On April 14, 1780, at 3 AM, Banastre Tarleton’s Partisan Legion, a loyalist mixture of dragoons and mounted infantry, thundered out of the dead of the night in a terrifying charge. Sabers slashed downward on startled Americans torn from their sleep. The surprise attack on mainly patriot light dragoons, both Continental troopers and South Carolina militia, led by General Isaac Huger, was a total British victory. Those rebels not captured fled on foot into the swamps that flanked their camp. Left behind were the dead and dying, weapons, supplies, and most importantly, their horses; a present to the British Legionnaires who lost most of their mounts during the arduous ocean journey south from New York City.
This sudden ruin of General Huger’s dragoons, most tearing off on foot into the surrounding mire, was a gift to the British high command. The supply train that had been sent by General George Washington along with the Virginia Line to aid the besieged Southern Army encapsuled on Charlestown Peninsula was left exposed. It had fallen into British hands. The much-needed supplies expected to sustain the American army in the siege was gone. And so too, the defensive position of Moncks Corner that helped defend a vital communication link and provide a corridor for possible escape by the Southern Army as British commanding General Henry Clinton’s forces closed in. With this critical patriot post severed, it was only a matter of time before the noose closed in around America’s hopes to retain the southern colonies to the cause.
British Strategy Shifted South
After over three years of punch and counterpunch, the war in the north had ground to a stalemate with both sides non-committal to another large campaign. England looked for other means to bring her colonies back to the fold and turned south. The southern colonies had not seen any major action since 1776; the Battle of Moore’s Creek Bridge, fought on February 26th, and when General Henry Clinton failed to take Charleston at the Battle of Fort Sullivan (then called Charlestown) on June 28th. Since then, there were only a series of partisan clashes between loyalist and patriot militias; mainly small groups in violent retribution for raiding parties. This changed when a British invasion force of regulars under Lt. Colonel Archibald Campbell, that included the famed veterans 71st Highlanders, landed at Savannah and captured the city on December 29, 1778.
Over the next year, England’s influence over Georgia and the Carolinas expanded. With the American and French failed attempt to retake Savannah (September 23 – October 18, 1779), England saw an opportunity to claim the south in force. By the end of 1779, General Clinton, now Commander of British Forces in America, dispatched over 10,000 regular troops south to destroy the American Southern army and reclaim Charleston. After a long and arduous journey by ship, plagued with severe storms, General Clinton and the British invasion fleet arrived off the coast of South Carolina in February, 1780, 30 miles below Charleston. With his fleet arriving in bits and pieces, Clinton slowly organized his forces until his command was fully prepared to march north. By March 29th, his army had begun encircling Charleston to lay siege to the city and the American Southern Army; Commanding Major General Benjamin Lincoln had drawn his men behind the city’s defensive works.
Partisan Legion Cavalry’s Campaign of ‘British Aggression’
Colonel Banastre Tarleton, along with Colonel Patrick Ferguson, had accompanied the invasion force and were put ashore in Savannah, Georgia, February, 1780. Both officers led partisan legions of mainly loyalist of both cavalry and mounted infantry. The long voyage and severe weather had killed and sickened most of their horses, forcing them to be thrown overboard. As soon as the dragoons arrived, they combed the countryside desperate for new mounts. Patriot farms and homesteads were raided of livestock and subsequentially homes and barns destroyed. Still in need of horses, Tarleton and Ferguson continued a devastating path north as they marched to join Clinton enroute to Charleston.
While Clinton maintained the Siege of Charleston, beginning March 29th, he sent his Partisan mounted legions into the countryside. They were to seek out any rebel strongholds and possible reinforcements, both local militias and Continental units marching from the north, and destroy them before they could join Lincoln at Charleston. So too they were to continue ravaging the countryside to isolate and deprive the hemmed in Southern Army of much needed supplies. This indiscriminate destruction incensed and hardened patriot passions for revenge against what they termed ‘British Aggression.’
Washington Responds to Lincoln’s Pleas for Reinforcements and Supplies
Towards the end of 1779, Washington’s spy network in New York City informed the commanding general of Clinton’s intent to attack Charleston, where Lincoln had withdrawn the Southern Army; around 4,500 strong. By then, Lincoln’s pleas for manpower and materials, plus the condition of his army at Charleston, had reached Washington’s desk. Washington decided to send Lincoln the entire Virginia Line; 2,500 veterans; proven troops and among his best. Because British ships prowled the coast, they could not ship south and were forced to march the 800-mile trek from Morristown, New Jersey to Charleston. This, during the worst winter experienced in the entire war. The hardy Virginians stored their gear and headed south; reaching northern Virginia by March.
When the commander of the Virginia Line, General William Woodford, received word of Clinton having begun the siege, he ordered the baggage and supply train left behind. He then force marched his men south, covering the over 500-mile journey in less than a month; a herculean effort to reach the city in time to reinforce Lincoln. The baggage train of much needed supplies would continue their push south. After enlistments expired, illness along the route, and large desertions as they marched through their home state, on April 8, 1780, 750 worn and weary troops reached Charleston. Even with the addition of these men, Lincoln did not have the strength to counter Clinton’s large invasion. The die was already cast. The Virginians, along with the largest American army of the war, would be surrendered a month later.
British Troops Dispatched North
General Lincoln had posted Brigadier General Isaac Huger’s detachment of 500 mainly dragoons, both Continental and militiamen, at Moncks Corner and nearby Biggin’s Bridge, 30 miles north of Charleston, to protect the American supply route. These men would have to be dealt with if Clinton was to achieve his goal to cut off all communications to the American army. The British commanding general also received intelligence that the Virginia baggage train was nearing Charleston. He decided to cut this life-line supply route while also capturing the baggage train. On April 12th, he detached 1,400 regulars under Lt. Colonel James Webster to Biggin’s Bridge on the Cooper River at Moncks Corner.
The evening of the 12th, Tarleton’s calvary met up with Webster’s regulars at Goose Creek, 18 miles north of Charleston and about 15 miles from Moncks Corner. It was decided that the next day, Lt. Colonel Banastra Tarleton’s Partisan Legion and Colonel Patrick Fergusson’s American Volunteers would ride ahead and attack Huger’s Continental Dragoons and militia. The regulars would continue onto Biggins Bridge, to secure the area, cut off rebel supply routes, and capture all supplies and baggage.
American Forces at Moncks Corner
Commanding officer Brigadier General Isaac Huger was a wealthy planter born along the nearby Cooper River and a resident of the Beaufort region. Having combat experience during the Cherokees War in 1761, when hostilities with England broke out, he was commissioned a colonel of the 5th S. Carolina Continental Regiment. In January 1779, he was promoted to brigadier and had been wounded at the Battle of Stono Ferry, June 20, 1779. He later commanded the Carolina militias during the failed attack on Savannah on Oct. 9, 1779. At Charleston, Lincoln had dispatched Huger to man the defensive outpost at Moncks Corner to protect his vital supply line.
The detached force assigned to Moncks Corner consisted mostly of Continental and South Carolina mounted dragoons with several detached companies of North Carolina militia. Total strength around 500 men.
- Brigadier General Isaac Huger – Commanding Officer
- Two companies of the 3rd Regiment of Continental Light Dragons (Virginia) – Lt. Colonel William Washington commanded (2nd cousin once removed of George Washington) with Major Richard Call as second.
- Four companies of the 1st Regiment of Continental Light Dragoons led by Major John Jameson.
- Two troops of Pulaski’s Legion of Horse and Foot led by Chevalier Pierre-Francois Vernier. (Remains of Pulaski’s Legion decimated in their attack on the Spring Hill Redoubt at the Siege of Savannah in October 1779).
- One detached company of South Carolina Light Dragoons led by Col. Daniel Horry (who would later join Lt. Colonel Francis ‘Swamp Fox’ Marion in his guerrilla warfare in the swamps of S. Carolina).
- One detached company of the 1st North Carolina Regiment led by Capt. Joshua Hadley
- Seven detached companies of the North Carolina Militia loosely led by Major James Brandon of the Rowan County Regiment.
British Forces Detached to Moncks Corner and Biggin’s Bridge
Many of the partisan dragoons in Tarleton’s Legion and Ferguson’s Volunteers were loyalist troops raised from South Carolina. The 17th Dragoons who participated were regular British troopers. Total strength of foot and cavalry under Lt. Colonel James Webster, commanding officer of the 33rd Regiment of Foot, was around 1,400 men.
- 33rd and 64th Regiments of Foot – Lt. Colonel James Webster commanding.
- British Legion Cavalry led by Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton with second Capt. David Kinlock.
- British Legion Mounted Infantry led by Major Charles Cochran.
- Detachment of the 17th Regiment of Light Dragoons led by Capt. William Henry Talbot.
- American Volunteers Light Dragoons led by Major Patrick Ferguson
- One company of Georgia Light Dragoons led by Capt. Archibald Campbell (not to be confused with Lt. Colonel Archibald Campbell, commander of the 71st Regiment).
Battle of Moncks Corner
The morning of April 13th, the slower British infantry marched toward Biggins Bridge while Tarleton and Ferguson’s cavalry rode ahead. It was decided that they would attack the Americans by surprise in the early morning hours of the 14th. Tarleton wrote: “An attack in the night was judged most advisable, as it would render the superiority of the enemy’s cavalry useless…” While riding toward Moncks Corner, they happened upon an African American. According to Tarleton, “At some distance from Goose Creek, a negro was secured by the advanced guard, who discovered him attempting to leave the road…” A search revealed a letter in the man’s pocket from Brigadier General Huger to General Lincoln in Charleston which described Huger’s troop deployment. Huger was aware of British patrols and perhaps reasoned that a black man would have better luck passing through the dragnet encircling Charleston.
Knowing the size and positioning of his enemy, Tarleton hastened his troops. After an evening’s rest, they broke camp at 10 PM on the 13th and in silent caution, continued along the road to Moncks Corner. Amazingly, they encountered no enemy scouts or patrols while they approached. So too, as they neared the enemy camp, there were no sentries or pickets to set off an alarm. Tarleton wrote: “…the injudicious conduct of the American commander who…neglected fending patrols in front of his videttes, which omission equally enabled the British to make a surprise [attack]…” Huger’s incredible lack of normal protocol when encamped near an enemy was indeed mystifying.
Nearing the American force, scouts reported that the rebel camp was lined on both sides by swamps. There could be no coordinated flanking attack. Tarleton met with his officers and positioned his troops for a frontal assault. He wrote his men would: “…charge the enemy’s grand guard on the main road, there being no other avenue open, owing to the swamps upon the flanks, and to pursue them into their camp…”
Tarleton was also made aware that Huger had placed his cavalry in front of his infantry; another fatal error. He wrote of the American camp and his planned attack: “It was evident, that the American cavalry had posted themselves in front of Cooper river, and that the militia were placed in a meeting house, which commanded the bridge, and were distributed on the opposite bank. At three o’clock in the morning, the advanced guard of dragoons and mounted infantry, supported by the remainder of the legion and Ferguson’s corps approached the American position…”
Tarleton ordered the charge. What followed quickly become a complete rout. Tarleton wrote: “The order was executed with the greatest promptitude and success. The Americans were completely surprised.” Few of Huger’s troops offered resistance. Of those killed and wounded, most were cut down as they made a break on foot for the swamps. Others were captured. Among those escaping was General Huger, Colonels Washington and Jameson, as well as several officers. Tarleton wrote, “[the enemy] fled on foot to the swamps, close to their encampment where, being concealed by the darkness, they effected their escape.” The militia defending the bridge were quickly dispersed. Again, Tarleton writing, “Without loss of time, Major Cochrane was ordered to force the bridge and the meeting house with the infantry of the British Legion. He charged the militia with fixed bayonets, got possession of the pass, and dispersed everything that opposed him.”
Chevalier Vernier, commander of the Pulaski Horse, was captured and later brutally killed by Tarleton’s troopers. Though Tarleton did not order Vernier’s death, he was later held accountable and reprimanded. Soon after, word spread through the region damming Tarleton as a butcher; an accusation that gained substance after the brutal slaughter of Continental troops at the Battle of Waxhaws the following month. When Major Ferguson learned of Vernier’s killing, legend has it he was so incensed, that upon return to Charleston, he had the perpetrators in Vernier’s killing whipped. Interestingly, in his memoir, perhaps as a cover-up, Tarleton states Vernier died defending himself during the initial charge of British cavalry, making no note of impropriety by his men. He wrote, “Major Vernier, of Pulaski’s legion, and some other officers and men who attempted to defend themselves, were killed or wounded…”
Casualties and Aftermath
The Americans suffered 14 killed, 19 wounded and by most accounts, 64 captured. The British had only one officer and two men wounded, losing five horses. Critical to the patriot cavalry was the loss of their mounts. This proved a bonanza for British dragoons who were still replacing the horses they lost during the voyage south from New York. Tarleton recorded, “Four hundred horses belonging to officers and dragoons, with their arms and appointments, (a valuable acquisition for the British cavalry in their present fate) fell into the hands of the victors…together with fifty wagons, loaded with arms, clothing, and ammunition…”
The defeat at Moncks Corner left Major General Lincoln without any lines of communication. With the supply route severed as well as another avenue of escape from Charleston cut off, this defeat only hastened the American Army’s surrender at Charleston. On May 12th, Lincoln turned over to the victorious British over 5,600 men, nearly half Continental troops. Though the officers would be treated comparatively well while waiting for parole, the common soldiers languished on prison ships where more than half later died of disease and malnutrition.
This was the first major victory for Tarleton in the south. His reputation for swift surprise attacks grew as he added the Battle of Waxhaws, May 29, 1780 to his list of accomplishments. So too did his prestige as a butcher. At Waxhaws, 113 Continental troops were hacked to death and another 150 horribly wounded, many it is reported while trying to surrender. To be somewhat fair to Tarleton, he had been trapped under his dead horse while the worst atrocities occurred. However, as author David Wilson points out, it was his lack of discipline in both officers and rank and file as well as the loss of control of his men which held him accountable; therefore rightfully wearing the mark of slaughterer.
Many of the American dragoons and militia regrouped under Colonel Anthony Walton White, but were once more scattered by Tarleton’s Legions at the Battle of Lenud’s Ferry on May 6th. After this action and Waxhaws and surrender of Charleston, those troops who remained either returned to their homes in the Carolinas and Georgia to await future calls to arms, returned to American headquarters established at Hillsborough, North Carolina, or joined guerrilla outfits to carry on the fight in South Carolina under men like General Sumter and Lt. Colonel Francis ‘Swamp Fox’ Marion.
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RESOURCE
“Battle of Moncks Corner.” The American Revolution in South Carolina.
Buchanan, John. The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas. 1999: Wiley Publishing, New York, NY.
Commanger, Henry Steele & Morris, Richard B. The Spirit of Seventy-Six. The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participants. 1958: Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, IN.
Maloy, Mark. “The Virginians’ 800-Mile March to Save Charleston.” Emerging Revolutionary War Era.
Schenawolf, Harry. “The Battle of Waxhaws: Tarleton’s Quarter.” January, 2023: Revolutionary War Journal.
Scoggins, Michael C. The Day It Rained Militia: Huck’s Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May–July 1780. 2005:Charleston, SC: The History Press.
Tarleton, Lt. Colonel Banastre. A History of the Campaigns of 2780 and 1781 In the Southern Provinces of North America. 1787: Colles, Exshaw, etc… Dublin, UK.
Wilson, David K (2005). The Southern Strategy: Britain’s Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775–1780. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.