By Harry Schenawolf, author of the Shades of Liberty Series about African American soldiers in the American Revolution. Scholars have agreed that 18th century regular troops, the private and non-commissioned soldiers who stood firmly while massed musketry tore through their ranks, expected to be led by officers of society’s gentry. It was believed that these rank and file grunts would not follow a commander who did not come from society’s upper classes. These ‘gentlemen’ officers were mainly wealthy aristocrats with either blood-family traditions or were successful businessmen.
Though we tend to believe just the British army practiced this, the American army was not far behind in their belief that the masses needed to be led by those who proved themselves qualified not by feats on the battlefield, but (to use present-day terms) prowess in the boardroom. If you were among the ‘well-ballasted’, meaning one with deep pockets who lived a lavish lifestyle – then you were naturally considered well educated and capable of managing an impecunious peasantry. This idea of wealth giving one certain natural rights to rule over those less fortunate financially has been ingrained in mankind’s psyche for countless generations, as evidenced by the current hierarchy in political leaders. Therefore, it was mainly money, not merit, that determined the leaders of 18th century politics and the military in England and America. It is just that the British took it one step further; they sold officer commissions outright – a practice not observed in America.
First, let’s take a brief look at England’s system of selecting their military’s commissioned officers to the rank of lieutenant and higher. Like the colonists in America, the English did not trust a standing army. They feared that the ‘riffraff’ and ‘guttersnipes’ of the lowly classes might obtain power over a large company of armed men. As such, they might threaten a fiefdom of lords who ruled England since the time of William the Conqueror. By 1776, more than three quarters of England was still owned by the direct ancestors of the original Norman invaders in 1066. Therefore, to obtain a tight fist on the military, guaranteeing they were at the helm of any armed body of men, the wealthy aristocracy established a longstanding tradition of purchasing commissions. Since most of those who could afford the high prices military rank demanded were also members of parliament who wrote and enacted the laws of the land, this reaffirmed that the army remained at the command of the elite landlords.
Prices were set for each rank and when promotions through attrition and seniority became available, the officer still had to pay the going rate for the next higher rank. This was strictly adhered to with very few exceptions based on merit. Only among the regiments of artillery and the Highland battalions of Scotland was merit considered above the ability of one’s purse to advance ranks. Even though these ‘country gentlemen’ obtained their military status based on their class status, they took their role as military leaders very seriously. Many became highly skilled professional soldiers who studied war as a science and followed it as a career, advancing up the ranks to retire as major generals.
The cost of officer rank for a line regiment was very high at a time when ten pounds sterling was considered enough to sustain a farming family for a year. Five hundred pounds sterling bought a lieutenant’s commission. It took one thousand, five hundred pounds for a captain; two thousand, six hundred pounds for a major, and a lieutenant colonel had to come up with three thousand, five hundred pounds!
Cavalry and guards were even more expensive. David Fisher put it best in his text Washington’s Crossing writing that: “Later generations condemned this purchase system as organized incompetence and institutionalized corruption, but its purpose was to ensure that British officers had a stake in their society and were not dangerous to its institutions. The purchase system kept the army firmly in the hands of Britain’s governing elite, mainly its small aristocracy, who controlled much of the wealth and power in the nation. Of 102 regimental colonels in 1769, more than half came from an aristocracy of two hundred families in a nation of seven million people.”
As for the Americans, we have been taught that colonial commanders and leaders at the start of our nation gained their roles purely by merit. This was for the most part not true. When hostilities broke out with England, most of our early leaders came from well-established families who were financially well-off community leaders; men like Patrick Henry (outspoken Virginia planter), John Hancock (considered the richest man in New England who made his fortune from smuggling) and George Washington (plantation owner and among the largest slave holder of the colonies). There were few exceptions that included such out of work fanatics like Samuel Adams or passionate patriots like Dr. Joseph Warren. However, those who sat among the first and second Congress in Philadelphia were those who this day would be considered among the highest one percent financially.
Examining those who obtained the ranks of captains through general, you see a wide arrangement of lawyers, investors, merchants, bankers, shipping magnates, plantation owners and large land-owning farmers; these were men who obtained local power and respect. And with that power and respect came the offer of leading the local militia that had been established by the British to help police and protect a vast wilderness. Once war erupted, it was natural that these militia captains and colonels be granted commissions in the newly formed Continental Army – especially if any had previous experience during the French and Indian War. Even though there was no system of purchasing one’s commission, this natural graduation from militia commander to army commander retained the army’s power firmly in the hands of the local ruling class based on one’s financial status. Therefore, like England, those who were instrumental in setting and enacting laws, maintained control of the new nation’s military arm.
After an American officer obtained his commission, like England, it was by attrition and seniority in which they advanced in rank. Notably different was the fact that merit played a larger role in the American army. However, detriment to the effectiveness of the Continental army, seniority and personal, political influence often took precedent over one’s ability at leading a company or regiment of armed men. This often placed men in high command who, when confronted by a military crisis or a need to act decisively, demonstrated their incompetence with disastrous results; such as General Horatio Gates at the Battle of Camden who, at the first shots of battle, commandeered the nearest horse and tore off leaving his army far behind, and General Benjamin Lincoln at Charleston in which he fumbled his command and had to surrender an entire army, the largest in the war.
To counter this, there were examples in the American system in which merit, not money, played a major role. General Daniel Morgan, leader of Virginia riflemen and hero of the Battle of Cowpens, came from a moderate background to become one of the greatest American warriors. One thinks of Colonel Thomas Knowlton, simple Connecticut farmer, whose men held the fence at Bunker Hill, repulsing rank after rank of redcoats and whose leadership qualities was recognized among the finest in the American army; truly a tragedy when he died in combat early on in the war at Harlem Heights. And Quaker Major General Nathanael Greene, the mastermind of the war in the south which ultimately contributed to General Cornwallis’ defeat at Yorktown, who rose from private to Major General in one year based solely on his natural ability to act decisively as a true leader of men.