By John Pezzola. John formerly served in the United States Army. He received a master’s degree in Military History and Civil War Studies. He presently teaches 7th-grade US history and military history at American Military University.
The cannon fire from the fort was terrible, and the grapeshot flew thick and, at times, when it ricocheted on the rocks, made a startling sound, still, the brave Scots and Englanders, as well as Captain von Erckert, with his company and the Hesian Grenadier Battalion pressed through with fixed bayonets, even though many people fell.[1]
The Battle of Forts Clinton and Montgomery, October 6, 1777, took place in the highlands of the Hudson River Valley, about fifteen miles south of West Point, in the colony of New York. Crown forces, under the command of General Sir Henry Clinton, captured Fort Clinton and Montgomery and then proceeded to dismantle the chain across the Hudson River that hampered their movement north. The sortie up the Hudson was to create a diversion to draw Patriot forces from the Northern Army under the command of General Horatio Gates and perhaps support British General John Burgoyne’s troops in their attempt to capture the Hudson River and sever New England from the Southern Colonies. Despite losing the forts to the invading Crown forces, the Patriot contingents in both Fort Clinton and Montgomery stalled Sir Henry Clinton’s Forces from moving up the Hudson and supporting Burgoyne with his operations promptly.
The Strategic Setting in 1777
In 1777, Britain’s high command looked to conduct operations to secure the strategically important Hudson River Valley region. By securing the Hudson River Valley Region, the New England colonies would be isolated from the remainder of the colonies, thereby severing communications and supplies and rendering the rebellion impotent.
The Crown forces decide to conduct the campaign with a forward movement out of Canada under the command of Lieutenant General John Burgoyne. Burgoyne’s command comprised about 8,000 strong, made–up of (British Regulars, Hessians, Loyalists, Canadians, and Indians) and was to move down towards Albany via Lake Champlain and through the dense New York forest. The third-prong attack’s second component consisted of Colonel Barry St. Legers‘ mixed force that would move via Lake Oswego, follow along the Mohawk River, and rendezvous with Burgoyne in Albany. The last prong was to move out of New York City; however, due to miscommunications, General William Howe’s expedition moved against the rebel capitol in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, instead of in conjunction with Burgoyne.
The Hudson River Valley During the American Revolution
The Hudson River was always viewed as a strategic artery that split the Middle Colonies from that of New England. The river played a strategic role in the communications and a supply line for the Continental forces from the outset of the conflict. Undoubtedly, the British troops in North America recognized Hudson’s importance. The roads that traversed the New England and Middle Colonies had to cross the great river at some point. Access to Lake George or Lake Champlain and moving into the colony’s interior via the Mohawk River made control of the Hudson River vital. According to George Washington, he believed that “the only passage by which the enemy from New York or any part of our Coast can ever hope to cooperate with an Army that may come from Canada. . .the possession of it is indispensable to preserve the Communications between the Eastern (New England), Middle and Southern States…” [2] A few large settlements were nestled in the valley in which the river flowed and at the end of it sat New York harbor, a deep water port with an active trade city. So, there was no doubt that the Crown forces would do their utmost to gain control of this vital waterway. If the Crown forces were victorious in their attempt to gain control of the river, the New England colonies would have been cut off from any type of support that the Middle Colonies could offer. The Hudson River sat just above Albany and moved through the highlands, emptying into the Atlantic Ocean. The Hudson stretched for one hundred and sixty miles, and the terrain in the vicinity was rather rugged, with mountains and hills reaching heights of more than a thousand feet above sea level, along with rolling fields and dense wilderness.[3]
Forts Clinton and Montgomery
The Continental forces realized the significance of the Hudson River Valley and its strategic role throughout the rebellion. The President of the Continental Congress, John Hancock, therefore, initiated steps to fortify the river in the Highlands north of New York City, a Crown stronghold at the time. Congress believed that a post be erected “in the highlands on each side of the Hudson River and batteries erected in such a manner as will most effectively prevent any vessels passing that may be sent to harass the inhabitants on the borders of the said river.” [4]The New York Provincial Congress selected Colonel James Clinton and Christopher Tappen to survey the Hudson Highlands to select a location for the placement of fortifications. After Clinton and Tappan’s analysis, they recommended the construction of two fortifications, one on the eastern side of the river and the other on the western side. The two recommended fortifications would be five miles north of the future sites of both Fort Clinton and Montgomery, at the bend in the river where West Point and Constitution Island preside. [5]
On October 16, 1775, Bernard Romans, a Dutch surveyor and engineer by trade acting per the Continental Congress, suggested erecting defenses at Martelaer’s Rock (later named Constitution Island). Despite proposals being made and plans being accepted to erect batteries, redoubts, and other types of defensive works, there were monetary problems and insufficient laborers and supplies. Therefore, by January of 1776, the New York Committee of Safety concluded that the project at Martelaer’s Rock was terminated and that soldiers of the Continental Army commence the erection of defenses along Popolopen’s kill. On March 1, 1776, Captain William Smith marked out the lines for the future fortifications along the sides of Popolopen Creek. Smith prepared a map that would be submitted to the commission of the Provincial Congress. Smith also proposed the erection of a new battery at Fort Constitution. The emplacement of a battery would aid in defending the river at the point.
As of March 14, 1776, work began on the fortifications under the guidance of Commissioners Gilbert Livingston and Thomas Palmer. Their work party for the new fortifications along the Popolopen was a detachment from Fort Constitution. t is believed that the name ‘Fort Montgomery’ was given in honor of Brigadier General Richard Montgomery, who fell during the assault on Quebec on December 31, 1775. Several buildings were being erected at Fort Montgomery, which sat on the western side of the Hudson River and the northern side of Popolopen Creek. Along with erecting structures, batteries were also in the works. [6]On the 20th of May, Colonel James Clinton was appointed commander of the fortification project underway in the Hudson Highlands. However, with the examination of erecting fortifications still being active, Major–General William Alexander (Lord Sterling) and Rufus Putnam provided a report detailing the condition and effectiveness of the defenses:
“The works begun and designed at Fort Montgomery are open. Lines, and all lie on the north side of a small creek called Pooplopen’s Kill, on the south side of the which is a point of land which projects more into the river, commands all the principal works, and is within two and three hundred yards of them. On top of this point is a level spot of ground, of near an acre, commanded by nothing but high gground, inaccessible mountains, at about twelve hundred yards distance; this spot, I think should by all means be fortified as well for the annoyance of the enemy in their approach up the river, as for the protection of the works at Fort Montgomery. Indeed, this appears to me the most proper place I have seen on the river to be made the grand post; and in my opinion, should be a regular strong work, capable of resisting every kind of attack.”[7]
It was apparent to Lord Stirling that an additional fortification to protect the land approach towards Fort Montgomery from the South should be erected. The point of land of the future site of Fort Clinton sat on high ground and projected farther into the Hudson. Stirling “concluded that this promontory should be fortified to threaten northbound ships and cover the heavily armed Fort Montgomery.” [8]As a result, work began immediately in earnest. To garrison the new fortifications, militia companies from surrounding counties and the recently formed 5th New York Regiment were given the task. It would also be up to the 5th of New York to see the mounting of artillery pieces.
The fortification was strategically well placed, and for any attacking forces, the closest spot to land forces was at least five miles downriver at King’s Ferry, only for invading forces to traverse a treacherous wooded path. Command of the Highland post was given to Brigadier–General James Clinton. Clinton worked vigorously to improve the defenses of the newly formed fortifications. Fort Clinton was established on the south side of the Popolopen Creek with a star-shaped redoubt facing the Hudson River. Below, moving towards the river itself, were two gun batteries. There were outer walls that pushed inland with a redoubt outside the main perimeter facing west. Fort Clinton and Montgomery were made of earth, wood, and stone. The most common fortifications during this era used horizontal walls made of timber and squared logs. The logs would be placed one on top of the other in two parallel lines with space in between. The empty center would be filled with earth or stone. Embrasures would be made for artillery to be deployed. To support fortifications of the 1700s Fascines, which consisted of a bundle of sticks bound together to fill in marshy ground or strengthen the sides of embankments, trenches, or ditches. Gabions were also made use of and created out of large woven wicker cylinders filled with earth and stone or sand. An abatis would protect the outworks and slow down an enemy’s attack. The abatis consisted of felled trees closely laid next to each other. The ends of the branches were sharpened, mostly using a draw knife. [9]
Fort Montgomery was made of a series of redoubts and batteries interlocked by a parapet, a breastwork, or a defensive wall. However, the size of the fortification and lack of manpower would pose a problem when trying to support each other during the battle. Looking over the Hudson was a Grand Battery (a battery is a placement for artillery), and Fort Montgomery included other batteries along with their grand battery. On the western side was a redoubt, and north of that was a Hill redoubt (an enclosed fortification without the use of bastions). Facing north near present-day route # 9W was the north redoubt. Inside the fort, were a series of barracks, storehouses, kitchens, provision stores and necessaries, and a powder magazine. [10]
Stretched out on the water was a chain of eight hundred and fifty links. Each of the links weighed about thirty – five tons. The chain was supported by logs made from pine. Ships hung – up on this chain trying to negotiate the river north would be subjected to battery fire. The chain was completed in November of 1776 under Lieutenant Machin’s direction. Providing naval support were the frigates Montgomery and Congress positioned on the opposite side of the boom, ready to provide broadside fire to up-coming attackers. Unfortunately, Fort Montgomery was not completed for the battle, leaving portions of the fort compromised. Given the circumstances in which both fortifications sat on rather steep cliffs and thereby nullified a frontal assault by an amphibious landing, attacking forces would have to attack by landward routes. [11]
To attack them from the water was virtually impossible. The closest landing point was about five miles to the south at King’s Landing. The terrain rises dramatically once one moves past Stony Point, having crossed King’s Ferry. A marching force would have to traverse rough terrain, including deep ravines and narrow passes such as Timp Pass, ideal for ambushes. Timp Pass led to Doodletown, where there was an intersection where if one took the left heading west/north-west, whereas by taking a right at the intersection, one would move eastward towards the Hudson River. British Major General John Vaughan would move to the right along the river at the intersection and attack Fort Clinton. Lieutenant Colonel Mungo Campbell will take his column to the left of Bear Mountain, move forward with Torne Hill on his left and Popolopen Kill and Bear Mountain on his right, and attack Fort Montgomery. [12]
Field Tactics and Weapons at the Battle of Fort Clinton and Montgomery, 1777
During the Battles of Fort Clinton and Montgomery, the primary combat arms utilized were infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Mounted forces were very little used during this campaign outside of the British 17th Regiment of Light Dragoons, which operated in dismounted roles.
What determined the deployment of the infantry and other combat arms was the technological aspects of the weaponry at the time and the terrain in which the armies were operating. During the 18th Century, the ordinary foot soldiers in the Continental, British, or German military establishments were armed with a muzzle-loading smoothbore weaponry, most commonly known as a flintlock musket. This British Army utilized the ‘Brown Bess,’ which was most likely introduced during the Era of the Duke of Marlborough. This weapon system fired a lead ball approximately ¾ – inch in diameter, a .75 caliber round. The French-made Charleville was more common in the American ranks, which was slightly small in diameter, firing .69 caliber. Due to the inaccuracies of these weapons systems, infantrymen of the line were trained to fire their weapons in compact formations. The thought behind this was due to the accuracy of the smoothbore musket, which only had an effective range of 80 – 100 yards. Therefore, soldiers would be formed using a two- or three-rank system called ‘linear warfare.’ [13]
It was also the understanding that allowing soldiers to move independently would hinder their firepower and impede the field commander’s command and control over his soldiers, leading to confusion on the battlefield. When fired, the musket created a thick grayish cloud of smoke on the battlefield. Eighteenth-century soldiers often carried a cartouche box with a set number of pre-wrapped cartridges. Each cartridge contained a soft lead ball and a pre-measured portion of gunpowder wrapped in paper. When loading, a small amount of powder was poured into the pan and covered immediately with part of the lock, known as the steel. The remaining powder and ball, along with the paper wadding, were loaded down the barrel and rammed by the soldier using a ramrod to ensure the material was snug in the base of the barrel.
When given the command to fire, the trigger was pulled, at which point a flint that is held in the teeth of the hammer struck the steel, sending a spark into the pan filled with powder and, thereby, delivering sparks into the vent of the barrel igniting the powder and sending forward its contents. Another part of the smoothbore weapon system used a triangular bayonet that could be fixed to the end of the barrel. Most of all, the bayonet had a psychological component on the battlefield; it could also, in many cases, be the deciding factor in a battle. Military theorists believed that firing in mass or volley would enable the infantrymen to deliver a wall of lead toward their opponent. [14]
Therefore, keeping soldiers in rigid linear formations to maximize their tactical advantage by firing in unison became the standard practice. Military historian Brent Nosworty states that the “platoon fire allowed the fire to be directed, if necessary, obliquely to the left or right, and not just perpendicular to the front of the battalion.” [15]The reason for utilizing the platoon firing system was so the firing of a battalion could be extended thereby causing severe damage to the opposing line. Also, if your adversaries’ line was too close to yours, part of the battalion could be reloaded. This system allowed a section of the line to always have their weapons loaded and ready to fire. Regarding the deployment of the eighteenth-century infantry arm, the regiment or battalion was the staple of the tactical formations. Once the enemy’s formation has weakened, it is at this point that one would try to close with their opponent. Formations would move at the ‘quick step,’ which was the case when the Crown forces stormed Fort Clinton “with as much velocity as the ground would admit.” It also required one to have a reserve line to exploit a position, as was the case during the attack on Fort Clinton and Montgomery, “Clinton posted the Hessian Regiment von Trumbach in reserve “to cover our retreat in case of misfortune.” [16] The tactics originated in France during the latter half of the 17th Century under the tutelage of Turenne.
British regiments included ten companies within their infantry regimental organization, comprising about sixty officers and rank and file. Along with the line ‘battalion company,’ there were flank battalions known as light infantry companies and Grenadier companies. The Grenadiers were usually the tallest men and used as the regiment’s ‘shock troops.
The Continental Line units would be modeled more on the Prussian system upon the arrival of Fredreich Von Stueben and his use of the ‘Model Companies’ to train the Continental forces in 1778. However, at the war’s outset, most units, like the 5th New York, were drilled according to the 1764 Manual. Their states more or less organized continental regiments. The Continentals did not form Grenadier companies; however, there were some on occasion. There were few light companies in 1777; however, they were most likely a ‘composite’ company if used. Some German soldiers served from various German states and principalities. The ‘Hessian’ (as they were commonly known) regiments consisted of six companies comprising five musketeers and one grenadier.
Along with skirmishers, the German contingents allied with the Crown forces deployed Jager’s (hunters). The Jagers were usually deployed in advance and were armed with a particular rifled flintlock musket. One of the most notable of the Jagers was Captain Johann Ewald. Ewald distinguished himself during the New York campaign. Ewald recorded in his journal how his Jagers were able to clear rebel forces on a hill and secure it for advancing British and German units. “two Jager companies had to work their way, under the heaviest enemy cannon fire, through the ravines and marshes which lay between the two wings.” [17]Ewald and the two companies could clear the area of enemy riflemen and continue their advance. Clinton also possessed various Loyalist units in his army. One of the most noted were Emmerich’s Chasseurs, recruited in Germany, and the Loyal American Regiment, a light infantry and rifle formation. Both of these formations donned green regimental coats. Clinton’s forces must conduct a five-mile march to reach their objectives. Most in Clinton’s ranks were carrying up to sixty pounds of equipment.
In terms of artillery, it was mostly deployed as an anti-personnel weapon. On the field of battle, artillery, known as field artillery, was deployed in limited numbers in the Americas during the American Revolution. In the case of Fort Clinton and Montgomery, they both mounted various types and calibers of artillery. Artillery of the period, like the flintlock musket, was a muzzle-loading black powder weapon. Artillery was usually deployed with the infantry and was critical in disorganizing an adversary’s ranks. Although firing a single non-exploding shot was unlikely to damage an entire formation, it did cause distress in the ranks and, at times, broke up unit cohesion. However, unless overpowered or broken, regular troops would close ranks under artillery fire as men fell. While artillery was often deployed between battalion formations, a common tactic for the period was allowing shot to ricochet, deceiving the enemy of where the round would strike. Artillery at Fort Clinton and Montgomery were of various calibers, such as 3, 6, 12, and 32-pounders. Most of the artillery was of the Gribeauval design and manned by members of the Second Continental Artillery Regiment (Lamb’s). For the sake of speed, Clinton left his artillery behind to move his forces faster. [18]
Order of Battle: Rebel Forces
Fifth New York Regiment 371 rank and file under the command of Colonel Lewis Dubois
2nd Continental Artillery 100 men under the command of Colonel John Lamb
Various Militia units were under the commands of Colonels Johnathan Hasbrouck, James McClaughry, Jesse Woodhull, and William Allison, and they numbered around 200 personnel.
There were also two frigates, Montgomery and Congress, two-row galleys, and a privateer sloop to provide security for the Hudson’s chain. About six – hundred defenders were divided into two groups of three hundred to man both forts.
Order of Battle: Crown Forces
Lieutenant Colonel Mungo Campbell commanded 900 troops from the 52nd and 57th Regiments of Foot. Colonel Beverly Robinson, second in command, commanded the Loyal Americans. Another loyalist unit was the New York Volunteers and Colonel Andreas Emmerich’s Chasseurs.
Major General Sir John Vaughan commanded around 1,200 troops of composite battalions from the Grenadier and Light Infantry companies of the 26th 63rd Regiments of Foot. He also had Frasier’s 71st Highlanders, members of the 17th Dismounted Dragoons as 200 Hessians from Koehle and Anspach Grenadiers, followed by some Jagers. Major William Tryon, the former Royal Governor of New York, accompanied Vaughan, bringing a contingent of men. Finally, Commodore W. Hotham dispatched several vessels to accompany the land force. This force included the following vessels: row galleys the Crane, Dependence, and Spitfire, plus Preston, Mercury, and Tartar. Other units were selected: King’s Orange Regiment, King’s American Regiment, select Guides and Pioneers, and Regiment Von Trumbach. [19]
Prior to British Assault
Washington placed his forces in a way that allowed him to move toward Howe. By July 10, 1777, Washington was made aware of the fall of Ticonderoga and was preparing to move toward the Hudson Highlands. Washington was near King’s Ferry and was made aware of Howes’s move toward the capital, Philadelphia. Howe had decided that by moving to the capital, he could draw Washington’s forces into an engagement and possibly destroy Washington’s army. At the same time, Washington was concerned that Clinton, still holding New York, might move up the Hudson to support Burgoyne’s expedition.
By late September, Clinton gathered the necessary forces, and on October 4, 1777, Sir Henry Clinton’s Flotilla began to head north to support Burgoyne’s operations. Clinton utilized a series of feints to deceive the rebels as to his true intentions. Putnam was under the impression that his forces in Peekskill were the target of Clinton’s invasion force and requested support from across the river. Putnam received the needed support, leaving an understrength contingent to defend the tin forts. As Clinton’s forces sailed up the Hudson, they landed a contingent at Tarrytown to possibly forage. The next morning, the flotilla continued toward Verplanck’s Point, a few miles from Peekskill. To reiterate, Verplanks Point was the main river crossing that connected communications between the Middle Colonies and those of the New England Colonies.
On the night of October 5th, Clinton’s forces moved over to the western shore and decided to create a diversion by fending off Fort Independence in Peekskill. By morning, a heavy fog was in place while Crown forces began to row towards Stony Point. A force was left on the eastern side to give the illusion that an attack would be made on Fort Independence. Once on land on the western side, Lieutenant–Colonel Mungo Campbell detached an advance guard to move forward through the various degrees of terrain that preceded the twin forts. The marching columns of Campbell and Vaughan were now in full motion, and it was apparent To Governor Clinton that the two forts were the targets. [20]
As the path would not admit above three men to march abreast, and by its windings would have exposed the troops during the passage, to be destroyed at the pleasure of any force stationed at the top of the hill, the most trifling guard would have been sufficient to have rendered the attempt of the British abortive.[21] Nevertheless, to Clinton’s benefit, the pass went unguarded, as discovered by a small reconnaissance party dispatched by Clinton. Rebel scouts watched the columns as they moved through Timp Pass, a chokehold that would have offered an excellent opportunity for an ambush. However, the scouts were ordered only to observe the approaching enemy and not to bring on a general engagement.
It was around eight o’clock when Campbell’s forces were securing Timp Pass. Major Logan was tasked with conducting the mission, and it must be stated that his patrol could have delayed Clinton’s forces along Dunderberg Mountain. Sir. Henry Clinton was aware of its importance and instructed Campbell upon securing the pass to strike out for Doodletown where the fork in the road lay. It is at Doodletown where the two columns would split. According to Charles Stedman, ”As the path would not admit above three men to march abreast, and by its windings would have exposed the troops during the passage, to be destroyed at the pleasure of any force stationed at the top of the hill, the most trifling guard would have been sufficient to have rendered the attempt of the British abortive.”[22]
Battle
Nevertheless, to Clinton’s benefit, the pass went unguarded as discovered by a small reconnaissance party dispatched by Clinton. A second survey was now being dispatched under the command of Lieutenant Patton Jackson, who commanded the second company, which consisted of many combat veterans. The reconnaissance force moved within the vicinity of Doodletown. As the advanced British force moved into the hamlet of Doodletown, Patton’s command stood fast and delivered a devastating volley. The Crown forces returned fire from concealed positions and killed a few rebels, at which point they withdrew. At this point, Governor Clinton was optimistic that Putnam would dispatch reinforcements of one hundred militia and Continental forces. The rebel forces at the stone fence delivered a series of volleys. The Crown forces began to flank the rebel left, and under the cover of artillery from Fort Clinton’s west redoubt, the holding force withdrew.
Governor Clinton conveyed the action at the stone fence to the New York Congress. “…yesterday at 10 am, an advanced party was attacked by the enemy at Doodletown about two and a half miles from Fort Montgomery. They consisted of thirty men: the enemy by appearance and accounts after receiving, of five thousand. They received the enemy fire, returned it, and retreated to Fort Clinton.” [23]The rebel forces had little time for defensive preparations; however, the Crown forces lost the element of surprise. The redoubts of Fort Clinton were being strengthened, and Corporal John Allison described what he saw beyond the redoubts. It was about three o’clock p.m., and a mass of British, Loyalist, and Hessian forces were fixing bayonets, preparing for their assault.
After hearing the firing, Colonel Bruyn left with about eighty men at about midnight and advanced towards Doodletown. As Bruyn advanced, Lieutenant Jackson notified Colonel Jacobus Bruyn that the Crown forces were moving through Doodletown. Bruyn set out with Lieutenant Colonel James McClaghry and about fifty Continentals and militia. Colonel John Lamb was ordered to dispatch a field piece to cover the road from Doodletown. [24]Governor Clinton knew that his force that had sallied out had no hope of holding for a prolonged period and ordered Captain Ephraim Fenno to spike the field piece once ordered to retreat. Bruyn force fell back and made a second stand at a stood wall near what is now Hessian Lake. The company was holding off Vaughan’s attack force, which numbered 1,200 Crown forces and was tasked with taking Fort Clinton. The gallant opposition and the roughness of the terrain checked the British force for a short period until the were able to flank to the left of Bruyn’s holding force. John Allison, in the 2nd Company commanded by Bruyn, was instrumental in the location of the advancing Crown forces. Cannons were thereby firing, sounding the alarm of the approaching enemy forces.
Clinton states, “At daybreak on the 6th, the troops disembarked of Fort Clinton to push if possible & dislodge the enemy from their advanced station behind a Stone breast work, having in front for about half mile a most impenetrable Abbatis; This the General [Vaughn] by his good disposition obliged the enemy to quit, tho supported by cannon, got possession of the wall, & there waited for the motion of the Cooperating Corps, when I joined him & soon afterwards hear Lt. Co Cam[p]bell begin his attack.”[25]
Clinton stated that he waited until he consolidated his forces and launched an attack on the circular height, Fort Clinton. Clinton noted that three guns and an infantryman defended the post. Clinton also indicates that two redoubts flanked the position. Corporal John Allison of the Second Company of the Fifth New York relegalized Fort Montgomery, saying it needed reinforcements. Major Buyn moved immediately to reunite with the regiment to defend the fort. As well as an abatis and clear fields of fire with ten artillery pieces. At this point, a charge made by the Crown forces at the end of the bayonet led to the downfall of Fort Clinton and resulted in many casualties for Colonel Allison’s command. Upon entering Fort Montgomery, John Allison, and Patton Jackson took a patrol to Doodletown to determine what the second column of Crown troops were about. Militia units from throughout the area were now flocking to Fort Montgomery. Some traveled up to twenty-five miles from New Windsor to aid in the defense of the fort. Regarding the Royal Navy, the order was given around 5:00 p.m. to begin a steady bombardment upon the fortifications.
As Vaughan’s attack took place at Fort Clinton, Lieutenant Colonel Campbell was working around Bear Mountain with a force of nine hundred men, and his column moved through a series of ravines and gorges of Popolopen Creek. George Clinton dispatched a force of about one hundred and twenty men, along with two field pieces, under the command of Captain Ephriam Fenno. Clinton knew that deploying the field pieces was most likely to be a forlorn hope, so he gave orders to have the gun spiked and all ammunition destroyed.
As the Crown forces pressed forward through the gorge of Popolopen Creek, they came under fire from Fenno’s fieldpiece deployed on Torne Hill, which sat a mile from Fort Montgomery. Campbell’s Column immediately came under a rain of grapeshot, which drove back the advancing force some times. Nevertheless, the American delaying force succumbed to bayonet charges carried out on the American flanks. Due to the intensity of the engagement, the site has become known as the ‘Hell Hole.’
Both Vaughan and Campbell’s forces suffered casualties before reaching their objectives. Sir Henry Clinton explained to Howe in his report how his advancing army had to traverse rugged terrain to arrive at both Fort Clinton and Montgomery. As Campbell’s force advanced, defenders of Fort Montgomery began taking position in the rear of the fort, which had poorly established walls, followed by a redoubt on the western side. The 5th New York was under the command of Colonel John Lewis Dubois and members of Colonel John Lamb’s artillery. There were also about two hundred militiamen.
As the British land forces approached Fort Montgomery, the Royal Navy ships, the Crane, Dependence, and Spitfire, opened fire on the fort, hoping to create a diversion and draw forces from the landward side. The rebel works were now receiving fire, and American naval forces sat on the northern side of the chain. American forces returned fire, while Crown land forces were ready to attack their objectives. Vaughan’s forces, tasked with capturing Fort Clinton, pushed rebel forces from the stone wall and began to cut their way through the abatis in front of Fort Clinton. Fort Montgomery’s landward side was strengthened with artillery and manpower. However, the redoubts were spaced too far apart for the garrison to properly man, and many rank–and–file were not equipped with bayonets. It was now around three o’clock in the afternoon. Governor Clinton sent his last appeal to General Putnam across the rivers to send reinforcements. The Crown forces began their assault, and for about three hours or so, they assaulted their adversaries’ fortifications over and over, constantly being repelled and sustaining heavy casualties from musketry and grapeshot. It was around 5:00 p.m. when Lieutenant – Colonel Mungo Campbell approached Fort Montgomery under a flag of truce. Colonel William Livingston met Campbell. Campbell expressed that the defenders had five minutes to surrender, or they would have to succumb to the bayonet. Clinton previously instructed Livingston to offer the same terms. Three days after the engagement, Clinton reported to Washington the following:
“…at about five O’clock a British officer appeared with a flag. I ordered Colonel Livingston to meet without the works and know his business. He was told that the bearer of the flag that he was Colonel Campbell, and that he came to demand the surrender of the fort to prevent the effusion of blood. Colonel Livingston replied that he had no authority to treat with him, but, if they would surrender themselves as prisoners of war, they might depend upon being well treated; and if they did not choose to accept those terms, they might renew the attack as soon as he should return within the fort, he being determined to defend it to the last extremity.” [26]
The Crown forces recommenced their attack upon Colonel Livingston‘s return to the fort. As Campbell prepared to give the order to renew the attack, he was struck down by an enemy sharpshooter. The Crown forces came on strong with an aggressive attack, while rebel forces put up their best defense. The rebels overestimated the size of Campbell’s force, which numbered around eight hundred. But the second in command, Colonel Beverly Robinson, took over command and pressed the attack forward. The Crown forces were now overwhelming the patriot rebel forces, and Colonel Turnbull was the first to go over the walls of Fort Montgomery along with the Loyal American Regiment. ”He has acquired great honor, being the first that entered Fort Montgomery, after losing one officer and eight privates.” [27]
The Crown forces were pressing the attack as the rebels were now facing a tidal wave of assault forces from all sides. The Royal Navy was keeping up a steady bombardment from the Hudson, and the situation for the defenders of Fort Montgomery was very precarious. The fighting continued at Fort Montgomery, and soon, the combatants were engaged in a ferocious hand–to–hand combat. Fighting was most aggressive at the western redoubt. As resistance at the West Redoubt began to collapse, the defenders fell back to a position in the North Redoubt. The 2nd Company, including John Allison and Patton Jackson, stood with General George Clinton, Colonel Dubois, and Major Bruyn. According to Major Abraham Leggett, who was positioned in the north redoubt, “They [Crown Forces], came on very furiously and were beat back the second and third time.”[28]
According to one of the militiamen at Fort Montgomery, it was the “middle of the afternoon [when] the British columns appeared and pressed on to assault with bayonets fixed. But our men poured down on them such a destructive fire of bullets and grapeshot that they fell in heaps and were kept at bay till night.”[29]While fighting raged on at Fort Montgomery, Sir Henry Clinton gave the final order for his forces to carry out their assault on Fort Clinton. Clinton attacked by establishing a covering force if his forces needed to fall back. Hessian Musketeer Regiment Von Trumbach was stationed at the stone wall alongside the now (Hessian Lake), the earlier Rebel delaying action site.
While the assault was climaxing at Fort Montgomery, Colonel Vaughan moved his forces forward to take Fort Clinton. Vaughan wanted to get his forces into the fort as quickly as possible, giving the order not to fire their muskets and to rely solely on their bayonets. Vaughan’s were pressing the attack, trailing broken ground filled with boulders and an abatis. They were coming under the hail of artillery fire in the form of grape and round shot. [30]As the Crown forces approached the wall, they found themselves helping each other over the works while sustaining heavy casualties. Some of the Crown soldiers were killed on the walls themselves and in the embrasures.
Casualties and Aftermath
Count Grabouski, a Polish nobleman, acting as an aide-de-camp to Sir Henry Clinton, fell mortally wounded at the foot of the works. Major Francis Sill, leading the charge of the Sixty-third Regiment on the fort, was killed, Captain Stewart of the Grenadiers went down, but the defenders were no match for the trained troops who, eventually, cleared the parapets and entered the fort, driving all before them. [31]
Despite the aggressive melee playing out in both fortifications, it was evident that both forts were about to fall, and their defenders needed to try to escape. As night was falling, Charles Stedman stated: “that the garrison of Fort Clinton retreated fighting across the parade ground where they fired a last volley and threw down their arms.”[32] By 8:00 p.m., Sir Henry Clinton was fully confident that he was now in control of the two fortifications. Both Governor Clinton and his brother, James Clinton, were able to escape. Although, James did receive a wound in the thigh from the point of a bayonet. In terms of Continental officers that were wounded, Colonel Lewis Dubois, who was the commander of the 5th New York, received a bayonet wound in the neck; however, he was able to escape. Colonel Lamb and Thomas Machin made their escape; however, Machin received a severe wound. As for Lieutenant–Colonel McClaughry and Major Logan, they both received wounds and were captured. In all, around two hundred and sixty three rebels were taken prisoner.
The British and their German and Loyalist allies suffered a significant amount of casualties. The Crown force’s casualties were forty-one killed and over one hundred and fifty wounded. It was said that Vaughan had a horse shot out from under him, and Clinton himself almost had a brush with a passing grapeshot. British Commodore Hotham stated, “When it is considered that this attack was made after a most fatiguing [march] over precipices and through roads almost impenetrable for the troops to avail themselves of the use of cannon, so necessary for such a purpose, and the little assistance they could therein promise themselves from the ships, the access through the highlands.”
The approaches to the twin forts were treacherous; nevertheless, the Crown forces achieved their objective and seized the day. The engagements at Fort Clinton and Montgomery were a tactical victory for the Crown forces but a strategic victory for the rebels. Despite Sir Henry Clinton’s successful campaign, it feels short of its true objective. The original purpose of the campaign was to create a diversion and pull rebel forces from General Horatio Gates’s Northern Army, who presented an obstacle to Burgoyne’s attempt to capture the Hudson and divide New England from the Southern colonies. The American forces at both Fort Clinton and Montgomery sacrificed themselves by providing time to Gates’s Army time to ensure victory.
If you would like to read more about the war and the Hudson River Valley, we recommend the following books:
Of Similar Interest on Revolutionary War Journal
Endnotes and Sources
[1] Dohla, Conrad and Burgoyne, Bruce E. A Hessian Diary of the American Revolution. Norman,
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. P. 93.
[2] MARK, PAUL SETVEN. “TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: BATTLE OF THE HUDSON HIGHLANDS” JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. HTTPS://ALLTHINGSLIBERTY.COM/2013/11/LITTLE-LATE-BATTLE-HUDSON-HIGHLANDS/. RETRIVED: 2/12/2019. 2. Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution. Old Saybrook, Connecticut: Macmillan Company, 1952. p. 198. Luzader, John. Decision on the Hudson: Battle of Saratoga. Eastern National: Washington,D.C.: 2002, p. 1 – 5. Logusz, Michael O. With Musket & Tomahawk: The West Point Hudson Valley Campaign in the Wilderness War of 1777. New York: Carrel Books. 2019. p. 2 – 8.
[3] Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. p. 1 – 3. MARK, PAUL SETVEN. “TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: BATTLE OF THE HUDSON HIGHLANDS” JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. HTTPS://ALLTHINGSLIBERTY.COM/2013/11/LITTLE-LATE-BATTLE-HUDSON-HIGHLANDS/. RETRIVED: 2/12/2019. 2. Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution. Old Saybrook, Connecticut: Macmillan Company, 1952. p. 198. Luzader, John. Decision on the Hudson: Battle of Saratoga. Eastern National: Washington,D.C.: 2002, p. 1 – 5. Logusz, Michael O. With Musket & Tomahawk: The West Point Hudson Valley Campaign in the Wilderness War of 1777. New York: Carrel Books. 2019. p. 2 – 8. Journal of the Continental Congress, Volumes I, II.
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html. Retrieved: 12/8/19 p.4
[4] Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. p. 1 – 3. Journal of the Continental Congress, Volumes I, II. https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html. Retrieved: 12/8/19. P. 3
[5] Journal of American Congress, January 5, 1776, 227 and February 15, 1776, 266.
[6] Carr and Koke, 12. Lossing, Benson J. The Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution. 2 Vols. New York,
1860. P. 13. Lossing, Benson J. The Hudson from Wilderness to the Sea. New York, 1866. p.
135 Journal of American Congress, January 5, 1776, 227 and February 15, 1776, 266.
[7] Lord Sterling in Carr and Koke, 13 – 14. Diamant, Lincoln. Bernard Romans: Forgotten Patriot of the American Revolution: Military Engineer and Cartographer of West Point and the Hudson Valley. Harrison, New York: Harbor Hill Books, 1995. p. 95 – 110.
[8] Mark, p. 4. MAYERS, ROBERT A. THE WAR MAN: THE TRUE STORY OF A CITIZEN – SOLDIER WHO FOUGHT FROM QUEBEC TO YORKTOWN. YARDLEY, PENNSYLVANIA: WESTOLME PUBLISHING, LLC, 2009. P. 53 – 56.
[9] MAYERS, ROBERT A. THE WAR MAN: THE TRUE STORY OF A CITIZEN – SOLDIER WHO FOUGHT FROM QUEBEC TO YORKTOWN. YARDLEY, PENNSLVANIA: WESTOLME PUBLISHING, LLC, 2009. P. 80. Diamant, Lincoln. Chaining the Hudson: The Fight for the River in the American Revolution. New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1989. P. 35. Logusz, Michael O. With Musket & Tomahawk: The West Point Hudson Valley Campaign in the Wilderness War of 1777. New York: Carrel Books. 2019. Chartrand, Rene. Fort of the American Revolution, 1775 – 1783. London, Osprey. 2009. P. 25, 61 and 6.
[10] MAYERS, ROBERT A. THE WAR MAN: THE TRUE STORY OF A CITIZEN – SOLDIER WHO FOUGHT FROM QUEBEC TO YORKTOWN. YARDLEY, PENNSLVANIA: WESTOLME PUBLISHING, LLC, 2009. P. 80 – 83. Chartrand, Rene. Fort of the American Revolution, 1775 – 1783. London, Osprey. 2009. P. 25, 61 and 62. Carr and Koke, 20-21.
[11] MAYERS, ROBERT A. THE WAR MAN: THE TRUE STORY OF A CITIZEN – SOLDIER WHO FOUGHT FROM QUEBEC TO YORKTOWN. YARDLEY, PENNSLVANIA: WESTOLME PUBLISHING, LLC, 2009. P. 80 – 85. Carr and Koke, 20-28.
[12] MAYERS, ROBERT A. THE WAR MAN: THE TRUE STORY OF A CITIZEN – SOLDIER WHO FOUGHT FROM QUEBEC TO YORKTOWN. YARDLEY, PENNSLVANIA: WESTOLME PUBLISHING, LLC, 2009. P. 80. Diamant, Lincoln. Chaining the Hudson: The Fight for the River in the American Revolution. New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1989. P. 35. Logusz, Michael O. With Musket & Tomahawk: The West Point Hudson Valley Campaign in the Wilderness War of 1777. New York: Carrel Books. 2019. Chartrand, Rene. Fort of the American Revolution, 1775 – 1783. London, Osprey. 2009. P. 25, 61 and 6.
[13]Luzader, John. Decision on the Hudson: Battle of Saratoga. Eastern National: Washington,D.C.: 2002, p. 80 – 81. Darling, Anthony D. Red Coat and Brown Bess. Alexandria Bay, New York: Museum
Restoration Service, 1976. P. 86. Nosworthy, Brent. The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689 – 1763. New York:
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[14] Luzader, John. Decision on the Hudson: Battle of Saratoga. Eastern National: Washington,D.C.: 2002, p. 80 – 81. Darling, Anthony D. Red Coat and Brown Bess. Alexandria Bay, New York: Museum Restoration Service, 1976. P. 86. Nosworthy, Brent. The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689 – 1763. New York:
Hippocrene Books, 1992. P. 98-91. Spring, Matthew H. With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in
North America, 1775 – 1783. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009. p. 78 – 83. Houston, Wade L. Fighting The American Revolution: Tactics, Battles & Battlefields. Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: Thomas Publications, 2001. p. 34. THE HESSIAN JÄGERKORPS IN NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA,1776-1777by David Ross. https://allthingsliberty.com/2015/05/the-hessian-jagerkorps-in-new-york-and-pennsylvania-1776-1777/. Retrieved on 5/22/19.
[15] Nosworthy, Brent. The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689 – 1763. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1992. P. 73.
[16] Spring, Matthew H. With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775 – 1783. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press., 2004. p. 97 and 146.
[17] Flanquers und Pelotons: Hessian Links between the Seven Years’ War and the American War of Independence. Journal of the Seven Year’s War Association. Luzader, John. Decision on the Hudson: Battle of Saratoga. Eastern National: Washington,D.C.: 2002, p. 80 – 81. Darling, Anthony D. Red Coat and Brown Bess. Alexandria Bay, New York: Museum Restoration Service, 1976. P. 86. Nosworthy, Brent. The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689 – 1763. New York:
Hippocrene Books, 1992. P. 98-91. Spring, Matthew H. With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in
North America, 1775 – 1783. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press,
[18] Luzader, John. Decision on the Hudson: Battle of Saratoga. Eastern National: Washington,D.C.: 2002, p. 80 – 81. Darling, Anthony D. Red Coat and Brown Bess. Alexandria Bay, New York: Museum Restoration Service, 1976. P. 86. Nosworthy, Brent. The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689 – 1763. New York:
Hippocrene Books, 1992. P. 98-91. Spring, Matthew H. With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in
North America, 1775 – 1783. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press,
2009. p. 78 – 83. Houston, Wade L. Fighting The American Revolution: Tactics, Battles & Battlefields. Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: Thomas Publications, 2001. p. 34. Milsop, John. Continental Infantryman of the American Revolution. London: Osprey Publishing, 2004. Peterson, Harold L. Round Shot and Rammers. South Bend, Indiana: South Bend Replicas, Inc, 1950. p. 34. Schultz, A. N. (Edited) Illustrated Drill Manual and Regulations For The American Soldier of The Revolutionary War. Union City, Tennessee: Pioneer Press, 1976. p. 17 – 20. Tully, Mar R. (Edited) The Manual Exercise as Ordered by His Majesty in 1764 and including the Fundamentals of Marching and Maneuvering. Baraboo, Wisconsin: Ballindalloch Press, 2001. p. 35 – 40.
[19] Conely, Jan Sheldon. The Battle of Fort Montgomery: A Short History. New York: Purple Mountain Press. p. 38. Michael O. With Musket & Tomahawk: The West Point Hudson Valley Campaign in the Wilderness War of 1777. New York: Carrel Books. 2019. p. 28.
[20] Steadman in Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. P. 38.
[21] Steadman in Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. P. 38.
[22] Steadman in Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. P. 31.
[23]Clinton, George. “Public Papers of George Clinton, first governor of New York,” 1777 – 1795. Ed. By State
Historian, 10 Vols. (Albany, 1899 – 1914). Clinton, George., to the court of Inquiry, 1778. ( Letter published in The Quarterly Journal of the New
York State Historical Association, April, 1931. ) Carington, Henry B. Battles of the American Revolution, 1775 – 1781: Historical and Military.
[24] Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. P. 31.
[25] Clinton, Henry Sir. The American Rebellion. New Haven, Connecticut: 1954.
[26] Clinton, George. “Public Papers of George Clinton, first governor of New York,” 1777 – 1795. Ed. By State
Historian, 10 Vols. (Albany, 1899 – 1914). Clinton, George., to the court of Inquiry, 1778. ( Letter published in The Quarterly Journal of the New
York State Historical Association, April, 1931. ) Carington, Henry B. Battles of the American Revolution, 1775 – 1781: Historical and Military. Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. P. 31. Clinton, Henry Sir. The American Rebellion. New Haven, Connecticut: 1954.
[27] Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. P. 38 and 117.
[28] Clinton, George. “Public Papers of George Clinton, first governor of New York,” 1777 – 1795. Ed. By State
Historian, 10 Vols. (Albany, 1899 – 1914). Clinton, George., to the court of Inquiry, 1778. ( Letter published in The Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Association, April, 1931. ) Carington, Henry B. Battles of the American Revolution, 1775 – 1781: Historical and Military. Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. P. 31. Clinton, Henry Sir. The American Rebellion. New Haven, Connecticut: 1954. MAYERS, ROBERT A. THE WAR MAN: THE TRUE STORY OF A CITIZEN – SOLDIER WHO FOUGHT FROM QUEBEC TO YORKTOWN. YARDLEY, PENNSLVANIA: WESTOLME PUBLISHING, LLC, 2009. P. 80 – 85.
[29] Clinton, George. “Public Papers of George Clinton, first governor of New York,” 1777 – 1795. Ed. By State
Historian, 10 Vols. (Albany, 1899 – 1914). Clinton, George., to the court of Inquiry, 1778. ( Letter published in The Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Association, April, 1931. ) Carington, Henry B. Battles of the American Revolution, 1775 – 1781: Historical and Military. Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. P. 31. Clinton, Henry Sir. The American Rebellion. New Haven, Connecticut: 1954. MAYERS, ROBERT A. THE WAR MAN: THE TRUE STORY OF A CITIZEN – SOLDIER WHO FOUGHT FROM QUEBEC TO YORKTOWN. YARDLEY, PENNSLVANIA: WESTOLME PUBLISHING, LLC, 2009. P. 80 – 85.
[30] Clinton, George. “Public Papers of George Clinton, first governor of New York,” 1777 – 1795. Ed. By State Historian, 10 Vols. (Albany, 1899 – 1914). Clinton, George., to the court of Inquiry, 1778. ( Letter published in The Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Association, April, 1931. ) Carington, Henry B. Battles of the American Revolution, 1775 – 1781: Historical and Military. Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. P. 31. Clinton, Henry Sir. The American Rebellion. New Haven, Connecticut: 1954. MAYERS, ROBERT A. THE WAR MAN: THE TRUE STORY OF A CITIZEN – SOLDIER WHO FOUGHT FROM QUEBEC TO YORKTOWN. YARDLEY, PENNSLVANIA: WESTOLME PUBLISHING, LLC, 2009. P. 80 – 85.
[31] Clinton, George. “Public Papers of George Clinton, first governor of New York,” 1777 – 1795. Ed. By State Historian, 10 Vols. (Albany, 1899 – 1914). Clinton, George., to the court of Inquiry, 1778. ( Letter published in The Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Association, April, 1931. ) Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. P. 31. Clinton, Henry Sir. The American Rebellion. New Haven, Connecticut: 1954. MAYERS, ROBERT A. THE WAR MAN: THE TRUE STORY OF A CITIZEN – SOLDIER WHO FOUGHT FROM QUEBEC TO YORKTOWN. YARDLEY, PENNSLVANIA: WESTOLME PUBLISHING, LLC, 2009. P. 80 – 85.
[32] Carr, William H. and Koke, Richard J. Twin Forts of The Popolopen: Forts Clinton and Montgomery, New York, 1775 – 1777. Bear Mountain Trailside Museums. Historical Bulletin Number 1. July, 1937. P. 31 – 38.