The Battle of Blackstocks, November 20, 1780, was one of the more crucial battles of the southern war and important American victory. Yet the battle has been lost to history, overshadowed by the later Battle of Cowpens (January 17, 1781). But upon study, Blackstocks provides an insight, if not a preview, of why British Lt. Col. Banaster Tarleton lost at Camden, and why American General Daniel Morgan could rely on militia support in his victory.

Blackstocks pitted British Legion commander Bloody Ben Tarleton, against the Gamecock, militia leader General Thomas Sumter. It was the second time the two clashed. The first was a devastating defeat for Sumter at the Battle of Fishing Creek, August 18, 1780. But three months later, Blackstocks proved a resounding loss for Tarleton and his Legion; his first. Time and again Tarleton’s tactics had proved successful. Once he came upon his enemy, he ordered a quick and brutal assault without the knowledge of terrain or his enemy’s strength. It mattered not if he faced Continental troops or militia; each ended with a brutal slaughter and scattering of his prey. But at Blackstocks, against hardened and experienced militia, the golden boy’s attack fizzled out. He sent his 63^rd Foot to attack over a wide killing field, eighty against hundreds of rifle and musket. They were mowed down. When the Legion charged, they too met the same fate. Tarleton withdrew, leaving the field of honor to the Americans; a meadow littered with red and green coats; twenty British for every rebel casualty!

But after the battle, in the eyes of his superiors, the flamboyant Legion officer’s aura remained unblemished. The war’s premier spin-doctor, Tarleton padded his after-action report with lies and fantasies, convincing Lt. General Lord Charles Cornwallis he had yet notched another glorious triumph. Cornwallis wrote to General Henry Clinton on December 4, 1780, that “It is not easy for Lt. Col. Tarleton to add to the reputation he has acquired in this Province, but the defeating 1,000 men posted on very strong ground …with 190 cavalry and 80 infantry is a proof of that spirit and those talents which must render the most essential services to his country…”  One could argue, had Tarleton been truthful at Blackstocks and reported the facts, that he blundered in his approach and tactics resulting in defeat and loss of 67% of his men that fought that day, Cornwallis might never have given him command of the British force that went after Brigadier General Daniel Morgan. The later Cowpens was a disastrous fumble that even Tarleton could not lie or report his way out to his military superiors. But for the English public, Tarleton’s popularity remained spotless. Much like a certain modern day politician’s mutilation of the facts; when treated with half-truths or more often, outright lies, they trump reality.

And arguably, of perhaps equal importance, General Thomas Sumter’s wounding at the battle, removing the general from active duty for some months, was a gift to the American cause. The contentious, ego driven and prickly militia leader marched to his own drum. Sumter was difficult to work with and preferred his own separate command rather than coordinating actions with Continental Army Officers. In modern-day terms he was a right ‘pain in the ass.’ At a time when major changes were taking place in the Southern Continental Army, Sumter’s removal from action proved a blessing. Plans were laid that critically relied on local militia support. With the popular leader out of the picture, able militia officers stepped forward and readily took orders to defeat the enemy. Some scholars believe that Cowpens might never have been the deciding American victory had Morgan been forced to rely on the whims of General Thomas Sumter.    

Background

In 1780, the war in the south had been somewhat of a roller coaster ride for the British. Since invading South Carolina, a two-month siege of Charleston ended in the total surrender of the American army on May 12^th.. Banastre Tarleton’s quick moving legion fanned out into the backcountry and destroyed additional Continental troops at the battles of Monck’s Corner, April 14^th, and Battle of Waxhaws or Buford’s Massacre, May 29. Resistance faded as rebel militia leader’s paroles were taken. Outposts established across the state. And loyalists, called ‘friends’, were assembling to fight for the crown. All was ready to advance into North Carolina and spread British influence. Or was it?

Tensions ignited across the former colony. A civil war erupted between neighbors. Rebel militias formed around backcountry leaders who refused to accept British control. Men like Thomas Sumter, Elijah Clarke, William Richardson Davie, and of course, the ever-elusive Francis ‘Swamp Fox’ Marion. Guerrilla hit and run tactics turned British patrols and foraging parties into death sentences. Outposts and Tory militiamen were attacked by roving ‘gangs of marauders;’ Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, and Ramsour’s Mill to name a few. Lt. General Lord Charles Cornwallis, left in charge of the British southern army, used all his resources to go after the rebel leaders. But no amount of stomping on the fire could snuff out the flames of resistance.

The southern conquest regained momentum with the Battle of Camden, August 16, 1780, that shattered the resurrected American Southern Army. And on the heels of this action, just three days later, at the Battle of Fishing Creek, August 18^th, Cornwallis greatest plague, Colonel Thomas Sumter’s large force of rebel followers were savagely sabered by Tarleton’s Legion. Things were back on track. Yet the same day Sumter’s command was cut to pieces, at Musgrove Mill, British partisan regulars and loyalist militia were mowed down by Carolina militia and a large detachment of ‘over the mountain men;’ wilderness settlers who the British called ‘yelling boys (prequel to another war’s famed ‘rebel yell’).

Cornwallis, desperate to bring South Carolina in line so he could move north, revved up the use of violence. In September, Major James Wemyss and his 63^rd regiment were sent out on a scorch and burn raid through the low country, seeking Marion and other rebel leaders while punishing patriot supporters. A sixty mile long and fifteen-mile-wide path of torched homes, businesses, and churches lay in ruin, (similar but of smaller scale to the Sherman’s Civil War march to the sea). The result was far from what His Lordship desired. Hatred followed Major Wemyss’ path. Many residents who had been ‘on the fence’ grabbed their musket to join ranks with Marion and other rebel leaders.

By September 23^rd, Cornwallis decided he could no longer put off the invasion north and crossed into North Carolina. But His Lordship had been plagued with Yellow Fever, reducing his rank’s effectiveness. On the 26^th, the Battle of Charlotte was yet another set-back. A small band of rebel militia, led by the competent leader William Richardson Davie, defiantly held the town. Davie’s  riflemen threw back three charges by the despised Legion cavalry (led by Major George Hanger as Tarleton was sick with Yellow Fever) before the patriots marched off in an orderly withdrawal. The action stalled Cornwallis march north and before he regain momentum, on October 14^th His Lordship’s plans once more took a major dip along the roller coater’s ride.

Devastating news of the Battle of King’s Mountain (October 7, 1780) had arrived. British Major Patrick Ferguson was killed and his large command of Tory militia, the entire west flank of Cornwallis’ army, was annihilated. All survivors were captured and several Tory leaders were hanged. This in effect doused all hope for throngs of loyalist friends flocking to the British banner.  On October 15^th, Cornwallis called off the invasion north and returned to Winnsboro, South Carolina, some sixty-five miles south. There he would regroup and send out large detachments to deal with the pesky militia once and for all. Tarleton was well and went after the Swamp Fox to the east. And Sumter, who American General Horatio Gates had ordered to shadow and harass Cornwallis’ army, would be dealt with once and for all.

Prelude to Battle

In early November, Cornwallis learned that promoted General Thomas Sumter was only thirty miles northwest of Winnsboro at Moore’s Mill. He decided to send Major Wemyss and a detachment of his 63^rd, along with a company of Legion Horse, to round up the ‘banditti.’ Though outnumbered three to one, Wemyss took a chapter from Tarleton’s aggressive tactics and ordered a surprise night attack on Sumter’s camp, Battle of Fishdam Ford, November 9, 1780. But Sumter’s colonels had learned their lesson at Fishing Creek. They instructed their men to sleep on their arms away from their campfire’s light. When Wemyss’ men stormed into Sumter’s camp’s they were on full display and met with a sheet of lead. Wemyss was wounded and captured along with a third of his men lying casualties on the field.

When the surviving troops reported back to Cornwallis, His Lordship was furious. There was only one answer to solving the Thomas Sumter problem; Bloody Ben Tarleton. Since gaining health, Tarleton had been frustrated in his attempt to catch the ever-elusive Francis ‘Swamp Fox’ Marion. Cornwallis’ urgent order to report to Winnsboro arrived at Tarleton’s headquarters on November 14, 1780 in the low country on the upper Santee River. That same day Tarleton drew in his scouts and turned northwest, riding hard to his summons, 130 miles distant.

Meanwhile, Cornwallis was concerned for his major outpost at Ninety-six, sixty-five miles further west of Winnsboro. o Brierly’s Ferry on the Broad River (16 miles south of Winnsboro), He dispatched Major Archibald McArthur to Brierly’s Ferry on the Broad River, 16 miles southwest of Winnsboro. McArthur commanded 250 regulars of the First Battalion, Frazer’s Highlanders, and the eighty Fishdam Ford survivors of the 63^rd Foot. With Major Wemyss wounded and on parole in Charleston, Cornwallis’ favorite aide-de-camp to whom His Lordship treated as a son, Lt. John Money, was put in command. Couriers were sent to Tarleton to hurry his troops to join McArthur at Brierly’s Ferry and take command for the pursuit of Sumter.

Unaware that Tarleton’s troops raced westward, Sumter carried on his plans to harass British outposts. After the Battle of Fishdam Ford, the militia leader’s numbers swelled to just over 1,000 men; most of them seasoned backcountry fighters. He had encamped in the Dutch Fork Region, where the Broad and Saluda Rivers fork to form the short, but wide Congaree River. Captain Patrick Carr of Georgia was sent to keep an eye on McArthur at Brierly’s Ferry while Colonel Thomas Tayler rode to raid the British depot at Summer’s Mill. Sumter gathered his main force and set his sights on the Tory post at Williams Plantation, fifteen miles north of ninety-six.

    

On the 18^th of November Tarleton, along with his Legion of cavalry and mounted infantry, 190 strong, arrived at Brierly’s Ferry. Though weary after their three-day forced march, Tarleton was never solicitous of his men nor their mounts. He immediately ordered McArthur to break camp and cross the Broad River, heading west in search of their prey. By 10 PM that night, Tarleton finally ordered a halt and encamped. The next day, the 19^th, scouts were sent out in all directions to probe the region in search of Sumter’s camp and the militia leader’s intent. One party reported back that Sumter was just north of the British and was about to attack the Tory outpost at Williams Plantation. Tarleton broke camp that night and marched toward the Enoree River and bivouacked at Indian Creek. Because of Tarleton’s quick marches and approaching his enemy in a night march, Sumter remained ignorant of Tarleton’s presence. However, providence or sheer luck saved the rebel leader from another surprise attack by Bloody Ben.

Before dawn on the 20^th, a British regular of the 63^rd stole a horse and rode to Sumter’s camp. He told all; of Tarleton’s quick approach, his plan to attack, and the despised partisan leader’s strength and location. Sumter called council. His officers had to decide fast; fight or flight. Though they had a two to one advantage over Tarleton’s force, over half the British were regular foot soldiers with nearly 200 dreaded Legion. Tarleton was feared as much as hated, with many in the rebel camp having tried to defend themselves against the savage slash of heavy sabers. But the British were too close. If they tried to run, they could be caught trying to cross the river, or be stretched out over the region in column; a proper target to be chased and cut down by hard riding Legionaries. And if they managed to escape, Sumter argued they would give up their mission, discouraging patriot militiamen who would give up and go home. All were hardened veterans with multiple battles under their belts. The decision was unanimous. They would fight.

At the war council, all agreed to find a strong defensive position where they would prepare and wait for Tarleton. They were familiar with the headstrong partisan leader’s tactics. When Tarleton came upon his enemy, he would not pause to study terrain, nor his enemy’s strength or positioning. He would attack; directly and head on. Colonel Thomas Brandon had been at King’s Mountain. Dutch Forks was his home. He knew it well and he knew where to meet Tarleton; Captain William Blackstock’s Farm on the Tyger River (Captain Blackstock was campaigning elsewhere with the bulk of Roebuck’s Regiment and not present). Captain Patrick Carr was left at the Enoree with a small detachment to give early warning of Tarleton’s approach. With the rest of his force, Sumter rode north to Blackstocks to await what would be one of the more important battles of the southern war.

Combatants

British

Commanded by Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton. Total 250 – 270 regulars and Partisan Cavalry [Tarleton’s memoir after the war stated he had 170 cavalry whereas in a letter from Cornwallis to General Clinton, he gave the number at 190]

• 63^rd Regiment of Foot Detachment led by Major John Money: 80 men
• British Legion Cavalry – 6 troops of 170 – 190 men led by Captains David Kinlock, Richard Hovenden, Jacob James, Thomas Sanford, David Ogilvy, and Lt. John Skinner
• Georgia Light Dragoons – 1 company commanded by Captain Archibald Campbell
• Total: Sources state 250 – 270

American Militia

Commanded by Brigadier General Thomas Sumter.  Multiple sources gave the total as anywhere from 450 – 600 men [Cornwallis most likely exaggerated 1,000 in his report to Gen. Clinton].  It was composed of detached companies from 21 district regiments of mainly South Carolina plus North Carolina and Georgia. Most companies had anywhere from a dozen to twenty-some men. Fourteen of the regiments were represented by only one to three companies.

• 2^nd Spartan Regiment: Col. Thomas Brandon (12 ) companies
• New Acquisition District: Col. Samuel Watson and (10)
• Roebuck’s Battalion of the Spartan Regiment: Col. Benjamin Roebuck was not present (8)
• Little River District: Colonel Joseph Hayes and (5)
• Turkey Creek: Col. Edward Lacey (4)
• Hill’s Regiment of Light Dragoons: Col. William Hill (5)
• 1^st Spartan Regiment: William Smith (3), Upper Ninety-Six: Col. James McCall (3), Lower District: Col. David Glynn (2), Hampton’s Regiment of Light Dragoons: Lt. Col. Henry Hampton (2 rifle companies), Kershaw Regiment: (2),  Orangeburgh: (1), Fairfield: Col. Richard Winn (1), Lower Ninety-Six: Maj. Samuel Hammond (1), S. Carolina 3^rd Dragoons: Capt. Robert McElvy (1) & Capt. Thornton [killed] (1)
• Burke County (GA): Col. John Twiggs and 100 riflemen
• Wilkes County (GA): Col. Elijah Clarke & Major William Chandler with Capt. Patrick Carr (1)
• Richmond County (GA): Col. Benjamin Few (1)
• Rutherford County (NC): Col. Andrew Hampton (3)
• Washington County (NC): Captain (?) Burnett (1)
• Polk’s Regiment of Light Dragoons of Mecklenburg County (NC): Capt. James Martin (1)

Battlefield and Rebel Position

Short Video of present day Blackstocks Battlefield. View looking up the slope to where the farm house, barn, and outbuildings were used by Sumter’s riflemen. One hundred Georgia riflemen manned a stout wooden fence on the left of the field while rebel militiamen were positioned in the woods and to the right of the buildings. Video Clip care of Paul T. Carter.

The battle took place about 10 miles west of present-day Union, South Carolina. Most of the land in front of the Blackstocks farm had been cleared which offered a clear field of fire and room to maneuver. The road to the farm descended from a hill and crossed a shallow stream before ascending through a field and gentle slope of fifty acres. The lane carried on past a long wooden fence on its left toward the farmhouse, barn, and other outbuildings, all constructed of logs, before descending sharply about 200 yards to the Tyger river. Colonel William Hill described this fence that would play an important role in the battle: “[for] about a quarter of a mile there was a very large and strong fence not made with common nails but with small trees notched one on the other.” To the right of the farmhouse was a thickly wooded ridge with steep slopes. In Tarleton’s memoir after the war, he described this ridge as an “inaccessible mountain.”

It was late in the afternoon when the rebels reached the farm. Men lit fires to heat their meals while the officers examined the grounds and assigned detached regiments to defensive positions. Sumter chose his command post along the wooded ridge to the right of the house. The regiments of Colonels James McCall, Thomas Brandon, and (Lt. Col) William Bratton were with him and lined the ridge facing the field. The barn and outbuildings were occupied by Lt. Colonel Henry Hampton’s riflemen. The walls had not been chinked so riflemen could fire between the logs while concealed. Colonels Lacey and Hill’s men were about a hundred yards below the ridge from Sumter’s command post along the woods. At the stout fence along the left side of the road and at the upper part of the fence in front of the house were posted Colonel Twiggs’ 100 Georgia riflemen. Colonel Winn commanded his reserve of assorted detached regiments including his own between Sumter’s position and the house. Once set, the determined militiamen had but to wait.

Battle

First Clash of Arms

After breaking camp on November 20^th, Tarleton, as usual, pushed his men hard in pursuit of Sumter. He was fearful the rebels would slip across the Tyger River and scatter to the wind before he could bring on a fight. In the late morning, scouts found Sumter’s trail leading towards a ford on the Enoree River. Sumter had posted one of Elijah Clarke’s Georgians, Captain Carr, along with his detachment, to watch the crossing. As soon as Tarleton’s advance troopers appeared, they spotted Carr’s men and charged across the ford. Carr’s men turned and galloped off to warn Sumter, leaving behind five Tory prisoners. Tarleton’s men rarely bothered to ascertain whether the militiaman they savagely cut down with heavy sabers were friend or foe; all having similar attire. As the loyalists called out and smiled upon providence, deliverance turned to terror as they were horribly mutilated. Even in his report and memoirs, Tarleton later maintained a quick victory over rebel militia writing, “…a detachment to cover the rear was waiting the return of a patrole. The advanced guard of the British dragoons charged this body, and defeated them with considerable slaughter.”

Tarleton Races Ahead, Leaving His Infantry and Artillery Behind

By mid-afternoon, Tarleton’s grueling drive to catch up with Sumter was becoming too much for the foot infantry and artillery. The confident British commander was never concerned about an enemy’s superior numbers; especially when it came to rabble militia. As he had done at the Battle of Waxhaws when intent on catching Colonel Abraham Buford’s continentals, he raced ahead with a portion of his command, leaving the foot soldiers behind. He ordered Major McArthur to bring his highlanders and artillery along as quickly as possible while he and his horsemen galloped ahead. Tarleton, writing in the third-person, stated; “He therefore left his legion and light infantry, who had made meritorious exertions during the whole day, to march on at their own pace, whilst he made a rapid pursuit with one hundred and seventy cavalry of the legion, and eighty mounted men of the 63rd.

Tarleton’s torrid speed brought him close to Sumter’s line. Just as the British van appeared they were fired upon by Sumter’s pickets. At that same moment the partisan dragoons spotted a group of rebels. Tarleton and later wrote; “Before five o’clock the advanced guard charged a detachment of the Americans, who gave ground after some loss, and retreated to the main body.”  This proved to be Georgian veteran of King’s Mountain, Major William Chandler and his company, returning from a foraging expedition. The race was on with Legion cavalry nipping at the Georgian’s heels. Though laden with wagons, the rebels managed to slip within Sumter’s lines with literally seconds to spare.

All sources agree that when Tarleton arrived, instead of ordering an immediate attack, he paused. This was not Fishing Creek whereas his prey was still asleep in camp and unaware of his presence. Sumter’s men outnumbered Tarleton’s as much as three to one and were positioned on strong ground that was to the partisan leader’s disadvantage. But shadows were beginning to lengthen and it would be dark soon. In the night, Sumter might slip across the Tyger and disperse his men. The Legion commander was desirous to bring Sumter to battle. But would he do so with or without his infantry and cannon?

Battle Begins

Scholars disagree as to who initiated the battle. Tarleton stated that he chose to wait for his infantry and artillery, but his actions prove otherwise. Tarleton wrote, again in third-person; “The whole position was visible, owing to the elevation of the ground, and this formidable appearance made Tarleton halt upon the opposite height, where he intended to remain quiet till his infantry and three pounder arrived. To encourage the enemy to do the same, he dismounted the 63^rd to take post, and part of the cavalry to ease their horses.”  Rebel accounts state that knapsacks were removed and cavalry sat by their mounts. However, when Tarleton wrote the 63^rd dismounted and took post, they were not quiet in the least. Lt. John Money (Cornwallis’ favorite aide-de-camp) was ordered to advance his eighty 63^rd regulars to fix bayonets and march down the hill towards Colonel Twigg’s 100 Georgian riflemen. The effect of the 63^rd ‘taking post’ with fixed bayonets was quite the opposite of encouraging the enemy to wait on their arms. Sumter viewing this from the rebel line countered this threatening act by ordering a detachment to support the Georgian riflemen.

The American version has Sumter initiating the battle before the British infantry and cannon could arrive. The rebels noted Tarleton’s hesitation and had been informed why he did not immediately attack. Tarleton concurred in his memoir that “A woman on horseback had viewed the line of march from a wood, and, by a nearer road, had given intelligence that the British were approaching without infantry or cannon.” Georgian Lt. Charles Middleton wrote, “They [British] appeared within 400 yards of our camp, dismounted, and formed in a field…Brigadier General Sumter noticed that his enemy had divided his forces and he quickly realized that Lt. Col. Tarleton was waiting for artillery support.”  Sumter would not have it. He would begin the battle immediately before the rest of Tarleton’s force arrived. Seeing the 63^rd marching down the far hill towards the shallow stream, he sent a detachment forward with orders to attack.

63^rd Advance With Bayonet

With only an hour or so of light left, the battle was joined. Col. William Few’s Georgians and Major Joseph McJunkin of the 2^nd Spartan Militia (12 companies strong) were ordered to lead a large detachment down the field (Tarleton put the number at 400), cross the shallow stream, then march uphill the opposite hill to engage the 63^rd.  The rebels raced downhill, got halfway, and faltered. Time and again militia proved stalwart when fighting from behind walls and barriers, but out in the open, facing a line of British regulars who steadily approached with fixed bayonets; that was another matter. Few and McJunkin’s men halted then delivered a volley of musket at too great a distance to do any harm. Undeterred, Lt. Money’s 63^rd swept forward; grim faced, their gleaming 17inch pikes at the end of six-foot muskets. This was too much for the militia. According to Lt. Charles Middleton, “…they were to engage and if not strong enough to resist they were directed to fall back gradually…” Gradual immediately turned into a rout and they raced back up the hill, some halting to fire before joining the others. Officers could not rally them until past the log buildings and into the woods, safely within the rebel line.

Elated and excited to see the ‘rebel rabble’ turn tail, Lt. Money committed a ruinous error in judgement. With sword drawn, he carried on the charge, leading his small force forward; into death’s grip. At 200 yards, he was within the killing field of Colonel Henry Hampton’s skilled riflemen. Sheltered in the buildings and firing in the spaces between the logs, they began to lay down a devastating fire. Militia ignored eighteenth century’s honorary rules of engagement. Sharpshooters aimed for epaulets and cross belts, taking down officers first. Lt. Cope fell dead. He was soon followed by Lt. Gibson, also shot dead. Lt. John Money, favorite to Cornwallis who treated him as a son, fell mortally wounded in front of his men, his sword still grasped in his hand. As the 63^rd stoically advanced, men continued to drop under intense and accurate rifle fire. According to one of the 71^st Highlanders who came on the scene at battle’s end, fully one third of the regular’s privates were shot down. But discipline ruled and the Englishmen would not give up the field. Heads lowered, they pressed on into a hail of deadly lead.

Tarleton and his Legion sat their mounts on top of the opposite hill, quietly witnessing the 63rd’s heroic advance, and slaughter. And Sumter observed the Legion. He galloped to Colonel Lacey’s position on his right and ordered him to take his men through the woods and flank the Legion, to bring them under fire. With the action in front of them, Tarleton nor his men noticed the stealth militiamen slipping through the forest to their left. Around 60 to 75 yards from the British cavalry (Lt. Middleton placed it at 75 yards), a sheet of buckshot exploded from the woods and ripped through the green coated partisans. In an instant, twenty horsemen were hurled from their saddles. But according to Tarleton, he and his men immediately regained the upper hand and charged Lacey’s men who pulled back, casually commenting afterwards, “…a troop of cavalry, under Lieutenant Skinner, bravely repulsed the detachment which threatened the flank.”

Tarleton’s Cavalry Charges

With nearly half the 63^rd sprawled across the opposite field and troopers lying still alongside him, Tarleton erupted into action. He wrote, “Though the undertaking appeared hazardous, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton determined to charge the enemy’s center with a column of dragoons, in order to cover the 63rd, whose situation was now become dangerous.” In his typical fashion he drew his sword, ordered the bugle sounded, and thundered down the hill at the head of his cavalry. They tore across the stream with saber’s raised over their heads. Guttural shouts and shrieks accompanied the horsemen as they galloped up the hill to rescue their comrades and fall upon their prey. Tarleton wrote, “The attack was conducted with great celerity, and was attended with immediate success. The cavalry soon reached the houses, and broke the Americans, who from that instant began to disperse: The 63rd immediately rallied, and darkness put an end to the engagement.” He added that three American colonels “fell in the action and…upwards of one hundred Americans were killed and wounded, and fifty were made prisoners.” He admitted to fifty-one British casualties.

Yet another sterling performance by the bold, daring, victorious Legionnaire. Except it was a lie. All of it. A boldfaced lie. No, Tarleton’s forces never reached the buildings. No, he never broke the Americans nor pierced any part of the rebel line. No, he did not disperse the rebel defenders; in fact, Tarleton never got beyond mid-field. The 63^rd did rally, only to carry off their wounded while they made a hasty retreat. As for the three mysterious colonels Tarleton reported he vanquished, the highest rank to fall casualty that day among the rebels was one captain killed. As to total casualties, Tarleton’s claims of American losses was grossly exaggerated while not even coming close to British killed and wounded.

Cavalry Stopped Cold and Forced to Retreat

Returning to reality, Tarleton and his Legion charged, but were stopped cold by intense and effective rebel fire from both his front and left flank. Author John Buchanan wrote, “Hampton’s South Carolina riflemen in the outbuildings and the riflemen behind the stout log fence [Georgians under Col. John Twiggs] and in the thick woods nearby met the charge of the Legion dragoons with the same volume of accurate fire that crippled the 63^rd.  It was Lt. Skinner who rescued the withering 63^rd, not Tarleton who had dismounted and slung Cornwallis’ favorite aide, Lt. Money, over his saddle then riding off the field. American Colonel William Hill, commander of Light Dragoons and present during Huck’s Defeat, July 12, 1780, wrote of the Americans effectively stopping Tarleton’s charge and forcing them to retreat; “The Americans having the advantage of the before mentioned fence, together with the thick wood just by the fence, that before they [Tarleton’s cavalry] got through the Lane their front both men and horses fell so fast that the way was nearly stopt up – a retreat was then ordered which was a pleasing sight for the Americans to behold – so many falling either by wounds or stumbling over the dead horses or men.”

If Tarleton refused to except the damning reality of his defeat at Blackstocks, his officers did not share such qualms. Lt. Roderick McKenzie of Frasers’ 71^st Highlanders wrote that his version of the battle was “collected from the concurrent testimony of several officers of veracity, who were in action in that engagement.” McKenzie continued that “The 63^rd was roughly handled; the commanding officer [Lt. Money], two others, with one-third of their privates, fell. Colonel Tarleton, observing their situation, charged with his cavalry; unable to dislodge the enemy, either from the log barn or the height upon his left, he was obliged to fall back. Lt. Skinner, attached to the cavalry, with a presence of mind ever useful in such emergencies covered the retreat of the 63^rd  [Tarleton had left the field and his Legion with wounded Lt. Money, Cornwallis’ favorite aide, across his saddle]. In this manner did the whole party continue to retire, till they formed a junction with their infantry, who were advancing to sustain them, leaving Sumter in quiet possession of the field.”

Casualties

Tarleton did what he did best, lie to cover up his shortcomings. He reported to Cornwallis that “…upwards of one hundred Americans were killed and wounded, and fifty were made prisoners.” Nineteenth century author Benson J. Lossing was far more accurate when he stated in his Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution that the Patriots lost 3 killed and 5 wounded for a total of 8 casualties. British Lt. McKenzie of Frazier’s Highlanders once more shed light on American casualties writing, “The real truth is that the Americans being well sheltered, sustained very inconsiderable loss in the attack, and as for the three Colonels [Tarleton’s report mentioned that three rebel colonels had been killed] they must certainly have been imaginary beings, ‘men in buckram’,”

As for British losses. Tarleton admitted that fifty-one were killed or wounded. Once more far from the truth. Again, Lossing was near accurate when he wrote of British casualties; 90 were killed and 100 were wounded. Most scholars agree that Tarlton lost 92 killed and 76 wounded for a total of 168 casualties. Therefore, the actual percentage loss of Tarleton’s command who fought that day was an astonishing 67%; twenty British fell for each American! Unheard of. Not until Cowpens, Tarleton’s second loss, did the British suffer anything that came close to that number.

But for the rebel force, the battle resulted in a tremendous loss; among the five wounded was General Sumter. And it occurred after Tarleton’s charge had been smashed and survivors of the Legion and the 63^rd were retreating. While red and green coated British stumbled along the road from the field amidst cries of the wounded and shrieks of dying horses, Sumter, followed by his officers, rode down the hill for a closer look. They paused when nearing the British, around fifty to sixty yards. Lt. Skinner headed up the rear guard that included a platoon of 63^rd regulars. He spotted the rebel party and ordered the men to raise their muskets. The volley ripped among the militia officers. Captain David Hopkins wrote to his sons that “Captain Gabriel Brown was killed on my left hand and General Sumter was on my right. It happened from one platoon of the enemy on their retreat.”

Those with Sumter stated that when the patrol raised their weapons, he instinctively twisted away and was hit by six buckshot. Five went into the side of his chest. The sixth entered under his right shoulder, chipped his spine, and lodged under his left shoulder. This bullet was the more critical injury. Tarleton  would later write that Sumter was wounded in the shoulder. The surviving party rode back to Sumter’s headquarters where the leader kept his wound quiet; assuming he did not want to panic the men. But he could not hide the show of blood from Captain McKelvey and told Col. Hampton, who had commanded the riflemen in the outhouses, that he could not lift his right arm. Sumter continued to direct his men, but realized he needed to relinquish command, turning it over to Col. John Twiggs of Georgia. Sumter was helped to the Blackstock farmhouse. Doctor Robert Brownfield had been attending the wounded on the battlefield and when informed, came directly to Sumter’s aid, removing the bullet from under the leader’s arm. Sumter was semi-conscious when laid on a raw bull’s hide stretched between poles laced to a horse. Col. Lacey provided a 100-horse escort to remove the general to safety; a journey that crossed two rivers before arriving at the rebel outpost on Steel Creek.    

Aftermath & Conclusion

Colonel Twiggs was decisive in command. Militiamen rode to harass the retreating British. Thirty riderless horses were captured. The wounded were brought in off the field, including British who according to Lt. McKenzie, were treated with the “strictest humanity,” and “supplied with every comfort.” American dead were buried near the river. Decoy fires were lit and that night, in a cold November rain, the militia crossed the Tyger and dispersed to their homes; there to wait for the next call to battle.

Tarleton had withdrawn two miles from Blackstocks and encamped. Major Archibald McArthur’s Highlanders, Legion infantry, and artillery arrived that night. It is believed, with his command intact, Tarleton intended to have another go at Sumter. Instead, he buried the dead and cared for his wounded. He remained a few days longer before pulling back towards Winnsboro. For Tarleton, he had accomplished his purpose; to protect the outposts at Williams Plantation and Ninety-Six while dispersing the threat by Sumter’s militia. Williams Plantation was Sumter’s target and in all probability, so too Ninety-Six. On November 22^nd, he wrote his report to Cornwallis falsely claiming victory over Sumter; but so too stating he never intended to attack writing, “only to harass and lie close to him till I could bring p the rest of the Corps, as he could never pass the Tyger if I had attacked. The 63^rd were attacked by the Enemy which brought on the affair.”  Cornwallis took Tarleton on his word and accepted his report as fact. He congratulated his favorite mastiff’s victory but on learning of Tarleton’s loss, especially the 63^rd regulars he could not replace, he wrote “but wish it had not cost you so much.” Cornwallis learned the extent of his loss when Major McArthur wrote that His Lordship’s aide, one he treated as a son, Lt. John Money, had died from his wounds on December 1^st.

One can speculate what would have happened had Cornwallis been fully aware that instead of a victory, Blackstocks was a dismal defeat. That how poorly Tarleton managed a larger command, rather than just his own Legion in which the aggressive cavalryman had attained earlier victories. Would Cornwallis, barely two months after Blackstocks, have consented to place Tarleton at the head of a far larger command to go after General Daniel Morgan’s detachment of Continental soldiers and militia? Where at the Battle of Cowpens, January 17, 1781, the leader of a partisan corps, now in command of British regiments, used similar tactics to Blackstocks that ended in defeat with the loss of over two thirds of those he sent into battle.   

Author John Buchanan argues that the main importance of Blackstocks was the crucial wounding of General Thomas Sumter. He wrote, “The overwhelming importance of Blackstocks was not that Banastre Tareton had been defeated for the first time…nor was it the severe loss suffered by Tarleton…The platoon of the 63^rd that laid Sumter low never realized it but their deed was of the greatest benefit to the Rebel cause. Sumter would be out of action for the next two months. During those months highly significant changes took place in the command and strategy of the Southern Department, and a battle that was critical to the campaign was fought. Had the prickly Sumter remained in active command, he almost certainly would have seriously compromised if not wrecked the plans of the new commander of the Southern Department through his lack of strategic sense and his stubborn refusal to cooperate with Continental commanders.”

IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO READ MORE ON THE WAR IN THE SOUTH OR TARLETON AND SUMTER, CHECK OUT THESE RECOMMENDED BOOKS ON AMAZON

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RESOURCES

American Revolution in South Carolina. “Blackstocks”

Buchanan, John. The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas.  1997: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY.

Commager, Henry Steele & Moris, Richard B.  The Spirit of ‘Seventy-Six, The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participants. 1958: 1775: Harper Collins Press. 1995: Da Capo Press, New York, NY.

Hill, William & edited by A. S. Salley.  Colonel William Hill’s Memoir of the American Revolution. 1921: Historical Commission of South Carolina, Columbia, SC.

Purvis, Randy V.  “Major James Wemyss: Second Most Hated British Officer in the South”  2018: Journal of the American Revolution.

Rankin, Hugh F.  North Carolina in the American Revolution. 1971: University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. NC.

Sherman, William Thomas. Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 2003: Published by author, Seattle, WA.

Tarleton, Lt. Col. Banastre A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America, (1787; reprint, North Stratford, NH: Ayer Company Publishers, Inc., 1999), Chapter III, pp. 175-180:

Walter, Edgar.  Partisans and Redcoats: The Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide of the American Revolution. 2001: Harper Collins, New York, NY.