Battle of Brier Creek: American Rout that Opened the Carolinas to Invasion

Literally caught between a rock and a hard place, the American position at Brier Creek, Georgia, on March 3, 1779, commanded by Brigadier General John Ashe of North Carolina militia, proved to be a death trap. Situated on a triangular plot of land, the American choice of encampment was fatally flawed. Their backs were to the river. The bridge was destroyed. Swamps enclosed both ends. And open ground in the front offered no natural or manmade defenses. When the British under Lt. Colonel Marcus-Jacques Prevost attacked, there was literally no escape. Nowhere to run. Except a quagmire that surrounded a deep river which for many Americans, became a watery grave.

When the British charged with bayonet, the militia had done what they typically did best, at the sight of British steel, they broke and ran; most without firing a shot. Unfortunately, it meant a long swim that many did not survive. This also left the small band of Continental troops to do what they did best, hold firm and suffer the consequences; in this case, half were cut down and those left surrendered to a man. A brilliant victory for the British, and in the words of American General William Moultrie:

“This unlucky affair at Brier Creek disconcerted all our plans, and through the misfortunes of Gen. Howe [who had surrendered Savannah earlier without a fight] and Ashe, the war was protracted at least one year longer…it is more than probable that Carolina would not have been invaded had this event not taken place.”

A Southern Strategy and Invasion of Georgia

By 1778, it became apparent to those pulling the war’s strings in England that the effort to subdue the rebellious American colonies had reached a stalemate in the north. Secretary of War for the American Department, Lord George Germain, decided a ‘southern strategy’ was in order; this to sever ties between the two regions, expand British influence in the south before the French brought their military might to bear, and bring loyalist recruits into the war, especially the large number of Scottish immigrants. On November 24, 1778, Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in America, General Henry Clinton, launched an invasion force to take Savannah, Georgia. Command was given to Lt. Colonel Archibald Campbell of the marines who sailed from New York City with 3,100 regulars, among them his own 71^st Regiment of Foot, Fraser’s Highlanders. One thousand strong, the 71^st was the largest and most experienced regiment in the British army. So much so, that it was divided into two battalions, each the size of most regiments.  At Savannah, Campbell was to meet up with Swiss General Augustine Prevost who was marching north from East Florida with the 60^th Regiment of Foot or American Regiment, and Florida Rangers.

Campbell arrived first on December 23^rd and, discovering Savannah was lightly defended, decided not to wait for Prevost. The city fell on the 29^th. When Prevost arrived, he took over command and on January 24, 1779, sent Campbell with 1,000 men, including his 71^st regiment of Highlanders, up the Savannah River to capture Augusta, Georgia. This was accomplished about a week later; the American garrison fleeing as the British approached. Campbell immediately sent out recruiters to draw in loyalist militias. So too, with the arrival of American General Benjamin Lincoln to take over command of the Southern army, local patriot forces were recruited to his banner. By early February, 1779, the two sides clashed. Enthusiastic loyalists gathered and hit the road to join the British at Augusta, while equally passionate patriot militias were determined to stop them.

Lead Up to Battle

By February of 1779, the South Carolina and Georgia militia and scattering of Continental troops were on a roll. Though the British had launched a southern campaign with the capture of Savannah, and soon after marched up the Savannah River to occupy Augusta, Georgia, their designs to enlist those loyal to the crown had hit a snag with two major British defeats of Loyalist militias attempting to join the British. This proved to dampen the loyalist ardor; the Battle of Beaufort, fought on February 3, 1779, and the Battle of Kettle Creek, February 14, 1779, in which a large loyalist force under local influential loyalist John Boyd was soundly trounced.

Throughout January into February, southern patriotic militias had been flocking to General Lincoln’s camp at Purrysburg, South Carolina, along the Savannah River near the Georgia border. Importantly, North Carolina’s Governor Richard Caswell knew that his state’s future hopes lay in the security of the South Carolina and Georgia border. After Savannah fell in late December, 1778, he ordered 438 North Carolina Continentals and most of the state’s thirty-five county militias; either entire regiments or detachments thereof, from all six of the state’s district brigades. The influx of men doubled Lincoln’s command at Purrysburg to around 4,000 troops This emboldened the commander of America’s southern army to consider actions to recover the lost state of Georgia.

Lincoln decided he had the numbers to begin consolidating the territory while still increasing his army through continued recruitment of local militias. So too, to put pressure on the British and confront Campbell’s force at Augusta; the ultimate goal – ousting the British from Savannah. He made the following postings:

• General Andrew Williamson of Georgia with 1,200 militiamen from Georgia and South Carolina to garrison Augusta. After British Colonel Campbell occupied the city, General Williamson moved his forces to the eastern, S. Carolina bank of the Savannah River, opposite Augusta.
• General Griffith Rutherford of North Carolina, commanding the Salisbury Militia Brigade, with 800 men, was dispatched to the Black Swamp, south of Charleston, South Carolina.
• General John Ashe, with 1,400 North Carolina militia and about 100 Georgia Continental regulars under Colonel Samuel Elbert, were ordered to advance along the S. Carolina border of the Savannah River and take up a post outside of Augusta where they would link with General Williamson. The intent was to drive the British from the Augusta region. Ashe had been the former State Treasurer and commander of the North Carolina Wilmington Brigade, 1^st and 2^nd Battalions of six state regiments.

January, 1779 was colder than normal for the far southern colonies, with temperatures dropping below freezing. Troops on the move complained bitterly of the harsh conditions and lack of supplies. So too, the officers discovered that many of the new recruits eager to join the fight showed up without muskets and means to sustain themselves in the fight. Colonel Samuel Elbert, commander of the Georgia Continental troops wrote a letter to General Lincoln, commander of the Southern Army, on January 29, 1779:

“The articles of provisions we shall have plenty, of artillery we have none, small arms very ordinary in general and scarce, many men have come to camp without any, which we have not to give them. Entrenching tools and camp utensils are not to be had here…”

When Ashe neared Williamson’s post on February 12^th, Campbell, realizing he was outnumbered and in danger of entrapment, set about to abandon Augusta. The same day, February 14^th, that loyalist John Boyd was defeated at Kettle Creek, Campbell left Augusta to begin the 135-mile march along the Georgia side of the river for Savannah. When General Ashe learned that Campbell had departed Augusta, he crossed the Savannah River and half-heartedly pursued the retreating enemy.

General John Ashe’s Command

The 1,400 man command consisted mostly of North Carolina militiamen from detachments of over thirty regiments:

• New Bern Brigade of North Carolina, Brigadier General William Bryant commanding the following county regiments: Beaufort, Dobbs, Pitt, Craven, Johnston
• Edenton Brigade of North Carolina, Colonel Henry Young commanding the following county regiments: Bertie, Currituck, Martin, Gates, Chowan, and Tyrrell
• Wilmington Brigade of North Carolina, Colonel Henry Young commanding the following county regiments: Bladen, Duplin, New Hanover, Cumberland, Onslow
• Halifax Brigade of North Carolina, General John Ashe commanding the following county regiments: Edgecombe, Franklin, Halifax, Martin, Nash, Northampton, Warren
• Salisbury Brigade of North Carolina with the following county regiments: Surry, Mecklenburg, Guilford County, Rowan, Anson, Lincoln, Burke, Montgomery, Washington, Rutherford, Wilkes
• Hillsborough Brigade of North Carolina with the following county regiments: Wake, Chatham, Granville
• Lt. Colonel Anthony Lytle commanded 200 North Carolina Continental Light Infantry
• 60 Georgia Continental troops and 150 militiamen commanded by Lt. Colonel Samuel Elbert and Lt. Colonel John McIntosh.
• 300 Horse Dragoons, New Acquisition Brigade of South Carolina under Major Francis Ross. They would not arrive until March 1^st and were absent scouting during the battle.
• 7 pieces of artillery mainly 4-pounders   

Pursuit, Disadvised Encampment, Lincoln Considers Assembling American Army at Brier Creek

As the British steadily marched toward Savannah, General Ashe’s perfunctory pursuit seemed more an attempt to urge his enemy forward than displaying any interest to attack. Cognizant of Ashe’s presence, when Campbell reached Ebenezer, Georgia and crossed the Brier Creek Bridge, 68 miles south of Augusta and half-way to Savannah, he ordered the bridge destroyed. Campbell then proceeded another twelve miles, camping at Hudson’s Ferry.

Brier Creek is a riverine watercourse that traverses eastern Georgia between the Ogeechee River and the Savannah River. The bridge over Brier Creek was at the confluence with the Savannah River. The surrounding land was swampy, constraining movement across both waterways.

When Ashe came to the destroyed bridge on February 27^th, he halted the pursuit to repair the torched structure. He made camp, about 200 – 300 yards from the ruined bridge. This was along the banks of Brier Creek on a triangle of land where the creek and river met. Militarily speaking, this choice of encampment was an invite to disaster. The militia’s back was to the creek and swampy lands, it was hemmed in on both sides by the river and marshlands, while its front was open and presented no opportunities for defense; nor were any kind of fortifications thrown up. Ashe’s adjutant, Brigadier General William Bryant of the North Carolina Militia New Bern District Brigade, recognized their position was not secure and suggested they relocate. Ashe did not concur.

Ashe left camp for Black Swamp the next day, February 28^th, to attend a council of war called by Lincoln for March 1st. The commander of the southern army was considering assembling his forces further up river towards Augusta to rid the interior of British control. When Ashe was asked of his position at Brier Creek, he was emphatic that it was an ideal place to consolidate American forces. Lincoln took Ashe’s at his word and began plans to reposition troops from General Williamson in Augusta and General Rutherford in Great Swamp to Brier Creek.

General Bryant, left in command, called a council of his field officers and it was decided to move the camp about a mile higher up the fork from the burnt-out bridge. At this new camp, General Ashe stated at his Court of Inquiry that

“The left nearly touched the creek, and the right reached within about half a mile of the swamp that borders upon the Savannah River. In advance, about a mile, was a field officer’s picket of 100 men…divided into several smaller ones with a chain of sentries between…In the rear was posted the Light Infantry with one brass four-pounder…”

This new location was not much of an improvement. Historian Captain Hugh McCall wrote in his History of Georgia:

  “…a position the most completely calculated for the destruction of his army…if the enemy should attack…with a deep and impassable creek on his left, the Savannah River on his rear, a lagune, deep and wide, on his right, and an open uninterrupted entrance for his enemy on his front.”

British Prepare and March to Attack

Colonel Campbell received excellent intelligence on General Ashe’s selection of camp from captive Americans and saw an opportunity. He and General Augustine Prevost’s younger brother, Lt. Colonel James Mark (Jacques-Marc) Prevost of the 60th Royal American Regiment, devised a plan for attack. Similar to actions taken by the British at the Battles of Long Island and Brandywine Creek, it was decided a decoy feint would demonstrate a few miles from the burt-out bridge to draw the American’s attention. Meanwhile, the main attack force would march a forty-mile semi-circle loop around the American position to gain the enemy’s rear. The two pincer movements would form on the open ground before the American camp and trap Ashe’s men on a triangle of land where the creek and the Savannah River met. Once the plan was agreed upon, Campbell placed the younger Prevost in command and as prearranged, immediately departed for Savannah where he would board a ship for England.

On March 1^st, the decoy force of 500 men commanded by Major Duncan McPherson openly marched north to Buck Creek, three miles south of the Brier Creek bridge, and made camp; expecting to draw the American’s attention. This force included:

• 1^st Battalion of the 71^st Regiment Fraser’s Highlanders
• 150 Carolina loyalists
• 2 field pieces.

The main attack force was under command of Lt. Colonel Mark Prevost. They rapidly marched up the south side of Brier Creek toward Paris Mill, some twelves miles west of the American encampment, where they expected to cross the creek. From there they would carry on back along the northern side of the creek and, on the morning of March 3^rd, would attack the camp in its rear. This force included:

• 2^nd Battalion of the 71^st Regiment
• Sir James Baird’s Corps of Light Infantry
• Three grenadier companies of the 60^th Regiment of Foot (American Regiment)
• Lt (Captain) Tawse (Tawe) troop of Light Dragoons – 19^th Century Historian Charles Jones gives the commander of horse as Captain Tawe. Worthington Ford’s extensive roster of British Officers serving in America has no Tawe listed – however there is a Tawse, a lieutenant who served with the 71^st Highlanders. His lieutenancy is given as 1775, so by 1779, he may have been promoted to captain.
• 150 men of the Florida Rangers Militia
• Five pieces of artillery including a howitzer and 6 pounders  

Lt. Colonel Prevost’s main force arrived at the Paris Mill at 10:00 AM the next morning, March 2^nd, and discovered that the bridge over the creek had been destroyed by the Americans. Timbers and planks were ripped from the Paris Mill home and mill to rebuild the bridge. To guard against discovery, that evening, Prevost had the light dragoons ford the river and Baird’s light infantry passed over on pontoons to advance and cut off all communications. Before daylight on the 3^rd, the main body of British troops succeeded in crossing the creek and began the fifteen-mile march down the north side of the creek to attack the American camp some fifteen miles away. 

Warning Signs Ignored and Incompetence by American Command

Though signs of a British advance towards their camp filtered in, there were no clear indication of such to either General Bryant or General Ashe until the British were formed for the attack. On March 1^st, Bryant was advised by pickets that someone, presumedly British, had been on the lines all the previous night. He had no cavalry until Major Francis Ross’s weary detachment of horse dragoons arrived later that day. Ross was persuaded to venture out and took 60 men to have a look. After combing the region for the rest of the day and that night out to Paris Mill, some twelve to fifteen miles distant, he returned the morning of the 2^nd having seen nothing of concern. Tragically for the Americans, Ross had left Paris Mill on the morning of the 2^nd only a few hours before Provost’s main attack column had arrived. Interestingly, however, according to James Fergus, one of Ross’ horse among a group masquerading as North Carolina Loyalists, they came upon a talkative Tory. She gave them information describing Provost’s movement towards Paris Mill. There is no record that this information was ever divulged to General Ashe or Bryant. 

Ashe returned from the war council at noon and did not see Bryant or Ross for two hours. Even though Bryant insisted that patrols be sent out, Ashe decided to keep all scouting patrols at camp. It is presumed that an overconfident Ashe was persuaded by Ross to give his dragoons a much-needed evening’s rest. Therefore, the night of March 2^nd, when a sizable British force marched to their attack positions, there were no American scouts patrolling the area to sound the alarm. More so, as incredulous as it sounds, it appeared that the Americans were also ignorant of McPherson’s decoy; that in which 500 British troops made no effort to conceal their presence, two full nights and a day, within just three miles of Brier Creek. As writer David Heidler wrote leaving, “McPherson in the position of the actor who, after delivering his lines, discovers there is nobody in the audience.”

The morning of March 3^rd, day of battle, Ashe sent Ross and his 300-man cavalry South along the Savannah River to garnish information on the British at Hudson’s Ferry. Ashe later reported he expected Ross to return to camp that same day. During the ride south, Ross crossed the trail of Provost’s maneuver however, he did not send word of his discover back to Ashe. Ashe would never see Ross again. The cavalry, upon completing their mission, rode back toward Brier Creek and on the night of March 4^th, came across a camp of stragglers from the battle. Major Ross would, by the end of the month, be killed during a skirmish with loyalist Native Americans.

There was another near miss that would have given the Americans more time to prepare for the attack. On the morning of March 3^rd, Lt. Colonel Leonard Marbury and a small contingency of dragoons were upstream near Paris Mill. They discovered and exchanged fire with Provost’s main force crossing the creek. An express rider was sent out; however, he was captured and the warning never reached the camp.

The first warning of an imminent British attack came from a messenger Ashe had sent to General Andrew Williamson, posted outside Augusta. He came across the British marching south towards camp and avoided capture to fly back and sound the alarm. Shortly after the messenger advised Ashe, another rider rode in. He was posted eight miles up the creek with Colonel Smith who had been detailed to guard baggage. He confirmed that a large British force was approaching. This was approximately between 2:30 and 2:45 in the afternoon.

Americans Beat to Arms. Confusion and Problems with Ammunition

Ashe consulted with Bryant and Colonel Samuel Elbert of Georgia, who commanded sixty Continental troops and a hundred and fifty Georgia militia. All agreed that with the British bearing down on them, they had no choice but to meet the enemy.  The drums beat to arms and the men rushed to form three divisions in two lines. Here, Ashe’s battle tactics proved fatal. There were no preconcerted plans. Officers were not assigned to posts. Therefore, many of the brigades were under no uniformed system of command.

Added to this was the problem with ammunition. The quartermaster was unavailable so General Bryant oversaw the distribution of ammunition to the men. There was a shortage of prepared cartridge boxes, leaving many to carry their ammunition loosely on their clothing. Also, for many, the cartridges given out proved incompatible with the caliber of their weapons. On top of this, by the time the British fired the first shots upon the rebel pickets, many of Ashe’s men had yet to receive any shot and powder.  This was not an isolated instance at Brier Creek, but plagued American troops throughout the war. Contraband weapons of all calibers were smuggled from France and England prior to the war and later captured by American privateers. This mixture of arms without a standard caliber, unlike the British’s universal use of the Brown Bess Standard, proved difficult to provide accurate shot to their regiments. Added to the fact that many militiamen showed up with antique weapons including rifles, muskets, shot guns. They were all of various calibers that was near impossible to organize and supply the correct caliber in time of emergency.

The American Line of Battle

Because several regiments sent detachments to either scout, guard baggage, or work on repairing the bridge, reports varied as to the total number of troops Ashe had available to form for battle; anywhere from a low of 600 to more likely 800 men. After deciphering misinformation from original secondhand accounts, it is pretty conclusive that Ashe’s hasty deployment in two lines was as follows:

• FAR RIGHT: Colonel Henry Young of the New Hanover County Militia commanded the Edenton Brigade and Wilmington District Brigade
• RIGHT CENTER: Colonel Samuel Elbert along with Lt. Colonel John McIntosh commanded 60 Continental troops and 150 Georgia militia to which a light field piece had been attached
• LEFT CENTER and LEFT: General William Bryant commanding the following Militia Brigades: New Bern, Salisbury, and Halifax.
• RESERVE: Lt. Colonel Anthony Lytle’s North Carolina Light Infantry Continentals – a mile south of the camp near the burnt-out bridge
• A line of 100 picket guards were posted a mile in advance of the camp
• It is not recorded where the three Hillsborough Brigade regiments took post – either in line of battle or repair detail at the burnt-out bridge.

Once the lines were drawn, Ashe advanced about a quarter of a mile in front of his encampment. His left was buttressed at Brier Creek and his right extended across the road to within about half a mile of the river swamp. This created a large gap on the right side, between the end of the line and the river to which the British would take advantage.

For generations, the American line of battle had incorrectly placed the Georgia Continentals and militia under Elbert on the left with Bryant’s North Carolinians formed the center. Captain Hugh McCall, who was not present at the battle, first recorded this in 1784. Renowned 19^th century historian Charles Jones concurred in his 1883 History of Georgia. So too did Otis Ashmore and Charles Olmstead in their 1926 article on the battle. David Heidler’s 1982 article in the Georgia Historical Quarterly pointed out that primary sources concurred that the Georgians were on the right of center and that Bryant’s militia was on the left. His proof lies with accounts by General Ashe and General Bryant during Ashe’s Court of Inquiry ten days after the battle when events were still fresh. Ashe stated:

“It was now that the Georgia Continentals and Col Perkins’ Regiment, which formed the right of our first line, began their fire.”

So too, General Bryant concurred, stating that he was:

“Apprehensive of the enemy’s turning [American] right flank, and ordered…Colonel Perkins regiment…to move towards the road…[where he] found the Georgians to his front…”

British Line of Battle

• RIGHT: Baird’s Light Infantry with two field pieces. They were ordered to penetrate by a road leading to the camp.
• CENTER: 2^nd Battalion of the 71^st Fraser’s Highlanders. Florida Rangers and Carolina Loyalists. A howitzer and two six-pound field pieces positioned in front.
• LEFT: 150 Dragoons ordered to turn the American right.
• RESERVES: 400 yards in the rear – three companies of the 60^th Foot Grenadiers. A troop of dragoons. Fifty riflemen stood further to the left to cut down any American retreat.

The Battle

The battle that General Moultrie claimed set the war back an entire year for the Americans and opened the Carolinas for invasion was decided in the first minutes once the two main forces fired upon each other. Only Prevost’s command, largely the 2^nd Battalion of 71^st Highlanders, would attack. The feint under Colonel McPherson, consisting almost entirely of the 1^st Battalion of 71^st Highlanders, would remain three miles distant, south of the burnt-out bridge.

At 3 PM, the British drove in the American pickets stationed a mile in front of their camp, taking several prisoners. Lt. Colonel Prevost brought his command forward in three columns, six abreast. At 4 PM, 150 yards from the enemy, the howitzer and six-pounder cannon up front fired while Prevost formed his men into line. The British right, Baird’s light infantry, faced N. Carolina militia under General Bryant. The center squared off the 71^st Highlanders against N. Carolina militia and the Georgia Continentals and militia further to the right. The British left, 150 Dragoons, faced N. Carolina’s Edenton and Wilmington Brigades. Once deployed in line, the British volleyed at long range and was answered by the American’s first line.

At this early stage in the fight, Colonel Elbert leading the Georgians, advanced his men a few steps beyond the line and to his left. This maneuver brought his command in front of the right side of Bryant’s New Bern troops, impeding their firing. It also opened a gap on the right of the front line between his men and N. Carolina militia commanded by Lt. Colonel Henry Young. This breach in the line was only further stretched when Colonel Solomon Perkins’ Currituck Regiment of Edenton Brigade shifted to the right. Young later stated that he had ordered his men to pivot to the right to help cover the large end of the line to the river, this to prevent being flanked by the British dragoons.

Lt. Colonel Prevost instantly saw the advantage in this widening gap. While British dragoons drove into the gap, he ordered his men to fix bayonets and charge. The Halifax Brigade on the far left, second line, witnessed the British charge and immediately broke and ran for the swamps and creek in the rear. So too did the first line on the left collapse; both lines never having fired a shot. The Edenton and New Bern Brigades fired a few volleys, hoping for Colonel Lytle’s Light Infantry to come up. As the Highlander charge came to bear and crumbled the American line, the entire center militia, both lines under General Bryant, followed the left’s example and turned tail, running for the swamps and river. Within five minutes, they were followed by Young’s militia on the right.

Colonel Lytle was bringing his two hundred Continental troops forward when he witnessed the entire North Carolina militia, both lines, dissolve into a panic-stricken rout. He immediately withdrew his men and told them to disperse to save themselves. Lt. Colonel Young on the right leading the Edenton and Wilmington Brigades later stated that his order to shift further to the right to prevent being flanked by British dragoons was mistaken by his officers as a retreat; the men soon broke and ran for the Savannah River, about two miles distant, having been swept up by the terrorized rout.

Generals Ashe and Bryant were among those crashing into the swamp. Ashe then veered downriver and forded the Savannah River to safety among those thrashing through the high water. In defense of an accusation of personal cowardice at his Court of Inquiry, Ashe stated that he was actively trying to get in front of his panic driven troops to try and turn them back to the fight.

With the militia gone, this left Colonel Elbert and Colonel McIntosh’s Georgians of just over two hundred Continental and militia troops to face the British charge. It was a pattern in American armies throughout the war; when the poorly trained militia fled for their lives, the Continental troops held firm, as did any contingency of militia who by example, stood with them. With dogged resolve, the Georgians stayed their ground, matching shot for shot and paring sword for sword in close combat. As the Highlanders swarmed around them and Prevost called in his reserve of grenadier, they were eventually surrounded. Half his men were dead or dying when Elbert, himself wounded as was McIntosh, put a stop to the slaughter and called for his men to ground their weapons and surrender. The British captured or cut down the last of the militia as they tried to escape through the swamp or swim the river bringing the battle to a conclusion.

Casualties

The carnage on the American side was never fully tallied. British commander Mark Prevost claimed that 150 bodies were found on the battlefield. That he had taken 227 captives. Many prisoners were wounded and most were from Elbert’s Georgians who fought obstinately until surrounded and forced to surrender. Twenty-seven officers were among the prisoners; including three other colonels beside Elbert and McIntosh. An undisclosed number were lost in the swamp or drowned in the river; estimates put the number around fifty men. Most of the four or five hundred troops that did make it across the water continued in a beeline back to their homes in North Carolina. So too, the British reported seven pieces of field artillery and a thousand stand of arms were taken; the American claim placed the number of lost arms at five hundred.

Of British losses, one officer and five privates were killed and eleven had been wounded.

Aftermath

“Gen. Ashe’s affair at Brier Creek was nothing less than a total rout. Never was an army more completely surprised and never were men more panic struck as Gen. Ashe’s…Most threw down their arms and ran through a deep swamp two or three miles to gain the banks of a wide and rapid river…to escape from the bayonet.,,Many of them endeavoring to reach the opposite shore sunk down and were buried in a watery grave, while those who gained the other side…were still so terrified that they struggled through the woods in every direction…” General William Moultrie

By evening of the 3^rd, Ashe and many survivors arrived at Mathew’s Bluff, about four miles distant from Brier Creek, where some of General Rutherford’s men were encamped.

On March 13-16, 1779, a Court of Inquiry was held at Purrysburg, SC for the purpose of investigating the conduct of Gen. John Ashe.  Witnesses reported that Ashe had cowardly fled the battle into the woods and swamp. Ashe doggedly countered that he had been desperately trying to halt the rout and turn the men back to the fight. The court concluded that:

“General Ashe did not take all the necessary precautions which he might have done to secure his camp and obtain timely intelligence of the movements and approach of the enemy; but they do entirely acquit him of every imputation of a want of personal courage…”   Signed William Moultrie, President.

The victory at Brier Creek allowed British forces to maintain a foothold in Georgia. Many argued that it emboldened England, particularly Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in America, General Henry Clinton, to launch a massive invasion of South Carolina leading to the fall of Charleston on April 12, 1780. This resulted in the surrender of Lincoln’s entire army, the largest loss of men for the Americans in the entire war.  Afterwards opening up all of the Carolinas to invasion; prompting General Moultrie to write that Brier Creek resulted in the war protracted a year longer and that there would have been no invasion of North Carolina if this event had not taken place.

Colonel Campbell not only turned his command over to Lt. Colonel Prevost prior to leaving for England, but also his position as Governor of Georgia, reverting the state back to a colony. It was a position Prevost held until the spiring of 1780, as he was transferred to take command of British forces in Jamaica. He was wounded in an affair against local rebel forces and in October, 1781, die of these wounds. Brigadier General John Ashe would return to Wilmington, North Carolina where he remained active against loyalist forces. In 1781, British Lord Cornwallis captured Ashe and imprisoned him. He was soon after exchanged, but had contracted small pox while in prison and died shortly after. General William Bryant was sufficiently shaken by the experience and soon returned to North Carolina. He resigned his commission at the end of April, 1779. Colonel Elbert, who would become future governor of Georgia at war’s end, remained a prisoner on parole in the British camp for more than a year. During this time, he was accorded great respect and kindness. The British made every effort to suborn his allegiance, offering promotion, honors and other rewards, but he stayed loyal to the American cause. Upon exchange, he remained in service until war’s end, obtaining the commission of General upon its conclusion.

Myth: A Masonic Signal Saved Colonel Elbert’s Life

A story concerning Continental Officer Colonel Samuel Elbert’s surrender has been circulating for decades in texts and presently listed on the web. The story goes that Elbert, having been wounded and while trying to surrender, was struck down. He was about to be bayonetted by a regular redcoat, when he made the Masonic sign of distress. Good fortune placed a British officer and fellow Mason nearby who saw the sign and ordered Elbert to be spared.

The story is pure romantic fabrication. There is no mention of this occurring in McCall’s 1784 text, nor any other early discourse on the battle. The official British account only states that Elbert offered his sword to a British officer and received quarter. Not exactly the stuff of legends. But that did not stop Charles C. Jones who, in 1883, granted it the grace of fact by first presenting it in his History of Georgia. The 19^th century proved to be ripe for romantic trappings. Publishers frequently pushed their historical authors to garnish boring facts with interesting antidotes; usually a tale of love, unselfish gallantry, or, as in case, life threating events of honor and chivalry. All to increase book sales.

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RESOURCE

American Battlefield Trust.  “Battle of Brier Creek” 

American Revolution in North Carolina.  “List of Officers of North Carolina Militias.”  

Ashmore, Otis; Olmstead, Charles (June 1926). “The Battles of Kettle Creek and Brier Creek”. The Georgia Historical Quarterly. June 1926(2): pp 85–125.

Cox, William E.  “Brigadier General john Ashe’s Defeat in the Battle of Brier Creek.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly.  Vol. 57. No. 2 (Summer 1973), pp 295-302.

Ford, Worthington Chauncey.  British Officers Serving in the American Revolution 1784-1783.  1897: Historical Printing Club, Brooklyn, New York.

Heidler, David S.  “The American Defeat at Brier Creek, 3 March, 1779.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly. Vol. 66. No. 3 (Fall, 1982), pp 317-331.

Jones, Charles C.  The History of Georgia in Two Volumes.  1883: Houghton, Mifflin & Company, Boston, MA.

McCall, Hugh, Captain.  History of Georgia, Vol. 1 Containing Brief Sketches of the Most Remarkable Events Up to the Present Day. 1784: Reprint Edition 1909: A. B. Caldwell, Atlanta, Georgia. The Battle is described on pages 403-405.   

O’Kelley, Patrick.  Nothing but Blood and Slaughter: Military Operations and Order of Battle of the Revolutionary War in the Carolinas, Volume One, 1771-1779. 2003: Booklocker.com

Ouzis, Clay. Samuel Elbert and the Age of Revolution in Georgia, 1740 – 1788. 2022: Mercer University Press, Macon, GA.

Purcell, Clarice E. “The Public Career of Samuel Elbert.” 1951 Master’s thesis. University of Georgia, Augusta, GA.

Rankin, Hugh.  The North Carolina Continentals.  1971: University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC.

Schenawolf, Harry.  “British Army Command & Structure in the American Revolution – Grenadier & Light Infantry Battalions” Jan. 31, 2017: Revolutionary War Journal.

Smith, Paul H.  Loyalists and Redcoats. 1964: University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC.

Wilson, David K.  The Southern Strategy: Britain’s Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775–1780: 2005: University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC