Coming on the heels of the American disastrous defeat at Camden, August 16, 1780, The Battle of Fishing Creek, August 18, 1780, was but another feather in the cap of British Legion’s commander Banastre “Bloody Ben” Tarleton. And another depressing loss for the Americans. Tarleton led a fast moving, hard striking, ruthless corps of dragoons and light infantry composed of middle state loyalists. Part of British Commander-in-Chief General Henry’s Clinton’s southern invasion, Tarleton’s Legion arrived South Carolina in February, 1780. Given a free reign to roam the countryside, his drive and aggressive style of brutal attacks without warning resulted in a string of victories against both continental troops and patriot militia. At both Monck’s Corner on April 14th, and Lenud’s Ferry, on May 6th, Tarleton’s vicious and sudden attacks brutalized his enemy in total routs of Continental and patriot militia forces.
At the Battle of Waxhaws, May 29th, Tarleton’s callous and cold-blooded fame became legend. Shortly after General Benjamin Lincoln surrendered the American Southern Army at Charleston, May 12, 1780, Tarleton drove his troops hard to intercept and attack a detachment of the Virginia 3rd Regiment. Their commander, Colonel Abraham Buford, had been marching his men to reinforce the embattled American Army at Charleston. Tarleton’s troops gave no quarter as they cut down the Americans, many raw enlistments. Over two thirds of Buford’s force were slaughtered with many later dying from gaping wounds. Tarleton’s quarter, as well as ‘Bloody Ben,’ became a common referral to the young British officer’s barbarous and merciless attacks.
As such, Tarleton’s Legion became the eyes and ears, as well as the shock troops, of British General Charles Cornwallis; leader of the Southern Invasion after General Clinton departed for New York City. Cornwallis, who had been in near every major battle of the war since its beginning, had recently returned from England where the general had lost his wife to illness. The embittered commander threw himself into pursuing success in the south, no matter the consequences. He would not only approve of Tarleton’s savage tactics against the enemy, he would encourage it.
The ‘Greatest Plague’: Colonel Sumter
Meanwhile, another flamboyant commander, this one a partisan rebel, was compiling a list of victories against the loyalist militiamen of the Carolinas; Colonel Thomas Sumter. There were three rebel partisan leaders that emerged in the back country of South Carolina; Francis “Swamp Fox” Marion, mainly in the low country, Colonel Anthony Pickens, gaining notoriety after his victory at Kettle Creek on February 14, 1779, and Colonel Sumter. A self-inflated egotist, Sumter took no advice from anyone as he fought the war as he saw fit. Though his tactics and military knowledge were lacking, he fought hard and could instill men to fight just has hard, earning him the title ‘gamecock.’
In a two month’s span, Sumter had become a real thorn in British commander General Cornwallis’ side. He was victorious against loyalist forces at Mobley’s Meeting House (late May or early June), Williamson’s Plantation (July 12th), Rocky Mount (August 1st), and Hanging Rock (August 6th). His harsh treatment of loyalists in the western regions of South Carolina deterred those loyal to the crown from flocking to the British banner; one of the major reasons for the invasion.
Sumter Requests and Receives Men and Cannon from General Gates
After taking command of what was left of the southern army after General Lincoln’s Surrender, General Horatio Gates advanced his command south into South Carolina with Camden the objective. For arguable reasons, General Gates gave serious consideration to the optimistic correspondence he received from a militia commander had never met. Thomas Sumter, who possessed the same self-delusions of military greatness shared by Gates. In a letter, Thomas Sumter had outlined his version of a grand strategy to take Camden, a British stronghold that supported surrounding outposts. As Gates marched toward Camden, Sumter, who was on the western bank of the Wateree River, wrote and requested a large detachment of men be sent to him along with cannon.
Sumter explained that a strong detachment of the enemy was on its way from British held Fort Ninety-six to Camden [Nineteenth Century historian Dawson stated that this convoy was enroute from Ninety-six, whereas modern historians Buchanan and Crawford write that it traveled from Charleston]. Sumter continued that they were bringing a quantity of stores, and that if he could be supplied with artillery to secure a redoubt which covered the ferry over which this detachment was to pass the Wateree, he would be able to intercept it.
The Wateree Ferry crossing was approximately five miles south of Camden. Though facing an enemy force of unknown strength and unknown location, Gates immediately complied with Sumter’s request. Three Hundred North Carolina militiamen were sent. So too, 100 Maryland Continentals; veterans who were among Gate’s best troops, along with two three-pounder cannon, also known as ‘grasshoppers.’ This draw down of forces greatly reduced Gate’s army; however, some historians have excused his decision based on what intelligence he had and his intent in the region. Gates did not expect a battle with the British army. He only wanted to do as he had done at Saratoga in 1777. Establish a defensive perimeter and force his enemy to attack him once his men had been rested and well supplied. He even sent out engineers to map the area north of Camden to do just that. He believed Cornwallis was still in Charleston with his main army and what faced him was a small garrison at Camden. Any troops and cannon sent to Sumter would be returned to him once the partisan commander captured the supply convoy.
Sumter Captures both Redoubt and Supply Convoy
After having received Gates’ reinforcements, Sumter moved from Elkin’s Ford, along the western bank of the river to the Wateree Ferry, five miles south of Camden. On the morning of August 15th, Colonel Thomas Taylor, along with a strong force, were sent across the river and attacked the redoubt, commanded by Colonel Mathew Carey. Seven regulars were killed along with thirty taken captive, including Colonel Carey. So too they found thirty-eight wagons loaded with corn, sundry supplies, and rum (that no doubt delighted the rank and file). Questioning the prisoners, Tayler learned of the convoy’s location and rode out, capturing the detachment sent from Ninety-Six. This included seventy additional regular prisoners and six wagons loaded with supplies and clothing, including a large quantity of baggage. According to correspondence Gates later wrote to Congress that Sumter had suffered no loss while taking the redoubt and convoy.
Loaded down with nearly fifty wagons of booty and 100 British prisoners, Sumter began a slow march north along the west bank of the Wateree River. Within a few days, this would play into the hands of a British Legion of aggressive loyalists under a commander whose tactics favored a fanatically driven mobile force. [Note: Dawson and Buchanan state Sumter was successful in capturing his sought-after convoy as do most sources; however, Crawford writes that he was not – settling on what was taken at the Wateree Ferry]
Battle of Camden, August 16, 1780
It became apparent that if Cornwallis was to achieve his objective and capture North Carolina, Sumter had to be dealt with and soon. But before he could deal with the pesky partisan leader, he had to take care of the revitalized remnant of the American Southern Army that had received veteran Continental reinforcements and most recently, a new commander; hero of Saratoga and the darling of Congress, General Horatio Gates.
Fortunately for Cornwallis, Gates proved to be an incompetent leader whose actions led to the annihilation of his force at the Battle of Camden, August 16, 1780. After arriving to assume command of the tattered force, an army worn down by defeat and long marches without necessary nourishment, he immediately set off towards the British posting at Camden. Ignoring advice, he chose a direct path through hostile, loyalist territory that offered no means of foraging. Still intent on establishing a defensive position north of Cambridge, and with no intelligence on the enemy’s location (he had previously refused North Carolina cavalry and sent away Francis ‘Swamp Fox’ Marion, for whom he had no need) he carried on blindly towards Camden. Believing all was falling into place after receiving word of Sumter’s success at Wateree’s ferry, he was amazed when on the evening of August 15th, his army stumbled into Cornwallis’ main army.
This left Gates no option but to do battle with the enemy before him. When Gates put his North Carolina militia front and center in his battle plans, they did as what had become expected of militia, without firing a shot, they turned and ran with the first flash of British steel. And Gates? He led the rout on the fastest horse the army had to offer, traveling 180 miles to safety before stopping. This left General De Kalb with his Delaware and Maryland Continentals alone, along with some veteran Virginia militia, to face the entire British army. De Kalb was killed and few Continentals escaped. They would later form the core for another, more successful southern army led by General Daniel Morgan and General Nathanael Greene.
Tarleton Pursues Sumter
With Gates out of the way, Cornwallis could turn his attention elsewhere. He had received word of Sumter’s attack at Wateree Ferry and the capture of the convoy loaded with supplies. So too, the capture of 100 veteran regulars, men he could ill afford to lose. He had received word of the annoying rebel partisan’s whereabout. And who better to send after Sumter but his hard riding legion, commanded by his favorite officer; Banastre Tarleton.
On the morning of August 17th, one day after Camden, Tarleton left Rugeley’s Mill and headed west toward the Catawba River. With him were 350 of his legion that included light infantry foot. He headed toward Rocky Mount where he had heard that Sumter was encamped. After the capture of men and supplies, Sumter had spent the 16th slowly heading north along the west bank of the Catawba. Later that night, three riders rode into camp led by Captain Martin, dispatched from fellow partisan commander William Richardson Davie. Davie informed Sumter that he had met General Gates on the road, hastily on his way to Charlotte, North Carolina. Gates told Davie about the defeat at Camden and that Sumter was to retreat with all speed to Charlotte where the remains of the army was gathering. The next day, the 17th, Sumter increased his pace, but still far slower than his British pursuer.
Tarleton had pushed his men hard up the east bank of the Catawba and arrived Rocky Mount that same night of the 17th, noting Sumter’s campfires across the river, he ordered his men not to set fires. From his cold camp, Tarleton kept close watch on his prey. According to William Davie, Sumter had been warned that Tarleton was parallel to him on the eastern bank of the river. Even with that information, he remained the night and resumed his march the next morning. When Tarleton’s scouts reported his enemy had continued their march along the west bank, Tarleton procured boats and ferried his men across the river. Sumter carried on his march towards the fords of the Catawba where he intended to cross and carry onto Charlotte.
The 18th was hot and humid. The road was a series of steep rolling hills that sapped the energy of both man and animals. Under the scorching Carolina sun, Sumter pressed onward, pushing his men to exhaustion. Perhaps thinking by keeping to the west of the river, he was safe from any pursuit for after having proceeded eight miles, he called a halt. He had just crossed Fishing Creek, two miles above Catawba’s Great Falls, and stopped on the north bank, about two miles from where Fishing Creek entered the Catawba. There he ordered a long rest and encamped along the main road. His men stacked their arms and scattered in every direction. Some cooked an early supper, others bathed in the river or strolled off to a nearby plantation, while most stretched out in the shade and fell asleep. The prisoners and baggage had been moved a little further north of the encampment to ensure their safety. Sumter joined his men and removed his hat, coat, and vest and quickly fell asleep in the shade of a wagon.
Meanwhile, so too under a hot sun, Tarleton pushed his men and animals at a grueling and punishing pace. By noon, the British were about five miles south of Fishing Creek. There, Tarleton’s infantry informed him they were “overpowered by fatigue,” and could not keep up with his demanding march. He explained in his memoir, “by the exhausted condition of the British light troops, by the intense heat of the day, and by the ground yet to be gained before an attack could take place…” But their commander would have none of it. Though Sumter reported to have had approximately 800 men in his command, many experienced fighters, Tarleton was determined to bring the rebels to battle, no matter how many men the young commander could field. He chose 100 dragoons and sixty light infantry troops to double up and ride behind. With 160 now mounted, he pressed on with all haste, rapidly closing in on his enemy.
Battle of Fishing Creek
Sixteen-year-old James Collins was with Sumter that fateful day and later wrote of the battle. As to setting precautions, Collins noted that two pickets or guards were posted in the rear along the road; they were over a crest of a hill and could not be seen by anyone in camp. It was not long after Tarleton’s mounted dragoons and light infantry took off after Sumter when the vanguard came upon the two sentries. To the men’s credit, they stood their ground and fired at the charging dragoons, killing one. Incensed by their loss, the dragoons rode both men down and sabered them to death. This action irritated Tarleton, for he had hoped one could have been detained to provide information on Sumter’s position.
Tarleton wrote that four dragoons and a sergeant carried on to the crest of the hill and motioned for him to come forward. Tarleton’s memoirs always referred to himself in the third person, “where, instantly halting, they crouched upon their horses and made a signal to their commanding officer. Tarleton rode forward to the advanced guard…and plainly discovered over the crest of the hill the front of the American camp, perfectly quiet, and not the least alarmed by the fire of the vedettes.” In fact, Sumter had been awakened and demanded who fired the two shots. An officer informed him it was just soldiers shooting at cattle prior to butchering. Sumter accepted the explanation and continued to rest.
Tarleton could not believe his luck. And as he had done at Waxhaws and Buford’s massacre, as well as Lenud’s Ferry and Monck’s Corner, there was no need to study the terrain and plan an attack. The young trooper’s audacity and pomposity kicked in. He wrote, “The decision and preparation for the attack were momentarily.” With just 160 troopers, facing odds outnumbered nearly five to one against battle hardened partisans and 100 veteran Continentals, there was no hesitation. He would draw up his men and attack immediately. Tarleton described his actions in his memoir:
“The cavalry and infantry were formed into one line, and giving a general shout, advance to the charge. The arms and the artillery of the continentals were secured before the men could be assembled. Universal consternation immediately ensued throughout the camp; some opposition was’ however made from behind the wagons, in front of the militia. The numbers and extensive encampment of the enemy occasioned several conflicts before the action was decided.”
Nineteenth Century historian Henry Dawson wrote that “he, [Tarleton] immediately rushed forward, securing the arms, which were stacked, and the artillery, before the Americans could be assembled to defend themselves or their position, and overcoming the few guards who interposed any opposition.” Teenager James Collins wrote: “ Before Sumter could wake up his men and form the enemy were among them cutting down everything in their way. It was a perfect rout, and an indiscriminate slaughter. No quarter was given; we were preparing in all haste to secure our own safety. The greater part of our number dashed through the creek, at the fording place, and pushing on with all possible speed, reached the highland. There they waited for friends, but none appeared until a few blasts from the bugle directed some straggles to them.”
Most British Objectives Achieved
Over in literally minutes, it was an incredible coop for the aggressive British officer. He had achieved his objective, albeit if he had been able to bring his whole corps into the fight, he might have exacted a more terrible price on the fleeing rebels. In previous action, Tarleton was criticized for allowing his men free reign to inflict unrelenting barbarism on his enemy. As if sensitive to critics, he would carefully include in his memoirs written after the war that he always took measures to limit his men’s brutality. Tarleton wrote: “At length, the release of the regulars and the loyal militia, who were confined to the rear of Americans, enabled Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton to stop the slaughter and place guards over the prisoners.”
Tarleton lamented his lack of additional troops writing, “The pursuit could not with propriety be pushed very far, the quantity of prisoners upon the spot demanding the immediate attention of great part of the light troops.” He sent back orders to hurry along the remaining of his Legion “…necessary to repulse any attempt the enemy might make to rescue their friends.” Then adding, perhaps to appease his later critics, “All the men he could assemble were likewise wanted to assistance to the wounded and take charge of the prisoners.” Of captured supplies Tarleton wrote, “…two three pounders [called grasshoppers], two ammunition wagons, one thousand stand of arms, forty0four carriages loaded with baggage, rum, and other stores, fell into the possession of the British.”
Tarleton wrote of his amazement over Sumter’s lack of standard military protocol in the presence of possible enemy troops, “…the supposed distance of the King’s troops occasioned a negligence in their look out, and lulled them into fatal security.” However, he was also more understanding towards Sumter in his memoir after having question some of the rebel prisoners writing, “Some information received…greatly diminished the mistakes which Colonel Sumpter [sic] seemed to have committed: It appeared upon inquiry that he had sent patroles to examine the road towards Rocky Mount but, fortunately for the British, they had not proceeded far enough to discover their approach…”
Tarleton also regretted the loss of capturing the rebel commander Sumter writing, “Colonel Sumter, who had taken off part of his clothes on account of the heat of the weather, in that situation amidst the general confusion made his escape.” As Tarleton’s dragoons thundered down on the camp. Sumter leapt onto a horse and galloped off. Within a couple of days, he rode alone into Charlotte to greet Colonel Davie, minus a saddle and his entire partisan corp.
Casualties
While British officers often downplayed their casualties while exaggerating the enemies, Tarleton’s memoir describing casualties on both sides of his actions would prove quite accurate. Of American casualties he wrote: “…one hundred and fifty of his officers and soldiers were killed and wounded, ten Continental officers and one hundred men, many militia officers, and upwards of two hundred privates, were made prisoner.” Tarleton’s tally of American prisoners would be 310, which included all Maryland continentals Gates had sent Sumter.
Of the British loss he wrote, “The loss…was inconsiderable; fifteen non-commissioned officers and men, and twenty horses, were killed and wounded.” Missing from that number was a sixteenth casualty; an officer killed who Tarlton spoke highly of, “Captain Charles Campbell, who commanded the light infantry, was unfortunately killed near the end of the affair….He was a young officer whose conduct and abilities afforded the most flattering prospect that he would be an honor to his country.”
Afterwards
Tarleton would ride back into British headquarters at Camden with the captured men Cornwallis was so desperate to have back, along with the return of much needed supplies. This action only endeared the young and aggressive officer to Cornwallis who later sent him after another pain in the neck, Francis ‘Swamp Fox’ Marion. But Marion was no Sumter in that he could be lulled into safety and viciously attacked without warning. The case proved an exhausting affair for the over confident dragoon who after several trying weeks traipsing all over the low country’s swamps and forests, returned to Cornwallis empty handed.
With the remnants of the rebel southern army destroyed, it appeared the road was open to subjugate North Carolina. Even though Cornwallis effected a resounding defeat against Gates and Sumter’s militia, he had not the men nor supplies to carry on a protracted march deep into North Carolina. For that he had to prepare, while hoping for the continual arrival of southern loyalists who were showing in far les numbers than he had been led to believe. After Major Patrick Ferguson’s loyalist detachment was annihilated by ‘over the mountain men’ rebels at the Battle of King’s Mountain, October 7, 1780, the trickle of loyalist militia arriving at the British camp stopped; as if a spicket had been turned off. Cornwallis would have to wait before advancing further north. But by then, Cornwallis would meet his equal; Gates would be replaced with an American general with equal savvy and competence as the acclaimed British commander
For Thomas Sumter, who Cornwallis had called his ‘greatest plague,’ Fishing Creek was just a temporary setback. Many of his men who escaped the slaughter eventually rejoined him in Charlotte. His fame and personality quickly attracted more rebel militiamen to his banner. By the fall of 1780, he would have a thousand men under his command as he rode the Carolina backcountry, terrorizing loyalists. So too, he would have some revenge against Tarleton at the Battle of Blackstock’s Farm, November 20, 1780. This time, Tarleton’s headlong attack resulted in such a high number of British casualties, he had to pull his troops back and wait for reinforcements before attacking the next day. By then the rebels had pulled out. There was one silver lining that day for Tarleton when he learned that Sumter was severely wounded by a British volley. But by 1781, the ‘gamecock’ was back once ore recruiting patriot rebels to harass the British and loyalist population.
As for ‘Bloody Ben,’ he would finally meet an advisory with the skill, courage, and knowledge to one-up his tactics. Newly commissioned Brigadier Daniel Morgan read Tarleton’s style of assault like a book, understanding his lack of reconnaissance prior to rushing in to attack, allowing his viscous assault to carry the day. Morgan’s based his plans for the Battle of Cowpens, January 17, 1781, on Tarleton’s aggressiveness and lured the British into total defeat. In one day, Cornwallis lost a quarter of his best troops, men he would never find replacements as many historians believe, what led to his decision to pursue the Americans at all costs and his complete surrender at Yorktown.
IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO READ MORE ABOUT THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, CHECK OUT THESE GREAT BOOKS ON AMAZON
OF FURTHER INTEREST ON REVOLUTIONARY WAR JOURNAL
RESOURCE
Buchanan, John. The Road to Guilford Courthouse The American Revolution in the Carolinas. 1997: John Wiley and sons, Inc., New York, NY.
Crawford, Alan Pell. This Fierce People, The Untold Story of America’s Revolutionary War in the South, 2024: Alfred A. Knoph, New York, NY.
Dawson, Henry B. Battles of the United States by Sea and Land…Volume 1. 1858: Johnson Fry and Co., New York, NY.
Southern, Ed (editor). Voices of the American Revolution in the Carolinas. 2009: John F. Blair Publisher, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
Swisher, Dan. The Revolutionary War in the Southern Backcountry. 2007: Pelican Publishing Co., New York, NY.
Tarleton, Lt. Colonel Banastre. A History of the Southern Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America. 1787: Printed for Colles, Exshaw, White, H. Whitestone… Dublin, Ireland, UK.
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