Battle of the Chesapeake Bay: Gateway to Yorktown

Fought on September 5, 1781, the Battle of Chesapeake Bay (Battle of the Capes) was a French victory that set the stage for British General Lord Charles Cornwallis’ surrender at Yorktown, Virginia, October 19, 1781. On August 15^th, a French fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Francois Joseph Paul, the Comte de Grasse, sailed from Hatti in the Caribbean to the Chesapeake Bay. When British Admiral Sir Thomas Graves’ fleet appeared outside the bay on September 5^th, the French sailed out to do battle. It was a strategic loss for the British who failed to aid Cornwallis’ army by either reinforcing or evacuating his besieged force. Admiral Graves sailed back to New York City, leaving the French fleet in control of the Chesapeake.  

War is a path. A road. In which events fall in line. Often leading to a major battle; the Road to Lexington and Concord, the Road to Camden, or the Road to Guilford Courthouse. Or a place. A turning point; Trenton, Saratoga, Cowpens.  So too, in this chain of events, are actors. Those who step onto the stage at that precise moment. When their presence becomes an important link. And they need not be the right person at the right time. The wrong person may be given a role in which they play to perfection. Steering a path that gains momentum as the passage weaves a course towards an outcome. Thickly laced with the human spirit, encompassing all its valor and frailties.

In that we come to the Road to Yorktown and the sea action that made it possible. A sequence or chain of events that started with incompetence. That took in a traitor before spanning a course of determination, luck, frustration, opportunities – fortuitous and missed, decisions beyond reach, resourcefulness, leadership, battle, and victory. Over the next year, this road twisted and turned, ascending peaks of fortune while sliding into nail biting valleys of despair. Where the cards were laid out on one final twist of hand; the Battle of the Chesapeake Bay, and a mistake in signals that proved fatal. A battle fought without colonial Americans, but between two nations locked in eight hundred years of violence. And not even in the bay for which it was named. But out at sea. Where wind, waves, and the flow of eternal currents played its part in a battle that, more than all the cannon of Yorktown, decided the fate of America.

Incompetence

When the Southern Continental Army of 5,500 soldiers surrendered at Charleston, South Carolina on May 12, 1780, only bands of rebel militia were left to stop the British from claiming the southern colonies. Congress sent the best Continental troops from Maryland and Delaware to the Carolinas. They needed a strong leader to rally what was left of the rebellion’s southern resistance and put a stop to British General Charles Cornwallis. Major General Horatio Gates was chosen, hero of Saratoga and the darling of Congress. Previously, several members of Congress had conspired in the Conway Cabal to replace the weak and inept George Washington with Gates as supreme commander; the cabal collapsed on January 19, 1778. Washington did not agree with the choice of Gates to command the Southern Army, but Congress would have none of it and got its way.

But it was not Gates who had taken the aggressive action to defeat General Johnny Burgoyne at Saratoga. That was Benedict Arnold. With Arnold wounded and out of the picture, Gates stepped in to take all the credit. In that, a tragic façade hid Gates’ incompetence; he may be able to march and muster an army, but he could not fight it. When he faced Cornwallis at the Battle of Camden on the morning of August 16, 1780, the curtain was thrown back, leaving Gates naked on the field of honor. Minutes of the opening shots, he mounted his horse and left behind his army to face a devastating defeat. While Gates’ steed carried the illustrious former hero 200 miles to safety, his cowardice was the first major step along the path to the Chesapeake. It allowed Washington to send his first choice to command the resistance in the south, General Nathanael Greene. And it was Greene’s competence in protracting the war, along with his dependence on a continuation of supplies through Virginia, that convinced Washington that any path to victory needed a strong French Navy.

Traitor

Virginia’s government and Governor Thomas Jefferson were expected to see that Greene’s southern army was supplied with goods and ammunition.  Washington sent General Baron von Steuben to help organize this and assist General Peter Muhlenberg who commanded the state’s militia and oversaw security. British General Henry Clinton in New York agreed with Cornwallis’ request for a diversion in Virginia to draw away the legislature’s attention from the Carolinas and disrupt the state’s operations and supplies to Greene’s army. In December 1789, Clinton dispatched the turncoat Brigadier Benedict Arnold in charge of 1,600 troops to the southern Chesapeake. He was to establish a naval base at Portsmouth, just south of Norfolk, Virginia which controlled all commerce along the King’s Highway (Great Road), that ran from Boston to Savannah, Georgia. From there, he could raid the interior cutting off the two major branches of the King’s Highway, Fall Line Road and Upper Road, at Fredericksburg, and the Great Wagon Road further west. This would seal off all aid to General Greene.

On January 4, 1781, Arnold sailed up the James and marched rapidly to Richmond where he torched the city and warehouses. Arnold could have penetrated further inland for Muhlenberg’s inexperienced militias were useless to prevent his movements. But Arnold had commanded American forces during the British Danbury Connecticut raid. He knew the redcoats had delayed too long in returning to the sea and the aggressive former patriot rallied his men and almost caught them. Arnold would not make that same mistake. Once having ravaged the countryside, he returned to Portsmouth to begin fortifications on a British post. But the damage was done. Governor Jefferson turned from the Carolinas and ordered the militia, including Muhlenberg and von Steuben, to focus not on supplying Greene, but preventing Arnold from another inland raid. General von Steuben wrote to Washington, “For while there is an enemy in the heart of the country, you can neither expect men or supplies.”

Determination

Ever since Arnold’s plot to turn West Point over to the British was discovered on September 23, 1780, Washington was determined to catch and hang the turncoat. When the ‘arch traitor’ turned up in Virginia in January, 1781, plundering and torching his home state, Washington was enraged. He was wintering in the Hudson Heights at New Windsor, New York and he had a plan.  If Virginia’s militia were supported by a strong detachment of Continental troops, along with landed French troops supported by war ships, he could trap and hang the hated turncoat and continue supplying Greene. But it would take more than a few French men-of-war to counter the British navy.  He needed the whole fleet.

The French fleet had been bottled up at Newport, Rhode Island for some time. It was poorly prepared and according to British intelligence, had a “wretched system of discipline.”  It had been commanded by Admiral Charles Henri-Louis d’Arsac de Ternay who recently died (Dec. 15, 1780) prompting Lafayette to comment that the admiral had “found no way to bypass [the British blockade] except by way of the next world.” He had been replaced by Charles Destouches, Ternay’s second, who since inheriting the poorly fleet, had his work cut out for him to whip it in shape.

Washington knew it would take all the fleet’s battle ships along with transports to bully their way past a British fleet to land a thousand infantry including siege guns at Portsmouth, Virginia. Then transport Washington’s Continentals down from Head of Elk, Maryland, some 200 miles at the Chesapeake’s northern tip. It was brilliant and it could work. But Washington had to convince a difficult and condescending French admiralty the merits of his plan. And since the British held a two-ship advantage in number of battleships, he was restricted from even requesting their assistance. But it took an intervention of nature to provide the American commander an opening to set his plan in motion.

Luck

January, 1781, the British had nine ships of the line (those carrying 50 or more guns) to the Frenchmen’s seven. On January 20, 1781, three French ships sailed from Newport. The British had excellent spies in Connecticut who immediately warned Rear Admiral Mariot (often misspelt Marriot) Arbuthnot, commander of the fleet at Gardiners Bay at the end of Long Island. Arbuthnot assumed they were headed for the Chesapeake and dispatched three ships, two 74-gun line ships; Culloden and Bedford, and the 64-gun America. One of the worst storms in history hit just as the ships sailed, wrecking the Bedford and Culloden while the America was blown clear to Virginia. It could take months to repair the damaged ships, if at all. In one day, the odds were switched from a two-ship deficit to the French now at a one ship advantage. As for the French ships, they had sailed north, not south, to escort a convoy from Boston.

Washington was ecstatic. In mid-February, he sent his prodigy, General Marquis de Lafayette with 1,200 Continentals to march to Head of Elk while he sent a letter to Destouches officially requesting the fleet operation. He only had to wait for a positive response. But it never came. Seemed Congress, without Washington’s knowledge or input, and based soli on a Virginian legislator’s advice (Richard Henry Lee), requested only three ships (only one a line ship) be sent to capture Arnold. It proved a farce. On February 9^th, Captain Le Gardeur de Tilly sailed in the 64-gun Eveille along with two frigates. He made it into the Chesapeake, but Eveille’s draft was too deep to get at Arnold and his frigates would have been cut to pieces. He need, as Washington requested in his letter, French infantry. Tilly gave up and sailed back. Luck was fading as while the British fervently repaired their ships.

Frustration

Ever since the French declared war on England (March 17, 1778), Washington hoped French troops, supported by a French fleet, would join his Continental soldiers in attacks against the British. But two defeats in combined efforts that same year, Battle of Rhode Island (Aug. 29, 1778) and Savannah (Dec. 29, 1778). The year 1779 passed in frustration and further delays in future cooperation.  After the British abandoned Newport, Rhode Island in October, 1779, in July of 1780, the French fleet finally arrived at Newport with army commander General Jean-Baptiste Comte de Rochambeau and 6,000 French troops. France was finally committed to North America by establishing Newport as its fleet and army base.

With the French nearby, Washington set his sights on attacking New York City. Instead, the American supreme commander faced six more months of frustration. He could not pressure his allies to act for the French aristocracy would not take direct orders from provincials. But now, in the early spring of 1781, Washington was finally prying his allies from their home base. But with the Tilly disaster, and intelligence the British were nearing their fleet repairs, frustration once more consumed America’s supreme leader. In the meantime, Destouches finally received Washington’s letter requesting the entire fleet sail. With a one ship advantage and the British tied up on Long Island with repairs, Destouches decided to act on Washington’s request. But February led to March and still the French had not sailed. The window of opportunity was closing. Washington was beside himself and decided a personal touch might get the French to haul anchor. On March 2^nd, Washington and his aides, left camp at New Windsor and rode 180 miles over a wintery landscape to Newport (arriving on March 6^th).

The irony, Washington’s arrival, instead of hurrying the French to sail, did the opposite. When he showed up in Newport, the French halted all preparations to sail. The popular general was wined and dined with celebratory fleet inspections, countless introductions, elaborate balls, and an assortment of mind-numbing delays. Washington knew every moment counted. The plan’s success depended on the French fleet arriving at the mouth of the Chesapeake before the British finished their repairs and were able to sail. He hoped to advert a fleet action that could jeopardize the entire operation. Two full days were wasted before on the evening of March 8^th, French sails sank into the sea. But by then, it was too late.

Missed Opportunity

Seven French ships of the line that included four frigates, ship transports, and a tender set their course for Cape Henry, Virginia, 300 nautical miles, at the mouth of the Chesapeake. But the French did not hug the coast. Instead, they piled on more miles by heading further out to sea before turning south. Speculation assumed Admiral Destouches wished to avoid discovery, or a cautionary measure against a lee shore under a sudden spring gale. Either way, when he finally turned south, his course took him directly into the Gulf Stream, a current of more than three knots flowing in the opposite direction.  Americans knew of the stream and took it into account, Ben Franklin had published accounts of it, but the French ignored it. With the two-day delay in sailing, extra mileage, and loss of speed, the French advantage vanished.

When the French finally sailed, sixty miles southwest of Newport, at Gardiners Bay, the British were about ready to head out. The Bedford was repaired by removing the masts and rigging from the Culloden which was beyond repair. The America had since sailed back from Virginia. On March 10^th, Admiral Arbuthnot set out with eight ships-of-the-line and four frigates. He had one additional battleship with an overall 40 cannon advantage. Though the French had a two-day head start, Arbuthnot rapidly made up the loss. He remained closer to the coast, thereby lessening the mileage. Luck provided a strong tail wind while he avoided the time-consuming Gulf Stream. But of most importance, his ships were copper plated, whereas the French ships were not. This gave him as much as a knot or more edge in speed. Buy the time the French reached Cape Henry on March 16^th, the British fleet had won the race and were between them and the mouth of the Chesapeake.

The ensuing Battle of Cape Henry opened as a classic bout between ships of the line with each opposing admiral jockeying their fleet to take the best advantage of both the weather gage (upwind from the enemy – tilt in heavy seas and lowest deck guns may be submerged) – mostly fire into the hull) and the leeward position (downwind from enemy – all deck guns are able to fire – mostly in sails and rigging). Ships line up and either pass each other firing broadsides, or head in same direction – firing broadsides at the ship across.

Destouches came to land French troops to capture General Arnold, not battle a British fleet to do so. He immediately ordered his fleet to gather sail and head north. The British pursued and by the time the they gained on the French, Admiral Arbuthnot allowed three of his fastest ships to race ahead, forming a vanguard with over a half mile distance between the rest of the British fleet. Destouches took advantage of this basic error in fleet maneuver and swung his fleet around to gain the leeward position. This allowed the entire French fleet to pass the three British ships raking them (firing broadsides where shots passed from bow to stern – doing the most damage).

By the time Arbuthnot brought the rest of his fleet up, the three British ships were viciously mauled and nearly out of action. Arbuthnot managed to do some damage on the French before Destouches sailed out of reach. Though the French basically won the contest – inflicting the most damage on their enemy, Destouches decided to break off the action and return back to Newport, allowing the British to limp back to the Chesapeake.

With the British in control of waters off the coast, all hope of attacking Arnold was lost. The American militia under General Peter Muhlenberg, along with Lafayette, retreated inland. Lafayette would spend the next month working his troops south to join von Steuben and Virginia’s militia. Meanwhile, when word of Destouches’ besting the British fleet, yet breaking off the action and returning to Newport reached Washington, the American commander was raked with frustration. However, he was still committed to use France’s sea power in his plans for ultimate victory. Washington began a correspondence with his French counterparts to request a large French fleet sailing for the Caribbean under Admiral Comte de Grasse to turn north, having set his sights for an attack on New York City.

Another Opportunity

The Battle of Cape Henry occurred one day after the fateful land Battle of Guilford Courthouse, March 15, 1781. General Greene had stopped eluding British General Cornwallis’ pursuit. Greene’s militia and Continentals stood their ground against a fierce British onslaught. When Greene issued an orderly retreat, leaving the field of honor to Cornwallis, he had inflicted severe casualties on Cornwallis’ regulars; men His Lordship could not replace. Whereas the Americans, well supplied by a steady flow of men and materials from Virginia, regrouped, Cornwallis’ suffered a Pyrrhic Victory. He had exhausted his supplies as well as his men and could not carry on the offensive. Cornwallis retreated to the coast where he made what proved to be a fatal mistake. Rather than head to Charleston to carry on the southern campaign, he marched north to join newly arrived British forces under Brigadier General William Phillips.

On March 26^th, General Phillips arrived Portsmouth, Virginia with 2,000 British troops. He assumed command from Arnold and began a campaign to raid the interior of Virginia. By April 23^rd, Phillips sailed up the James River and landed a large British force at Westover, 20 miles east of Petersburg, driving off 500 rebel militia. General Muhlenberg and von Steuben only had 1,000 militia to face the British regulars. Lafayette had yet to reach the region and behind him, another Continental force under “Mad” Anthony Wayne marched south. The American militia decided to make a stand at Blandford, only a mile or so from Petersburg. That same day Phillips landed his force 12 miles from Petersburg and marched west. The battle that followed on the 25^th (Battle of Blandford) was short and decisive for the British; however, the militia did well – offering a stiff resistance with over 150 casualties.

Phillips and Arnold marched towards Richmond, but Lafayette beat them to the city and bombarded the British as they approached. Phillips and Arnold sailed back down the James to Westford where Phillips was to await General Cornwallis who was marching north. Lafayette followed the British to remain close while waiting for General Wayne’s forces to join his. Philips died of Typhoid on May 9^th, leaving Arnold in temporarily in command. Cornwallis arrived on May 20^th and spent a fruitless time chasing after Lafayette. Reinforcements arrived from New York bringing the British force to 7,000 troops. By early June, Cornwallis gave up on the Continentals and retreated to Williamsburg before carrying on to Yorktown where he began fortifications.

Cornwallis depended on a strong British naval presence in the Chesapeake and along the coastal passage to New York for his operations in Virginia to continue. But instead of building a strong naval port, throughout July into August, Cornwallis carried on his ongoing feud with his superior in New York, General Henry Clinton. But by then it was too late for the obstinate Lordship.  By May of 1781, French ministers in France decided to send a strong French fleet to the Caribbean which proved to be the first death toll for Cornwallis’ army.

Decisions Beyond Reach

Washington’s influence held little weight when it came to France’s use of their military, often leaving the American commander dumfounded when his plans to protract the war seemed to fall on deaf ears. In mid to late May, Washington learned most of the details of actions initiated by the French ministry in March. On the 12^th, the new French navy commander, Jacques Melchoir Saint-Laurent Comte de Barras, a conservative and cautious man, arrived at Newport. He brought news that a large fleet of warships had departed for the Caribbean in March led by Admiral Francois Joeph Paul Comte de Grasse. While in the Caribbean, de Grasse was to see to the security of French convoys bound for France and in July and August, during the hurricane season, he was to sail north along the American coast. Even after dispatching convoy escorts, combined with previous French ships in the Caribbean and those anchored at Newport, the French should have naval superiority over the British. The catch, which was not divulged to Washington, was that when and where de Grasse’s fleet sailed was entirely up to de Grasse. And in that Washington had no control.

Washington would later be clandestinely informed by one of Rochambeau’s staff (Marquis de Beauvoir Chastellux) that Paris had no stomach to attack New York City. They believed it would result in a long and bloody contest which they were not prepared to support. Also, if the American rebellion remained stagnant with no end in sight, the French command in Newport were given the option to ship all interests south to the Caribbean and begin peace terms with England.  De Grasse’s destination north to avoid the hurricane season would remain in flux until Cornwallis settled it for the French. His Lordship’s decision to march his army onto the James peninsula at Yorktown was just the opportunity the Frenchmen sought. In July, De Barras and Rochambeau in Newport ignored Washington’s efforts to plan an attack on New York and dispatched a letter to de Grasse requesting he sail to the Chesapeake.

Washington had no choice but to agree to the Frenchmen’s decision. When overcautious de Barras refused to transport troops south (fearing the British fleet too much for him to handle) American Continentals marched south in coordination with the French under General Rochambeau. But by the time the North American allied armies were heading south to Yorktown, the French fleet in the Caribbean was stalled, facing insurmountable obstacles. Unless resolved, there would be no siege at Yorktown, for de Grasse would remain in the Caribbean and Cornwallis’ army would continue in Virginia; supported by British warships. History would have been rewritten, but for a young, energetic Spanish diplomat whose sagacious actions sprang the French fleet, leading to the Battle of the Chesapeake and gateway to Yorktown.

Resourcefulness of Saavedra de Sangronis

Admiral de Grasse’ fleet of twenty ships-of-the-line had arrived off Martinique on April 28, 1781, to join the French Caribbean squadron. Over the next two months, the French fleet and British squadron under Admiral George Rodney kept up a cat and mouse game  The French were busy escorting merchantmen among the islands while British interests focused on maintaining their blockade. By early July, Admiral de Grasse had assembled 160 French merchantmen and on July 15^th, he arrived at Haiti, along with twenty-three ships of the line. There, he received the letter from Newport, but he was in no position to comply.

De Barras and Rochambeau requested that by the end of August, his fleet would be in the Chesapeake to support a land attack on Cornwallis’ army at Yorktown. He was also to transport four to five thousand troops with artillery from the Indies to land at Yorktown. But De Grasse was at an impasse. With the British West Indies squadron under Admiral Rodney nearby, he could not sail his entire fleet, leaving his large assembly of merchantmen unprotected. With Rodney sending some of his squadron north and with reports of another British fleet under Admiral Robert Digby sailing from England to join Admiral Thomas Graves’ fleet at New York, he would need every ship available if he had to fight the combined forces. Plus, he had run out of cash.  For the expedition to go forward, he needed 1.2 million livres in species. A request of an emergency loan from Haiti’s wealthy sugar planters fell on deaf ears.  As it stood, with only twenty days to set sail, de Grasse was going nowhere. That was until three days later, on July 18^th, on board de Grasse’s flagship Ville de Paris, Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis proved America’s savior.

Sangronis told de Grasse that Spain was willing to further France’s interests in aiding the American rebellion against the British. France had already lent its support to operations to reclaim Pensacola, Florida from the British by providing a Spanish army with troops and warships. Sangronis suggested that de Grasse not leave any ships to protect his merchantmen, but sail north with his entire fleet of thirty ships-of-the-line. He said that Spain would provide four Spanish battleships to safeguard Haiti and the merchantmen. He also encouraged de Grasse to take the 3,400 French troops stationed at Haiti. De Grasse would be back in the Caribbean and return the troops by the fall in time for a planned attack on Jamaica. Meanwhile Spanish troops would provide Haiti’s security. However, there was still the problem of lack of funds.

French Haiti was the richest sugar producing colony in the Caribbean with Cap Francois classified as “the Paris of the Isles.” Though the white residents were among the richest merchants and farmers of the world, they were stingy to part with their wealth. By July 31^st, de Grasse’s appeal for money received a resounding no, prompting the admiral to fear his “fleet [must] remain idle in port.”  Again, Saavedra came up with a solution. He offered to sail to Havana, Cuba and solicit the colony’s government for a loan. De Grasse would follow later with his fleet and meet up with the Spanish envoy off Matanzas, about 70 miles to the east of Hanana.

When Saavedra arrived at Havana, he got the bad news that the only convoy Spain would send home during the entire war had just left, loaded with all the gold and silver in Cuba. He had no recourse but to do as de Grasse had done, appeal to the citizenry. Unlike the wealthy white French Haitians, Cuba’s merchants and farmers were far more sympathetic to Saavedra’s request. Within six hours, 500,000 pesos was raised, equivalent to the 1.2 million livres. On August 18^th, the Spanish ship Aigrette, loaded with six tons of coins rendezvoused with de Grasses’ fleet. The money was divided between the fleet (to assure the loss of a single ship did not sink the treasure). That evening, de Grasse set a course up the Old Bahama Channel towards the Chesapeake, aided by the Gulf Stream.

Leadership

Another event out of de Grasse’s hands proved a windfall for the Frenchman’s chances against a British fleet. By the end of July, British Admiral Rodney, a competent and aggressive commander in a fight, decided he must seek medical treatment. On August 1, he sailed for England, leaving Admiral Samuel Hood in command of his squadron. Incredible to understand, though Rodney’s spies informed him that de Grasse would be sailing for the Chesapeake, he never told Hood. Hood had orders from Graves to sail his squadron to New York. On his way, while passing the Chesapeake, he was to look in on the bay for any sign of the French fleet.

Had Rodney informed Hood that the French destination was not New York or Newport, but the Chesapeake, he could have sailed directly there. He would have informed Graves by a swift packet, who would have dispatched the New York fleet south. The British combined fleet could have beat the French to the Chesapeake, gaining the advantage and the all-important possible weather gage in the event of battle. When Hood sailed on August 10^th from Antigua with fourteen ships of the line, he had no reason to think there would be a French presence in the Chesapeake. His last information on the French had de Grasse sailing from Haiti to Havana, Cuba. He rightfully assumed that de Grasse had to leave a significant portion of his fleet in the Caribbean to defend Haiti and Martinique, as well as escort the large convoy of merchant ships for France. Hood was certain he sailed before the French and was sure that his and Admiral Graves’ squadrons were sufficient “to defeat any designs of the enemy, let de Grasse bring or send what ships he may in aid of those under Barras.”  Hood shot past the Chesapeake, as log books indicated he never bothered to look in on the bay on his way to New York.  This left de Grasse an open passage clear from Cuba to the Chesapeake.

Though able, Hood was not Rodney when enemy fleets met in battle. Nor was Admiral Thomas Graves, who of the three men, was the most conservative and least willing to take advantage of opportunities that arose during battle.  During the Seven Years war, in 1757, Graves refused to attack a large French merchantman for fear it was a more powerful ship of the line, for which he was later court-martialed and reprimanded. And during the recent Battle of Cape Henry, his ship, HMS London, the largest in the fleet, had been disabled by the smallest ship in the French fleet. When the time came, Graves would be commanding the British fleet sent to battle de Grasse.

Order of Battle

French Fleet Divided into Three Flags or Divisions commanded by Rear Admiral Lord Thomas Graves

Vanguard Flag: Louis Antoine de Bougainville aboard the Auguste

• Auguste             80       Cpt. Pierre-Joseph de Castellan
• Pluton               74        Cpt. Albert de Rions
• Bourgogne        74        Cpt. Charles de Charritte
• Marseillois         74        Cpt. Henri-Cesar de Castellane-Masjastre
• Diademe           74        Cpt. Louis Augustin de Monteclerc
• Reflechi             64        Cpt. Armand-Francois Cillart de Suville
• Caton                64        Cpt. Georges-Francois de Framond
• Saint-Esprit       80        Cpt. Joseph-Bernard de Chabert-Cogolin

Center Flag: de Grasse aboard Ville de Paris

• Cesar                74        Brigadier Charles Regis de Coriolis d’Dspinouse
• Destin               74        Cpt. Francois-Louis du Maitz de Goimpy
• Ville de Paris   104        Cpt. Antoine Cresp de Saint-Cesaire
• Victoire             74        Cpt. Albert de Saint-Hippolyte
• Sceptre               74        Cpt. Louis de Rigaud de Vaudreuil
• Northumberland  74        Cpt. Bon Chretien de Bricqueville
• Palmier              74        Cpt. Jean-Francois d’Arros d’Argelos
• Solitaire             64        Cpt. Louis-Toussaint Champion de Cice
• Citoyen              74        Cpt. Alexandre de Thy

Rear Flag:  de Monteil in the Languedoc

• Scipion               74        Cpt. Antoine Pierre de Clavel
• Magnanime        74        Cpt. Jean Antoine Le Begue de Germiny
• Hercule              74        Cpt. Jean-Baptiste Turpin du Breuil
• Languedoc          80        Cpt. Louis Guillaume de Parscau du Plessix
• Zele                   74        Cpt. Charles-Rene de Gras-Preville
• Hector               74        Cpt. Laurent-Emmanuel de Renaud d’Aleins
• Souverain           74        Cpt. Jean-Baptiste de Glandeves du Castellet          

British Fleet Divided into Three Divisions

Because the British fleet tacked in Unison and not Succession to obtain the same tack and direction as the French fleet, the Rear Division became the vanguard and fought the battle while the Vanguard became the rear and did not see action.

Vanguard Division: Rear Admiral Samuel Hood in HMS Barfleur (Rear during Battle)

• Alfred               74        Cpt. William Bayne
• Belliqueux        64        Cpt. James Brine
• Invincible         74        Cpt. Charles Saxton
• Barfleur            98        Cpt. Alexander Hood
• Monarch          74        Cpt. Francis Reynolds
• Centaur            74        Cpt. John Nicholson Inglefield

Center Division: Admiral Thomas Graves in HMS London

• America             64        Cpt. Samuel Thompson
• Bedford              74        Cpt. Thomas Graves (not to be confused with his cousin Admiral Graves)
• Resolution          74        Cpt. Lord Robert Manners
• London              98        Cpt. David Graves
• Royal Oak         74        Cpt. John Plumer Ardesoif
• Montagu            74        Cpt. George Bowen
• Europe              64        Cpt. Smith Child

Rear Division: Rear Admiral Francis Smauel Drake in HMS Princessa (Van during Battle)

• Terrible              74        Cpt. William Clement Finch
• Ajax                 74        Cpt. Nicholas Charrington
• Princessa           74        Cpt. Charles Knatchbull
• Alcide               74        Cpt. Charles Thompson
• Intrepid              64        Cpt. Anthony James Pye Molloy
• Shrewsbury        74        Cpt. Mark Robinson   

Battle of the Chesapeake, Sept. 5, 1781

French Arrive First

Twenty-three days before Hood’s Caribbean squadron left for New York City, De Grasse had tacked for the Chesapeake via the longer passage through the Old Bahama channel. As they emerged from the Caribbean, the Frenchmen were whisked north by the Gulf Stream pushing the fleet further to the east, upon which they had to beat back towards the bay. Plated with copper bottoms, Hood’s faster ships shot north to New York, arriving before de Grasse reached the Chesapeake. But General Clinton was cautious and delayed further fleet action to see if Washington intended to attack New York City. When finally convinced the Americans and French allies were marching south toward Cornwallis, and word that the French fleet had sailed from Havana, Clinton ordered Admirals Graves and Hood to make for the Chesapeake. On August 31^st Graves, with Hood as his second in command, departed New York for the Chesapeake with nineteen ships-of-the-line. Convinced they were equal in numbers to what the French had sailed, they were confident of victory.

On August 30^th, the day before the British left New York, de Grasse entered the Chesapeake with twenty-eight ships of the line and five frigates. It was the first time since France entered the war that they had established naval superiority in the Americas. It would be some weeks before Washington and Rochambeau reached the James peninsula (sandwiched between the James and York Rivers) and de Grasse was to cooperate with land forces to defeat Cornwallis. In the meantime, he would secure the inner bay waters with his frigates and prepare for the initiable action with the British fleet. To that end he kept his battleships vigilant at the bay entrance; for if he were to forfeit the Chesapeake, all would be lost.

De Grasse was soon forced to reduce the fleet’s effectiveness by the loss of some of his ships and a large portion of manpower. Three ships of the line and a frigate were dispatched to the mouth of the York River to prevent Cornwallis’ army from escaping by water to Gloucester. On September 4^th, de Grasse offloaded 3,100 French troops under Comte de Saint-Simon to join Lafayette’s forces at Williamsburg. It meant the use of all the fleet’s longboats to row the soldiers more than sixty miles up the James River. It would take at least a week to row upriver and return, meaning close to 30% of his officers and sailors would be absent from their ships. Low manned with the loss of, as de Grasse described them, “the best drilled part of the crew,” the French commander gambled that the British would not choose this worse time to show themselves.

By dawn of September 5^th, instead of 28 battleships and five frigates fully manned, de Grasse’s force was reduced to 24 ships of the line and two frigates assigned to packet duty; minus 30% of all crewmen. To add to de Grasse’s woes, Washington had requested he assist the land forces by transporting his and Rochambeau’s troops down the bay from Baltimore. With Admiral de Barras’ squadron from Newport delayed, and with the risk of further reducing his force, de Grasse reluctantly agreed to send seven men-of-war north. This would leave him with just 17 battleships. At ten in the morning on September 5^th, just as he was about to issue orders to send the seven line-ships north, fate stepped in. The first sails were sighted off the entrance to the bay. De Grasse was relieved, thinking they were the tardy Frenchmen under de Barras. But 25 sail were soon visible on the horizon, far more in number than the expected Newport squadron. September 5, 1781, de Grasse’s lost his gamble, the British had arrived.

French Rush to Battle

De Grasse’s fleet was anchored inside what was called the Middle Ground, a wide shoal between Cape Charles to the north and Cape Henry to the south. Before the British were sighted, one of the two frigates had grounded on Cape Henry that morning. It would take several hours to free itself. To make matters worse, though the British were sighted at 10 AM, the tide was flowing in, preventing the French from immediately hauling anchor. De Grasse would have to wait until the tide changed at noon before he could sail from the bay. At that, he could only hope his ships could clear Cape Henry before the vanguard of the British fleet arrived. It made sense, with a foul tide and reduce manpower, he remain in the bay and wait for the British to attack. But an impulsive de Grasse would not wait. At 10:30 ships were ordered to clear for action. At 11:15, cables were ordered heaved (positioning his ships above anchors). And at 11:45, cables were ordered slipped (buoys attached to anchor cables for later retrieval), and the French fleet set sail.

Normally, a fleet admiral would take the ponderous time to assemble his ships in line of battle; positioning the admiral’s flagship in the center. But with the British fast approaching, speed was essential to clear the bay. For only the second time in history, de Grasse ordered the ligne de Vitesse  or line of speed. Therefore, the fastest ships would form line first. Ships’ captains slipped anchors and raced to form the vanguard and the honor of leading the fleet into battle. When de Grasse’s flagship Ville de Paris cleared the Chesapeake, he had to settle for whatever line of battle that was created. But a major problem emerged for the French that could prove fatal under a more aggressive enemy commander.

Crippling Mix-up in Signals and Graves Fails to Take Advantage

The British had been on a southwest tack under a north wind. As they approached the shoal waters of the bay entrance, Graves ordered ships to wear (come around on the other tack by turning the head or bow away from the wind). It was 2PM and his fleet was now sailing southeast on the same tack and direction as the French. Unfortunately, and what would ultimately prove disastrous for the British, due to a foul in signals, the fleet came about not in succession, but in unison. This reversed the line of battle order in which Graves’ fastest and newest ships under the able Admiral Hood were no longer in the van, but in the rear. This left the oldest ships, under Admiral Francis Samuel Drake, in the vanguard. Grave’s weakest ships would now be the first to come under French guns and as such, fight most of the action; a key factor determining the battle’s outcome.

Eighteenth century naval battles were often settled when a bellicose admiral recognized an opportunity and took immediate action. If enemy ships could be isolated into smaller groups and attacked by the fleet, victory was often assured. By the time the French cleared the capes, all the copper plated ships shot ahead of the rest of the fleet with the Augusta leading the front. According to Chevalier de Goussencourt, (a pseudonym for his Journal of a French Officer in America…) aboard the Saint-Esprit recorded that “The fleet formed in a very bad order…there were only four vessels in line, the Pluto, the Bourgogne, the Marseilles, and the Diademe…” These ships, along with the Augusta, Reflechi, Caton and Staint-Esprit, comprised the vanguard and would see the most action in the coming battle.

The usual distance between fleet ships in line of battle was from 600 to 1,200 feet. But the French vanguard outraced the rest of the fleet. The Augusta led the four ships that spearheaded the French line of battle with a mile and a half separation between the other two ships, Reflechi and Caton.  From there, another three-mile gap occurred before the rest of the French fleet, with de Grasse’s flagship commanding the center. If Graves had been the stuff of a Rodney, he would have instantly taken advantage and attacked the French vanguard with his entire fleet.De Grasse’s fleet could have been dismantled in piecemeal as each section came under the British fleet’s guns. But Graves chose the more conservative approach. Rather than pounce on the enemy vanguard, he elected to take the time to adjust his line of battle so to “bring his Majesty’s fleet nearly parallel to the line of approach of the enemy.”  Admiral Hood, whose HMS Barfleur commanded had been the vanguard of the British line, was vehement that the seven Frenchmen of the vanguard would have been “demolished… a full hour and a half…before any of the [French] rear could have come up.

Perhaps Graves did not immediately attack the French vanguard out of fear for proper communication between his and Hood’s Caribbean squadron. He took his time edging towards the French and soon after, signaled to cease all forward motion to “let the center of the enemy’s ships come abreast of us.”  This adjusting ships’ positions consumed two additional hours as the British gradually verged downwind towards their enemy. By now it was 4 PM, six hours since the fleets spotted each other, and Graves was running out of time to engage the enemy. At 4:15 PM, Graves’ flagship London’s log recorded, “the Admiral, judging this to be the moment of attack, made the signal for the ships to bear down and engage their opponents.” Just as the order to attack was given, the wind had begun to swing about, bearing 33 degrees to the east.

The result of this shift in wind from north to east quickly brought the opposing fleets’ vanguards closer together, while lengthening the distance between the rearguards. The result was that leading ships of the lines would engage while in the ensuing battle the rear ships never came within effective range. Even the center of both fleets remained too far apart for any effectiveness. Therefore, the Battle of the Chesapeake was fought mainly between fleet vanguards. Chevalier de Gras-Preville aboard the Zele, near the rear of the line, best recorded in his log that “From the center the [rest of the] two navies looked on.”

Fleet Vanguards’ Savage Engagement

Since Graves tacked in unison, switching the fleet’s order, the British van consisted of their slowest and weakest ships. While de Grasse’s ‘line of speed’ order embodied the fastest and newest warships in his van. Also, to the Frenchmen’s advantage, their van was under the command of one of the most intelligent, and most talented seaman of both navies; fifty-one year old Louis-Antoine de Bougainville; captain of the 80-gun Auguste. Though de Grasse was credited for the ultimate victory, it was Bougainville and his half dozen ships of the vanguard who fought and inflicted the most damage upon their enemy.

The two lines neared with the French in leeward advantage to the British who approached from the windward or direction of the wind. This meant that the wind blew across the British hulls, burying a portion of the lowest decks underwater and thereby nullifying those guns. Because of the angle, more of their shot went into the Frenchmen’s hull rather than rigging. The French; however, enjoyed the leeward position which kept all their guns above water and angled their shot up towards the British decks, masts, and rigging. In a slugfest, the French often dismasted their enemy, while the British inflicted more casualties by spraying decks with grape and pounding lower levels with solid shot.

It was nearer to 4:30 PM when the first broadsides erupted, described by a French seaman aboard the Auguste at “a very small half-cannon range.”  Because the British angle was more obtuse, the front ships’ bows faced their opponent. This allowed the opening French shots to rake these ships from bow to stern, whereupon the most damage is done. With Augusta leading, the French van exploded in a sheet of flame. The Shrewsbury, at the head of the British van, was disabled very early by ferocious broadsides that according to Hood, left “her fore and main topsail yards shot away.” Unable to maintain control, the Shrewsbury drifted off station. Hood wrote that the second ship in the British line, HMS Intrepid, was left “exposed to two ships of superior force;” simultaneously assaulted by the heavier gunned Pluton and Marseilles. She too, like her sister ship Shrewsbury, were so terribly battered they were unable to maintain station and fell out of line.

Chevalier de Goussencourt wrote that the Reflechi received the opening British broadside and suffered one of the first French casualties with the death of its captain, Brun de Boade. Soon after, Admiral Drake’s flagship, the 80-gun HMS Princessa, captured from the French the previous year, got into the action and fired upon the French 74 Diademe, captained by Marquis de Montecler, at close range. According to Goussencourt, the two ships fired so close, that wadding from British cannon set portions of the Diademe aflame. With the leading ships fully engaged, the French vanguard of found themselves opposed by double their number. The center and rear of the French fleet was still too far back to offer assistance. As one French officer wrote, “four ships in the van soon found themselves…entirely cut off from the rest of the fleet and constantly engaged with seven or eight vessels at close quarters.”

After a half hour of battle, at around 5 PM, Ensign Fabry aboard the Auguste wrote the enemy had come “within the infinitesimally small range of langridge shot (pistol shot). Bougainville and his Auguste drew his ship beside the Princessa and pounded Drake’s flagship mercifully. Bougainville later proclaimed that de Grasse told him “That is what I call fighting…I thought you had boarded.”  The Princessa was forced to pull off to avoid capture leaving Bougainville to focus on the HMS Terrible which he hammered into a floating wreck. One of the Frenchman’s cannonballs found embedded into the Terrible’s foremast weighted an incredible 39 pounds. Later, Bougainville would claim that his Auguste had fired an impressive 654 cannon balls during the battle.

While the Auguste was pulverizing the Terrible, the beleaguered 74-gun Diademe was in trouble. She had been mauled by the80-gun HMS Princessa prior to that ship’s dual with Bougainville’s Augusta and was now under the relentless guns of the 74-gun Albion. Goussencourt wrote that the Diademe was so bad that she could “…scarcely hold out… having only four 36 pounders and nine 18s fit for use and having all on board killed, wounded, or burnt.”  But the nearby Augusta could not come to her aid. Bougainville’s bowline was suddenly severed by a cannonball. This left his ship unmanageable and the Augusta dropped out of line while it made emergency repairs. Goussencourt, aboard the Saint Espirit, stated that Bougainville “was too far to leeward and in no condition to relieve the Diademe…”  Captain Chabert Cogolin of the 80-gun Saint Espirit, Goussencourt wrote, saw Diademe’s imperilment, “seeing the imminent danger of the Diademe, hoisted sail and was soon in her wake.” He said she “opened a terrible fire” that caused the 74-gun Albion to “haul her wind” to escape.

The 64-gun Canton, smallest ship-of-the-line in the French fleet,whose normal position brought up the rear at number twenty-eight, found herself in the thick of the fight; the only non-copper-bottomed Frenchman to have raced forward to join the van. Captain Georges-Francois de Framond wrote later in a letter describing his ship’s heroics as she suffered a severe pounding by ships nearly a third her weight in metal. He wrote that “more than fifty gunshots in the planking of my…bottom, including several under the water, one in my rudder, at least three times as many in my sails, mast and rigging.” With the center of the fleet still to far off to aid support, the Canton endured a “continual fire” for upwards an hour and a half “without bending or yielding by a line.”

Belligerents Played Out

It was around 5:30 PM and the pitched battle between both fleets’ vanguards had gone on for nearly an hour and a half. Ships had been engulfed nearly the entire time by a disorienting cloud of fire and smoke, making it difficult to discern friend from foe. It was compounded by an ever-shifting wind that shuffled ships’ positions whereas they blasted at whatever ship drew alongside. But non-stop battle took its toll; the men were exhausted. Goussencourt recorded that “For our part we were so tired that though within gunshot, the vans no longer fired.”

Sporadic fighting continued for the next half hour as the opposing fleets’ centers came within distant range. Graves wrote “…the action did not entirely cease until a little after sunset…” But the van was finished. The French front was done and complied with de Grasse’s earlier order, given in the heat of battle, and bore away from the wind. Graves noted writing that “The van of the enemy bore away to enable their center to support them…in view to shelter their own van as it went away before the wind.” As the vanguard sailed downwind, according to Captain de Thy on the Citoyen, “by crowding sail, we closed our line to the extent possible.” By 6 PM, de Grasse had finally tightened the gaps in the French line and was seeking to renew the attack, but he was too late. With the approach of darkness, all firing ended.

Immediate Aftermath

Both van’s slugfest had resulted in a higher number of British casualties, 90 killed and 246 wounded, to 209 for the French (there is no recorded distinction between killed and wounded). The HMS Shrewsbury and HMS Intrepid suffered the most as the British van of six ships suffered 207 total casualties or 62% of those dead or injured. The French Augusta reported 68 dead and wounded which was one third of all French casualties; indicating flag commander Bougainville’s aggressive actions throughout the battle.

That night, French captains and crew worked frantically to repair ships riggings. Even though the vanguard had experienced a ferocious fight, it was incredible how little overall damaged was suffered. By morning, only the Diademe needed assistance. Along with the rear, which had not seen battle, the French fleet was ready to renew the fight. In a letter from de Grasse to Bougainville written on the night after battle, de Grasse wrote, “we shall meet them at closer range tomorrow morning.” 

But it was not to be. The British had suffered far worse than the French.  Admiral Graves learned that the Shrewsbury, Intrepid, and Monytague had been mauled to the point that they could not resume the line of battle. The Princessa’s maintopmast was so damaged that at any moment, it was expected to go over the side. So too, the older ship Terribles’ pumps was having difficulty keeping up with the water pouring in below decks. [she would later be skuttled]  The night of the battle, Graves, Hood, and Drake held council. Hood pressed that the fleet make sail directly for the Chesapeake to lay claim to the bay and support Cornwallis. Graves rejected the plan, allowing the fleets to drift eastward from Chesapeake in hopes of renewing the battle. Come morning, Graves was aware his sailors needed more time for repairs and took the weather gage to keep the French fleet within contact, but too far to do battle.

While Hood’s recommendation to Graves to turn back for the Chesapeake fell on deaf ears, so too, Bougainville tried to convince de Grasse to give up chasing after the British and sail for the Chesapeake; the object of their mission north from the Caribbean. However, like Graves, de Grasse was hoping to win the day by a complete victory over his adversary. On the 8^th and 9^th, de Grasse tried to take advantage of favorable winds to attack the British, only to be thwarted by another frustration shift of wind. For the French, the chase ended on the 9^th when Admiral Baras’ squadron from Newport, Rhode Island was spotted heading towards the Chesapeake. De Grasse had no choice but to turn and follow the tardy admiral into the Bay.

Two days later, on the 11^th, Graves was informed the Terrible was taking on too much water and had to be scuttled.  When notified on the 13^th that de Grasse, along with Baras’ fleet from Newport, were in the Chesapeake, he turned north writing, “Upon this state of the position of the enemy, the present condition of the British fleet…and the impracticability of giving any effectual succor to Lord Cornwallis in the Chesapeake, it was resolved the British squadron…should proceed with all dispatch to  New York, and there use every possible means for putting the squadron into the best state for service.”  In other words, the French had won with now thirty-six ships of the line anchored within the bay. They were far too strong for Graves to do anything without reinforcements. Cornwallis, for the time being, was on his own.

Yorktown & Caribbean

The day after Graves turned his fleet north for New York, Washington and Rochambeau rode into Williamsburg, Virginia. That night Washington learned of the French victory. He immediately penned a letter to de Grasse writing, “These happy events, and the decided superiority of your fleet, gives us the happiest presages of the most complete success in our combined operations in this bay.”  Allied troops continued to arrive over the next two weeks including the offloading of the all-important French artillery shipped from the Caribbean. On September 28^th the Siege of  Yorktown began with sappers digging the first artillery trenches.

As soon as Graves arrived in New York on Sept. 19th, dockworkers worked from dawn to “near 10 at night,” to have another go at the French. On the 25^th, Admiral Digby arrived from England with three more ships of the line bringing the British fleet to 25 ships. A dispatch sneaked out by Cornwallis on September 17^th arrived a week later, pleading for help, “ If you cannot relieve me very soon, you must be prepared to hear the worst.” Repair to British ships took longer than expected and it was not until October 19^th when Cornwallis’ rescue sailed from New York. It included 25 line ships and transports carrying 7,000 troops. But they were far too late. Cornwallis surrendered his army to Washington and Rochambeau that same day.

De Grasse would return to the all-important Caribbean that winter to protect French interests. Between April 9 – 12, 1782, the British fleet under Admiral Sir George Rodney won a decisive victory in the largest naval battle of the war, the Battle of Saintes, over the combined French and Spanish fleet planned invasion of Jamaica. British Admiral Samuel Hood, in his flagship HMS Barfleur famously slugged it out with French Admiral de Grasse in his Ville de Paris.  The French suffered massive casualties with the loss of five ships of the line; four captured (including the Ville de Paris along with de Grasse) and one was destroyed. This halted France’s momentum after General Cornwallis’ surrender at Yorktown with British regaining naval superiority in the Americas and greatly affected ultimate peace negotiations.

The historic road to Yorktown consistently turned in a sequence of compounded events, some planned, some by error, and some by fate.  From the defeat of Gates at Camden in June of 1780, to British Lt. Col. Tarleton’s mauling at Cowpens in  January 1781, to Cornwallis’ Pyrrhic victory at Guilford Courthouse, to perhaps the most important incident that doomed British hopes; Graves mix-up in signals that ordered his weakest ships to fight, proving to be the most important naval battle of the war.

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REFERENCE

“Battle of the Capes.” National Park Service. Yorktown Battlefield – Colonial National Historic Park.

Desmarais, Norman.  The Road to Yorktown: The French Campaigns in the American Revolution, 1780-1783. 2021: Savas Beatie, Eldorado Hills, CA.

Goussencourt, Cavalier de – Edited by Shea, John Gilmary. The Operations of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse in 1781 – 1782.  1864: Published as #3 by John Moreau in the Bradford Club Series, New York, NY. 1971: Reprint by Da Capo Press & Subsidiary of Plenum Publishing Corp., New York, NY.

King, Dean. A Sea of Words. 1995: Henry Holt and Company, Markham, Ontario, Canada.

Philbrick, Nathaniel.  In the Hurricane’s Eye: The Genius of George Washington and the Victory at Yorktown. 2018: Penguin Random House, New York, NY.

Norris, David. “Grand Clash on the Chesapeake.” January 2015. Warfare History Network.

Warner, Oliver. Great Sea Battles. 1981: Exter Books, & Bookthrift, New York, NY.

Willis, Sam.  The Struggle for Sea Power: A Naval History of the American Revolution. 2015: Atlantic Books, Bloomsbury, London, UK.