On January 17, 1777, Major General William Heath, under orders from General George Washington, took approximately 5,000 militia troops of the Hudson Valley army south to the Spuyten Duyvil at Kingsbridge, about a 15-mile trek. Washington had marched his main army into New Jersey to counter British General Howe’s threatened attack on Fort Washington and advance into New Jersey state. In just over a week’s time, Washington had rebounded from retreat and total despair, to obtaining two major victories, Trenton on December 25, 1776, and Princeton, January 3, 1777. After deciding not to attack the British stronghold and supply depot at New Brunswick, he marched his army north to winter in Morristown, New Jersey.
Immediately embroiled in what would be called the Forage War with British units stationed in New Jersey, Washington wished to open another front to the north of New York City, thereby drawing British and Hessian troops out of New Jersey to man the city’s defenses. An important goal Washington hoped General Heath was able to achieve during his operation was the capture of all the outposts and fortifications, including Fort Independence, in and around Spuyten Duyvil at Kingsbridge. This would deny British General William Howe access to the Westchester Country and the rich bounty of forage available.
Heath quickly marched his small army of militiamen through the night of January 17th and at dawn on the 18th, surprised and captured the British outposts; however, he failed to force the garrison at Fort Independence to surrender, defended by 2,000 Hessians and a few hundred Queens Rangers loyalists. Heath failure to secure enough cannon to bombard the fort, he attempted to surround and siege the fort which proved to be a dismal failure. After halfhearted skirmishes, meaningless and bungled artillery duels, and faced with cold, wet, and miserable weather conditions, by January 29th, Heath called off the assault.
But instead of retaining the outposts and the ground he secured, thereby denying the British must needed forage, he marched his force back to Tarrytown and New Rochelle. Within another week, he was back at Peekskill, NY, thirty-five miles from his enemy, in which the entire operation was called off. Washington fumed when he received news of Heath’s failure and in a three letters over three days, he lambasted Heath for his shortcomings. The result; Heath was censured and never again given a command that led men into combat.
Washington divides his army and heads to New Jersey
After White Plains, Howe gave up chasing Washington’s army and returned to New York City, focusing on the large garrison of rebels defending Fort Washington, just north of the city along the Hudson River. Washington crossed the Hudson and marched a portion of his army south into New Jersey to counter Howe’s intensions south, leaving General Lee in charge of several divisions at Peekskill, NY. This force included Heath’s division, assigned to guard the upper Hudson region and New England. While Washington was chased across New Jersey into Pennsylvania, he ordered Lee to rejoin him with a portion of the Hudson Highland army. Lee dragged his feet and when finally complying, was captured at an Inn in Basking Ridge, NJ after spending the night with a prostitute; the British cavalry unit was led by the young and upcoming dragoon, Banastre Tarleton. This left Heath in charge of the Highland forces.
Heath’s Botched Attack on Fort Independence
General Heath remained north of New York City in Westchester County during Washington’s critical victories at Trenton, December 25, 1776, and Princeton, January 3, 1777. After Princeton, Washington marched his main army to Morristown, New Jersey and into winter quarters, beginning what has been termed part of the forage war with British troops stationed in northeastern New Jersey. Washinton believed that another front north of New York City would force British General Howe to withdraw his forces out of New Jersey to defend New York City.
For this Washington chose Heath in command at Peekskill to organize a large force of three divisions of militia and march south. Washington wrote to Heath dated January 5, 1777, shortly after the Battle of Princeton; “…it has been determined in Council, that you [Heath] should move down towards New-York with a considerable force, as if you had a design upon the city; that being an object of great importance, the enemy will be reduced to the necessity of withdrawing a considerable part of their force from the Jersies, if not the whole to secure the city…” Washington suggested troops to join Heath writing, “You will retain 4,000 of the militia coming on from the New-England Governments for the expedition…”
Along with Heath were Generals Benjamin Lincoln leading Massachusetts militia, David Wooster in charge of Connecticut militia (who had been previously relieved of command in Canada), John Morin Scott (leading NY militia) and Samuel Parsons also in charge of Connecticut militia. There were several redoubts and outposts occupied by British troops just north of the city in what is today the Bronx Boro; all constructed by Washington’s forces as part of the defense of New York City. The main fortification was Fort Independence, in the Valentine’s Hill region just north of Spuyten Duyvil (river that formed the northern border of Manhattan Island) and Kings Bridge that spanned the waterway onto Manhattan.
The fort had been constructed in June, 1776. Heath knew it well as some of his division had been assigned to defend the fort. When Washington retreated towards White Plains, the fort fell into British hands. The fortification was unimpressive. Built hastily, it had four earthen walls with a few stone structures within. By January, 1777, it was defended by 2,000 Hessian soldiers; the commanding officer’s name has escaped historical records. Some accounts also place a few hundred members of Colonel Robert Rogers’ Queen’s Rangers in the garrison as documents indicate Ranger units garrisoned some of the outposts.
On the night of January 17, 1777, Heath marched three divisions towards Kingsbridge; Lincoln’s division from Tarrytown on the Albany Road, Generals Wooster and Parsons’ from New Rochelle and East Chester, and General Scott’s from below White Plains; each division had about 15 miles to reach the Kingsbridge region. Heath’s column marched with Scott’s. Between four and five thousand rebel militia marched throughout the night and just before sunrise, approached several British hillside outposts; Valentine’s Stone House, Williams’ Bridge, Van Courtland’s House, and the Negro Fort. Records indicate the Negro Fort was defended by a unit of Black Loyalists in the Queen’s Rangers under Captain Robert Cook. The British were totally surprised by the appearance of a large body of rebels and immediately evacuated with the Americans hot on their heels. Most of the British defenders made it back to Fort Independence. After securing the outposts, Heath’s forces advanced so by afternoon they were approaching Fort Independence.
Heath sent a flag to the fort and demanded the German commander surrender the fort immediately (according to Heath’s memoirs – the exact wording of the demand, though described as pompous, did not survive history). The order to surrender was refused by the garrison’s commander and Heath decided to open with artillery. He only hand two field pieces and ordered they descend the hill before the fort and begin an active fire. The Americans did not suspect the Hessians had artillery and were surprised when the garrison returned cannon fire. Since they were exposed, the rebel artillery immediately limbered their pieces and fled back up the hill. At this early stage, Heath was at a loss how to press the attack against the fort.
In the meantime, reports that the outposts were easily taken were magnified to include Fort Independence. The news reached General Washington before having received an official account from Heath. Washington was so delighted, he immediately wrote to Congress on January 22nd that included Heath’s success, penning: “I have not heard from Genl. Heath since the firing near Kingsbridge last Saturday…But the Account of his having surprised and taken Fort Independence on Friday Night last, comes so well Authenticated by different ways, that I cannot doubt it…”
This would become a point of embarrassment for Washington when later reports stated that not only was the fort not taken, but eventually, would result in Heath’s failed efforts to maintain a front to the north of the city when forced to retreat.
On the 19th, the enemy cannonade from the fort intensified and killed one American. It was determined to cut off the fort from Kingsbridge. Early the next morning on the 20th, Heath ordered that with first light on the next day, a thousand men were to pass over the frozen Spuyten Duyvil Creek. The ice was questionable; however, the weather had been very cold. But fate came into play as that night, the weather warmed and by morning, the General Officers informed Heath that it would be too hazardous to attempt crossing on the ice; the attack was called off.
Over the next couple of days, Heath rode the several nearby hills to best effectively place his small number of cannon. He focused his artillery on reserve Hessian troops and enemy artillery on the far side of the fort. This resulted in a cannonade between the two opposing forces that little or no effect. He also ordered his men to construct chandeliers and fascines in preparation for an assault on the fort. On the 23rd, Heath ordered a small detachment of troops closer to the fort to lay down small arms fire. A heated skirmish took place just before dusk near the south side of the fort. An Ensign and New York militiaman were killed with five wounded. Enemy casualties were not reported.
Heath’s memoir only states that on the 24th, the weather was excessively stormy. In fact, a cold, torrential January rain soaked the soldiers and all their supplies as few marched south with tents. The bulk of General Lincoln’s troops who faced the fort were forced to leave the immediate region and seek shelter in nearby homes and barns; some as far as Dobbs’ Ferry on the Hudson. Early in the morning on the 25th, seeing the Americans had pulled back, part of the garrison sallied from behind their shelters and reclaimed the outposts from Delancey’s Mills to Valentine’s house including driving off American pickets at the Negro Fort. At Williams’ Bridge, Heath ordered a detachment of soldiers and artillery to cross the bridge and unlimber the cannon to fire upon the enemy. After much difficulty positioning the cannon due to terrain and weather, the rebel fire smashed through stone walls that offered the Hessians some defense. This caused the King’s troops to retire back to the fort. American losses were two killed and several wounded with no report of enemy casualties.
Heath decided he could not take the fort without more fire power. He ordered a brass 24-pouder and howitzer brought up which were positioned on the 27th. As if a scene from Charlie Chaplin’s Keystone Cops, after the third shot, the 24-pounder sprang its carriage and proved useless. Insult to injury, no one brought ammunition for the Howitzer. Seemed the artificers could not find any at North-Castle and lugged the howitzer anyway – since Heath ordered it be brought down. With no hope of forcing the fort to surrender by cannonade, Heath positioned his men closer to the fort to draw the Hessians and Queens’ Rangers out from behind their defenses. The fort’s commander would have none of it and remained safely behind the fort’s walls.
By the 29th, with no hope of battering the fort to surrender and with the fortification too heavily defended for an assault, Heath and his generals were at a loss of what steps needed to be taken. It appears the weather once more took command of the situation. A severe snowstorm was developing. As recorded in Heath’s memoirs, “…when all the General Officers on the ground…were unanimously of the opinion that the troops ought to move back before the storm came on…And from first to last they were unanimously opposed to any idea of an assault or storm of the fort…” Having spent days without tents and constantly shifting along enemy lines while exposed to wintery rainy conditions that ‘soaked to the bone,’ Heath’s command was in dire straits. As the memoir stated, “…the troops were ordered as soon as it grew dark to move back, Gen. Lincoln’s division to Dobbs’ Ferry and Tarrytown, Gen. Wooster’s to New Rochelle, and Gen. Scott’s to White Plains; the guards to remain at their posts and alert, until the troops were all moved off, and to form rear guards on the several roads, following the troops…”
Aftermath of Heath’s Retreat and Washington’s Censure
A week after pulling back to their camp, Heath tried once more to make good on Washington’s hopes to create a distraction with another front to the north of the city. He sent Colonel Enos to retake the outposts. However, the British and Hessian troops were not taken by surprise and were prepared to defend their position. After this halfhearted attempt to renew a front, the operation was suspended for the rest of the winter when a suspected smallpox outbreak in the area was reported. Heath returned his forces to Peekskill and General Lincoln marched his men to New Jersey to join up with Washington’s main force outside Morristown.
In Michael Troy’s December 22, 2019 podcast, he explained that in effect Heath had partially obtained his mission goal. “The attack on Fort Independence did force General Howe to redeploy some British Regulars from North Jersey to New York. If the Americans were going to attempt an assault on New York, they would almost certainly do so from the north, where they would not be forced to cross the Hudson River in the face of the enemy. The failure to take the fort though, ended any contemplation of further attacks.”
On January 27th, Washington had not heard officially from Heath since the 24th when the Roxbury native was still outside of Fort Independence. Washington shot him a short, curt letter demanding better communications along with a copy of his January 19th letter in which Heath’s operation was originally outlined by Washington. On January 31, Washington wrote to Congress and mentioned Heath in what could be described as damage control for having originally reported the fort had been taken nine days previously “I have a Letter from Genl. Heath of the 24th Instant; he was at and near Kingsbridge with his Army, I dont find that he is likely to do more than to draw the attention of the Enemy that way and cut them off from Forage, of which they are in great want.”
On February 2nd, Washington sent another short and direct letter to Heath demanding more information: The tone may indicate Washington was suspicious as to just how poorly Heath had performed his task. The fact that Heath was using just militia reaffirmed General Washington’s dim view of the effectiveness of ‘citizen soldiers’ when facing an enemy of trained, regular soldiers.
“Dear Sir. I have not been favored with any information from you since the 24th. Ulto, Anxious for the success of the Troops under you, I wish to hear from you frequently;…” Washington received a letter from Heath later that evening penned on the 30th. He shot another letter off the next day on February 3rd; his words expressing the supreme commander’s frustration: “Dear Sir: Your two favors of the 30th last month reached me last Night. I cannot say but I was a good deal surprised and disappointed at the contents. I never was very sanguine, as to any thing more being effected than to oblige the Garrison either to Surrender or evacuate Fort Independence…as neither has been done, I wish your summons had never been sent, as I am fearful it will expose us to the ridicule of our Enemies. By falling back as far as you have done, one valuable purpose of your going down, is lost, and that is depriving the Enemy of the forage of which they are in extreme want, and collecting it for our own use.”
Heath responded to Washington’s February 3rd letter on February 6th with a litany of excuses as to what he had faced and reasons for his actions. By then it was far too late. The colloquial express – like a lead balloon – best represents how Washington treated Heath’s failure. A full reading over the three days of letters the supreme commander wrote to Heath, (Feb. 2nd – 4th) one can see his frustration building over the portly general’s handling of the entire affair and the consequences he, Washington, had to deal with. On February 4th, the ax fell heavily as Washington pulled no punches as he ripped into Heath:
“Dear Sir: This Letter is in addition to my public one of this date. It is to hint to you, and I do it with concern, that your conduct is censured…” He continued that his opinions were shared by Heath’s men and officers who were with the general on the expedition to Fort Independence. Washington continued that Heath’s actions were “fraught with too much caution, by which the Army has been disappointed, and in some degree disgraced…Your Summons [for the fort’s surrender], as you did not attempt to fulfil your threats, was not only Idle but farcical; and will not fail of turning the laugh exceedingly upon us;… Upon the whole, it appears to me from Information, that if you had pushed vigorously, upon your first going to Fort Independence that that post would have been carried;…”
John Adams expressed his anger over Heath’s actions, or lack of, to his wife Abigail on February 21st. He included two other general officers during his rant: “Many persons are extremely dissatisfied with numbers of the general officers of the highest rank…Putnam, Spencer, Heath, are thought by very few to be capable of the great commands they hold. We hear of none of their heroic deeds of arms. I wish they would all resign…”
On February 9th, Washington wrote to Heath and mentioned he had received the general’s letters (three dated 5th, 6th, and 7th). All three no doubt penned by an anxious commander cognizant of the mess he had made of affairs while attempting to explain actions in which no amount of elucidating could set to right. Washington agreed that it was time for Heath to go home to Roxbury for an extended leave and in his correspondence gave him one task: to order all Continental troops in Boston to march to General Schuyler at Fort Ticonderoga. In effect, though remaining a friend, Washington was done with Heath; to see he was never given a combat command for the rest of the war.
The Region north of Kingsbridge to Peekskill, New York, and between the Hudson River and the Long Island Sound, Westchester County, would remain a no-man’s land from 1777 until 1783 and war’s end. Both British and rebel foraging units and loyalist raiding bands called cowboys or skinners, roamed the farmland, plundering and terrorizing loyalists and patriots. Only after the British army departed New York City on November 25, 1783, did hostilities finally cease.
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Of similar interest on Revolutionary War Journal
Sources
Headley, J. T. Washington and His Generals in Two Volumes. 1850: Baker and Scribner, New York, NY.
“Heath Triangle.” New York City Dept. of Parks and Recreation.
Howe, Edward T. “Massachusetts Bay Militia Regiments, Forerunners of the Army National Guard.” New England Historical Society.
Whitman, Zachariah G. The history of the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company, <rev. and enl.> from its formation in 1637… 1842: J. H. Eastburn, Boston, MA.
Troy, Michael. “William Heath, Episode 128: Fort Independence.” December 22, 2019. American Revolution Podcast.
Casey, Thomas. “Mystery of the ‘Negro Fort.’ June 20, 2023. The Kingsbridge Historical Society.
Fitzpatrick, John C. Writings of George Washington from Original Manuscripts… Vol. 1936:United States Government Printing Office.