The American Revolution was teetering on ruin. But if you were to ask folks on the street to identify America’s darkest hour, except for the glazed looks of those who had slipped texts to their friends during high school history class, the common answer is Valley Forge, winter 1777-78. Wrong! It was four years later and the winter of 1781. January to March to be exact. And with nearly everything in shambles, from a mutinous military, failed economy, frustrated allies, and a jubilant England intent on protracting the war, rebel patriots, from Georgia to New England, were throwing up their arms in disgust and defeat while looking for the exit door.
Major events were taking place that winter that spelled doom for those seeking an independent nation free from any bond to a mother country:
- The Continental army was worn out, malnourished, ill-supplied, and had not been paid in years. Soldier mutinies threatened its very existence.
- American morale to support a war that showed no signs of ending was at its lowest point. A growing number of colonists believed that acceptance of ‘accommodations’ that did not include liberty was necessary.
- The economy was tottering on an abyss; with out-of-control interest rates and no hope of gaining credit from other nations.
- France was tired of an expensive war and seeking negotiations for a way out.
- Articles of Confederation, the glue that was to hold the United States together and give Congress the power to seek much needed revenues to progress the war, by March 1781 had still not been ratified; after four years of hand wrangling.
- In January, 1781, turncoat Benedict Arnold invaded Virginia and torched Richmond, the state’s capitol. Georgia and South Carolina were in British hands while General Charles Cornwallis prepared to invade North Carolina. And England had just received news of victories at Camden and Charleston. Britains, confident of success, voted in a Parliament that supported continuing the war.
Those who sought compromise to end the conflict had gained a voice in Congress. A peace agreement with the possibility of a fractured United States would leave New York City, western territories, plus Georgia and the Carolinas remaining colonies of England.
Continental Soldiers Mutiny
“We are bankrupt with a mutinous army,” wrote congressman James Lovell of Massachusetts to his colleague John Adams on January 2, 1781. On January 1, 1781, the 2,400-man Pennsylvania Line wintering at Jocky Hollow, New Jersey mutinied. Most had not been paid for three years’ service, only receiving the initial $20 sign on bonus. They had endured horrendous conditions in housing, food, and clothing. Most were three-year men and had considered their time in the army done as of January 1st. However, their officers understood the enlistment as for the war’s duration if the war carried on beyond three years. Pennsylvania soldiers armed themselves and decided to leave camp without permission, stating they were marching to Philadelphia to demand their back pay and end of enlistment. Officers tried to stop them with several wounded; a captain was killed.
The Pennsylvania troops carried on towards Princeton where the sergeants would form and negotiate with Pennsylvania authorities. Washington immediately favored using force to resolve the crisis, but fearful that soldiers would not fire on their comrades, he had allowed the men to leave camp. Washington was also afraid that any coercion and bloodshed through confrontation could spread to additional mutinies within the troops. He ordered General Anthony Wayne (commander of the Pennsylvania Line) to follow and only use force if the mutineers attempted to join with the British.
Joseph Reed, former secretary to Washington and Pennsylvania Council president arrived at Princeton to address the soldiers’ grievances and to seek a reasonable compromise. While talks carried on between the Pennsylvania’s rebellious sergeants and Reed, Washington was quick to get ahead of a similar attempt of mutiny at West Point. These troops had not been paid for eighteen months while subjected to the same deplorable conditions in lack of food and supplies. Washington appealed to the governors of New England and neighboring states to find the cash to provide three months back pay while rounding up food and clothing. This soothed the concerns of the Hudson army. Meanwhile the Pennsylvania Line reached an accord with Reed in which all charges were dropped and concessions granted the mutinous rank and file.
On January 20th, a copy cat mutiny occurred among approximately 300 New Jersey troops stationed at Pompton (modern day Bloomingdale), New Jersey. Like the Pennsylvania troops at jockey hollow, these troops also marched towards Trenton to air their grievances with Congress. By now Washington was done with negotiations. He believed only a quick and decisive use of force would put an end to this and future rebellions. Major General Robert Howe was dispatched by Washington to use whatever violence deemed necessary to return the troops to their camp. Howe surrounded the mutineers and demanded their surrender. Once rounded up under guard, he immediately executed two of their leaders. This had the effect Washington sought. There was no more mutinous talk among the Continental troops for the remainder of the year.
Low American Morale
In 1775, only one third of American colonists supported separation from England. A third remained loyal to the crown. And a third basically did not give a damn. The last could care less over all the politics and sword rattling. They wished to be left alone, to continue their way of life; considered the most fruitful among the world’s nations.
By 1781, loyalists throughout the colonies were driven from their homes that were confiscated and sold off. Many Tories yet remained in their communities, either under British protection or keeping a low profile, hoping that England prevailed. Of the patriots who favored a break with England, morale for a war that had stalled with ongoing hardship was at its lowest ebb. Dignitary Arthur Lee, who had spent four years in Europe along with Benjamin Franklin and Silas Dean, seeking an alliance with France and aide from Prussia and Spain, returned to America in late 1780. He was shocked by the country’s dire mood concerning the patriot cause. In 1776, he had left an ecstatic nation of firebrands that declared liberty, returning to one ready to accept a compromise that did not include independence.
General John Sullivan, New Hampshire lawyer turned soldier, who had led a division under Washington in most of the war’s major battles, by 1781 turned in his sword to sit in Congress. By then, among the delegates was a strong resurgence of ‘reconciliationists.’ Sullivan labeled these colleagues, “Timid and the neutral.” With rabble-rouser Samuel Adams calling them “our most dangerous enemies.” Not since the early days of the war had so many legislative members (federal and state) considered suing for a peace proposal to end hostilities. To take what gains accomplished and leave England to obtain the territories they had claimed; mainly New York City, Long Island, vast western lands to the Mississippi, South Carolina, and Florida. Unless a major military breakthrough occurred, it was feared Americans were ready to toss in the towel and accept a fractured nation.
American Economy on Precipice
By January of 1781, it took a wheel barrel of United States species to even consider purchasing a new draft horse. Runaway inflation consumed most of new revenue efforts by Congress and states that levied precarious levels of taxation. The citizenry smarted under new burdens to come up with the cash that pumped money into bankrupt governments. Financial choices were thrust upon leaders who could ill afford to even feed or clothe the regiments they sent into battle.
By the end of 1780, Congress had no choice but to beg France for another loan. While General Gates relinquished the southern army to General Nathanael Greene in December, 1780, Congress decided to seek 25 million livres from France, a number more than double that given in 1776. President Henry Lauren’s son, Colonel John Laurens, aide to Washington, boarded a ship to Europe in January, 1781, to propose the request, bypassing Benjamin Franklin who many in Congress considered a feeble figurehead. Richard Henry Lee of Virginia attacked Franklin in a letter to Samuel Adams writing, “How long my dear friend must the dignity, honor, and interest of these United States be sacrificed to the bad passions of that old man under the idea of his being a philosopher?”
Washington had confided in his former aide Colonel Laurens prior to his departure stating that the “patience of the army…is nearly exhausted.” He added that the “people are discontented” from relentless taxation and a war that had become deadlocked due to financial woes that arrested it from being properly waged. Laurens had an uphill battle; for France, by 1781, was considering other options for a quick end to the war.
France Weary of War
Though France was unwavering in its commitment to their new American allies, the old adage, the enemy of my enemy is my friend held true. John Adams wrote Congress from Paris in 1779, cautioning that France’s support was based on pursuing its own interests. He implied that France’s Foreign Minister, Charles Gravier, Count of Vergennes, would support the Americans only so long as the former colonies were useful to France. With the influx of bad news since British General Burgoyne’s surrender in 1777, especially throughout 1780, American diplomats and leaders were worried that France had reached the end of aid provided their ally. So too, Congress was concerned the war with England coupled with America’s financial woes, was driving France to bankruptcy.
With defeats at Camden, Charleston, and Arnold’s treason, the Dutch pulled the plug. John Adams wrote that “…no disposition [speaking of the Netherlands] to afford any assistance…[to the United States]. But the real crisis and gravest threat to the patriot cause was a proposal for a conference of Europe’s principal powers to end the American war through mediation; sponsored by Russia and Austria. By the spring of 1781, Vergennes discussed this proposal with John Adams who feared France was preparing Congress for her ally’s withdrawal from the war. The peace proposal that allowed the European mediation conference was being used as an honorable means for France’s departure. Adams, and rightfully so, was afraid that the great European powers, strained by the economic turmoil the American war had created, would push through peace terms that would allow each belligerent to keep that what they possessed at the proposed armistice.
America would be effectively enclosed by a more powerful England who would maintain Canada and much of northern New England, western territory beyond the Alleghenies, New York City and Long Island, the Carolinas, Georgia, Florida, and all its Caribbean prewar holdings. Later, it was learned that Prussia had pushed through its suggestion that France reclaim Canada while the ‘independent’ American states were reduced to just eight colonies. With that, England could, at a later period, declare war on the fractured United States and thereby reclaim all its former colonies.
Articles of Confederation in Limbo
In June of 1776, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia motioned in Congress a proposal to declare independence from England. He also included a need for foreign alliances and a constitution. A committee that included Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson was formed to draft the document to proclaim liberty. Efforts were stepped up to send delegates to Europe to seek weapons and financial assistance. And while Jefferson penned the famous Declaration of Independence charter to sever ties to England, another committee was established – that to draft a constitution; the Articles of Confederation.
The Declaration of Independence was adopted on July 4, 1776 and signatures began to be attached on August 2nd. France was already ready and willing to supply weapons of war and money to see England, their long-standing enemy, weakened. The Netherlands channeled much of this aide through their Caribbean holdings while Congressional delegates personally sought assistance from Spain, Prussia, and Austria.
But the constitution hit a snag over the power levied by states and a new federal government. States’ sovereignty, taxation, foreign duties, and commercial concerns combined to form a web of indecisiveness over what the constitution would look like. Eventually the committee was suspended while back door conversations worked out differences. Not until the defeat of British General John Burgoyne’s army at Saratoga, October 17, 1777, and the specter of America’s total victory just on the horizon, were the Articles of Confederation completed and approved; Virginia being the first state to sign on December 16, 1777 with other states beginning to affix their signatures in July, 1778.
However, the articles leaned heavily towards the rights of states over a federal government. To create an alliance of equal and independent states, the national government was left with almost no power to levy taxes and regulate commerce. By January, 1781, twelve states had ratified the constitution, but it could not take effect; unanimity was required. Maryland dragged its feet fearful of Virginia, its large and influential neighbor, who continued to press its claim to royal titles still held in western lands.
Though ratifying a constitution gave no more power to Congress than it already had, meaning it could not raise the revenue to properly protract the war and provide supplies and pay to its soldiers, it was important to sooth nervous investors, both domestic and foreign, over the dire economic situation American found itself. Congressmen and influential leaders, merchants, and state legislators, saw that having a stronger national government was important to secure victory over England and the interests of the United States at home and globally. These men who pushed for centralized authority in a national government were eventually labeled Nationalists and later Federalists.
The growing number of Nationalists were embarrassed by a ragged, underfed army that was mutinous and without the means to bring England to a final and glorious battle. During the climatic early months of 1781, they pressured Maryland to reconsider its priorities. But Virginia was the first to blink. When Benedict Arnold invaded Virginia on January 5, 1781 and later that month, torched a significant portion of Richmond, (the capital having been moved there from Williamsburg) Virginia legislatures and financial elite gave more thought to their obstinate claim to large swaths of western lands. When Cornwallis set his sights on invading Virginia to join other British forces already raiding the state, these land claims were waved and Maryland soon after signed the Articles. The Constitution took effect on March 1, 1781.
England Determined to Carry on the War
By late 1778, the war in northern America had ground to a stalemate. British citizens were tiring of the financial burden of carrying on a war that brought no clear cut victories. When word reached London of General Clinton’s successes in the American south, the mood in England shifted drastically. News of the capture of over 5,000 Continental troops at Charleston and total defeat of what remained of the American Southern army at Camden was greeted with enthusiasm. Turncoat Benedict Arnold had reported that Washington’s army had dwindled to six thousand troops who were “illy clad, badly fed, and worse paid men,” commanded by a rabble of officers of the poorest quality. Arnold added that Congress and the army were at each other’s throats, the navy ceased to exist, and the general population was “generally tired of the war.”
Cornwallis’ harsh measures dealing with South Carolina rebels buoyed Secretary of State for America, George Germain, with optimism. Cornwallis’ favorite attack mastiff, the brutal and effective Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton, became what in today’s terms would be called a ‘rock star.’ Each reported massacre of the rebellious rabble was greeted with salivated interest. Though Prime Minister Lord Frederick North’s government knew that the news from the south was tainted with inconsistences, mainly the Tory element so heavily relied on was non-existent, the ministers counted heavily on Clinton’s and Cornwallis’ major victories to gain the public’s confidence. Author John Ferling wrote that throughout the land [England], according to one Briton, hope sprang of “a sure reduction of all the Southern Colonies,” leading to a death blow to rebellion.
England’s populace was convinced that much could still be gained by protracting a war in which their troops had regained the upper hand. Therefore North’s cabinet was not pressured to negotiate, and acted coolly to any move by Europe to mediate. With a nation that consumed a false pretense of looming victory in America, North’s government, strengthened by a vote of confidence, took a stance in which “All prospect of peace is vanished, and war in its extreme will now be carried on.”
If you would like to read more on the crisis America faced throughout the war, we recommend the following books:
Of further Interest on Revolutionary War Journal
Source
Ferling, John. Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence. 2007: Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Ferreiro, Larrie D. Brothers in Arms: American Independence and the Men of France and Spain Who Saved It. 2016: Published by Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY.
McCusker, John J & Menard, Russell R. The Economy of British America. 1985: University of North Carolina Press, Chapel, NC.
Montross, Lynn. The Reluctant Rebels, the Story of the Continental Congress 1774-1789. 1950: Reprinted in 1970 by Barnes and Noble and Harper & Row Publishers, New York, NY.
Rosswurm, Steven J. Arms, Country, and Class: The Philadelphia Militia and the Lower Sort during the American Revolution. 1989: Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ.
Shachtman, Tom. How the French Saved America: Soldiers, Sailors, Diplomats, Louis XVI and the Success of a Revolution. 2016: St. Martin Press, New York, NY.
Sharp, James Roger. American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis. 1993: Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
Wood, Gordon S. Power and Liberty: Constitutionalism in the American Revolution. 2021: Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Wood, Gordon S. Radicalism of the American Revolution: 1991: Knopf with reprint Vintage Books and Random House, New York, NY.