Battle of Hobkirk’s Hill: Victory to Defeat in the Blink of an Eye

Hobkirk’s Hill: April 25, 1781. American General Nathanael Greene had yet to achieve a personal victory since he took over command of the American Southern Army in December of 1780. But he did not need to. Either planned, by accident, or a twist of fate, Greene was able to get rid of General Lord Charles Cornwallis and his main army. Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, and the Race to the Dan each one, along with numerous skirmishes, had depleted Cornwallis’ force; regulars he could not replace. His hopes of raising the loyalist population to his banner were dashed by disasters at King’s Mountain and Pyle’s Massacre. And without supplies and an army worn down by countless marches with little food, he had no other choice but to limp his malnourished army one hundred and eighty miles to the coast. At Wilmington, North Carolina. There he could rest, resupply, and decide his next move.

Yet for Greene, the fight was not over. With Charles out of the picture, he still could not claim the deep south. He had another powerful adversary to deal with. Colonel Francis Lord Rawdon was holed up in Camden, South Carolina. With him was a force of regular and veteran loyalist partisan corps that nearly equaled Greene’s. With a string of outposts and strong fortifications strung out between Camden, Ninety-Six, and Charleston, Greene was outnumbered more than two to one.

But he had a bigger problem that raised its ugly head; a nemesis that had plagued the American Army since its inception. Enlistments had expired. The militia, particularly those of North Carolina, had turned their backs on the war and headed home to their farms as soon as their ninety day promise to fight for the cause ended. He still had his continentals. But two regiments, one from Virginia and the other from Maryland were recent enlistments. Couldn’t count on them in the heat of battle. As for his veterans, they were bruised and battered and just plain worn down.

While keeping abreast of Cornwallis’ slow march to the coast, Greene so too had a decision to make. And it began in early April, 1781, by ordering his army to prepare to march. South. Not after Cornwallis, but back to Camden. Some 150 miles south. Where there were battle hardened militia still fighting under strong leaders like Pickens, Swamp Fox Marion, and the temperamental Sumter. Greene would once again try and win a war of attrition. He would best Lord Rawdon while still seeking that one battle in which he may finally claim victory. And Hobkirk’s Hill would come close. So close to becoming that gem in an already brilliant campaign.

March to Camden

Greene set his plans in motion. He would send Lt. Colonel Henry ‘Light-Horse’ Harry Lee and his legion, along with one company of continentals under Captain Edward Oldham of the 5^th Maryland, to link up with Francis ‘Swamp Fox’ Marion in the Pee Dee or Black River Region. Lee and Marion were to progress down the Cape Fear river as a feint to mislead Cornwallis that they were the vanguard of Greene’s army. Lee was then to head for and destroy Fort Watson on the Santee, an important supply stockade halfway between Camden and Charleston.

NOTE: There has been an error among several historians who wrote that the continentals sent with Lee were of the 1^st NC. That regiment had surrendered at Charleston the previous year and had been reformed in 1781; they would not join the army until later in the year. Also, there were two Capt. Oldhams of NC who were in the southern army, but they were both militiamen from Caswell County. This may be the cause for confusion.

Word was sent to Pickens suggesting he invest the British at Fort Ninety-six if he believed possible, or to at least prevent any reinforcements sent to Camden. He also dispatched a letter to Sumter, hoping the testy general would join him outside of Camden. Lee departed for the Pee Dee on April 6^th, and on April 7^th, Greene broke camp at Ramsey’s Mill and the army headed southeast, taking the road along the Cape Fear as if his intention was to confront Cornwallis at Wilmington. The very next day he changed direction and headed southwest towards Camden, averaging eighteen miles a day. The late spring weather was pleasant. The army was rested with plenty of food and rum. The miles slipped away.

Lee and Marion Capture and Destroy Fort Watson

While Greene marched toward Camden, Lee found Marion. Within days the two laid siege to Fort Watson, named by Lt. Colonel Watson Tadwell Watson for himself. Watson was a newly arrived favorite dandy of General Henry Clinton for whom Cornwallis despised. Believing he was sent as Clinton’s spy, His Lordship called him ‘The Plague.’ Watson was in command of a battalion of loyalists called the Provincial Light Infantry from New Jersey and New York City. Cornwallis wanted nothing to do with the man and assigned him to Rawdon who gave him the unenviable task of finding Swamp Fox Marion. He was given the 64th Foot and a company of 17th Foot that brought his strength up to 500 men. Watson was soon floundering in the swamps of the low company when Lee and Marion attacked his fort, left to be garrisoned by Lt. James McKay and 120 regulars and militiamen.

The siege of Fort Watson lasted nine days, April 13^th to the 23^rd. After several days of pondering how to lodge the British from their strong position, Major Hezekiah Maham of Marion’s corps stepped forward and suggested they construct a tower higher than the fort walls. Riflemen would shoot down into the fort as if the works were invested by mortars. This would prevent the garrison from defending themselves during a frontal assault. The first Maham Tower was built and on the morning of the 23^rd, riflemen opened up on the fort. After a quick assault, the fort was taken and later burned. Time spent capturing and razing the fort prevented Lee and Marion from participating in the battle.

Greene Arrives Outside Camden

Greene arrived four miles north of Camden on April 19^th. He had hoped to surprise Rawdon; however, His Lordship had ample loyalist scouts watching the American’s every move. Captain Robert Kirkwood of Delaware, a competent and dependable veteran, led the light infantry. Throughout the entire war he would fight in thirty battles. Before the main army arrived, Kirkwood and his light infantry took a small village called Logtown, less than a mile north of Camden. After a heated exchange with British pickets, by midnight Kirkwood laid claim to the town.

The next morning Greene brought up his force and encamped on a gradual rise. It was a low sandy ridge called Hobkirk’s Hill. The ridge of no great height ran down to and through Logtown with the Great Waxhaw road cresting the hill before carrying onto Camden. At its eastern edge, the hill gradually sloped down to a wide and deep swamp that bordered Pine Tree Creek which flowed to Camden. To the south and towards Camden was a thick thicket and stretch of Pine with patches of open ground. Because of the lay of the hill amidst the woods, from atop the ridge, there was no clear view from all approaches.  There Greene remained for two days to decide his next move.

Defenses at Camden and Rawdon’s Force

Rawdon’s headquarters at Camden was a strong, fortified position. The town’s natural defenses included the Wateree River covering the south and southwest in a mile curve. To the east was Pine Tree Creek which was a large tributary to the Wateree. To the north and west were a series of five smaller forts called redoubts which circled a large, well-fortified main stockade.

The fort was garrisoned with 900 regulars and units of loyalist provincials, all hardened veterans. They included the 63^rd Foot, New York Volunteers, King’s American Regiment (labeled Fanning’s Regiment after Colonel Edmund Fanning who raised the regiment on Statin Island in 1776) and the Volunteers of Ireland, which were Rawdon’s own regiment. An additional 60 Provincial Dragoons were present under Colonel Coffin and a small number of militia; the South Carolina Royal Regiment. Lastly, two 6-pound cannon were manned by forty men of the Royal Artillery. Lt. Colonel Watson had taken his Provincial Battalion, along with the 64^th Foot and a company of detached 17^th Foot, 500 men in all, to look for Marion. He would not arrive back at Camden until after the battle.

Greene’s Force

Greene had 1,560 men in his command, lessened by the absence of Light-Horse Harry Lee’s troops. They included 1,174 continentals, 259 militia from North Carolina, 87 cavalry, and 40 artillerymen.  Of the Continentals, the 4^th Virginia and the 5^th Maryland were recent conscripts with many having yet to experience combat. Unit breakdown:

• 4^th Virginia under Lt. Col. Richard Cambell
• 5^th Virginia led by Lt. Col. Samuel Hawes
• Both of the above were under the command of General Isaac Huger
• 1^st Maryland under Colonel John Gunby
• 5^th Maryland commanded by Lt. Col. Benjamin Ford
• Both of the above were led by Colonel Otho Williams of Maryland
• Light Infantry led by Captain Robert Kirkwood of Delaware
• Colonel William Washington’s Cavalry
• North Carolina militia under Colonel Jesse Read
• Recently arrived Artillery. Three 6 pounders under Col. Charles Harrison of VA

Once within reach of Camden, Greene knew he did not have enough troops to exact a siege of such a heavily defended position writing, “…we have no battering cannon, and too few troops to warrant a storm upon the post…”  As such, he sat and waited for the illusive and unpredictable Sumter to show up with his much-needed provincial troops. Sumter would never arrive. So too Greene looked for Lee and Marion to join him. By the time they completed their siege of Fort Watson, there was no time for them to unite with Greene.

But the ultimate decision on what to do would not be for Greene to make. And if you believe Chief-Justice John Marshall’s early account that he wrote in his text “Life of Washington, Volume II,  all lay with the desertion of one drummer boy.

Rawdon Decides to Attack

According to Justice Marshall and cited by early biographers of Colonel Gunby and General Greene, a Maryland drummer had deserted the American army and informed Rawdon that the rebel artillery had been sent away. The deserter also gave a detailed description of Greene’s force camped on Hobkirk’s Hill and that he had been reduced by sending out detachments. Rawdon knew that Lee and Marion could soon join Greene, along with the possible addition of the illusive Sumter. He decided the time would not be better to attack.

Encamped at Hobkirk’s Hill on the morning of the 22^nd, Greene had ordered Colonel Carrington of the North Carolina militia to remove all artillery to Lynch’s Creek, about 20 miles to his rear. This was because he had received word the previous day that Lt. Col. Watson, with 500 men, was advancing by “unfrequented ways,” to join forces with Rawdon. Greene then moved his camp to the east and north through swamps too thick to haul cannon and set up a defensive position to confront the expected Watson. On the 23^rd, having received better intelligence that Watson was still near the coast, he returned that evening to his original camp at Hobkirk’s Hill. On the 24^th, the day before the battle, he ordered the cannon to be returned and just prior to the battle, thee 6-pounders made their appearance.  

Morning of April 25^th

While on the morning of the 25th, Lord Rawdon marched his men from Camden, the Americans woke up expecting the day to be like any other. They would wait patiently for reinforcements so to conduct a siege on the British fortifications. No one expected a sortie from the British position. Earlier that morning, Colonel Edward Carrington, Greene’s quartermaster, had arrived with three of the artillery’s cannon along with “a comfortable supply of provisions.” Right after the morning drill, arms were stacked and the men cooked their food. Some finished early and repaired to wash their clothes in a small brook running down the northeast side of the hill that fed into Pine Creek.

Greene had set up camp in a curved line along the top of the hill; east and southeast. As a precaution for any surprise attack, the southern and western sides of the hill were picketed with skirmishers. On the plain below the hill and towards Camden, two strong picket guards were posted under Captain Perry Benson of Maryland and Captain Simon Morgan of Virginia. They were supported by Kirkwood’s competent light infantry.

It was a peaceful scene until 10 AM when blasts of musket were heard, followed quickly by another of even more musketry. The drums immediately beat to arms as the men rushed to gather their arms and raced to their predetermined lines of battle.

Battle

The pine forest had masked Rawdon’s troops who came on through the woods. The British van came upon the pickets and volleyed, which was quickly answered. Greene’s skirmishers slowly pulled back while pausing to fire at their pursuers. Kirkwood instantly brought his light infantry into the fray and a sharp exchange of volleys erupted. The pickets and light infantry put up a stubborn resistance, fighting tree to tree. It delayed Rawdon’s advance allowing Greene time to fix his line of battle. Only when Rawden’s full force pressed forward did Kirkwood’s light infantry pull back to join the main army in formation.

The Americans formed in two lines in a curve along the hill’s contour. In this case, it was the reverse of Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse where the militia were in front. At Hobkirk’s Hill, Greene’s Continentals made up the first line followed by the weaker militia and reserve. On the far right of the first line was Lt. Col. Campbell’s Virginia 4^th (new enlistments); followed by Lt. Col. Hawes’ 5^th Virginia – both under General Huger. Colonel Gunby’s 1^st Maryland was next in line with the 5^th Maryland under Lt. Col. Ford (new enlistments) forming the far left. Behind the left wing in reserve were Col. Read’s militia with Col. Washington’s cavalry to the left of them. Also, on the far left in reserve were Kirkwood’s light infantry who fell in after their heated skirmish to delay Rawdon’s advance. In the center of the first line and on the Waxhaw Road were the three 6-pounders under Col. Harrison of Virginia. A line of continentals concealed the cannon from the approaching enemy.

Rawdon had approached Greene’s camp further to the east, hugging the Pine Tree Creek swamps. There the assent up Hobkirk’s Hill was easier that brought his force against Greene’s left. Once the pickets and light infantry were driven in, he deployed his men in line of battle. Up front and center were the New York Volunteers with the 63^rd Foot on their right with the King’s American Regiment on the left. Behind the 63^rd on the right were Rawdon’s own Volunteers of Ireland and behind the King’s Americans on the left were a ‘corps of convalescents’ under Captain Robertson. In reserve were the New York Dragoons under loyalist Captain John Coffin and South Carolina Provincial Regiment. In the woods on the far right and far left were an assortment of Tory riflemen free to pick off enemy and officers from a distance.

Greene quickly realized that Rawdon’s approach forced him to present a narrow front. If Greene were to attack quickly and aggressively, a complete victory with the full destruction of Rawdon’s troops was in hand. The center two regiments, Hawes 5^th Virginia and Gunby’s 1^st Maryland would not fire, but immediately charge with bayonets. The other two flanking continental regiments, Cambell’s 4^th on the far right and Ford’s 5^th on the far left, would pass the British line and wheel around upon the enemy’s flanks. They would in a sense fold in the British on both sides subjecting them to an enfilading and devastating fire. While the center continued to press upon the British front, trapping the enemy, Washington’s cavalry would would be the coup de grace, sweeping behind the enemy to fall upon the rear. Totally surrounded and pressed on all sides, Rawdon would have no choice but to either face further carnage or surrender.

Greene turned to his aides and gave the necessary orders. The first line of Americans stepped to the side, exposing the guns. They exploded in grape that surprised the enemy, confusing them momentarily. Greene’s plan went into play as the Continentals advanced. But Rawdon, an experienced commander immediately saw his error and called his reserves forward to extend his flanks, the Ireland Volunteers on his right and Robertson’s corps on his left. This addition to his line now outflanked the Americans. The reverse was now true as the British threatened Greene’s flanks with an enfilading fire; however, the continentals came on as ordered.

Even with Rawdon’s correction, Greene’s plan was going well. Both flanking regiments, Campbell’s Virginians on the right and Ford’s Marylanders on the left were hotly engaged while Huger’s right actually gained ground. Meanwhile Gunby’s and Hawe’s Continentals in the center carried on in their bayonet attack with Harrison’s cannon still belching grape shot. So too, Washington’s horse were tearing through the woods to get around the enemy and into his rear. But as every general knows in war, one event can cascade into a domino effect which can spiral out of control. Throw in a little bad luck, and victory quickly turns to defeat. Greene would suffer such a loss that day.

Colonel Gunby’s 1^st Maryland, instead of pushing on with the bayonet without firing, stopped and volleyed. The regiment no sooner began their charge again when lightning stuck,  Captain William  Beatty,  Jr., battle hardened veteran from the war’s very beginning and well liked by his men, was out front leading his company when he was shot dead. His men faltered watching Beatty’s dead body carried to the rear. Some began to fall back. The confusion quickly spread. Men on each side of Beatty’s company halted their advance with some turning back. And in every battle, great officers will step in to rectify a critical situation, as Colonel John Eager Howard did at Cowpens, turning what could have been a devastating retreat into victory. But the Maryland First’s commander, Colonel Gunby, would not be that officer. Not that day. His next decision sealed defeat.

Instead of immediately rallying Beatty’s faltering company and any neighboring troops back into line, Gunby ordered the entire 1st Regiment to retire to the foot of the hill, a full sixty yards back from the enemy. There he expected to reform before carrying on the attack. The effect was a disaster. When Rawdon’s advancing line saw half the rebel center turn and retreat, they bellowed and charged forward with renewed energy. Instead of an orderly retreat, the 1^st Maryland suddenly broke and ran in a panic. While Gunby and Colonel Otho Williams raced between the fleeing Marylanders to check the rout, Colonel Ford of the 5^th on the far left was hit and carried from the field. His men, confused by Gunby’s sudden retreat, so too broke for the rear. In an instant, the same panic struck the far right as Cambell’s 4^th Virginians broke and ran. This left only Hawe’s 5^th Virginia the only regiment still in line facing the enemy.

Greene was in shock. Moments before his men were on the verge of besting the British while in the next instant he expected Washington’s cavalry to burst upon their rear. Now, his entire line but for one regiment had panicked and was running for the hills. Greene rode to the 5^th and ordered Hawes’ Virginians to cover the retreat of his broken command. In this the Virginians behaved as true veterans. They not only checked Rawdon’s pursuit, but at one point advanced against it. They held the line and only retired when Greene, realizing they were flanked and in danger of being cut off from the rest of his command, ordered it back. At that stage of the battle, all Greene could do was try and reassemble his regiments and initiate an unorganized retreat. When Harrison’s artillery became threatened by the pursuing British troops and Captain Coffin’s dragoons, Kirkwood’s light infantry were called upon to hold them at bay until the matrosses could draw the cannon off.

As if nothing else could go wrong for the Americans, Colonel Washington’s quick swoop behind the enemy’s rear turned into a long detour through thick undergrowth and tangle of trees felled to clear the space between Logtown and the hill. When he finally emerged, he was far behind the enemy. In front of him were a large number of noncombatants; surgeons, commissaries, quartermasters, including townspeople from Camden who came out to watch the battle. Instead of ignoring them and tearing off to the sound of battle, he herded them together, took the parole of officers, and with fifty prisoners riding behind his men, finally took off to join the fight. All this took time and when he finally arrived, he could only help with the guns as the army was already in full retreat.

After the Battle and Casualties

Greene had assembled his men and wagons and effected an orderly retreat. Once more Captain Kirkwood’s light infantry proved their mettle as rear guard. He and Washington’s cavalry effectively discouraged and slowed down the British pursuit. After a couple of miles, Rawdon called off his men. Gathering his wounded and prisoners, mainly stragglers caught during the American rout, he returned his forces back to Camden. While Greene rested his men and collected more stragglers, Kirkwood and Greene returned to the battlefield to draw off the wounded. There they ran into Colonel Coffin’s dragoons and after a sharp but short clash of arms, drove them off. Once the wounded were carried back to Greene, his army continued on to Sanders Creek, the site of General Gate’s total defeat the previous year.

For the Americans, those killed were one officer (Captain Beatty), and 18 rank and file. Wounded included 7 officers and 108 regulars. A large number were reported missing and were either killed, captured, or later joined the army as late stragglers. Of the British, 38 were killed that included one officer. The wounded and missing were thirteen officers and 211 regulars. For the British, that was nearly a thirty percent casualty rate for an army that could ill afford losing soldiers they could not replace.

Aftermath

Greene, who witnessed the opening battle playing out as he had hoped, expecting the destruction of Rawdon’s forces and leaving the rest of the south wide open to him. Instead, he watched his army crumble in a matter of minutes. He did not place the blame on his men, many had been stalwart in major battles since the war’s start. He did blame his officers; mainly one, Colonel John Gunby of the 1^st Maryland. Greene was adamant that had Gunby rallied the two companies that had broken and got them back in line with the rest of the regiment that was still advancing, the day would have been theirs. Instead, Gunby ordered the whole regiment into a withdrawal so to reform. Greene figured that this was the sole reason that most of the continentals withdrew. When the British charged that resulted in a panic, all was lost.

Greene wrote to Joseph Reed of Philadelphia “We should have had Lord Rawdon and his whole command prisoners in three minutes, if Colonel Gunby had not ordered his regiment to retire, the greatest part of which were advancing rapidly at the time they were ordered off. I was almost frantic with vexation at the disappointment.”  

A court of inquiry, held at Gunby’s request to clear his name, confirmed Greene’s sentiments, stating that “his order for the regiment to retire, which broke the line, was extremely improper….in all probability, the only cause why we did not obtain a complete victory.” But to smooth the officer’s feathers, they found his “spirit and activity unexceptionable.”

Greene believed he was in a fix. Sumter’s 1,000-man partisan force refused to join his army. All request for additional reinforcements from the north fell on deaf ears. For an army, he had to count on a handful of worn-out continental soldiers and a couple of hundred of militia. Though try as he might to recruit local militia, most partisan militiamen chose to join Pickens, Marion, Sumter, or the numerous other marauding groups that took it upon themselves to exact revenge on Tories in what was termed a civil war.  Without enough men to face Rawdon in battle, especially after Lt. Colonel Watson joined Rawdon at Camden on May 7^th, he had to settle with once more eluding battle with his enemy in pursuit.

But Greene did not know that Rawdon was in worse shape then he. The number of veteran regulars continued to decline with each clash of arms. Partisan patriot attacks on supply lines and his outposts have become critical. He was cut off from food and forage by these marauding bands. Morale among his troops were never lower with mutiny brewing among some. And added to this was Rawdon’s declining health. With no positive outlook on the horizon, Rawdon decided to quit Camden. Everything he could not carry, he destroyed. He burned all he could, including homes and fortifications, leaving Camden “little better than a heap of rubbish.”

The end of English rule in the south was coming. One more major battle would be fought that would prove to be the bloodiest of the entire war. Once again, it was a battle Greene would lose, only to lick his wounds and carry on the cause. As he wrote to the French envoy, the Chevalier de La Luzerne, “We fight, get beat, rise and fight again.”

IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO READ MORE ON THE WAR IN THE SOUTH, CHECK OUT THESE GREAT BOOKS ON AMAZON

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Colonel Otho Holland Williams

Daniel Morgan: His Life and the Battle of Cowpens

Colonel John Eager Howard: Hero of Cowpens

American Revolution: In the South, Not a War for Liberty, But a Brutal Civil War

RESOURCE

Buchanan, John.  Road to Guilford Courthouse. 1997: Wiley Publishing Co., Hoboken, NJ.

Greene, George W.  The Life of Nathanael Green, Vol 3.  1871: Hurd and Houghton Riverside Press, New York, NY.

Gunby, Andrew Augustus.  Colonel John Gunby of the Maryland Line: Being some account of his contribution to American Liberty. 1902: R. Clarke Co., Cincinnati, Ohio.

McCardy, Edward.  History of South Carolina in the Revolution. 1780 – 1783. 1902: Macmillan & Co., New York, NY.

Ward, Christopher.  The War of the Revolution. 1952: MacMillan, New York, NY.  2021: Reissue by Skyhorse Publishing, New York, NY.