Labeled a battle, what occurred along the Delaware River in the late afternoon on November 25, 1777 was actually a forty-five-minute skirmish; albeit the British force suffered a larger than usual number of casualties for a minor clash of arms. Considered an American victory, militarily, it was not significant. But politically, it proved worth noting on two fronts.
Such is the account of our little entertainment, which is indeed much too long for the matter.
Marquis de Lafayette. Letter to Washington. November 26, 1777
First, it would be the first time a young Frenchman, twenty-year-old Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette, would lead American troops in battle. His competent action was all that General Washington needed to justify having placed the youthful Major General Lafayette in command of Major General Adam Stephens’s division. This after Stephens was cashiered out of the army for drunkenness during the Battle of Germantown, October 4, 1777.
Secondly, after two major defeats, at Brandywine Creek (September 11, 1777) and Germantown, plus the loss of the Delaware River Forts and Philadelphia (September 26, 1777), a victory, no matter how small, was a moral boost for the rebellious war effort. More so, it was obtained over a superior British force. It also gave Lt. General Charles Cornwallis a black eye, as the Hessian and British units involved were under his overall command.
Prequel to Battle
After British Commander in Chief General William Howe captured Philadelphia, he spent the rest of the fall of 1777 consolidating his command. This included repulsing a major assault by Washington at Germantown and securing the Delaware River so his army could be resupplied by his fleet. The Delaware River forts, along with the Cheval-de-frise (obstacles with barbed metal sunk just below the water to rip open the hulls of ships), and American warships (though small and number) proved more an annoyance to the British than expected.
Approximately 2,500 Hessians under Colonel Carl von Donop crossed the Delaware River at Haddonfield, New Jersey and marched about 7 miles south to capture Fort Mercer, at Red Bank, garrisoned by two regiments of Rhode Islanders, approximately 400 men, commanded by Colonel Christopher Greene, nephew of General Nathanael Greene. On October 22, 1777, at the Battle of Redbank, the Hessians were repulsed with the second largest number of casualties of the war after the Battle of Bunker Hill, outside Boston.
Frustrated to secure the river so to replenish much needed supplies, General Howe ordered the British fleet to destroy Fort Mifflin that sat on Mud Island in the river across from Fort Mercer. After one of the largest bombardment of the war that began on November 10th, by the 15th, the fort was reduced to ruin and abandoned. The Cheval-de-frise sunk in the passage between the forts was being dismantled, Greene having written to Washington on November 26th that “I believe the enemy have removed the great chevaux-de-frise; there went up sixty sail of vessels this morning.” Meanwhile, General Cornwallis crossed the Delaware into New Jersey on the 16th with a large British force and marched south to capture Fort Mercer. As Cornwallis approached, overwhelmed by the number of troops they would face, the Americans abandoned the fort without a fight. Cornwallis claimed the fort on November 18th.
Three days later, the last obstacle in securing the Delaware River for British shipping was eradicated. Once Philadelphia fell, the Pennsylvania Navy had been bottled up between the city, where the British sunk the captured American ship Delaware, and the forts at Redbank. British warships sat just downstream from the forts. With the capture of the forts, the American navy had no alternative but to destroy their ships rather than allowing them to fall into British hands. On November 21st, off Gloucester, New Jersey and just south of Newton Creek, the ships were abandoned and burned.
Once the river was cleared, General Howe had ordered all his troops to consolidate within the city. He feared any regional posts outside Philadelphia and in New Jersey would be prone to attack by American forces and rebel militia. Perhaps he did not wish to lay open another assault similar to the previous year’s disastrous Hessian outpost at Trenton. As General Cornwallis marched his troops north towards Philadelphia, his pickets and temporary outposts proved to be too tempting a target for the rebel forces shadowing the British army, particularly a young French officer hoping to further prove himself.
Marquis de Lafayette
Lafayette arrived along the South Carolina shore on June 13, 1777. Already promised a Major General commission in the American army by French ambassador Silas Deane, after two weeks enjoying southern hospitality, he traveled north to Philadelphia. There he met with Congressmen to claim his prize. Soon after, Congress made good on Dean’s offer and gave Lafayette his commission. But by then, the delegates had been inundated with Deane’s hefty generosity. Their hands were full of far too many foreign military experts and ‘glory seekers’ demanding their commissions without there being enough soldiers to serve under them. Therefore, Lafayette become part of the rebel army in rank only.
In early August of 1777, Lafayette’s break came. He met Washington in Philadelphia and the two immediately bonded; similar to a father/son relationship. Lafayette became one of Washington’s aides. A month later, on September 11th, he had a chance to prove his mettle at the Battle of Brandywine Creek. While rallying American forces, he was wounded in the foot, but refused to leave the battle. Afterwards, Lafayette received accolades for his actions during the battle. He spent the next two months recuperating. However, after the Battle of Germantown and ouster of divisional commander General Adam Stephen for drunkenness during the action, Washington saw his chance and gave Lafayette Stephen’s division. Returning to the army in mid-November, Lafayette was eager to prove himself once more in battle.
Just Prior to Battle
When Cornwallis crossed the Delaware River to attack Fort Mercer with approximately 4,500 troops, Washington had dispatched Continental and militia forces under Major General Greene to counter and keep an eye on the British General’s actions. This included his division along with Generals Huntington’s and McDougal’s divisions plus brigades by Varnum and Glover. Though Lafayette’s future division was not part of the American force, Lafayette, as a volunteer awaiting confirmation of his promised division, received permission to accompany Greene.
On November 23rd, Cornwallis marched north from Woodbury, New Jersey, toward Big Timber Creek. The next morning, they crossed the creek and camped just south of Little Timber Creek. On the 25th, the British army forded Little Timber Creek and camped in Gloucester Town. There, arrangements were underway to ferry Cornwallis’ army across the Delaware River the next day, on the 26th. While his army marched north, Cornwallis’ troops foraged the region farms. They were able to collect 400 head of cattle including horses, pigs, chickens, and other food stocks to be taken into winter quarters in Philadelphia. Upon arrival at Gloucester Town on the 25th, they immediately began transporting the livestock and food supplies across the river which would take up the rest of the day. Cornwallis’ troops did not begin to cross until the next morning of the 26th.
Throughout the British march, the Americans kept their distance, though sent out scouting parties to keep track of the enemy’s movements. It is questionable if Greene had ordered Lafayette to accompany these men, or the eager Frenchman took it upon himself to do so. Lafayette wrote, “…having spent the most part of the day to make myself well acquainted with the certainty of their motions…” While reconnoitering close to the British encampment, Lafayette and his party witnessed the crossing of the river; however, they were not certain if the boats contained just supplies and food stock, or troops as well. Accordingly, in the afternoon on November 25th, Lafayette returned from his observance. He wrote the next day in his memoir: “Yesterday morning, in reconnoitering about, I have been told that they were very busy in crossing the Delaware. I saw them myself in their boats, and sent that intelligence to General Greene as soon as possible…”
Battle
After Lafayette’s return from his morning’s scouting of the enemy, he would gather a larger force and press close to the enemy line outside the Gloucester encampment. Secondary sources state that Lafayette convinced these troops to join him in this action; however, Lafayette, in his memoir, did not state how these men came under his command. Did he take it upon himself to command these troops, or was he proceeding on orders from General Greene? As a volunteer with no assigned body of troops for him to command, it seems unlikely that he would act without orders. We may have the answer in a letter Greene sent to Washington on the 26th, the day after Lafayette’s action. Greene wrote: “I proposed to the gentlemen [his officers] drawing up in front of the enemy, and to attack their picket, and to endeavor to draw them out, but they were all against it from the improbability of the enemy’s coming out.” Did Lafayette go to Greene and suggest a similar enticement of the enemy? And Greene, who had already proposed such an action, decide to allow Lafayette to probe enemy pickets, albeit on a smaller scale, to see if he could draw Cornwallis out to do battle?
The number of Americans under Lafayette’s command differed between primary sources. Lafayette himself wrote that “my whole body was not three hundred.” Greene reported to Washington that “The Marquis, with about four hundred militia and the rifle corps…” Lafayette wrote that he “had ten light-horse with Mr. Lindsey [most likely Lt. William Lindsay of the 1st Continental Dragoons], almost a hundred and fifh’ riflemen, under Colonel Butler [Col. Richard Butler of the 9th Pennsylvania], and two piquets of the militia commanded by Colonels Hite [possibly Lt. Col. Joseph Height of Burlington, NJ, just north of Gloucester] and Ellis [Col. Joseph Ellis of the 2nd Gloucester NJ Militia] …Colonel Arman [Marquis de la Rouërie[, Colonel Laumoy [John Bastiste Joseph chevalier du Laumoy], the chevaliers Duplessis [engineer Thomas-Antoine de Mauduit du Plessis] and Gimat [Jean-Joseph Sourbader de Gimat], were the Frenchmen who went with me.”
Morgan’s Rifles were Not Involved. Several articles, particularly on the internet, state that Colonel Richard Butler led 170 riflemen of Morgan’s Rifles of the 9th Pennsylvania Regiment. Colonel Butler led a company of approximately 150 riflemen, but they were not Morgan’s ‘Partisan’ Rifles. Morgan’s Rifles were with the 11th Virginia Regiment, not the 9th Pennsylvania. During this action, Morgan’s Rifles had remained outside Philadelphia. The 9th Pennsylvania regiment included men from Lancaster County, PA, which was the mainstay of the Pennsylvania Long Rifle [also Kentucky long rifle]. Colonel Butler had a company of riflemen in his 9th PA Regiment, it is they who participated in the attack, not Morgan’s riflemen.
In the late afternoon on the 25th, Lafayette advanced with his force of riflemen, militia, and a dozen or so horsemen. He wrote: “After, I came pretty late into the Gloucester road, between the two creeks.” He sent some of his men forward that included the French engineer Duplessis writing: “A scout of my men, with whom was Mr. Duplessis, to see how near were the first piquets from Gloucester, found at two miles and a half of it a strong post of three hundred and fifty Hessians with field pieces.”
This outpost was guarding the eastern approach to the British camp. This encompassed the Haddonfield to Gloucester Road and King’s Highway Bridge that crossed the Kings Run branch of the Newton Creek. It proved to be a Hessian Jaegerkorps. Jaegers were Hessian and Ansbach skilled riflemen (jaeger meaning hunter). Throughout the war, the British used these German marksmen as skirmishers and pickets that either guarded encampments or preceded the advance of the main army to make first contact with the enemy. The ‘korps’ was a mixture of riflemen along with regular Hessian troops armed with muskets. A tactic designed so the regular troops could provide cover to the Jager riflemen during an action. Throughout the war, Cornwallis had a company of Jaegers in his command.
Lafayette assembled his men and immediately attacked, surprising and routing the Hessians. Caught completely unprepared, the Jagerkorps began a disorganized fighting retreat toward the main British camp with Lafayette’s men giving chase. Lafayette wrote: “We pushed the Hessians more than a half mile from the place where was their main body, and we made them run very fast…” Greene wrote Washington that “they drove the enemy above half a mile…” This chase started at today’s Haddon Heights and Audubon into Mr. Ephraim, driving the Germans back into what is present day Gloucester City.
Informed of the assault on his picket to the east, Cornwallis sent forward a detachment of Grenadiers. They arrived and provided the Hessians cover as they retreated to the British line.
Lafayette’s men held their ground. As Greene wrote: “The Marquis is charmed with the spirited behavior of the militia and rifle corps ; and kept the ground until dark.” Lafayette wrote that “standing upon the ground we had got, I ordered them [his forces] to return very slow to Haddonfield [Greene’s encampment]. Accordingly, the British and Hessians began to pursue, but were thrown back again. Lafayette wrote, “The enemy, knowing perhaps by our drums that we were not so near, came again to fire at us; but the brave Major Morriss, with a part of his riflemen, sent them back, and pushed them very fast.
The heated action lasted about forty-five minutes upon which darkness caused the British to withdraw as did Lafayette’s men.
Casualties
Lafayette suffered only one killed and five wounded writing: “We left one single man killed, a lieutenant of militia, and only five of them were wounded.” Against this there were upwards of sixty casualties among the British force. Lafayette wrote: “I understand that they have had between twenty-five and thirty wounded, at least that number killed, among whom I am certain, is an officer; some say more, and the prisoners told me they have lost the commandant of that body; we got yet, this day, fourteen prisoners.” Greene wrote to Washington: “attacked the enemy’s picket last evening, killed about twenty and wounded as many more, and took about twenty prisoners.”
Aftermath
Once Cornwallis had destroyed Fort Mercer, he was under orders to return to Philadelphia to prepare for winter quarters. Washington and Greene assumed that Cornwallis would recross the Delaware, but feared Howe’s intention was not to go into winter quarters, but to consolidate his forces for an immediate attack on Washington’s divided force. In daily correspondence between the two American generals, Greene spent the week in New Jersey contemplating an attack on Cornwallis; however, as Colonel Reed would write to the President of Pennsylvania on the 30th, “General Greene has not been in sufficient force to see Cornwallis in the field.” This fear of an immediate attack by Howe was allayed somewhat after Lafayette’s attack on the Hessian outpost on the 25th included the taking of several prisoners. They told Greene that once Cornwallis returned, the British army had no plans to attack, but would go into winter quarters. With this information, Washington would order Greene to begin transporting his men to join him before the British sent ships upriver to destroy their boats.
Cornwallis would finish crossing the last of his men on the 27th. Howe immediately ordered all troops into winter quarters in and around Philadelphia. Greene ferried all his forces soon after, leaving one Brigade to reassure New Jersey residents of the army’s continued presence and protection; particularly against foraging parties. With all his troops once more in Pennsylvania, Washington would spend the next weeks deciding his winter encampment; settling on Valley Forge along the Schuylkill River. There the two sides would continue to watch each other closely as groups of men roamed the countryside seeking forage.
The Marquis de Lafayette would officially assume command of General Stephen’s former division. While a close companion to General Washington, he would participate in forays against the enemy both in intelligence and positioning for possible attacks. A boggled plan for a mid-winter invasion of Canada saw Lafayette travel to Albany. Once arriving, he quickly informed Congress of the foible of such a half-brained scheme and returned to Valley Forge soon after.
A Questionable Action on November 27th
In association with Cornwallis’ withdraw from New Jersey at Gloucester, some secondary internet sources state an action that primary evidence shows did not happen. That Butler’s Morgan’s riflemen would attack the British and Hessians on November 27th just as the last of the British were rowed across the river. So too, ‘Light Horse’ Harry Lee with the 1st Continental Light Dragoons would take part. And in consequence, Gloucester Town was bombarded by British naval ships.
This is highly questionable on two counts:
- It has already been shown that Colonel Butler commanded his own Pennsylvania riflemen of the 9th Penn. Regiment and not Colonel Morgan’s 11th Virginia riflemen. Just a few days prior to this, Jager Captain Johann Ewald wrote in his memoir of a failed ambush attempt by Morgan’s riflemen. This was in Pennsylvania, just outside Philadelphia making it impossible for Morgan’s men to be with Greene in New Jersey.
- Secondly and more importantly, there is no primary source detailing any action in Gloucester on the 27th. In fact, the opposite is true. Green wrote to Washington late on November 27th that though an order was issued to attack the British as they finalized their departure, none such occurred. He wrote: “Colonel Olney had orders to make an attack upon their picket this morning, but they [British] drew them [pickets] in so close to their main body, and there being but one road, he could not effect it…” There are accounts of Gloucester townspeople discussing huge explosions and a terrifying action, but they were referring to the American navy blowing up their own ships so they would not fall into British hands. This was on November 21st, six days before Cornwallis left New Jersey.
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SOURCE
Conrad, Dennis M. (editor). The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, Vol. 1. 1976: Published for the Rhode Island Historical Society by the University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC.
Ewald, Johann von and edited by Joseph P. Tustin. Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal, Johann Ewald Field Jager Corps. 1979: Yale University Press, New Haven, CN.
Gloucester City Historical Society. “Battle of Gloucester 1777”.
Greene, George Washington. The Life of Nathanael Greene, Vol. 1. 1900: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., New York, NY.
Knapp, Samuel Lorenzo Memoirs of General Lafayette. 1824: E. G. House, Boston.
Lafayette, Marquis. Memoirs, correspondence and manuscripts of General Lafayette, Vol. 1. 1837: Saunders and Otley, London, England.
Payan, Gregory. Marquis de Lafayette French Hero of the American Revolution. 2002: Rosen Publishing Group, New York, NY.