the enemy at Three Rivers… whose strength was estimated at 3 or 4 hundred…” He lists the columns of attack, differing from other accounts by stating that he commanded the second column, not Irvine, placing Irvine’s position in the 4^th column. “On the same evening we embarked and arrived at Colonel St. Clair’s encampment about midnight” [Gen. Thompson sent St. Clair a couple of days earlier a few miles down the St. Lawrence to Nicolet to reconnaissance the enemy]. He stated that 1,450 Pennsylvanians plus Maxwell’s Battalion took to the boats.

“About 2 in the morning we landed nine miles above the town, [he makes no mention of any deceit by the pilot for not directing them to four miles above the town] and after an hour’s march, day began to appear. Our guides had mistook the road, the enemy discovered and cannonaded us from their ships, a surprise was out of the question – We therefore put our best face on it and continued our line of march thro’ a thick deep swamp three miles wide, [Again, the decision – based not on military expertise – that doomed the operation] and after four hours arrived at a more open piece of ground [same clearing as mentioned in Irvine’s account] – amidst the thickest firing of the shipping when all of a sudden a large body of regulars marched down in good order immediately in front of me to prevent our forming- in consequence of which I ordered my light infantry together with captain Hays company of riflemen to advance and amuse them whilst I was forming; they began and continued the attack with great spirit until I advanced to support them when I ordered them to wheel to the right and left and flank the enemy at the same time we poured in a swell aimed and heavy fire in front. They attempted to retreat in good order at first but in a few minutes broke and ran in the utmost confusion.” [This is the only account that states the British retreated before an American assault]

“About this time the other divisions “began to emerge from the swamp except Maxwell who with his was advanced in a thicket a considerable distance to the left – our rear now becoming our front, etc.” [This explains Irvine’s account placing Maxwell’s regiment at the front] “At this instant we rec’d a heavy fire in flank from musketry, field pieces, howitzers, etc… which threw us into some confusion, but was instantly remedied. We advanced in column up to their breast works which till then we had not discovered – at this time Gen. Thompson with Colonels St. Clair, Irvine & Hartley were marching in full view to our support. Colonel Maxwell now began to engage on the left of me, the fire was so hot he could not maintain his post [as recorded in Irvine’s account – they broke and ran] – the other troops had also filed off to the left – my small battalion composed of my own and two companies of Jersey men under Major Ray amounting in the whole to about 200 were left exposed to the whole fire of their shipping in flank and full three thousand men in front with all their artillery under the command of Gen. Burgoyne. [Wayne mistakenly places Burgoyne as commander on the field when in fact it was Colonel Simon Fraser]. Our people taking example by others, gave way. Indeed, it was impossible for them to stand it longer.

“Whilst Col Allen and myself were employed in rallying the troops, Lt. Col. Hartley and I advanced with the reserves and bravely attacked the enemy from a thicket in a swamp to the left, this hardiness of his was of the utmost consequence to us – we having rallied about 800 men from the different regiments – we now sent to find the general [Thompson] and other field officers. At the same time the rifle men of mine and Irvine’s kept up a galling fire on the enemy. The swamp was so deep and thick with timber and underwood that a man ten yard in front or rear would not see the men drawn up – this was the cause of the General, Col. St. Clair, Maxwell and Irvine missing us – or perhaps they and taken for granted that we were all cut off. Col. Hartley who lay nearby, retreated without a discover on either side, until he crossed our line near the left, which caused our people to follow him. Allen and myself were now left on the field with only twenty men and five officers, the enemy still continuing their whole fire from great and small guns upon us – but afraid to venture from their lines, we thought it prudent to keep them in play by keeping up a small fire in order to gain time for our people to make good their retreat in consequence of which we continued about a hour longer in the field, and then retreated back into the woods which brought us to a road on the far side of the swamp.” [This concurs with historical accounts as it is generally accepted that Wayne organized a rear guard.]

“We followed this road about two miles when we cut loose from our small party and reached the place where our people had entered the swamp by which means we soon collected  6 or 700 men with whom we retreated in good order but without nourishment of any kind. The enemy who were strong in number had detached in two or three bodies about 1500 men to cut off our retreat. They way laid and engaged us again about 9 miles from the field of battle, [Wayne’s is the only account that indicates any organized action by the enemy] [but]they did us little damage. We continued our march and the third day, almost worn out with fatigue, hunger and difficulties; scarcely to be paralleled we arrived here with 1100 men. But Gen. Thompson, Col Irvine, Doctor McCalla and several officers are prisoners at Three Rivers. Col. St. Clair arrived alone last night.

Wayne’s account is definitely self serving, portraying himself as one who had made quick and accurate decisions with total control of events throughout the action. He ends his letter with the lofty proclamation: “I believe it will be universally allowed that Col Allen and myself have saved the army in Canada… Out of 150 of my own I have lost more than the quarter part together with a slight touch in my right leg.”[40]

Colonel Thomas Hartley’s Version While Commanding the Reserves

“The guide proved faithless, and the General was misinformed as to the number of the enemy as well as to the situation in the town. Our men had lost their sleep for two nights, yet were in pretty good spirits. Daylight appeared, and showed us to the enemy. Our guides (perhaps traitors) had led us through several windings, and were rather carrying us off from the post. The Gen. was outraged at their conduct. There were mutual firings. Our people killed some in a barge [return fire upon British ships?] Our scheme was no longer an enterprise, it might have been, perhaps, prudent, to have retreated, but no one would propose it. [Once more – a decision not based on military necessity while admitting that no officer was about to suggest the obvious].

“We endeavored to penetrate through a swamp to the town, and avoid the shipping. We had no idea of the difficulties we were to surmount in the mire, otherwise the way by the shipping would have been preferred. We waded three hours through the muck, about mid-deep in general, the men fasting. We every minute expected to get through and find some good ground to form on, but were deceived. The great body of the enemy, which we knew nothing of, consisting of two or 3,000 men, covered with entrenchments [Colonel Wayne also mentioned a breastwork], and assisted with the cannon of the shipping and several field pieces [the British had unloaded two shipboard 6 pounders], began a furious fire, and continued it upon our troops in the front. It was so heavy that the division gave way, and from the badness of the ground could not form suddenly again. Col. St. Clair’s division advanced, but the fire was too heavy. Part of Col. Irvine’s division, especially the riflemen, went up towards the enemy [this concurs with Irvine’s account]. I understand the army was in confusion” [by then they had begun to retreat].

“I consulted some friends, and led the reserve within a short distance of the enemy…under the disadvantages, our men would fight: but we had no covering, no artillery, and no prospect of succeeding, as the number of the enemy was so much superior to ours. Cols. Wayne and Allen rallied part of our men and kept up a fire against the English from the swamp [this concurs with Wayne’s account]. The enemy, in the meantime, dispatched a strong body to cut off our retreat to the boats, when it was thought expedient to retreat. Our General and Colonel Irvine were not to be found, they had both gone up in a very hot fire. This gave us great uneasiness, but a retreat was necessary. This could not be done regularly, as we could not regain the road, on account of the enemy’s shipping and artillery, and we went off in small parties through the swamp. Cols. Wayne and Allen gathered some hundreds together [as reported by Wayne], and I have got as many in my division as I could with several others, amounting to upwards of 200.[41]

Lieutenant John Enys with the 29^th Foot Gave the British Version of the Action

“On the 8^th of June, a boat belonging to our fleet which had been up the River [St. Lawrence] was fired upon by the rebels. About 2 o’clock in the morning, and about day light Captain Harvey of the Martin ordered out ship to drop a stern clear of the reach of his guns as he was going to fire on shore. On looking on shore we could see a large body of men near the edge of the wood. A good deal of firing took place from the Martin sloop; and an armed transport named the British Queen, but believe it had no effect except making the rebels just enter the skirts of the wood that they might not be seen. The signal for our party to land was very soon made which we accordingly did together with two six pounders which came from England on board one of our transports under the command of Lieutenants Smith and York of the artillery.

As soon as we were all on shore we marched and took post in their rear in order to cut off their retreat. A very short time after we had taken up our ground, a scattering fire began with the pickets of the army near the town which was soon succeeded by a very smart one from the 62^nd and some other regiments which lasted about ten or twelve minutes when the rebels retreated into the wood. About this time we were joined by 4 companies of the 24^th regiment and a field piece from Three Rivers, so that when the rebels had retreated as far as our post, finding us too strong they never attempted to fire upon us but tried to go round us by striking deeper into the wood in order to gain their boats which they had left at a place called Machiech [river] about 15 miles further.

This occasioned us another march in order to get possession of the boats before them, and as we had taken a good many prisoners very good intelligence was got of the place where they were. But unfortunately on our way we saw 5 other boats full of men just as we came to the banks of Lake St. Peter at a place named Point au Lac at whom we fired a few shot from our cannon which alarmed those we were in pursuit of and gave them time to get off which they did before we reached Macheich. Balked in our hopes and being now 18 miles from our ships and the day pretty far advanced we were ordered to take post, which was accordingly done, on the banks of the River Machiech we found convenient for the purpose. Here we lay all night very quiet. In the morning some of the rebels showed themselves at the shore of the wood but on seeing us retired. About 7 or 8 in the morning great numbers began to come in to us and give themselves up as prisoners, among whom was General Thomson who commanded.“[42]

Colonel Arthur St. Clair’s Account as Given by Biographer William Henry Smith in the St. Clair Papers

“On June 5^th, St. Clair “marched from the camp of Sorel to the village of Nicolet[43] – opposite to the lower end of Lake St. Peter, on the south side, whence he intended to cross the St. Lawrence…”[44]  In St. Clair’s words: “It had been the intention not to pursue the main road, but to strike off from it into another that lay nearly parallel, but at some distance from the river, and the point of separation was between us and a white house.“[45] St. Clair wrote that some two miles back, they had passed a road which the officers believed they should have taken. St Clair continued, “…the guide, a very intelligent man[46], thought we might gain the intended road by marching across the forest, in less time than must necessarily be spent in going back to the place first proposed, but without any path…” They did so, but “a considerable time was spent without reaching it and the general [Thompson], became suspicious that the guide was misleading him…” St. Clair stated that they retraced their track to the main road and was at that point discovered by a guard-boat which fired upon them. Thompson decided to push on. “The detachment marched but a short distance, before an armed vessel, posted lower down the river, opened her fire…”

He wrote that the officer who led the front division [Colonel Maxwell], when fired upon, struck off from the river “crossing what appeared to be a small wood, which would… cover the men from the fire of the vessel. It led us, indeed, into the wood, which was far from being a small one… and was crossed with the utmost labor and difficulty, being a morass the whole way through, full three miles over, knee deep nearly at every step, and intersected by a small rivulet, which had to be crossed may times, and took the men to their breasts.”

St Clair recorded that they emerged from the swamp upon a cultivated field [however other accounts describe this field as swampy at best] “at no great distance from the village.” He recorded that they saw British transports “busily debarking, [perhaps the 29^th of Foot as described in Lt. Eny’s account], and a considerable body, with some pieces of artillery, coming to meet us. The advance of the two corps was soon engaged, but they were not equal, and ours were obliged to give way, and we were forced to trace back our steps through the same dismal swamp by which we had advanced.” Smith, St. Clair’s biographer, claimed that St. Clair resumed command after General Thompson and Colonel Irvine and several other officers were captured however St. Clair, in all the confusion and separation of men, would not have known at the time that the general was captured and doubtful if he would take it upon himself to assume command.

St. Clair led his men to the landing place and found “the enemy formed in good order…” Their boats were gone. Smith stated that St. Clair, determined to make an escape, hastily formed his men and “threw a point of woods between them and the enemy.” This accordingly led them to an Acadian village and crossed the Riviere de Loups. Smith wrote “The enemy amused themselves by firing a harmless volley, but did not attempt to follow. In two or three days they again reached Sorel, demoralized…”[47]

Consensus by Primary Sources of the Battle of Three Rivers

General Sullivan, particularly General Thompson, wished to make a name for themselves. Both were convinced of their instinctive military skills. The whole affair was rushed into without proper reconnaissance of enemy forces or strategic military planning. As the bateaux ferrying the American troops approached the north shore of the St. Lawrence River, through error of the pilot, they landed considerably farther from Three Rivers than intended.  Col. Irvine estimated it to be nine miles. At around 2 AM, Thompson landed all the men, met with his officers, and it was decided to press on the attack, even though the large distance needed to travel would make a dawn attack impossible. He formed them into columns, and ordered them forward. At first they marched along a road paralleling the river, but they were exposed and determined to take a course slightly inland to maintain their surprise. St. Clair spoke of seeking another road, and thereby moving into the woods to do so, but his was the only recourse to mention this. Monsieur Gauthier, the Canadian guide, whether he was lost or was acting with guile, misled the Americans into a swamp, through which they floundered all night.[48]

On June 8^th, 1776, the moon rose at midnight and had entered the last quarter, providing forty percent illumination. Therefore the Americans had some illumination for the entirety of their march, though how much light filtered through a thick swamp would be questionable. This may have aided the British in spotting the Americans as they emerged from the swamp and onto the road. However, sunrise was at 4:06 – which, given the time the rebel column traversed the four miles through the swamp – still around five miles from their objective – there would have been some morning light for the British artillery to effectively harass the quick moving Americans.

Irvine states they emerged from the swamp at first light. Dawn found them still three to four miles from the town, near where they had originally intended to land to begin their march. Here they found the river road and gratefully returned to it, only to be observed by the British sloop of war Martin and other British vessels on the river. Under close range and accurate artillery fire, they continued onward for three quarters of a mile before forced to return to the “most horrid swamp that man ever set foot in,” as described by Colonel Irvine.

With no chance of making a dawn attack on the British garrison (still several miles away), and the advent of British naval guns booming up and down the St. Lawrence, any hope for a surprise attack was lost – a key to the American plan for victory. Historians have expressed that it was inconceivable why Thompson still pressed the attack forward.  It made no tactical sense. The British clearly controlled the river and with each step his men marched toward Three Rivers, it aided the British ability to move up river and cut off any hope for a withdrawal. He also subjected his right flank to naval gunfire which he had no way of responding for he carried no artillery into action. Were the British warned of Thompson’s approach? It is difficult to believe that two thousand rebels floundering through the swamps would not raise enough of a ruckus to alert British outposts and scouts. Though there is no confirmation by any primary sources, local Quebec lore has Gauthier’s wife racing down the river road, directly to the British garrison, to warn of the rebel attack. This tale is most likely based on romantic speculation by later generations. So warned by the naval vessels of an impending attack, British Colonel Fraser had ample time to prepare. He also had time to consider pushing up river and cutting off the American columns. He did so and unloaded two bronze six pounder cannon, commanded by 2^nd Lt. William P. Smith and 2^nd Lt. John H. York, both from the 1^st Battalion of Royal artillery.

After the Americans entered the swamp a second time to avoid the British guns, the divisions of St. Clair and Irvine separated from Maxwell. “Wayne, and Hartley, the two former with General Thompson, marching in a north-easterly direction back from the river; the three latter divisions continuing their march near the shore…” They struggled through the morass until they viewed a clearing to their front. Instead of open, dry ground, they were disheartened as the clearing remained a quagmire, hampering their ability to form. Colonel Maxwell’s force had been the first column down the road and into the swamps, but during the slog through the swamps, they traversed the greatest distance.

When emerging upon the clearing, they were on the American far left, well to the rear of the other columns. Here, the Americans met Colonel Fraser’s advance guard. Wayne, with fragments of other columns, at once attacked the advance guard of the enemy and [according to Wayne’s account] “drove them in upon the main body…” under Brigadier General Fraser, “strongly entrenched…” The rebels advanced, only to find a British force that vastly outnumbered their own, according to St. Clair, entrenched behind strong breastworks, their artillery sweeping the field that the Americans had to advance; “accurate fire that enfiladed the lines.”[49]

Though many rebels advanced with resolution, they were soon pulling back. “The Americans… displayed great courage and gallantry, but the enemy opened such a murderous fire upon them from behind their works that they were forced to give way.”  Meanwhile, St. Clair’s and Irvine’s divisions, with General Thompson, were advancing to support Wayne and Maxwell…”  Irvine wrote that Maxwell’s men were in front and broke and ran from the enemy while he, along with General Thompson’s division, tried to form. However, trudging and trying to form in the swamp, hindered all sense of bearing as well as “the enemy had, by landing troops in the rear of the Americans, thrown them into confusion” as to where the ‘front’ of the attack actually was.

Thoroughly out of his element, with soldiers fleeing a murderous fire that seemed to be coming from all directions, General Thompson had no recourse but to join his men in their hasty retreat back into the depths of the swamp. This left a dreadful march back through the swamp to their bateaux while British gunfire tore up their southern flanks. Soldiers, already exhausted by their night ordeal, struggled through the swamp as they continued to wade through the horrid quagmire – many carrying their wounded. The withdrawal, by all accounts, was dreadful. An extract from a letter published in Force archives, Volume IV, Series Four, pages 826-828 details the flight many of the soldiers experienced during their nearly twenty mile trek back to the American lines. A portion is footnoted here.[50]

General Thompson’s ability as a fighting force had vanished – more so when the British landed a troops to cut off their retreat and capture their bateaux (by all accounts, most of the boats did not wait for their troops, but had escaped as soon as they spotted the British). With some success, Colonel Wayne and Colonel Hartley, commanding the reserves, formed a crude rear guard to cover the retreat of Thompson’s shattered command and brought off seven to eight hundred men successfully. The British dispatched Canadians and Native Americans into the swamp to harass the rebels in their retreat. Without boats, those Americans who survived the ordeal would spend the next few days struggling overland in the most fiendish conditions in their trek back to Sorel. Those who did make it back, were mere shadows of the men who climbed aboard the bateaux just a few days earlier; gone was the “flower of our army,” as described by General Sullivan.

Immediate Aftermath of the Battle

The attack, and more so retreat, was a fiasco. Thompson’s force at Sorel, the only regiment capable of taking the offensive against the British, had been wrecked. This left General Sullivan without any means of halting the British advance up the St. Lawrence. A full retreat from Canada to Fort Ticonderoga, New York, where they hoped to halt what would become a British thrust south, was the only option left. General Thompson, including Colonel Irvine, along with 236 rebel soldiers, were taken prisoner. Add to that killed[51] and wounded, plus those lost in the swamps, never to be heard of again, and the Americans suffered almost four hundred casualties. The British loss was reported as eight killed and nine wounded.

Analysis of the Weakness and Major problems of General Thompson’s Plan and Attack

A few days after the clash at Three Rivers, Benedict Arnold wrote to General Sullivan from Montreal on June 11^th. “Mr. Tucker has this minute arrived here from Chambly, and tells a confused story of an engagement between General Thompson and a superior force of the enemy, and that both armies retired, the enemy to Three Rivers, and our troops to Berthier [further west on the St. Lawrence]. I wait with great anxiety to know the truth of this matter.”[52] By all accounts, General Thompson allowed ego and a desire to ‘grasp the bull by the horns’ attitude in his plan to attack the advancing British. Having arrived and immediately questioning the evidence of a strong British force advancing up St. Lawrence, he looked for the opportunity to seize the offensive. He had no strong confirmation regarding the condition of the British defenses at Three Rivers, the strength of Colonel Fraser’s command, or any details of the town he was planning to attack.

A night march by an inexperienced army was in itself questionable, but it also depended on the reliability of a Canadian guide of mental or dubious reliability (though St. Clair wrote that he seemed intelligent). When the American forces landed at 2 AM, nine miles, instead of the planned four, from the garrison at Three Rivers, historians and military tacticians are in agreement that the army’ marching at night over unsure territory, would be hard pressed, if impossible, to attack the town by daybreak – esp. when dawn, in June, that far north, occurred just after 4 AM. The attack should have been jettisoned. Instead, with no military logic to back it up, the columns formed and marched, leaving no strong detachment to guard the bateaux, to assure they had a means of escape if needed. After leaving the main road and being led into a dreadful swamp by a questionable guide, where they became helplessly entangled in the thick morass, the logical action by any commander would be concern for his struggling forces. They could have retraced their steps back to the boats and either retreated back to Sorel, planned another contingency for attack, or at least waited until daylight to regroup. Once they made the main road and were fired upon by British naval ships, the chance of a surprise attack, necessary for a successful operation – while still some miles from the garrison – became impossible. Yet – as Colonel Irvine stated in his memoir – they felt there was nothing else to do and they went forward with the attack.

During the slog through the swamps, the columns became entangled and lost their coherence, regiments breaking up into smaller groups and intermingling. When they came upon a clearing and the enemy, to which they tried to form a coordinated attack, the officers could only find fragments of their command dispersed throughout the woods. Furthermore, the clearing proved to be an extension of the swamp. The columns were soon engaged by a superior, well rested, and organized British force who had managed to confront them on more than one front. After a heated exchange in which the Americans realized they had no recourse but to retreat, the men broke off into smaller groups as they fled back into the mire towards their boats. Colonel Wayne and Hartley were able to organize a hasty rear guard and were also successful in gathering many of the demoralized troops to affect an escape. However, with no strong detachment to safeguard the boats[53], the rebels were cut off and had to make a forced march through the quagmire and go around the British – adding to their exhaustion and ‘ruin’ as they trudged hour upon hour in conditions beyond human endurance.

Historian Douglas Cubbison noted, “It had been a dreadfully botched affair, bungled in concept, bungled in planning, and bungled in execution.”[54]  General Burgoyne wrote a letter to his friend, General Henry Clinton (second to the Commanding General of British Forces in America, General William Howe) in July 1776 while Clinton was positioned outside New York City. He summed up the American effort: “Their attempt upon Three Rivers was founded in rashness and executed with timidity; two principles which compounded make a consummation of preposterous conduct.”[55]  Perhaps this early clash with American forces enforced Burgoyne’s low opinion of these ‘farmer soldiers’ and their officers’ fighting abilities. He was to make decisions based on such assumptions the following year as he led a British invasion of Lake Champlain towards Albany.

Aftermath

After the failed attempt to halt the British advance at Three Rivers, all hope of remaining in Canada was lost. The retreat south along the Richelieu River, with the British in hot pursuit, only worsened the condition of the dismally worn out American army. The sick and dying were transported south in the most dire conditions. Those who survived the near two hundred mile ordeal would finally reach the hospital established at Albany, New York.

The British thrust against the American invaders was so intense, that it would soon prove that British commander governor general Sir Guy Carleton would not stop at the Canadian border. While the British remained on Lake Richelieu dismantling and reconstructing a small fleet to launch their invasion south, Arnold, using his naval experience in the merchant fleet, was able to construct gun boats at Skenesborough, (now Whitehall) New York, on the southern tip of Lake Champlain.

On October 11, 1776, the two small fleets met at what became known as the Battle of Valour Island. During the heated battle, Arnold was defeated and retreated to what is now called Arnold Bay, Vermont, in Ferrisburgh, about ten miles north of Crown Point. He burned his vessels and carted what supplies he could to Crown Point, just north of Fort Ticonderoga. The Americans prepared for an invasion that never took place. Arnold was successful in offering a stiff resistance to the British advance that convinced Carleton to halt any plans for invading New York until the next year when he hoped for continued reinforcements.

Meanwhile, Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in American, General William Howe, had captured New York City and was pursuing General Washington’s forces north. On October 28, 1776, the two forces would collide, convincing Washington to split his army. While a portion remained north of the city to discourage any British push towards Boston, the rest headed south to reclaim forces left at Fort Washington and Lee. Both garrisons were soon lost leading to Washington’s mad dash across New Jersey and into Pennsylvania. Leading to the American army’s resurrection at Trenton on December 25, 1776.

IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO READ MORE ON THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO TAKE CANADA IN 1775-1776, CHECK OUT THESE FREE PREVIEWS OF GREAT BOOKS ON AMAZON

SIMILAR ARTICLES OF INTEREST ON REVOLUTIONARY WAR JOURNAL

RESOURCES

Anderson, Mark R. The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony. 2013: United Press of New England, Lebanon, NH.

Badeaux, Jean-Baptiste (Three Rivers Journal) & Goforth, Captain William (Letters), Edited by Mark R. Anderson.  Invasion of Canada by the Americans 1775-1776. 2016: State University of New York Press, Albany, NY.

Commager, Henry Steele & Morris, Richard B. editors. The Spirit of Seventy-Six, The Story of the American Revolution as told by Participants. 1958: Bobbs Merril, Indianapolis, IN, 1995: DeCapo Press, New York, NY.

Cubbison, Douglas R. The American Northern Theater Army in 1776. The Ruin and Reconstruction of the Continental Force. 2010: McFarland Publishing, Jefferson, NC.

Fenn, Elizabeth A. Pox Americana, The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-1783. 2001: Hill & Wang Publishing, New York, NY.

Force, Peter. American Archives Consisting of a Collection of Authentic Records…Volume IV, Series 6. 1844: Published by the author, Washington, DC.

Ford, Worthington Chauncey. British Officers Serving in America, 1774-1783. 1897: Brooklyn New York Historical Printing Club, New York, NY.

Garneau, Francois-Xavier, Translated by Andrew Bell.  History of Canada, From the Time of Discovery to the Union Year… in Three Volumes, Vol. II. 1860: Printed and Published by John Lovell, Montreal, Canada.

Gordon, William. The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the Independence of the United States including an account of the late war… in Three Volumes. 1801: Printed for Samuel Campbell, New York, NY

Jones, Charles Henry. History of the Campaign for the Conquest of Canada. 1881: Porter & Coates, Philadelphia, PA.

Ketchum, Richard M. Saratoga, Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War. 1997: Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY.

Lefkowitz, Arthur S. Benedict Arnold’s Army, The 1775 American Invasion of Canada During the Revolutionary War. 2008: Savas Beatie LLC, El Dorado Hills, CA.

Smith, William Henry. The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair, Soldier of the Revolutionary War etc… Vols. I & II., Arranged and annotated. 1882: Robert Clark and Co., Cincinnati, OH.

Thayer, Captain Simeon. The Invasion of Canada in 1775, Including the Journal of Captain Simeon Thayer. 1867: Knowles, Anthony & Company Printers, Digitized University of Virginia, 2007.

Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution. Original publication 1941, Reprint 2011: Skyhorse Publication, New York, NY.

FOOTNOTES

[26]  William Thompson (1736-1781) was a Colonel of the 1^st Penn Rifle Company. Outside of Boston, November 9^th, 1775, his rifle company of sharpshooters drove back a British landing party. Thompson was promoted to brigadier, over Washington’s displeasure as he questioned his military abilities. After he was captured at Three Rivers, he spent the next four years on parole waiting to be exchanged. He was finally exchanged for Prussian General Baron Riedesel who was captured at Saratoga. Thompson made several enemies in Congress when he blamed and sued Congressman Thomas McKean for stalling his exchange. He never saw any other military action and died at home in Carlisle Pennsylvania.

[27]  Cubbison, pg. 118.

[28]  Force, Vol. IV, Ser. 6, pg. 448.

[29]  General Wooster left shortly after Sullivan arrived.

[30]  By the time this letter was penned, June 1^st, Thomas had been at a hospital at Chambly. He was blind and on his last breath of life – dying the next day, June 2^nd, 1776.

[31]  Force Vol. IV, Ser. 6, pg 679

[32]  Not sure who General Thompson is referring to when he wrote that the British advance force was under the command of Colonel McLean. It is well documented that the British advance was under Colonel Simon Fraser.  Lists of British officers in America during the war lists several  officers with the sername McLean. The most famous, Colonel Francis McLean, who was stationed in Canada and later Maine, did not arrive until August of 1777. There was one other officer named McLean who might have been part of General Carlton’s forces: Lt. Colonel Allen McLean – commissioned on May 25^th, 1772, who, records indicate, was in the 29^th and later 84^th regiments. As noted, the 29^th was present during this operation.

[33]  Force, Vol. IV, Ser. 6, pg. 684

[34]  Force, Vol IV, Ser 6, pg. 482.

[35]  Force, Vol. IV, Ser 6, pp 826-827.

[36] Cubbison, pg. 111

[37]  Ibid, pg. 110.

[38]  Ibid, pp 111-113.

[39]  Ibid., pg. 113.

[40]  Ibid., pp 113-115.

[41]  Ibid., pg. 115.

[42]  Ibid., pp 115-116.

[43] General Thompson had sent St. Clair down the river to ‘keep an eye on the enemy’ a couple of days prior to the battle.

[44]  As noted, Lake St. Peter is a large body of water formed formed by the widening of the St. Lawrence River.

[45]  St. Clair is the first to mention the prearranged plan to take another road parallel to the main road as well as a white house. A rumor circulated among themen that there was a British ost at a white house about 3 miles from where they set off.

[46]  Some believed the guide, Gauthier, if not deceptive, was incompetent, however here St. Clair is on record stating he was of higher intelligence.

[47]  Smith, pp 18-22.

[48]  Cubbison, pg. 116.

[49]  Jones, pp 74-75.

[50]  Portion of letter detailing the march through the swamps to the American line: “The English had possessed the ground near the landing [where the bateau were left] so that we could not get there. We saw part of them. The enemy had so many men that they sent parties to fortify all the ferries we were to pass and theshipping proceeded up the river to cover them. Colonel Wayne and his party, lay near the enemy. We passed through a prodigious swamp and at night took possession of a hill near the enemy. Our men, without provision, without sleep [by now the third night without sleep] and after all this fatigue, required some rest. The mantle of Heaven was our only covering, no fire, and bad water our only food. We mounted a small quarter-guard, fixed our alarm post, and made every man lay down on the ground on which he was to rise for action in case of an attack. I slept a little by resting my head on a cold bough of spruce. Morning appeared, what ws to be done? We consulted our officers and men: they said they were refreshed with sleep; it was agreed to stand together, and that they would support and effect a passage through the enemy, or die in the attempt. A little spring water refreshed us more, the necessary dispositions were made, but we had no guides. We heard the enemy was within half a mile of us, but no one seemed alarmed at it, so we proceeded and luckily fell in with Colonel Wayne’s track. We pursued and overtook him near the river Du Luc. This made us upwards of seven hundred strong…”  Force, Vol. IV, Ser. 6, pg 827.

[51]  Charles Henry Jones in his “History of the Campaign for the Conquest of Canada,” gives the number of American killed as twenty five.

[52]  Cubbison, pg. 120

[53]  An extract from an unidentified letter written on June 10^th at the mouth of the Sorel is listed in Force, Vol. IV, pp 826-828. In this extract, the writer states that 250 men were left at the boats, however there are no other primary sources to back up this claim.

[54]  Cubbison, pg. 119.

[55]  Ibid.