Battle of Hubbardton: A Desperate Affair

The Battle of Hubbardton was unique in that a proud, obstinate officer of the British army, General Simon Fraser, was confident that his highly trained and disciplined regular troops would easily defeat and capture a band of hapless rebels who called themselves Green Mountain Boys. On the morning of July 7, 1777, the proud Highlander would soon discover that he had bitten off far more than he could chew. Besides the Green Mountain Boys, he also figured that the other two regiments of American commander General Arthur St. Clair’s rear guard would also fall prey to his attack; they would be no different than the likes of whom he had driven out of Canada the previous year. However, instead of reluctant green militia, the soldiers he would attack were among the best troops the Americans had – hard, determined Continental soldiers who had experienced the horrors of battle and stood firm, many having fought at the Battle of Bunker Hill and had been with Washington at Trenton and Princeton. Had it not been for a detachment of German troops that reinforced Fraser’s men at a critical moment, his entire unit would have been annihilated, and he would have been sitting down to dinner as a captive guest of the American commander.

British Lieutenant Hadden would write, “[Fraser’s corps] certainly discover’d that neither they were invincible, nor the rebels all poltroons; on the contrary many of them acknowledged the enemy behaved well, and look’d upon General Reidesel’s fortunate arrival as a matter absolutely necessary.” Two years later, the Earl of Balcarras, who commanded the British light infantry which flanked the American left at Hubbardton, told the House of Commons, “Circumstanced as the enemy was, as an army very hard pressed in their retreat, they certainly behaved with great gallantry.” Throughout the war, few if any rear guard actions by either side of the conflict demonstrated the sheer determination and skilled leadership needed to withstand a surprise attack; to halt the enemy’s advance, inflict large casualties, and slowly and methodically draw off one’s forces until an organized retreat was possible. The goal of the rear guard was to protect the main army and absorb any and all assaults in doing so. The Americans that day on July 7^th, 1777 did just that, as good as it could get.

Americans withdraw from Canada and fortify southern Lake Cahamplain

No sooner had the guns been silenced at the Battle of Bunker Hill, June 17, 1775, than an American invasion of Canada was planned. Generals Richard Montgomery and Benedict Arnold spearheaded the invasion that saw the defeat of British forts along the Richelieu River (which drained Lake Champlain into the St. Lawrence River) and Montreal. However, the Americans failed in their attack on Quebec during a blizzard on December 31, 1775. Though depleted in manpower and supplies, the Americans continued a haphazard siege to the fortress city until May 6^th, 1776 and the appearance of British ships carrying reinforcements. Undermanned and lacking provisions to counter British renewed aggression, the Americans had no choice but to retreat from Quebec and Montreal including outposts along the Richelieu River.

British General ‘Johnny’ Burgoyne had led the land forces during commanding General Guy Carlton’s actions that drove the Americans out of Canada during the summer of 1776. Sick, distraught, and defeated, American troops retired to the southern portion of Lake Champlain to Crown Point, Fort Ticonderoga, and Skenesboro, New York. Carleton remained at the Richelieu River’s rapids to dismantle and reform his fleet of war ships to enter the lake and pursue the rebels. Meanwhile General Benedict Arnold was active in constructing a fleet of his own, though on a smaller scale. When Carlton was ready to push south, so too was Arnold prepared to stop him. The Battle of Valcour Island, October 11, 1776, was not decisive for the Americans. Carlton was able to destroy much of Arnold’s fleet, however not before a hard and contested fight dampened the British momentum. With the advent of winter and need to find sufficient quarters with an ample supply line, Carlton was forced to rethink his planned invasion. He decided to draw back to Canada and try again the following spring.

Americans Fortify Their Position

After it became apparent that the British were withdrawing to Canada, the Americans set about refurbishing the defenses at Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga as well as construction of a redoubt across the narrow portion of the lake at Mt. Independence. Since June of 1776 and throughout the winter, Colonel “Mad” Anthony Wayne was left in charge of the fortifications at Ticonderoga. The same problems that hampered the northern army in Canada plagued Wayne. Supplies were meager and continual requests for provisions fell on deaf ears. Congress and the public were more consumed with the invasion attempt in the south at Charleston, June 28, 1776, and the defense of New York City, more hazarded by the July 12^th arrival of a massive armada of British and German troops under General William Howe. As the fall progressed and the main American army suffered defeats in and around New York City, any attempt to resupply the northern army was slender at best. Winter brought no relief as Washington escaped to Pennsylvania and Philadelphia expected the worst. A sudden and brilliant American offensive breathed new life into the struggle and the main army was salvaged, wintering in Morristown, New Jersey. This left Wayne and his troops were pretty much on their own. They barely sustained themselves through the harsh winter of 1776-1777; a day would not pass without a fatality caused by sickness, exposure to the weather, and the primitive conditions of camp.

Meanwhile, as General Carleton wintered his troops at St. John on the Richelieu River, at Montreal, and along the St. Lawrence to Quebec, General Burgoyne had returned to London. While there he penned a detailed plan of operation for renewing the offensive by way of Lake Champlain and taking Albany the following year – ultimately hooking up with General Howe’s forces who were to advance north up the Hudson River. Such an operation would splinter New England off from the rest of the colonies, allowing the British forces to regain control by piecemeal. Burgoyne was most persuasive in promoting his plan to politicians, including King George III. It was decided that the Canadian force should be reinforced and that General Burgoyne, not General Carleton, was to lead the next spearhead into the heart of the colonies.

That spring, 1777, Burgoyne set sail for Canada with reinforcements, arriving at Quebec on May 6^th, 1777. General Simon Fraser, close friend of Burgoyne, was in command of an advance corps and was already stationed along the Richelieu River. Burgoyne would waste no time in organizing his invasion force and by mid June, would be ready to advance south.

In March, 1777, Colonel Wayne wrote to state and federal authorities. He feared another invasion and warned of the imminent threat of attack by growing forces in Montreal and St. Johns. He sought much needed provisions including ammunition and powder and was critical for the need of reinforcements: “For God’s sake, rouse your field and other officers from their lethargy… There is not one moment to spare.” By May, the much needed supplies and manpower was still lacking. Washington was consumed with indecision as to General Howe’s next move – when and where would the commander of British forces strike out from New York. He had not the cash nor men and could offer little help to Wayne and Major General Schuyler – the commander of the northern army headquartered at Albany. So too did Wayne appeal for aid from New England provinces, however receiving a similar negative response.

The situation was made worse after the Danbury Connecticut Raid on April 27, 1777. States were reluctant to send their militia north, opting to keep them home for protection against future British raiding parties. In early May, Wayne had reported that the garrison at the fort had been reduced to 2,200 men and complained about the instability of the “sunshine” soldiers: “… at least one third of the troops now on the ground are composed of Negroes and Indians…” He was shortly replaced by Major General Arthur St. Clair, who had been with Washington at the Battles of Trenton and Princeton. St. Clair had been a British soldier, campaigned with General Wolfe during the French and Indian War and was present at the Battle of Abraham, Quebec, Sept. 13, 1759. He settled in Pennsylvania after the war and became an active patriot. The year before, as colonel of the Pennsylvania 3^rd regiment, he had seen action with the northern army, participating in the Battle of Three Rivers, June 8, 1776. Though reinforcements, mainly militia, had been dribbling in, along with the return of furloughs, the situation in and around Ticonderoga was still critical in June as Burgoyne’s army approached. Against Burgoyne’s fully manned nine British regiments of professional soldiers, six German regiments, and the King’s and Queen’s Loyal Americansⁱ, St. Clair had eight undermanned regiments including remnants of militia.ⁱⁱ

General Burgoyne Launches His Invasion

Burgoyne had divided his army into three units: a right wing to be made of all British regiments, a left wing of all German forces, and an Advance Corps commanded by Brigadier Simon Fraser. Burgoyne’s land force totaled 3,981 British troops and 3,116 Germans, along with several hundred Native Americans. Several ships of war, including a 384 ton frigate of 26 cannon, schooners, bomb ketches, floating batteries, gunboats, and multiple large bateaux, made up the flotilla that guarded and transported the army south along Lake Champlain. On June 20^th, Burgoyne set his invasion in motion, departing from St. John’s with Fraser’s corps out in front.

In a little over two weeks, it would be a strong detachment of Fraser’s command, about half, which included two companies and two battalions, who would attack the Americans at the Battle of Hubbington, in the “Grants” and present day Vermont. His total command consisted of: his own 24^th regiment (Maj. Robert Grant commanding), a grenadier battalionⁱⁱⁱ under Major John Acland, a light infantry battalion under Alexander Lindsay – 6^th Earl of Balcarres, 150 Canadian woodsmen, Ebenezer Jessup’s Kings Loyal Americans, Queen’s Loyal Rangers under John Peters, and a company of Canadian rangers led by Fraser’s nephew, Captain Alexander Fraser. The grenadier and light infantry battalions were among the finest troops in Burgoyne’s army; this array of approximately two thousand men constituted the best ‘strike force’ the British had to forge against any initial rebel resistance.

Colonel Fraser had been promoted to brigadier general after he had successfully commanded a brigade of light infantry and grenadiers at the Battle of Three Rivers, June 8, 1776. He was from a long line of Scottish Highlanders and Jacobites whose many relatives had forfeited their estates after the Battle of Culloden, April 16, 1746. As a teenager, he had enlisted in the Scottish Dutch Regiments and seen extensive action during the Seven Years War fighting alongside the Dutch & German armies in which he was severely wounded. He was also present alongside General Wolfe at Quebec during the famed Battle of Abraham and had spent time in a special fighting force of light infantry and American riflemen or rangers. Brave, cool headed in battle, with a natural talent for terrain and troop movements, by 1777, at age 48, Fraser was considered among the most experienced British officers who had a thorough understanding of wilderness tactics.

As General Fraser moved his advance corps south, he sent out parties of Canadian rangers and Native Americans to probe the enemy’s lines and obtain information. They brought back a captive, James McIntosh, who had been a British soldier and had since been part of the work crew refurbishing Fort Ticonderoga. He had a thorough knowledge of every aspect of the fort and the redoubt across the lake including manpower, supplies, defenses, strengths and weaknesses. Fraser immediately saw an opening when McIntosh described a large hill south of the fort which had been left vacant by American defenses. According to McIntosh, the hill, labeled Sugar Hill, Mt. Defiance by the Americans, was within cannon range of both fort and redoubt and could lob shell behind the walls, eventually proving the forts untenable.

Also of importance was MacIntosh’s answer when questioned as to which direction reinforcements and supplies arrived at the fort and redoubt. McIntosh said they came from the east, from Fort No. 4 (just south of present day White River Junction, Vermont) on the Connecticut River. The road then cut west to Castle Town (present Castleton, Vermont). From there one could head south to Manchester and west to Skenesboro (present day Whitehall, New York, renamed after loyalist Philip Skenes’ land was confiscated), or northwest toward Crown Point, with another road branching west to Fort Independence and Ticonderoga. He was aware that if the road that led west to Lake George and that which ran east of the redoubt at Mt. Independence, along with the water route to the south, could be compromised and blocked by British forces, the garrison would be trapped. The route to the east of Mt. Independence would prove to be the road General St. Clair would take his army to avoid capture when he ultimately evacuated Ticonderoga. With this windfall of information, Fraser knew he had the means to pry the Americans from their defenses and if handled correctly, the garrisons would be surrounded before they sprung the trap. He informed Burgoyne and pushed his men hard.

British Siege of Ticonderoga and the American Evacuation

On June 30^th, the main body of British and German troops was established eleven miles north of Ticonderoga at Crown Point. As the British approached, St. Clair decided to draw the garrison at Crown Point to Fort Ticonderoga and the redoubt was quickly abandoned. The wind abruptly shifted to the south and for over a week, the British fleet was held up. This did not stop the land forces from initiating plans to begin a siege and possibly cut off all supply and escape routes. Burgoyne split his army into two wings; General Riedesel and the Germans advanced up the east shore of Lake Champlain toward Mount Independence to capture the road that led to Castle Town to the east. They hoped to flank the Americans south and trap any and all rebel forces at the redoubt that was still under construction. Meanwhile, General Fraser, who was already at Three Mile Point, three miles distant below Crown Point, proceeded up the west bank toward Fort Ticonderoga to be followed by General Phillips and the artillery. Fraser would act upon the information MacIntosh had given him. He would fan out to the west to capture the road through Mt. Hope which led to Lake George, then swing south of the fort to seal off any and all escape routes in that direction.

No sooner did Fraser’s men established their position to the west of the fort, than he surveyed his position and saw the importance of what his maps labeled Sugar Hill^iv and which the rebels called Mt. Defiance. That afternoon, he dispatched Captain Craig with forty light infantry and Native American scouts to reconnoiter. By midnight, Craig was back; his report was most promising. The next day, July 3^rd, around noon, Fraser and Lt. William Twiss, engineering officer, hiked up the mountain in “abominable hot” conditions. Fraser saw that the position commanded both Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence, guessing at a distance of 1,400 yards and 1,500 yards respectively, within range of their larger cannon which could sweep the entire yards of both forts. Upon return to his headquarters, around 2 PM, Fraser ordered axemen to hack an abatis on the summit and begin carving a road to the top. Burgoyne and Phillips agreed “to use every possible expedition to get cannon to the top.” It was an incredible feat, but within two days, a road sixteen feet wide and three leagues long was built to the summit, more so as the uphill climb was “almost a perpendicular ascent.”

While the road was being built and cannon moved to the summit of Sugar Hill, British forces would continue their advance east and south to cut off all escape routes from the forts. It was imperative that the work on the road and cannon be done quickly and stealthy before the Americans discovered their predicament and abandoned their position along one of the paths before it could be blocked. Four hundred men and according to British Lt. William Digby, “most of the cattle belonging to the army” labored on the road all day, July 4^th in incredible heat, slowly inching two twelve pound cannon towards the summit. By noon on July 5^th, the job was done, a battery was constructed at the top, and the men received as a reward “a refreshment of rum.” However, it was too late, the Americans had been alerted before the trap could be sprung.

On the morning of the fifth, before the British completed the road and battery, a plume of smoke and what were obviously scarlet coats moving through the trees was detected about the heights of Mt. Defiance (Sugar Hill). The Americans realized that a battery was being constructed on the summit and indeed cannon were being hauled up the steep incline. Too late St. Clair realized that artillery on Mt. Defiance could be capable of raking both Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence. Technically, had the Americans been a professional army, well supplied with most fit for duty, the garrisons at Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence should have been able to withstand a protracted siege, but that was not the case. Even with Colonel Seth Warner’s arrival on the 4^th with seven hundred militia and fifty head of cattle, it did not change the situation for the Americans. The total command consisted of 2,089 rank and file fit for duty, 900 militia, 124 unarmed artificers (cannon cockers) and the sick and invalids numbered in the hundreds. Including the ships’ crews, there were approximately 4,000 rebels who faced the British force of over 7,000 well armed regulars, most fit for duty. The writing was on the wall; the Americans had not the food or ammunition to hold out and now, within a short time, both forts would ultimately be cannoned to oblivion.

Reports filtered in that a large German force was approaching the east flank of Mt. Independence with the prospect of severing the only route left for escape. American ships could still navigate the lake, however it was not a good option. With the British fleet close by, they had barely enough vessels to transport the sick, cannon which could be moved quickly, and limited supplies. This left no room for the army which had to evacuate by land. St. Clair had no choice if he wished to salvage the army. He must act and do so immediately. At noon on July 5^th, he ordered the fort and redoubt at Mt. Independence evacuated. Supplies and artillery, including the sick and invalids, were to be sent up the lake to Skenesboro, hoping that the booms and chain strewn across the lake would halt the British ships long enough for the rebel vessels to make their escape. The garrison at Fort Ticonderoga would cross the makeshift bridge across the lake and join the forces at Mt. Independence. Together, they would take the Hubbardton Road which had been cut the year before. Basically a rough cart track, strewn with boulders, stumps and deep ruts, it could only be traversed by foot. The road cut through the forest to the small hamlet of Hubbardton in the “Grants”^v before heading southeast to Castle Town, where another road cut back southwest to Skenesboro and Fort Edwards. As preparations were underway to execute a night evacuation, St. Clair could only hope that the road to Castle Town remained open and free of enemy troops, otherwise his army was doomed.

American Garrisons Abandoned

On the night of July 5^th, the army clutched the pathetically few belongings they had managed to pack before setting off in the darkness. The soldiers stumbled along, fearful of attack in the rear and flank, but unable to move any faster than those in front on the narrow road.^vi The morning sun on July 6^th promised another brutally hot day. By six o’clock that morning, four separate bodies of rebel troops were heading along the road as fast as they could. In the front was Brigadier Enoch Poor’s Brigade of Continentals. Behind them came the main body of St. Clair’s army, along with militia regiments tucked in between the Continentals. Peterson’s Brigade was followed by Frenchman General Fermoy’s Continentals who were spread out across the landscape in disorder. Colonel Ebenezer Francis commanded the 11^th Massachusetts Regiment; 450 men who were among the finest troops St. Clair had in his command, along with Colonel Nathan Hale’s 2^nd New Hampshire regiment^{vii .} They constituted a rear guard and had remained at the forts to the last, sweeping through the encampments and rounding up straggles along the road who could not keep up with the main army. The Americans’ luck held out. The German troops had been delayed in crossing a large wetlands just to the north of the road and by the time they reached the road, the last of the Americans had slipped to the east.

St. Clair’s nighttime escape was almost thwarted when General Mathias Roche Fermoy, at 2 AM, decided to torch his residence at Mt. Independence and surrounding buildings. The massive fire ball alerted the British that something was afoot. General Fraser, on the western shore and some miles to the southwest of the redoubt realized that the Americans were attempting an escape and quickly rounded up what troops he could. He cut across land and crossed the bridge just as the last of the rear guard had disappeared down the road. The tale of a ‘forlorn hope’ of four American soldiers who were left behind as a final precaution to safeguard the army’s retreat is pretty much just that – a tale. It has been elaborated upon in many texts and scholarly articles and accepted universally as fact. Thomas Auburey, who was in Fraser’s 24^th, was later captured at Saratoga and while a prisoner for the war’s duration, wrote a popular travel guide of America that was published in London in 1789. In his Travels through the Interior Parts of America in a Series of Letters by an Officer, he described the Battle of Hubbardton. Many of his antidotes have been seriously questioned by later scholars upon studying other first hand accounts of the battle. This bit about the forlorne hope was one of several in doubt. According to Auburey, the four soldiers who manned the cannon in the shore battery on Mt. Independence were to fire on the British while they were crossing the bridge. Afterwards, the four ‘heroes’ were to disappear into the woods and make their way as best they could to rejoin their comrades. Unfortunately for the Americans, when the British crossed the bridge unmolested, they came upon the battery. The four men still at their posts with linstocks lighted and ready to fire, except beside them was an empty cask of Maderia; the four were dead drunk. Lt. William Digby’s account, a more trustworthy officer, wrote that there was no gun defending the bridge across Lake Champlain. Auburey also added another literary touch writing that Fraser’s Native Americans had haphazardly lit one of the cannons which roared to life; fortunately no one was injured.

The American forces in full were as follows: General Enoch Poor’s Brigade: 1^st New Hampshire, Colonel Joseph Cilley; 2^nd New Hampshire, Colonel Nathan Hale; 3^rd New Hampshire, Colonel Alexander Scammell – General John Paterson’s Brigade: 10^th Mass., Colonel Thomas Marshall; 11^th Mass., Colonel Ebenezer Francis; 12^th Mass, Colonel Samuel Brewer; 14^th Mass, Colonel Gamaliel Bradford – General Mathias Roche Fermoy’s Brigade: 8^th Mass., Colonel Michael Jackson, Seth Warner’s Regiment (Green Mountain Boys), militia from New Hampshire under Colonel Pierce Long and Colonel Benjamin Bellows and from Mass. under Colonel David Leonard.

British Pursue Americans

In near total darkness, General Fraser assembled his men as quickly as he could, pulling them away from the ‘loot’ and ‘treasures’ found abandoned throughout the former rebel camp. At 5 AM, he figured they were about four miles behind the Americans and took off after them – followed by German General Riedesel and his command. Behind, the British fleet had no problem breaking through the chain, boom, and bridge and was under way to Skenesborough, present day Whitehall, New York, with Burgoyne on board. The 62^nd regiment occupied Mt. Independence while the Prinz Friedrich troops secured Ticonderoga. As the rising sun promised another brutally hot day, it was plain that this forced march was going to be hell.

By 6 AM, four separate bodies of troops would be heading as fast as they could down the roughly cut path that wound its way through the wilderness. General Poor’s Continentals led the bulk of St. Clair’s army, followed by General Paterson with General Fermoy’s Continentals in the rear, haphazardly spread out on either side of the road. After a wide break, Colonel Francis’ rear guard of his 10^th Mass. and Nathan Hale’s 2^nd New Hampshire made their way, “sweeping everything off the ground upon the Ticonderoga side, to bring every man and beast,” who was straggling under the strain of the forced march under the intense heat. Next came General Simon Fraser, hot on the heels of the retreating Americans. At times he was only four miles behind Colonel Francis’ rearguard, driving his grenadier and light infantry battalions relentlessly, along with two companies from the 24^th.

Some distance behind him came General Riedesel who, in his haste, collected a company of Jaeger (riflemen) and eighty men from Breymann’s corps, leaving orders for the rest of his regiment to follow along as soon as they could. It became a classic chase – two clumps of Americans, intent on escape, and one of British and another German, determined to catch up with their fleeing enemy. Each one was separated from the other, and all pounding down the road and tearing through the forests, trying to remain close to the same narrow track, with the expectation of violence at each twist of the road.

General Poor rode up and down the line encouraging the men in their tortuous march. At the first halt, the disciplined Continentals assembled by regiment and were silent and obedient. Not so for the militia. They continued to behave “with the greatest disorder,” their conduct “exceedingly insubordinate and seditious.” They created no end of trouble, grousing about the difficult march, their lack of sleep and food, all the while clamoring to be dismissed and sent home. It was close to 1 PM, July 6^th, when the first footsore Americans reached the tiny settlement of Hubbardton, just over half a dozen vacated residences.^viii

St. Clair knew his men needed a rest for they had been trudging along the road all night and into the morning, nine hours in sweltering heat, covering over 20 miles. He waited several hours at Hubbardton for Colonel Francis’ rearguard to catch-up, not knowing the Colonel was delayed by the large number of sick and exhausted stragglers hindering his progress. Finally, St. Clair could wait no longer and pushed on to Castle Town, six miles distant, sending back word to Colonel Francis to come up and camp a couple miles from the main army at Castle Town. To aid the rear guard, he left Colonel Seth Warner in command with a detachment from his regiment, 150 skilled fighters, crack shot riflemen proudly calling themselves Green Mountain Boys.

The Green Mountain Boys had evolved from a vigilante group of back country woodsmen and farmers to a regiment of Continental Regulars commanded by their effective leader, Colonel Seth Warner. Some dozen years earlier, they had settled the disputed land between the Connecticut River and Lake Champlain; purchasing land grants in the early 1760’s from New Hampshire which claimed the territory as the “New Hampshire Land Grants.” However, New York also maintained what would become the state of Vermont as their own. They did not recognize grants given by New Hampshire and set about trying to physically evict the New Englanders. To prevent New York’s incursions, local settlers organized into a militia labeled ‘Green Mountain Boys,’ and fought any attempt to drive off or destroy the many farms and communities that sprung up.

Ethan Allen was the first and most flamboyant leader of the group and when in 1775, the opportunity arose to confiscate the British supplies and provisions stored at Fort Ticonderoga, including an incredible stash of liquor, he and his Green Mountain Boys responded. Afterwards, Allen and his second in command Seth Warner, traveled to Philadelphia and petitioned Congress to establish the Green Mountain Boys as a Continental Regiment not connected to any state. Surprisingly, once the militia became a regular regiment, July 5, 1775, its men voted Ethan Allen out and Seth Warner became its new commanding officer. Later, during the American invasion of Canada, Allen would take himself out of the picture after a misguided attack on Montreal that resulted in his capture and removal as a prisoner to England. Colonel Seth Warner, who the men admired as an able and courageous leader, would maintain control of the Green Mountain Boys until their disbandment on January 1, 1781. Due to the rigors of war, Warner’s health diminished and shortly after the end of hostilities, in 1784, he died.

By 4 PM the rear guard, along with the hundreds of stragglers, arrived at Hubbardton where the rough cart track from Mt. Independence intersected the Crown Point to Castle Town road, running north to south. In a 2010 excellent article on historical discrepancies of the battle, Ennis Duling, Vermont historian, wrote: “In 1777, Hubbardton was a landscape of recent clearings, girdled and dying trees (cutting around the base of a tree thereby killing it to allow grain to grow beneath its dead crown), heaps of unburned tops and brush, and fields of stumps. This frontier settlement of nine families, all of whom had fled, was the first sign of civilization that the retreating Americans had encountered since leaving Mt. Independence.” The rebels, around 1,200 strong, were totally exhausted, many collapsing in the fields where they quickly fell asleep. Colonels Hale, Francis, and Warner, all in their mid thirties, decided that Warner, who as senior, would assume command.

The leaders held council in a cabin owned by John Selleck to discuss what to do next. Though St. Clair had left orders for the rear guard to continue on to Castle Town and camp one mile from the main army, Warner^ix decided, without objection from Hale or Francis, that the men were too fatigued to travel any further that day, let alone another six miles. Warner had a trait that has embodied New Englanders all these long decades – a stubborn determination to be one’s own boss and not take kindly to playing a subordinate role; he was a “stranger to discipline.” They would ignore St. Clair’s orders and stay the night at Hubbardton, departing for Castle Town in the morning. Warner’s Green Mountain Boys bedded down around the Selleck farm, the 2^nd New Hampshire with most of the stragglers bivouacked in the valley along Sucker Brook and the direction from which any pursuit would come, and to the north and right of Warner’s position, Francis’ Massachusetts soldiers encamped in the woods.

The Americans were cognizant of British pursuit, the enemy having fired upon the tail end of their rearguard on several occasions; but many seemed too exhausted to care. Perhaps there was a level of overconfidence in their numbers strongly positioned astride the main road to Castle Town and well supplied with water. So too the perimeter of the cleared land around the Selleck farm was lined with stone walls and piles of felled trees and brush, offering a natural fortification on the western and northern flanks. Lastly, two militia regiments were camped just two and a half miles away, between the rearguard and St. Clair’s main body. If the British did attack, presumably those men would rush to throw in their support. Pickets were posted and the men resigned themselves to grab what rest they could.

The Americans could not have been aware of the zeal General Fraser displayed as he pushed his men to catch the retreating rebels. Nor the fact Fraser was eager for a fight, regardless of the odds. Even as the Americans prepared to bed down, nearly a thousand exhausted British regulars pressed onward. However, the encroaching British and Germans were about to face their own surprise and their biggest test since campaigning in the Americas. This array of rebels, all Continental soldiers, remaining at Hubbardton was by far among the best soldiers in St. Clair’s army. All battle tested, many had fought at the Battle of Bunker Hill, Canada, Trenton, and Princeton. The Green Mountain Boys, skilled woodsmen who had spent years in a quasi-guerrilla war with New York authorities, carried rifles. Deadly accurate at over two hundred yards, they would be a formidable force for even the most skilled professional troops to contend with. And their leader, Seth Warner, was an old hand at protecting a retreating force, having fought till the end at Breed’s Hill. He and his men covered the retreat from Canada, marching south with what was left of the army, securing the sick and wounded to Fort Ticonderoga. So too were the New Hampshire and Massachusetts men veterans. The 11^th Massachusetts, though newly formed, had been drawn from regular soldiers, their leader Colonel Francis, a proven fighter.

Ebenezer Francis, born on 1743 at Medford, Massachusetts, commanding the Massachusetts 11^th, was a trusted leader. He had been a lieutenant minuteman in April, 1775, when war erupted at Lexington and Concord. He soon afterward became a captain in Colonel John Mansfield’s Massachusetts Regiment. His regiment was ordered to support the American forces at the Battle of Bunker Hill, however Colonel Mansfield did not follow orders and instead remained on the western side of Charleston Neck. Mansfield later claimed he did so to support the American retreat, however, later that summer, Mansfield was court-martialed and cashiered out of the army. Francis would remain a captain in the regiment and was active in the Boston siege until December 1775, when he left the service. He next accepted the command of the newly formed Massachusetts 11^th Continental Regiment at Boston on November 6, 1776. The 11^th was not a ‘green’ regiment of new recruits, but composed of men from several different regiments, many having seen action in Canada and New York. They were soon sent north and like the 2^nd New Hampshire, put to work on the fortifications on Mt. Independence.

Colonel Nathan Hale took over the helm of the 2^nd New Hampshire regiment after Colonel Enoch Poor was promoted to Brigadier. The regiment had first seen service during the 1775-1776 siege of Boston. Afterwards, they were ordered north to reinforce the invasion of Canada. They fought at the disastrous Battle of Three Rivers and were fortunate to have been led through the swamps back to the American lines. The regiment retreated to Fort Ticonderoga and remained there until November, 1776, when they marched south to join Washington’s army. They participated in the winter battles at Trenton and Princeton before wintering at Morristown, New Jersey. In the spring of 1777, the 2^nd returned to Fort Ticonderoga and were soon supplied with French muskets and bayonets. A shipment of “Charleville” muskets had arrived Portsmouth, New Hampshire which was quickly sent north. The troops eagerly traded in their family’s hunting muskets for state of the art weapons. The 2^nd was adequately prepared for battle, a regiment of veterans armed with superior weapons that matched the British Brown Bess.

The Americans constituting the rear guard drifted off to a troubled night’s sleep, not knowing a stubborn Scott and crack troops lay on their arms just three miles from their camp. By 5 AM the previous day, Fraser, after having discovered the Americans had evacuated both Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence, sent word to Burgoyne that he was setting out after the rebels and that he was “resolved to attack any body of the rebels that I could come up with.” He had then led his men on a punishing march in scorching temperatures. At 4 PM, at the time Warner was deciding to spend the night at Hubbardton, General Riedesel, on horseback, caught up to Fraser’s corps. As senior, he took command and stated that his men, who were following behind, could go no further and needed to rest. Though Fraser pressed the issue to continue, hoping to catch up to and engage the Americans, Riedesel was adamant, his Brunswickers would go no further, which included Fraser’s command. Fraser was incensed to be superseded by a superior officer of foreign birth ten years his junior. He was able to control his temper and pry a concession from the stubborn German, gaining permission to move his command to Lacey’s camp, three miles from Hubbardton before bivouacking for the night. He informed Riedesel that he had been authorized by Burgoyne to attack the rebels if he so desired and both generals agreed to resume the pursuit at 3 AM the next morning.

General Fraser Attacks without German Support

True to his word, Fraser marched his troops at 3 AM on the 7^th. Their progress proved to be extremely slow on account of darkness. According to Ensign Anburey, two hours later, at sunup and as Fraser’s command reached the end of a long climb, nearing the saddle below Sargent Hill, shots were fired to the front of his column. A study of other first hand accounts, including General Burgoyne’s report to Sec. of State Germain, based on Fraser’s lost battle report, the first shots fired was closer to 6:30 AM. Daniel Chipman’s 1848 memoir of Colonel Seth Warner states the British attacked at 7 AM. The rebel pickets had opened up on Fraser’s Tory and Native American scouts. Ensign Anburey reported that the Americans had not posted pickets, however all evidence points to his being incorrect. Fraser had no idea of the enemy’s strength and halted while additional scouts slipped into the woods to circle the rebels’ flanks. They soon reported back that the Americans were up ahead in considerable force. Fraser had to decide to wait for the Germans to come up, or attack without them. Perhaps he remembered his short and heated battle with the Americans the previous year at Three Rivers in which his troops thoroughly routed the American forces. Or maybe it was over confidence, for he was convinced that his seasoned, disciplined troops could overpower what must be a demoralized rabble running from their pursuers. For whatever reason, he chose not to wait for the Germans and ordered an immediate assault. His decision to blindly attack what proved to be a superior force of battle tested Continental troops almost proved to be his undoing. The two companies of the 24^th led the assault (approximately 140 men), followed by ten companies of light infantry and ten companies of grenadier acting as reserve and bringing up the rear, over a thousand men in all. They crossed the saddle without incident, and headed down toward Sucker Brook where the New Hampshire had camped.

Battle of Hubbardton July 7, 1777

At daybreak, Colonel Francis was seeing to his men. Between 6:30 and 7:00 AM, he ordered his good friend Captain Moses Greenleaf to parade the regiment and prepare to march. He went to the Selleck House to meet with Warner and learned that the British had broken through the boom laid across the lake and seized their ships of baggage and supplies. They could no longer march to Skenesboro as it would be occupied by the British. General St. Clair had sent a rider with instructions for the rearguard to follow him to Rutland and from there they would make a circuitous march to the Hudson where they were to meet General Schuyler. Francis hurried back to his regiment where he met Greenleaf around 7 AM. He ordered him to get underway – heading south on the Crown Point-Castle Town road. Five minutes later, all hell broke loose.

Fraser’s regiment, the 24^th, under Major Robert Grant, spearheaded the attack. He was followed by Major Alexander Lindsay, Earl of Balcarres, commanding ten companies of elite light infantry. Ten companies of grenadiers, led by Major John Acland, brought up the rear. Fraser expected his 24^th regiment to drive through the Americans’ scant defense and rout the entire force. Balcarres’ light infantry were to angle up along Grant’s left flank to counter any possible resistance to the main attack. The grenadiers were kept in reserve to be used as needed. Though it had been daylight for some time, according to Ensign Anburey & fifer Ebenezer Fletcher of the 2^nd NH, the American camp was only beginning to come to life. Anburey quoted from Burgoyne’s later report in which Burgoyne simply stated that the British were roused at 3 AM and attacked the Americans. Anburey elaborated with men were still rolling out of blankets, cooking, eating breakfast, packing gear, and, as 16 year old Fletcher observed, “all in a very unfit posture for battle.” However, Francis’ regiment, to the north of Selleck farm had already assembled and had paraded by this time. One reason for some of the Americans’ lackadaisical manner could be traced to Warner’s order to delay the march while he waited for a two hundred man detachment sent to rescue local families from reported marauding Tory & Native American forces. At around 7 AM, accounts differ on either end of the the hour, a shout carried across the rebel camp, “the enemy are upon us!”

Fletcher and his companions swung around and saw their pickets running for their lives. The redcoats were hot on their heels, racing forward in column then fanning out to deploy in line of battle. In doing so, the British became entangled in the rough vegetation, blindly pressing through the underbrush and forest. Again according to Ensign Anburey, the British commander, General Fraser’s good friend Major Grant, climbed on a stump to get a better look. Just as he was about to order his men to fire, an American volley cut down twenty redcoats, instantly killing the “very gallant and brave” Grant. Whether the details of the major’s death are true, the fact remained that a volley by the Americans killed the 24^th commander. Even so, with Grant down, the disciplined 24^th continued the attack, driving back the badly outnumbered New Hampshire troops and stragglers (along with the sick and invalids). For many youthful boys who found themselves embroiled in this surge of redcoats, militiamen and young farmers who numbered among the Continental troops, it was the first time they witnessed a man’s guts torn out or a face half blown off. To their credit, they fought doggedly, retreating while stopping to load and fire. As the 24^th pushed the center of the Americans back, Major Balcarres’ light infantry flanked to their left along the rebel camp.

Shortly after Major Grant’s regiment attacked, a cry rang out and redcoats were seen emerging from the trees on the far side of farmer Selleck’s field. Without missing a beat, Colonel Francis’ regiment faced right from column, swung into line, and in double time, headed for the attacking British. The redcoats were the vanguard of Balcarres’ light infantry. They had picked their way through piles of logs and thick brush, all the while rushing uphill with full packs in sweltering heat. Winded and disorganized, they were ordered to prime and load as they struggled up the steep incline in the face of “showers of balls mixed with buck shot.” When the light infantry finally reached the brow of the hill, they were able to see the rebels “strongly posted… with breast works before them, and great trees cut across to prevent our approach.”

Francis’ men were the first to arrive at the stone wall with logs piled around it. They quickly took position behind the barricade. With muskets raised, they waited, just barely thirty to forty yards from the British. When they opened fire, the massive volley took the attackers by surprise, shattering their ragged line and sending the redcoats plunging back down the hill. The officers were able to halt the men and under this intense fire, tried to reorganize the disheartened troops. Among the trees, bodies of men withered and called out in pain while all around lay the dead and dying. According to Anburey this included Lt. Haggit, shot in both eyes and the youthful Lt. Douglas, shot in the heart as soldiers were carrying him to the rear.

Meanwhile, the 24^th had made good their initial surprise of the New Hampshire men and the stragglers, crossing the Sunker Brook and driving them back up the hill. However, the Americans continued to lay down a constant fire for as the British advanced, they left behind a score of redcoats killed or wounded. And just as quickly, the regiment’s progress up the steep slope was stopped in its tracks. Warner’s riflemen had come up and dug in their heels, offering a stiff resistance to which the remnants of the 2^nd New Hampshire and straggles formed further north of the Green Mountain Boys line. The frontiersmen continued to lay down a devastating and accurate fire in which the redcoats’ only option was to hunker down and seek the forest for protection.

At this early stage in the battle, General Fraser, who had been leading Balcarras’ light infantry up the hill, must have realized his error in not waiting for the Germans to come up. The battle had barely begun and already the main attack was stalled and his left flank was in jeopardy of being turned. Not only had Francis’ firm stance stopped the light infantry and sent them back down the hill, but his superior numbers were beginning to angle along the British front to flank them. But Fraser was an experienced officer who had been in many a scrap. He remained composed and kept a cool head as he skillfully committed his reserves so he would not lose the momentum of his initial surprise attack. Rather than throwing his grenadiers against the Massachusetts men strongly holding the crisp of the hill to his left, he detached some of the light infantry troops along with the grenadiers, Major Acland in command, and ordered them to swing to the right of the 24^th and head off any Americans trying to reach the Castle Town road. He was taking an enormous chance, for he intended to press the offensive by flanking the American right while severely weakening his own left. But he was counting on General Riedesel’s Brunswickers to come up and fill the gap before Francis could press his advantage and attack, overwhelming the light infantry left in that sector. He sent a messenger of that affect to Riedesel urging him to come forward with all haste.

By the time Warner got his men in position to halt the 24^th advance, there were four separate rebel units engaged. The American line represented a half moon about eight hundred yards, or nearly a half mile in length. It snaked from the west side of the Crown Point-Castle Town road, crossed the road to Mt. Independence and continued south of the Selleck farm. From the south and left to right were the regiments of Warner, Francis’ 11^th Massachusetts then the scattered remains of Hale’s 2^nd New Hampshire, now led by their second-in-command, Lt. Colonel Benjamin Titcomb. Colonel Nathan Hale was still somewhere down the hill near Sunker Brook with a remnant of his regiment, including Captain James Carr’s company, Captain Caleb Robinson, and several stragglers and invalids. Despite being taken by surprise, Hale’s men had done their best to delay the crush of redcoats. However, as a fighting unit they ceased to exist, the men, faced with overwhelming odds, had slipped into the woods and continued the fight individually and in small groups.

The clash of battle had carried to additional units of both American and British forces. Six miles south from Hubbardton, at Castle Town, General St. Clair could make out the faint sound of distant gunfire. He ordered two of his aides, Lt. Colonel Henry Livingston and Major Isaac Dunn, to ride to Ransomvale, where the two militia regiments had camped two miles south of Hubbardton. The milita were to immediately head north and reinforce Warner and Francis. At the time St. Clair’s aides were galloping north, General Friedrich Adolph Riedesel rested his troops on a saddle below Sargent Hill, just west of Hubbardton. He climbed up onto a rocky knob and peered through his spy glass at the spectacle below. From his vantage he could see that the rebels had repelled Franser’s light infantry battalion and were cutting across to their right. Soon, they would be in a position to envelop the British left just as Fraser had foreseen. He saw his troops were needed to support the British left to prevent their flanking and turned to his commander of Jaeger, Captain von Geyso. He ordered them to advance on the double and make a frontal attack on the rebels. He then instructed Breymann’s grenadiers, led by Captain Maximilian von Schottelius, to sweep around the light infantry’s left and turn the American right so to fall on their rear. No sooner than his officers rushed off to order their men forward, General Fraser’s aide rode up with the highlanders’ urgent call for support. Riedesel sent the man back, reassuring Fraser that he was that instant moving to attack.

Because the battle was fought simultaneously on a number of fronts, and in the ‘fog of war’, the thick sulfuric black powder mist that covered 18^th century fields of battle and smothered the forests, a soldiers’ perspective depended on what occurred in the few square yards that constituted his peril. Few had a grasp of the whole and instead, decisions and movements were made based on isolated fragments. This give and take among the soldiers, like the many digits of a living organism, surged forward and back, drifting along flanks as men frantically fought their own desperate battles. Thomas Anburey wrote, “both parties engaged in separate detachments unconnected with each other.” And rebel Captain Enos Stone described it “as hot a fire as was ever kept up… many fell on both sides.” Men loaded and fired as fast as they could. They pressed forward and drew back and they fell, wounded and dead as the free-for-all enraged all around.

Grenadiers Flank American Left. Historians Differ on Route they took

As the battle raged in the center and British left, both sides stubbornly slugging it out, the grenadiers were rushing to the far right in an attempt to flank Warner’s troops on the American left. Here scholars have described the action in which more recent studies have shed grave concerns for their accuracy. Ensign Anburey’s description, in which his account places himself among the grenadiers, has been accepted by several historians who wrote exclusively on the battle; most notably Nickerson, Dupuy, Ketchum, and to some extent the most recent extensive study on the battle by Dr. Venter. However, as an ensign in the 24^th, he was not among the grenadiers on the right, but was with his unit attacking the center and Francis’ men lined along the crest of what has been called Monument Hill, who were behind a stone wall and timber barricades. His witness of events, combined with his preference to copy reports while adding his own embellishments, as well as writing for a London audience, has been subject to serious scrutiny, more so when considering other primary sources.

Three Events on the Right Previously Accepted by Scholars Seriously Questioned

First Event: As a detachment of grenadier under Major John Acland’s direct command approached this rocky precipice, Colonel Warner spotted them and sent part of his regiment to head them off. Two companies of grenadiers, posted on the edge of the woods, watched as about sixty Green Mountain Boys crossed the field towards them with their weapons clubbed, the stock near the ground at their side indicating surrender. The British officer in charge ordered his men to hold their fire to accept the rebels’ submission. However, when the Americans were within ten yards of the British, they suddenly shouldered their weapons and fired, taking the British completely by surprise before hightailing it into the woods. Anburey wrote in disgust, “a breach of all military rules”, leaving men dead or dying in its wake.

Questioned: No other primary source describes this episode nor does Daniel Chipman’s 1848 memoir of Seth Warren make mention. It was absent from Acland’s report nor was it in General Fraser’s and ultimately Burgoyne’s account. Historian Duling observed that, “It is difficult to image that in the heat of battle, the Americans could have concocted such a ruse and that professional British soldiers would fall for it.” Also, one must remember that Anburey was writing for an English public therefore exposing such a ‘gem’ of American deceit, especially so recently after the war, would help sell books.

Second Event: Auburey’s description of the grenadiers’ route during their flanking movement has confused historians for decades as to which exact hill the grenadiers scaled. General Burgoyne was succinct in his description of the grenadier’s route: “The grenadiers scrambled up a part of that ascent, appearing almost inaccessible, and gained the summit before them which threw them [the rebels] into confusion.” But then Burgoyne wasn’t writing to promote a book. Auburey took this simple explanation, copying it nearly word for word, and then added his own colorful additions: “The grenadiers scrambled up an ascent which appeared almost inaccessible, and gained the summit of the mountain before them; this threw them [rebels] into great confusion.” He continued, “So precipitous were the crags that they had to sling their muskets and scramble up with the aid of both hands, supporting themselves on branches, tree roots, and projecting bits of rock. Indeed, the danger such inexperienced cragsmen were in from falling seems to have been as vivid to them as that which they ran in fighting.” Glorious in their determination, there was no stopping the grenadiers in their relentless climb.

Questioned: Despite logic, Anburey’s account of the grenadier assent was given importance by historians who sought to established the route he described. Warner’s Green Mountain Boys took post on Pittsford Ridge and further north, not south. Francis’ men were positioned on what is now called Monument Hill. The fight was on Pittsford Ridge (not to be confused with the mountain) and the grenadiers flanking the American left would have done so on Pittsford Ridge. However, Anburey’s description did not match Pittsford Ridge as being inaccessible. The ridge slopes up, but is not precipitous; a present logging road easily climbs to the top. There is a sharp spine, however a hiker could easily scramble up (using Burgoyne’s words) and then down again before continuing toward the ridge line and Castleton Road. By any route, someone reaching the ridge would be breathing hard, but were in no danger of falling backwards with grave injury. Therefore historians, such as Nickerson who in 1928 accepted Anburey’s description verbatim, needed to make sense of the grenadiers’ mountaineering skills. As historian Duling wrote, “Therefore he [Nickerson] moved the location away from Pittsford Ridge. One half mile southwest of the battlefield and today’s visitor’s center is a rocky outcropping that fits Anburey’s description far better than the wooded slope to the east. Mt. Zion, presently known, rises four hundred feet above the valley. Decades later Dupuy in 1960, Ketchum in 1997, and Venter in 2015, took Nickerson’s lead and continued to accept Mt. Zion as the path the grenadiers took as they cut off the American retreat to the south. However, the supposed exploits on Mt. Zion made no sense. As Duling wrote, “There was enough room in the valley between Monument Hill and Mt. Zion – Pittsford Ridge – for the British to flank the Americans. A trek over the mountain [Zion] would have been a long, arduous, and pointless detour. For men armed with muskets, Mt. Zion offered no advantage and no threat.”

Third Event: This claimed that despite the steep and difficult terrain which the men struggled over, they continued to prime and load their muskets. They therefore abandoned trained discipline and instead, after priming, rammed the cartridge (which included powder and ball) by slamming the butt on the ground, rather than taking the time to use a ramming rod. Consequently, after the battle, they found their barrel full of half a dozen or misfired cartridges.

Questioned: The battalion grenadiers were among the best trained troops in the British army. It is inconceivable that to a man, they would, in their haste, forget their training in the manual of arms and ingrained discipline, submit to a practice, like the greenest militia, cram their barrels with unexplored cartridges.

Americans Pull Back

Warner’s men had been stubbornly holding their position to the west of the Castle Town Road. When the grenadiers had crested the hill and came down the slope towards him, Warner knew he was in danger of being flanked and ordered his men to pull back to the east side of the road. They took a position behind a log fence that ran parallel to the road making a right angle as it continued along Pittsford Ridge. It was a strong position. To get at the rebels, the grenadier would have to attack over an open field under a deadly fire. The Green Mountain Boys continued a stiff resistance, however without reinforcements, Warner knew he could not hold the fence. On the rebel right, Francis and Titcomb, leading what was left of the 2^nd, held the line at the stone wall. As stubborn as they were in holding, the British light infantry was just as obstinate in their attack. When Francis feared that this initial position was at risk, he ordered the men to pull back to a second position which, according to General Fraser, was a “hill of less eminence.” It was a gentle rise that offered some protection to lying troops. From here, with the light infantry and 24^th pressing the attack, he ordered the men back once again and it believed it was here that he was shot in the arm. He refused help as his limb hung limp, rushing among the men and organizing them as they lined up behind a wooden fence on the east side of the Castle Town Road – the same fence that Warner’s men were behind though they were further south along Pittsford Ridge. Like Warner, the thought of reinforcements must have crossed Francis’ mind for two militia regiments were only two miles south down the road, well within the sound of musket fire. The battle had been raging for just over an hour with no let up. Surely, as soon as it became obvious that the rear guard was being attacked, the militia would have lit out to help. They would arrive shortly if not already engaged. In the heat of battle, Francis had no way of knowing that the road to Castle Town had been cut off by the flanking grenadier. He also could not have known the militiaman’s desire to save themselves before their fellow countrymen.

No American Reinforcements

St. Clair’s aides, Livingston and Dunn, had galloped north to order the militia north to the rear guard’s aid. As they drew close to the militiamen’s camp, they were met with men under arms, marching with all speed, towards them – not north to the sounds of battle, but running from it to the safety of the main army at Castle Town. Warner’s memoirs and regimental returns indicate that the two militia units were commanded by Colonel Benjamin Bellows of New Hampshire and possibly Colonel Benjamin Simonds of Massachusetts who was with Warner at Ticonderoga and later remained in the Bennington area. The two riders spotted Colonel Bellows and informed him of Gen. St. Clair’s order to assist the rear guard. Try as he might, he was helpless to turn the men around as overwhelming fear drove them south. Livingston described Bellows’ forlorn efforts writing, “an unaccountable panic had seized his men, and no commands or entreaties had any effect on them.” Since there was no stopping the fleeing militiamen, the two aides pointed their mounts north and spurring them to the sound of muskets.

Though the Americans had retreated to another defensive position, the fight was far from conclusive. Colonel Francis was proving his mettle that day. Painfully wounded, he continued to prow the line, ordering and encouraging men to fight, shifting companies where they would be most effective, and all the while looking for an opportunity to gain the offensive. It came when he noticed that the left flank of the oncoming British was dangling, that their line was too short to form an enveloping attack. He immediately ordered troops out from behind the fence to cross the field along the assaulting British flank and enfilade that exposed section (pour shot onto the attacking troops from the side). According to Captain Moses Greenleaf of the 11^th, the battle had been raging for an hour and twenty-five minutes and that the fire lasted “without cessation” all that time. Yet, though fatigued from the previous day’s relentless march, receiving little rest, and engulfed in a fierce battle, the Massachusetts and New Hampshire Continentals advanced towards the British left.

At this critical moment, when it appeared General Fraser’s elite light infantrymen were endangered of being driven from the field, the distant blare of bugles, fifes, and pounding drums cut through the gunfire. General Riedesel’s Brunswicker Grenadiers were advancing, true to their commanders instructions “to proceed with resounding music,” to give the rebels the impression of superior numbers. And out of nowhere, moments after Breymann’s crack grenadier with their tall mitre hats announced they were attacking, eighty German riflemen, Jaegers under Captain von Geyso, in green coats with brown leather breeches and leggings, suddenly appeared and shored up the light infantry’s flank, driving the Americans back with their intense and accurate fire. Soon after, Captain Schottelius led blue-clad grenadiers in a bayonet charge, driving in on the right of the light infantry and exhausted 24^th.

The Americans were soon all but surrounded. As the deadly accurate fire of German rifle took its toll, the British troops, with German reinforcements, surged forward while pushing the New Hampshire men back, exposing the rebel right. On the American left, British grenadiers had driven Warner’s Green Mountain Boys back from the fence and were sweeping around them. Francis’ men held out for as long as they could, but it was clear that all would be lost in one savage bayonet charge. The only chance the Americans had of escape was to fall back to the only position that remained, a hedgerow on the far side of Hubbardton Brook. Beyond there, they would have to reach the steep slope of Pittsford Mountain and fade into the forests beyond the mountain. To reach the brook, they would have to race across eighty yards of a wheat field under intense fire. Francis gave the order and his men turned and ran for the hedgerow. Those who made the Brook turned and fired, however Colonel Francis, rallying the last of his men, called out not to shoot for fear they would hit their own men. It was his last command. A volley erupted from behind and Francis fell dead. Later, his friend Captain Greenleaf bemoaned, “… the brave and ever to be lamented Colonel Francis, who fought bravely to the last… rec’d the fatal wound thro’ his body entering his right breast, he drop’d on his face…”

With Francis’ death, the fight was over. Without their leader, the rebel troops scattered into the forests, running for their lives. As historian Ketchem wrote, “…scrambling up the cliffs behind Hubbardton Brook with the frantic speed of hunted men. Except for the occasional musket shot from the woods, the battle of Hubbardton was over.” Warner’s Green Mountain Boys, skilled huntsmen and familiar with the terrain, many having years traversed those woods and fields, quickly disappeared within the forest’s curtain. Singly and in small groups, men pushed on past the mountains and made their way to Rutland and Manchester where the main army was assembling on their march to Fort Edward.

Left on the field were the dead and dying including most of the American wounded, too hurt to chase after their comrades. Colonel Ebenezer Francis was recognized and a small group of soldiers gathered around him. General Fraser mentioned the rebel leader in his report and General Burgoyne repeated it in his letter to Lord Germain: “On our march we picked up several stragglers, from whom General Fraser learnt that the rearguard of the enemy was composed of chosen men, commanded by a Colonel Francis, who was reckoned one of their best officers.”

After the stiff resistance and skillful manner in which the Americans never panicked, but gradually gave way while keeping up a continual fire, the British and German troops staring down at Francis’ prone figure would have agreed with their commander. Lt. Digby was one of those staring down at Francis’ lifeless body and noted, “his figure… was fine” and even in death “made me regard him with attention.” It was a mark of respect that the Germans buried Francis with their own, General Riedesel in attendance.

Colonel Nathan Hale had remained at Sucker Brook with part of his command and a number of stragglers, nearly a hundred men in all. For over an hour the battle had raged all around them. They were exhausted, frightened, and with many dead and wounded. A sudden cry rang out from the woods that they were surrounded and to surrender. The men were totally disoriented, not knowing if their lines had held or if their army had been routed leaving them alone. Hale decided to surrender and ordered his men to lay down their arms. He was stunned when only one officer and fifteen men emerged from the woods. It was a clever ruse that Light Infantryman Lt. Hadden latter commented was “proof of what may be done against beaten battalions while their fears are strong upon them.”

Casualties

The battle involved about a thousand British and German troops and approximately 1,200 Americans. There was no accurate record of the number of stragglers the rearguard picked up between Mt. Independence and Hubbardton. By all accounts, the fight was intense, among the most fought throughout the war, as evidenced by the high number of casualties compared to combatants. For over an hour and a half there with no let up in firing. British units consistently pressed the Americans, doggedly advancing uphill while the Americans were just as obstinate in their refusal to pull back from their positions. Historical accounts of British and German casualties differed but can safely be put at 14 officers and 195 rank and file with thirty five dead and the rest wounded. The Americans suffered forty killed and approximately forty wounded, however with the loss of 234 prisoners – Colonel Hale and his detachment accounting for around a hundred of this number. The percentage of casualties was considered very high for eighteenth century standards. One in every five British or German combatant was either killed or wounded. Of the Americans, when prisoners are taken into consideration, the loss was twenty-five percent or one of every four of the rearguard. Perhaps equally important was the death of two of the finest officers of both armies – Major Grant leading the 24^th and Francis of the 2^nd NH – and the wounded grenadier commander Major John Dyke Acland. The Americans would, over the next couple of months, make up for this deficit in numbers by reinforcements from additional regiments sent north and state militias. Yet for Burgoyne’s army, there would be no reinforcements. The loss of over two hundred men, mainly from General Fraser’s Advance corps – light infantry and grenadier battalions, the best soldiers in his army – the affect would be keenly felt as the British forces advanced towards Albany and met stiffened American resistance.

Aftermath

General Fraser became enraged by General Riedesel’s decision to immediately return to General Burgoyne’s main army assembling at Skenesboro. Fraser had hoped to leave a detachment to care for the wounded and prisoners, then quickly set off in pursuit of St. Clair’s main army. Some of the wounded, mainly officers, were placed in the Selleck cabin. Prior to leaving, the Germans helped the British patch together huts for rank and file and American casualties. Many of the injuries were horrific with two or more wounds per man. No doctors had accompanied the British forces because of the snap decision to pursue the Americans. Men waited in agony for surgeons urgently summoned from Ticonderoga to arrive. The doctors arrived late in the day and attended to the officers and critically injured first. They brought no stretchers and the worst of those wounded, along with officers, had to wait a day and a half before carried back to Ticonderoga. The next evening the heavens opened up as recorded by American prisoner Enos Stone, it “rained as hard as ever it rained, almost, we lay in the water until 3 o’clock in the morning…” When the stretchers arrived, because of the rain, the rough road to Ticonderoga was a quagmire, adding to the suffering. It took more than thirty hours, including a night in the woods in which one of the Americans died, before the pitiful train of stretcher bearers made it to the fort. The rest of the wounded, mainly Americans, would have to wait nearly twenty days before a twenty man detachment of Germans were sent to transport them to the hospital at Ticonderoga.

Fraser remained at Hubbardton, contemplating continuing the pursuit without German assistance. However, after experiencing the stiff resistance by the American rear guard, the condition of his men, plus the added chore to see to the wounded and loss of men herding the prisoners back to Ticonderoga, prudence took the better part of his decision. On July 9^th, two days after the battle, his 24^th regiment along with light infantry and grenadier battalions, minus two of their commanders, followed the Germans back to the fort and from there to Skenesboro.

For most of those taken prisoners, the trek through pouring rain back to Fort Ticonderoga was the beginning of a long and painful ordeal: meager rations, sickness, death, and the detested “clost confinement under Dutch guard,” as Captain Enos Stone called Lt. Colonel Christian Prinz Friedrich’s regiment, those assigned to garrison the fort. Sixteen year old fifer Ebenezer Fletcher of Captain Carr’s company in the 2^nd New Hampshire, had been shot in the back and taken captive. He wrote, “The difference in mankind never struck me more sensibly than while a prisoner. Some would do everything in their power to make me comfortable and cheerful; while others abused me with the vilest language; telling me that the prisoners would all be hanged; that they wou’d drive all the damned rebels into the sea, and that their next winter quarters would be in Boston. They certainly wintered in Boston; but to their great disappointment and chargrin, as prisoners of war.” Some of the officers were released on parole at the end of July, promising to go home and leave the army and the war behind. Stone, including Hale and other prisoners were put aboard ships and taken down Lake Champlain and the St. Lawrence River to Quebec where they languished in dank prisons Stone writing in October, “a very squaley day of snow…and very cold.” Stone signed a parole and a month later, sailed to New York, arriving late December from whence he returned home. Colonel Nathan Hale was not as lucky. Though most of the officers were eventually exchanged or paroled, he would die three years late while still in captivity.

Warner’s Green Mountain Boys knew the terrain they had escaped through and easily made their way to Manchester and then onto Bennington where St. Clair’s army had passed through on their way to Fort Edward south of the British position at Skenesboro. Warren would remain at Bennington while his men continued to pour in from the countryside. He would be reinforced with militia units arriving from New Hampshire and Massachusetts, including the skilled fighter and recently promoted General John Stark. Warner’s men would soon take part in the Battle of Bennington. It would be the first and perhaps most important nail in the coffin of Burgoyne’s invasion, leading to his surrender to General Horatio gates at Saratoga on October 17, 1777. St. Clair would join the commander of the Northern Army, General Philip Schuyler at Fort Edward. However, he would be condemned for his quick abandonment of Fort Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence. A year later he would be exonerated at a court-martial, however he would never recover from the blemish on his career, not receiving a major field command for the remained of the war. The New Hampshire 2^nd and the Massachusetts 11^th would remain active throughout the war under new command.

For the many Americans who gave their precious lives on the field that day on July 7, 1777, fighting a rear guard action that would forever embolden the determination and dedication of those committed to the ideals of a new and free nation, their bodies would be left to rot. While the victorious British and Germans spent the day after the battle dressing men’s wounds, foraging food, resting, and burying their dead, except for a few officers, the forty or so Americans lying dead were left where they lay. One officer noted, “the wolves came down in numbers from the mountains to devour the dead…” Even some of the newly buried were not spared as the officer continued, “…and even some that were in a manner buried, they tore out of the earth.” What the wolves did not get, the crows and small animals, including insects picked at the clothes and flesh until only bleached bones remained. As historian Ketchem so amply wrote, “When the settlers who fled returned at last in 1780, they were too preoccupied with reconstructing their own lives to worry about battlefield debris. Three years later an influx of newcomers arrived, but it was not until 1784, a year after the Treaty of Paris was signed, that the residents turned out and finally laid to rest the crumbling remains.”

The visitors center at the Battle of Hubbardon was built in the early 1970’s. The Selleck cabin is long gone, but the site is enclosed by a fence. Most of the land is as it was that hot and sultry day in July, 1777. The saddle between the mountains in which the Mt. Independence road wove its way towards Castleton is clearly seen from what has been labeled Monument Hill. The brook and hilly terrain in which the combatants fought is much as it was during the battle. Though historians disagree as to the importance of Mt. Zion to the south, one can still hike and scale the rocky hillside and picture British troops trudging up the precipice, laden with heavy haversacks, twelve pound muskets, dressed in thick woolens in ninety degree heat, all the while under fire from above. The Crown Point to Castleton Road pretty much remains where it was when St. Clair’s army poured south in their escape from General Fraser’s frantic pursuit. At the top of Monument Hill is the marble monument constructed in 1859 commemorating the battle. It is surrounded by a cast iron fence and supposedly marks the place where Colonel Ebenezer Francis is buried. It was reported that General von Riedesel saw to it that Francis was interned with full military honors rendered by a detachment form his Brunswick troops.

For more reading, check out Amazon Previews on great books on the Battle of Hubbardton, Green Mountain Boys, and the northern battles that helped change the course of the American Revolution

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Why Was America So Obsessed to Gain Canada, the 14th Colony?

SOURCE

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Duling, Ennis. Thomas Anburey at the Battle of Hubbardton: How a Fraudulent Source Misled Historians. 2010: https://vermonthistory.org/journal/78/VHS780101_1-14.pdf

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Luzader, John F. Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution. 2008: Savas Beatie, New York, NY.

Metz, Elizabeth Ryan. I Was a Teenager in the American Revolution: 21 Young Patriots and Two Tories Tell their Stories. Ebenezer Fletcher Memoir. 2006: McFarland & Company, Jefferson, North Carolina.

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Schwalm, Johannes. Johannes Schwalm The Hessian. 1976: Johannes Schwalm Historical Association, Precision Printers Inc., Milville, PA.

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Venter, Bruce M. The Battle of Hubbardton: The Rear Guard Action that Saved America. 2015: History Press, Charleston, SC.

Vermont Life Magazine. Battle of Hubbardton: The Revolution’s Only Engagement Fought in Vermont. (Summer 1963) 4: 2 – 5, 56 – 57.

Walworth, Ellen Hardin. Saratoga: The Battle-Battleground-Visitor’s Guide. 1877: Published by Ellen Hardin Walworth, New York, NY.

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FOOTNOTES